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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 
How important are cultural differences for explaining divergent regional development and which 
cultural features are crucial to grow economically? How can we measure the effectiveness of 
development projects on a large scale and still account for project and regional specifics in order to 
derive valuable policy implications for future international collaboration? Are hotter regions particularly 
prone to adverse effects of temperature on income and to what extent is adaptation to temperature 
fluctuations relevant and feasible for them? 
Even though these three questions seem to be rather unrelated at first sight, they all contribute 
substantially to explaining regional (i.e., subnational) income differences. Naturally, their explanatory 
power for diverging regional development forms only part of a larger selection of impact factors, such 
as differences in geography, infrastructure, trade, productivity or the accumulation of physical and 
human capital, that recent literature has just started to discuss on a subnational level. On the contribution 
of culture, development aid and temperature however has not been any or a sufficiently strong focus, 
even though they exert a very distinct subnational variation and are of fundamental interest for 
politicians, (private and public) institutions and economists to make informed policy decisions. 
Consequently, we dedicate our research to understanding these three factors (culture, 
development aid and temperature), as they affect regional incomes to a substantial amount and as we are 
able to considerably contribute and extent existing knowledge and research efforts in this field. Future 
research should continue to focus on the regional level, because more heterogeneity can be captured and 
there are many other influence factors for economic development (e.g., trade, infrastructure or human 
capital) that are characterized by a distinct variation on the subnational level. 
As thoroughly and comprehensively analyzed and discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, our research 
reveals that collectivistic and obedient cultures induce lower regional growth rates which makes strong 
national institutions inevitable in order to strengthen innovative energies and other crucial factors 
associated with independent and individualistic cultures; it further gives information on crucial success 
factors of development projects, which should be initiated with relatively well-educated individuals, in 
relatively well-developed areas, and with a very clear sector-specific project setup in order to reach 
aspired targets and to create spill-over effects to other areas; and lastly it takes up the renewed interest 
in exploring the relationship between temperature and economic growth by finding that hotter regions 
are not systematically less wealthy but that they have a feasible chance to adapt to temperature 




Again, we would like to emphasize that the influences of culture, development programs and 
temperature are by far not the only aspects to explain regional development. However, we would like to 
stress their undoubted relevance for economic development, as outlined by various experimental, 
theoretical and empirical studies in the past. 
The Relevance of Culture for Economic Development 
Latest since the 1990’s, it is beyond question that culture, as a set of “customary beliefs and values 
that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation” 
(Guiso et al., 2006, p.23), plays an important role in economic development. These customary beliefs 
and values shape economic decisions, like the propensity to save or to invest, to contribute to public 
goods, the attitude towards risk, women’s participation in the labor market, fertility rates, the 
appreciation and pursuit of certain values like thrift, hard work, tolerance or trust etc., which in turn can 
explain persistent income differences across nations (e.g., Greif, 1994, Landes, 1999, etc.). As a 
prominent example, Harrison and Huntington (2000) claimed that Ghana and South Korea had very 
similar starting points in terms of income, production, and foreign aid in the 1960’s but as South Korea 
valued “thrift, investment, hard work, education, organization and discipline” (Harrison and 
Huntington, 2000, p. xiv) they went down in history as the Asian Tiger whereas Ghana’s economy 
stagnated. 
Even though many researchers have emphasized the importance of culture for economic 
development (see Fernández, 2011 or Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2013 for a review of epidemiological and 
empirical literature), they struggled to find a comprehensive measurement for the abstract concept of 
culture in order to quantify worldwide cultural distances. Instead they focused on various aspects like 
trust, social capital, individual responsibility, tolerance, creativity, informal institutions, religiosity etc. 
which they primarily analyzed on the national level (Alesina and Giuliano, 2015, Algan and Cahuc, 
2010, Barro and McCleary, 2003, Beugelsdijk et al., 2004, Bjørnskov and Méon, 2013, Chambers and 
Hamer, 2012, Chen, 2011, Davis, 2016, Dearmon and Grier, 2009, Dincer and Uslaner, 2010, Florida et 
al., 2008, Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011, 2017, Muthukrishna et al., 2020, Roth, 2009, etc.). 
One dimension of culture finds particular attention in the literature: Individualism and 
Collectivism. First mentioned by Greif (1994), who analyzed two groups of medieval traders in a game-
theoretical approach, the two terms were taken up by Hofstede (2001) who developed a measurement 
for Individualism on the country-level and conducted a number of surveys and studies in about 96 
countries. He describes Individualism as a cultural trait that awards individual accomplishments and 
encourages the individual to stand out whereas Collectivism emphasizes the embeddedness of the 
individual into a larger group, to which one is supposed to be unconditionally conform, loyal and 
respectful. Many other authors used this measure for their analyses (see e.g., Ball, 2001, Gorodnichenko 
and Roland, 2017, Kyriacou, 2016, etc.), or applied related indicators such as the values Independence 




Hofstede himself defines Individualism as “the extent to which people feel independent, as opposed to 
being interdependent as members of larger wholes” (Hofstede n.d.) and second because they reflect the 
distance to the ruling power, i.e., both independent and individualistic (obedient and collectivistic) 
cultures are characterized by a low (high) power distance. Whereas Obedience has been mainly explored 
in economic research efforts (see e.g., Harger and Hall, 2015, Tabellini, 2010), it was the psychological 
literature that dealt with the relationship between Independence and wealth (see e.g., Hofstede, 2001, 
Kitayama et al., 2010). 
Three major caveats of past studies must be mentioned when analyzing the effect of culture on 
economic growth: first, it is argued that culture might be endogenous to economic development and 
therefore their causal relationship remains ambiguous. Searching for a suitable instrument, Kashima and 
Kashima (1998) suggested to consider language patterns, such as the use of ‘I’ and ‘you’, expressing an 
individualistic cultural background, whereas Tabellini (2010) uses historical institutions and literacy 
rates, and a whole strand of literature is convinced that certain genetic information (e.g., blood types, 
historical prevalence of diseases or allele types) can isolate the exogenous variation in culture (see e.g., 
Chiao and Blizinsky, 2010, Fincher et al., 2008, Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011, 2017, Murray and 
Schaller, 2010, Nikolaev and Salahodjaev, 2017). It is argued that genetic susceptibility to infectious 
diseases leads to a more or less prudent behavior when it comes to (new) interactions with other 
individuals for economic activities and therefore the development of individualistic or collectivistic 
cultural traits. 
Second, it can be expected that culture interacts with institutional quality, and therefore separating 
their effects on economic growth remains difficult and ambiguous (see e.g., Dearmon and Grier, 2009, 
Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011, 2017, or Licht et al., 2007). Consequently, past literature is not able 
to fully capture potential mediating or substituting effects between culture and institutions, and therefore 
estimations of the ‘pure’ impact of norms and values remain controversial; 
And third, most studies have based their research on cross-country comparisons which neglects 
any within-country heterogeneity, makes it difficult to separate culture from any country-specific 
unobservables, and incorrectly assumes the existence of a unified national culture (see e.g., Bjørnskov, 
2007, Dearmon and Grier, 2009, Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011, 2017, Hofstede, 2001, Licht et al., 
2007 or Muthukrishna et al., 2020). Acknowledging the issues of cross-country analysis, a smaller 
number of studies abandons the national perspective and explores the culture-income relationship within 
countries (see e.g., Guiso et al. (2016) for Italian regions; Cui (2017) and Shi et al. (2014) for Chinese 
provinces, Dincer and Uslaner (2010) for U.S. states; Florida and Mellander (2007) for Swedish regions, 
Tabellini (2010) and Akçomak and ter Weel (2009) for European regions, or Falk et al. (2018) for a 
global set of 76 countries). 
Our research endeavor presented in Chapter 2 aims at contributing to and improving past research 




within-country heterogeneity) and therefore by estimating the effects of culture on income more 
precisely. 
The Relevance of Development Programs for Economic Development 
The effectiveness of foreign aid has been one of the most controversial topics in development 
economics. A large number of renowned authors, such as William Easterly, Jeffrey Sachs or Joseph 
Stieglitz, have not achieved an agreement on whether (past) development assistance has helped or 
harmed the poorest countries in the world. Much attention has been paid to cross-country analyses in 
order to assess the effects of aid on growth. Asteriou (2009), Fayissa and El-Kaissy (1999), Karras 
(2006) or Minoiu and Reddy (2010) follow panel approaches with five South Asian countries, with 80 
least developed countries, with 71 aid receiving countries and more than 80 developing countries, and 
find a consistent positive link between aid and long-run economic growth. In addition, they get support 
from Clemens et al. (2012), Dalgaard et al. (2004), Mekasha and Tarp (2013) and Roodman (2007) who 
re-analyzed a number of existing aid-growth studies in order to confirm and re-emphasize the positive 
effects of aid in a very controversial debate on the effectiveness of aid. On the other hand, Burnside and 
Dollar (2000, 2004), Liew et al. (2012), Malik (2008) and Rajan and Subramanian (2011) show the exact 
opposite, i.e., that developing countries (especially in Africa) were not able to benefit from large aid 
inflows (especially in environments of bad policies), but instead suffer from dependency on the money 
from donor countries, corruption and other side effects (such as currency overvaluation) of international 
aid (see also Easterly (2003) or Moyo (2010) for the adverse effects of aid on economic growth). 
Amongst the numerous efforts that evaluated the effectiveness of development aid in general, the 
analysis of water and sanitation issues as well as their effects on health have been particularly well-
discussed in the literature, as they are considered to be major contributors to poverty and social and 
economic inequalities (UNESCO (2019)). Bhalotra et al. (2017) analyze how water disinfection 
programs in Mexico can lead to a substantial improvement of mortality rates; Boone et al. (2011), Gross 
et al. (2017), Ilahi and Grimard (2000), Koolwal and van de Walle (2013) and Sorenson et al. (2011) 
examine the impact of distance to water sources on adults (women in particular) and children in 
Madagascar, Benin, Pakistan and across various developing countries; Bendavid and Bhattacharya 
(2014), Botting et al. (2010), Gopalan and Rajan (2016), Kotsadam et al. (2018) and Wayland (2017) 
find a strong correlation between aid disbursements (and proximity to aid projects) and access to safe 
water, sanitation facilities infant mortality and life expectancy across a number of recipient countries; 
whereas Duflo et al. (2015) present the successful installation of integrated water and sanitation 
improvement programs in rural India to significantly reduce diarrhea, Dwivedi et al. (2018) confirm 
Duflo’s experimental results empirically by showing that unsafe stool disposal is one of the main factors 
for under-five mortality among children in rural India; Zhang (2012) investigates the effects of water 
quality improvement programs in rural China and finds that as a consequence the incidence of related 




When it comes to the evaluation of development aid and its effectiveness, we must point to two 
shortcomings of past literature. First, many authors have focused on consolidated national aid flows and 
their effects on various poverty indicators, instead of conducting evaluations of specific agencies, such 
as the World Bank who is by far the largest financier of development aid (Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development Germany, 2019). Even though a few researchers attended to 
independently examining the activities of e.g., the World Bank, they focused on geopolitical aspects 
rather than project effectiveness (see e.g., Dreher et al., 2013; Dollar and Svensson, 2000; Kaufmann 
and Wang, 1995 or Isham and Kaufmann, 1999, etc.). 
Second, there exists a “lack of systematic studies of aid effectiveness […] below the country-
level” (Kotsadam et al., 2018, p.59). Field research and experiments, can help to fill this knowledge gap 
as they are able to take all project-specific circumstances into account and therefore can guide policy 
interventions appropriately. Most prominent representatives are Randomized Control Trials (RCT), 
emphasized by Banerjee and Duflo (2012), that randomly allocate individuals to a treatment (e.g., a 
development intervention) and a non-treatment group and that compare the respective effects on both 
treated and non-treated individuals. While this approach is able to reveal causal relationships and to 
make a point on the effectiveness of treatments, RCTs are not suitable for (ex post) evaluating 
development projects on a larger scale as they are very expensive and work-intensive. In addition, they 
have limited external validity, i.e., what works well in one environment does not need to work in another. 
As a solution, quasi-experimental approaches to assess the effects of aid on subnational development 
through the use of geocoded aid data, have recently been introduced to the literature. Although these 
approaches lack several advantages of field research, they also base their findings on statistically 
comparing the effect of a treatment on treated and non-treated individuals and on controlling for a large 
number of unobserved factors that potentially distorted previous results. In contrast to RCTs, this is 
possible for a large number of individuals irrespective of geographic location, political borders, number 
or type of treatments, etc. Prominent examples for this new approach are Kotsadam et al. (2018), 
Odokonyero et al. (2018), Marty et al. (2017), and De and Becker (2015) who find that geographical 
proximity to active health aid reduces infant mortality in Nigeria, productivity losses due to diseases in 
Uganda and Malaria prevalence, disease severity and diarrhea incidences in Malawi. 
Our research presented in Chapter 3 takes up this geocode-based evaluation approach, which 
includes the benefits of experiment-based evaluations of development projects, but significantly extend 
it by considering the effects of development projects on worldwide individuals. 
The Relevance of Temperature for Economic Development 
Is temperature central to understanding economic development and to explaining persistent 
differences in income? On one hand, after a comprehensive historical review, Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2012) conclude that neither geography (such as temperature, climate, resources, etc.) nor culture 




development. Instead, it is the lack of inclusive political and economic institutions that hindered 
necessary investments, an accountable and responsive government, an efficient allocation of resources, 
the incentivization and remuneration of innovations, and the broad-based participation of individuals in 
economic opportunities and education. Therefore, many African nations did not fail to catch up because 
they suffer from hot temperatures and its consequences (e.g., tropical diseases, lower human 
productivity, agricultural losses, etc.) but because they were unable to install the right set of institutions. 
On the other hand, there are various other researcher who are convinced that hotter temperatures 
are in fact leading to systematically weaker economic performances. Their major assumptions behind 
this hypothesis, pointed out by authors such as Easterly and Levine (2003), Gallup et al. (1999, 2001), 
Field (1992), Mendelsohn et al. (2001) or Wyon et al. (2020), comprise the negative effect of 
temperature on agricultural production, especially through water scarcity or plant infestations, on human 
productivity and labor performance (already Montesquieu argued that “the excess of heat enervates the 
body, and renders men so slothful and dispirited” (Montesquieu, 1750, p.343)), on crime and social 
unrest, on the prevalence of tropical diseases and its vectors (Malaria, Ebola, Dengue fever, etc.), which 
leads to an increase in days of absence from work or school, and on the historical emergency of inclusive 
and high-quality economic and political institutions as European settlements were discouraged (due to 
difficult agricultural production, diseases, etc.). 
In contrast to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), the cross-country literature agrees almost with one 
voice upon this clear negative relationship between temperature and economic output, but with a large 
span in their quantitative findings (see Carleton and Hsiang, 2016, Dell et al., 2014, Fankhauser, 1994, 
or Hsiang, 2016 for a detailed overview on climate-economy literature, methods and data). For a large 
number of country samples across the world, renowned authors such as Dell et al. (2009), Hsiang (2010), 
Burke et al. (2015, 2018), Lanzafame (2014) or Schlenker and Lobell (2010) predict a drop in economic 
income of between 8.5% and 25%, a 2.5% drop in industrial production, and a drop of 8% to 22% drop 
in agricultural output (depending on the prevailing crop production) with every degree increase in 
national average temperature. 
Nevertheless, various authors point to the fact, that the previously found negative effect of 
temperature on economic output is not universally valid, but that at least three restrictions have to be 
considered when analyzing this relationship. 
First, subsequent research from Burke et al. (2015, 2018), Deryugina and Hsiang (2014), 
Nordhaus (2006) or Zhao et al. (2018) provide evidence that the relationship between temperature and 
economic performance (in terms of labor supply and productivity or crop yields) might not be linear, 
i.e., that increases in temperature can be beneficial or at least non-harmful when they occur at the lower 
end of the temperature scale. Mentioned authors place this threshold for decreasing productivity beyond 




Second, wealthy populations might be unaffected by temperature, whereas poor countries are 
particularly prone to its adverse effects on economic performance. Dell et al. (2012) for instance show 
a 1.3 percentage points drop in growth per 1 degree rise in temperature in poor countries, due to negative 
effects on agricultural and industrial output and political stability. This is in accordance with Moore and 
Diaz (2015) and Zhao et al. (2018) who also find that the adverse effects of temperature on economic 
performance are more relevant for the poorer parts of the world. Despite a high correlation of low income 
countries and agricultural production or the prevalence of tropical diseases, authors such as Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2012) argue that it is mainly their (institutional) inability to adapt to climate change and 
in particular increases in temperature. Dell et al. (2009) predict that at least half of the negative impact 
of temperature on income is eliminated through adaptation in the long-run. And also Carleton and Hsiang 
(2016) describe persisting adaptation gaps across countries that are responsible for the fact that current 
climate conditions still have an important impact on shaping modern societies. 
Third, aggregation to the country-level might not be sufficient to capture the effect of temperature 
on income, as we observe large within-country temperature differences of more than 20 degrees (e.g., 
United States, China, India, Russia or Canada) and consequently also a large spread between subnational 
incomes. Several recent studies account for within-country heterogeneity, by re-assessing the effect of 
temperature, measured on region-, county- or grid-cell-level, on subnational economic activity. 
Predictions for the decrease in economic income range between 0.15 and 3% (Dell et al., 2009, 
Deryugina and Hsiang, 2014, Nordhaus, 2006) for every one degree increase in temperature, which is 
substantially lower than evidence from the cross-country literature. 
With our analysis in Chapter 4, we allow for more nuanced insights into the temperature-income 
discussion by exploring the temperature-income relationship for a large number of world-wide 
subnational regions. 
1.2 FOCUSING ON REGIONS: MOTIVATION AND RESEARCH POTENTIAL 
Throughout the last decades research in the field of development economics has been strongly 
characterized by cross-country studies i.e., the comparison of nationally aggregated or nationally tracked 
variables across two or more countries. Prominent representatives focused on the exploration of 
differences in national endowments regarding institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2001, Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2012 or Knack and Keefer, 1995), geography (Bloom and Sachs, 1998, Easterly and Levine, 
2003 or Gallup et al., 1999), foreign direct investments and trade (Alesina et al., 2000 or 
Balasubramanyam et al., 1996), political stability and good governance (Alesina et al., 1996 or 
Kaufmann and Kraay, 2011), public expenditure and infrastructure (Aschauer, 1989, Devarajan et al., 
1996 or Easterly and Rebelo, 1993) and human capital (Barro, 1991 or Castelló and Doménech, 2002). 




illustrates that research in the field of development economics (and others) has long been relying on the 
comparison of countries when analyzing determinants of growth or persistent income differences. 
While it is reasonable to cross-nationally compare variables that are collated by national statistical 
offices (because they are of particular interest for national governments), it is less plausible for variables 
that are characterized by a strong subnational variation. Results from Easterly et al. (2016) suggest that 
many of the determinants of long-run growth are influenced by the variation of institutions, history, 
geography or culture on the subnational (or supra-national) level. They also state that researchers and 
policy makers overstated the importance of the national state for long-run economic growth, as at least 
half of the variation in growth happens at the supra- or subnational level. In addition, Levine and Zervos 
(1993) state that national indicators are often measured inconsistently and inaccurately and therefore it 
seems erroneous to include a random number of (very different) countries into the same regression 
analysis. This is particularly fatal as national external shocks may have substantially influenced 
economic activity, but are not accounted for when averaging the effects over a large number of countries 
and over several decades. Other methodological, conceptual and statistical problems include causality 
issues, aggregation of data and the derivation of reliable inferences from regression coefficients (see 
Levine and Renelt, 1991). 
This critique is in accordance with a growing strand of literature addressing the relationship 
between subnational factors and economic outcomes: Acemoglu and Dell (2010) propose differences in 
productive efficiency attributed to local institutions and policies; Tabellini (2010) finds a causal effect 
between regional traits of culture on European economic income; Putterman and Weil (2010) stress the 
importance of subnational migration flows, as early settlements influenced agricultural cultivation and 
emergency of organized states; Dell et al. (2009) explores the negative relationship between temperature 
and subnational incomes in the Americas; Gennaioli et al. (2013) points to the crucial importance of 
human capital in accounting for worldwide regional income differences; Mitton (2016) finds high 
explanatory power of geographical (e.g., ocean access or natural resources) and institutional factors for 
subnational per capita income; and Henderson et al. (2017) analyzes the role of trade (among others) for 
the subnational distribution of worldwide income. Again, this selection constitutes only a small extract 
of studies that deal with influence factors for regional economic development. Nevertheless, only few 
attempts consider worldwide regions, but instead focus on within-country (e.g., China or the United 
States) or within-region (e.g., European Union) comparisons. 
Exploring and comparing subnational differences when explaining diverging economic 
performances bears several advantages and avoids conceptual and methodological problems of cross-
country studies: first, technological or institutional history, which clearly determines today’s 
development outcomes, does not necessarily correspond with current national borders. The sovereign 
territory of many countries has changed significantly throughout the centuries due to wars, colonial rules 




Alesina et al. (2011) find that the presence of artificial borders (e.g., drawn by colonial masters or war 
profiteers) are correlated with several measures of political and economic success. Second, looking at 
the subnational level, we can re‐run standard cross‐country regressions but include country fixed‐effects 
which are holding constant anything that is unique for a specific country such as institutions, policies, 
history, etc. Thereby, we not only exploit subnational heterogeneity but also account for any country-
specific unobservables that might be relevant for the research objective and mitigate the risk of omitted 
variable bias. There is a third side effect that comes from analyzing the development of subnational 
regions. Through restraining from artificially aggregating variables that are characterized by a strong 
subnational variation to the country-level, we are much closer to capturing the actual state of welfare of 
the individual and therefore to approaching an important epistemological target of development 
economics. 
In this thesis, we focus on three relevant impact factors of economic development as we believe 
they would strongly benefit from a re-evaluation from a regional perspective due to their pronounced 
national variation: culture, development aid and temperature. 
The Influence of the Cultural Values Independence and Obedience on Regional Incomes 
Culture matters for economic development. A large strand of research finds strong empirical 
evidence for this statement by comparing culture and economic development across countries (see e.g., 
Bjørnskov, 2007, Dearmon and Grier, 2009, Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011, 2017, Hofstede, 2001 
or Licht et al., 2007). Considerations to take up this well-discussed culture-income relationship and re-
analyze it on the regional level, are based on the concern that culture can hardly be unified across an 
entire nation. Countries are often subject to migration, arbitrary drawing of boundaries (colonial history), 
different cultural influences from adjacent states, shifting national boundaries after wars (East and West 
Germany), etc., and therefore we must assume that we are dealing with a subnational mélange of 
different cultures or simply with heterogeneity among individuals rather than with one unified national 
culture. This in turn, can explain why regional differences in economic growth continue to exist, despite 
the presence of nationally unified institutions, legal and education systems, administrations, etc. 
A very prominently discussed example is the divergent economic development in Northern and 
Southern Italy. Authors such as Banfield (1958) and Putnam (1994) trace differences in civic, social and 
economic behavior back to distant historical and traditional backgrounds. This is in line with Ichino and 
Maggi (1999) who find a significantly higher prevalence of shirking (i.e., absenteeism and misconduct) 
at the Southern branches of a large Italian bank. The authors attribute this behavioral difference to 
individual backgrounds that are typical for Italians born and raised in the Mezzogiorno. Comparing these 
observations with actual data from the World Value Survey, the largest survey-based research project 
on values and beliefs, we discover that there is indeed a huge gap between cultural values and beliefs of 
individuals living in Northern and Southern Italy between 1980 and 2010: people from the North place 




Obedience; they are also 55% more trusting than the people from Southern Italy. Even though this is 
just a small extract of a whole range of values and culture can certainly not fully explain a per capita 
income gap of 63%, it seems inappropriate to ignore or neglect these regional differences when 
explaining diverging economic development in Italy. 
In Chapter 2 we present our attempt to account for regional differences in the cultural values 
Independence and Obedience, but go well beyond the 20 regions of Italy. We compare a set of 1,204 
(subnational) regions across the world and estimate to what extent cultural differences can explain 
diverging regional economic development when other regional (population, religious shares, education, 
geographic characteristics, etc.) and national (institutions and country-specific unobservables) influence 
factors are accounted for. Herewith, we not only conduct a comprehensive and much more granular 
analysis of the culture-income relationship, but also provide a solid starting point for future research that 
aims at analyzing other cultural aspects on the regional level. 
Evaluating Water- and Health-Related Development Projects 
Our motivation to re-analyze the effectiveness of development aid on a subnational level follows 
two main considerations: first, funds allocated to development aid have reached remarkable levels. The 
World Bank alone has dedicated around 269 billion USD to 2,681 projects in 17,555 locations in 132 
countries (World Bank Maps, 2020). It is no wonder that assessing the effectiveness of foreign aid has 
been in focus of numerous research efforts in the past. Nevertheless, they have failed to come to an 
agreement on whether foreign aid is ultimately helpful to tackle the world’s most pressing issues, such 
as poverty, malnutrition, infant mortality, etc. A serious shortcoming to past evaluation attempts has 
been that they are based on nationally aggregated aid flows, which cannot be adequate to evaluate the 
effect of development projects on the living situation of individuals spread over an entire country. For 
instance, browsing the map of World Bank projects in Nigeria (World Bank Maps, 2020), it appears that 
Nigeria has a relatively high density of projects (between 200 and 249 active and closed projects) 
compared with other African countries. However, having a closer look at the subnational allocation of 
projects, it emerges that there is only one region (Kaduna state) that is characterized by a large number 
of projects (approximately 53 to 66 projects), whereas in almost all other states on average only 13-26 
projects were conducted. Making generalized points on the effectiveness of World Bank projects in 
Nigeria does certainly not capture the fact that only few people had frequent and extensive access to the 
Bank’s services whereas others had no or much fewer exposure. 
Second, it is crucially important to account for regional specifics as they can capture the rationale 
behind the subnational allocation (or accumulation) of projects. As pointed out by Alesina and Dollar 
(2000) foreign aid “is dictated as much by political and strategic considerations, as by the economic 
needs and policy performance of the recipients” (Alesina and Dollar, 2000, p.33). We know from 
subnational allocation procedures of e.g., the World Bank that regional projects are planned by the 




make need-based decisions but also might be distracted by public and private interests, by ease of 
implementation and accessibility (good infrastructure or good experiences with past projects in a certain 
area) etc. Therefore, evaluating development aid on a national level and across countries and not account 
for subnational specifics (including allocation considerations), cannot paint a proper picture of its 
effectiveness. 
Not only do we extend past cross-country research on aid effectiveness with our analysis from 
Chapter 3 with a new subnational perspective and the employment of subnational fixed effects. But also 
we present a new micro(/individual)-based approach to evaluate projects on a very large scale, that can 
easily be extended to any development agency, aid sector or target group, and that captures many 
advantages of experimental studies but in addition is inexpensive and externally valid. 
The Link between Regional Temperature and Regional Incomes 
There is a large strand of cross-country literature, aiming at explaining differences in income with 
differences in temperature, that finds a convincing evidence for a negative relationship. This is in line 
with very recent discussions on the harmful consequences of rises in temperature for the global economy. 
Researchers across the globe are searching for the right temperature thresholds in order to specify policy 
targets and to contain negative effects for worldwide economic activities. 
Our main motivation for re-analyzing the temperature-growth relationship lies in extending the 
national evidence for the role of temperature on income from a new perspective. We follow Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2012)’s reasoning and hypothesize that average national temperature is indeed not 
sufficient for explaining differences in national income. However, observing a large spread of 
temperatures within countries, we would like to re-assess whether regional temperature differences 
might bridge the gap between findings of past research on the temperature-income relationship. 
Whereas the national level seems to be a reasonable aggregation unit for tracking economic 
variables, it is certainly not adequate to capture large variations in temperature or other climatic 
indicators. Nordhaus clearly states that “for many countries, averages of most geographic variables 
(such as temperature or distance from seacoast) cover such a huge area that they are virtually 
meaningless” (Nordhaus, 2006, p.3511). For instance, within-country temperature differences in the 
year 2010 lay at 27 degrees in the United States, 26 degrees in India, 24 degrees in Russia or China and 
20 degrees in Canada, whereas their average national temperature (11, 23, 2, 11 and -1 degree, 
respectively) completely neglects this strong variation. A preliminary deep-dive and comparison of the 
United States and Canada, two neighboring countries on the same continent with comparable national 
per capita income, reveals that the richest region in Canada and the second richest region in the U.S., 
both with per capita income of 56.000 USD, had average temperatures of -14 degrees and +13 degrees. 
Despite the same regional income level, this span of 27 degrees is more than twice the span between 




temperature is indeed neglectable for explaining income differences. Obviously, a much larger 
comparison is needed in order to make valuable conclusions but the example clarifies that analyzing 
temperature on the subnational level paints a much more precise picture of the relationship between 
temperature and income. 
We are convinced that our analysis presented in Chapter 4 constitutes as valuable extension to 
past research as it systematically accounts for this regional heterogeneity for a large set of regions. In 
addition, it addresses various nuances of the temperature-income relationship, such as non-linearity or 
the particular consequences for poor countries, that have been highlighted by past literature. 
1.3 NON-TECHNICAL OVERVIEW 
How important are cultural differences for explaining divergent regional development and which 
cultural features are crucial to grow economically? How can we measure the effectiveness of 
development projects on a large scale and still account for project and regional specifics in order to 
derive valuable policy implications for future international collaboration? Are hotter regions particularly 
prone to adverse effects of temperature on income and to what extent is adaptation to temperature 
fluctuations relevant and feasible for them? These leading questions will be analyzed in a technical and 
detailed manner in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 and form part of better understanding regional incomes and 
growth differences. Here, we provide a non-technical overview with basic concepts and methodologies, 
research ideas and main results in the following. 
The Influence of the Cultural Values Independence and Obedience on Regional Incomes1 
The idea that culture is one of the driving forces behind economic development goes back to at 
least Max Weber (around 1900) who saw a close relationship between the protestant ethic and the 
emergence of capitalism. Since then economists were eager to uncover the dynamics behind cultural 
imprints and economic behavior such as the propensity to save, to invest, to innovate, to give to charity, 
to contribute to public goods etc. However, given that many countries experienced displacements of 
national borders (e.g., separation and reunion of West and East Germany, collapse of the USSR and 
formation of Modern Russia), drawing of artificial colonial or postwar borders (e.g., former African 
colonies) or large migration flows (e.g., United States and Canada), we must assume that a unified 
national culture does not exist and that all existing countries are multinational and multicultural states. 
Through a more granular geographical focus, we directly connect to very recent research on the 
psychological traits of individuals across countries (e.g., Muthukrishna et al., 2020) but extend the 
argument to the subnational level, where empirical evidence is still scare. 
 




In Chapter 2, we revisit the culture-income discussion from a regional (subnational) perspective. 
In order to capture the crucial cultural traits, that matter most for economic growth, we get orientation 
from past research endeavors, initiated by Hofstede (2001) and then followed by a large number of 
authors, that focused on the following two opposing cultural characteristics: Individualism, linked to 
personal independence and accomplishments, to discoveries and innovation, and therefore considered 
as a positive driver of economic development; and Collectivism, characterized by a strong embeddedness 
into a group of individuals, by loyalty and obedience to existing hierarchies, and tendentially negatively 
related to economic development. Findings of previous literature are based on cross-country evidence, 
which methodologically assumes the existence of a unified national culture and therefore encounters 
issues of omitted variable bias and endogeneity. Can we confirm the previously found positive (negative) 
link between individualistic and independent (collectivistic and obedient) cultural characteristics and 
economic development, if we account for existing subnational cultural differences and separate them 
from various country- and time-specific factors (such as national institutions)? 
In an extensive effort, we combine regional economic data on per capita income with information 
on regional cultural preferences from the World and European Value Surveys, which give information 
on the importance of Independence and Obedience (derived from mentioned qualities that parents like 
to teach their children). Both culture-specific factors mattered for explaining national differences in 
economic growth and capture core concepts of commonly used measures for culture in the cross-country 
literature (i.e., Individualism and Collectivism). Adding various geographic, religious, educational and 
institutional variables, we were able to create a comprehensive dataset that describes important 
characteristics of 1,204 regions from 66 countries between 1980 and 2010. We employ a conventional 
empirical regression control approach that predicts regional per capita income from regional cultural 
differences. Through the application of fixed effects we are able to account for any country and time-
specific heterogeneity. 
In fact, our results provide strong support for the findings of cross-country studies and reveal a 
very consistent and robust positive (negative) link between Independence (Obedience) and regional 
incomes. In addition, our results are much more precise as our data allows us to exploit within-country-
year variation, to separate the effects of regional culture from national institutions, to mitigate previous 
issues of omitted variable bias by including a large number of control variables and to introduce a 
regional instrument to further tackle endogeneity/causality problems. A large array of baseline and 
robustness tests can be summarized into the following three conclusions: 
• In a stringent empirical setting, with country-time fixed effects and a large number of control 
variables, a 10-percentage point increase in the regional appreciation of the value Independence 
(Obedience) leads to a 1.4% increase (1.2% decrease) of regional per capita income. This effect and 
roughly also its magnitude stays constant, even if we exclude regions with a relatively low number of 




restrict our geographical focus to continents, OECD countries, Eurostat countries, regions with a 
Christian majority, etc.; 
• In the presence of strong national institutions (proxied by Government Effectiveness, Rule of 
Law and Absence of Corruption) the positive (negative) influence of Independence (Obedience) is 
weakened. This is indicative for a strong moderating power of national institutions, which can act as 
substitutes for regional culture, especially in centralized state systems (characterized by a lack of 
decentralized institutions common in federal state systems); 
• Despite the inclusion of an empirical instrument, reflecting the genetic distance to the United 
Kingdom (leading the country list of very individualistic nations), we cannot rule out reversed causality 
between regional culture and regional incomes. Even though endogeneity tests suggest that our 
instrument is somehow valid, we end up with mostly insignificant results. 
Evaluating Water- and Health-Related Development Projects2 
According to the OECD (2019) Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the 30 members 
of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) accounted for 153 billion USD in 2018, which 
constitutes around 0.31% of their combined gross national income. Given this magnitude, it is no wonder 
that a still growing strand of literature is interested in its effectiveness. But neither macro-level studies 
(most of them national or cross-country) nor micro-based approaches, most popular representatives have 
been Randomized Control Trials (RCT) emphasized by Banerjee and Duflo (2012), fail to agree on 
whether development aid is serving its ultimate purposes. Particular interest lies in the effectiveness of 
investments in Water, Sanitation and Health (WASH), as these factors are considered to be main 
determinants of decreasing mortality rates and global inequality (Jeuland et al., 2013). 
Is there a way to measure the effectiveness of development projects in the WASH sector without 
aggregating its effects to the national level but finding consistent results for a large data basis that are 
able to give valuable policy implications? Our major contribution lies in presenting a geocode-based 
approach, which is able to ex-post measure the effects of development projects on worldwide 
individuals. We believe to have found a suitable but inexpensive approach that can be replicated for an 
infinite number of projects (independent of their sector and institution). Thereby, we can bring 
observational data very close to an experimental design, but simultaneously compare a large number of 
projects, which enables us to replicate existing studies, re-evaluate their findings and give a more 
consistent answer to the question on whether development aid is effective or not. 
In order to illustrate our approach, we consider geocoded worldwide development projects from 
the World Bank and combine them with likewise geocoded information on the quality of drinking water, 
the time to get to the closest drinking water source, the quality of toilet facilities and the number of 
 
2 A modified version of this chapter is currently revised for the Journal of Development Studies (July 2020). It is also available 




deceased children from close to two million individuals (originating from Demographic and Health 
Surveys (DHS)). Individuals are aggregated to the cluster-level which is a very small subnational 
geographical unit. We employ a conventional regression control approach with fixed effects estimation 
techniques in order to account for cluster- and time-specific heterogeneity. In the intention to compare 
individual quality of living with and without the World Bank being present (treatment vs. control group), 
we come very close to an experimental research design. 
The analysis reveals a significantly positive impact of the World Bank on our four water- and 
health-related indicators for live quality. Depending on the model specification (we conduct a large 
number of tests with data and methodological refinements) we observe that the mere presence of the 
World Bank results in: 
• a one to six minutes reduction in time that the average individual in a cluster needs to spend in 
order to reach the next drinking water source. In addition, results suggest that the highest reduction is 
realized within the first (couple of) World Bank project(s) and can only be replicated to a smaller extend 
by follow-up projects. We find an even stronger reduction if the target sector of the specific World Bank 
project lies in the field of water and sanitation and if the average individual is relatively well-educated 
and living in a low-income country; 
• a one to 14 percent improvement of the quality of drinking water, which seems to be dependent 
on the continuous presence and maintenance of the World Bank. Its measures seem to particularly work 
well in clusters with a relatively high development state (approximated by nightlight intensity). Same 
holds for the quality of toilet facilities, which are improved by between two and 12% if individuals have 
access to ongoing World Bank projects (and situated in a relatively high developed cluster); 
• a significant reduction of the number of deceased children between 0.01 and 0.13, which is 
particularly strong in a setting where we look at water-related projects only. This potentially leads to the 
conclusion that water-related (deadly) illnesses such as diarrhea can be reduced by World Bank 
activities. Results suggest that a constant presence of the World Bank is beneficial for the preservation 
of this improvement. 
The Link between Regional Temperature and Regional Incomes3 
A large body of cross-country research agrees upon the negative effect that higher temperatures 
exert on economic performance. Dell et al. (2009) for instance, predict a 8.5% drop in national income 
with every degree increase in temperature for the year 2000. Burke et al. (2015, 2018) go well beyond 
Dell’s prediction and estimate a decrease in global income by about 15-25% until 2100 if targets of 
global warming are not reached. If higher temperatures are indeed responsible for lower economic 
growth, how can these forecasts relate to exceptionally hot regions such as Abu Dhabi in the United 
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Arab Emirates or the Northern Territory in Australia that are also among the richest regions in the world? 
Is it necessary to analyze the temperature-income relationship on the subnational level in order to derive 
convincing results that are so urgently needed in today’s climate debate? 
Considering the spread of temperature and income within countries (e.g., average temperature of 
Russian regions ranges between -13 and +11 degrees, whereas average annual per capita income ranges 
between 2,000 and 50,000 USD) we believe it is inevitable to take the debate on the effects of 
temperature on income to the regional level (or even beyond). In Chapter 4 we present the comparison 
of several thousand subnational units and consequently explore this regional heterogeneity, which the 
cross-country literature was unable to account for. Not only do we present results for the effect of 
regional temperature on four different measures for regional per capita income, but we do also reduce 
the risk of omitted variable bias by accounting for any (potentially unobservable) country specifics. In 
addition, we re-analyze the assumption that the relation between temperature and income is non-linear 
(i.e., that a certain increase of temperature can also be beneficial) and that the negative effect of higher 
temperatures is particularly severe in poorer areas, as they fail to adapt adequately. 
We explore the relationship between income and temperature on the subnational level by 
employing data from two distinct data sources. Gennaioli et al. (2014) collected data from national and 
regional statistical offices and created a dataset that contains economic (e.g., regional per capita GDP) 
as well as geographical variables (e.g., average regional temperature between 1950 and 2000) for 1,542 
states and provinces spread across 83 countries. Due to the fact that Gennaioli et al. (2014) data lacks 
regional information from Africa, we create two cross-sections from all available Demographic and 
Health Surveys for the years 2005 and 2015. All surveys provide cluster-specific (i.e., between 14,130 
and 15,533 small geographical units) information for e.g., temperature, precipitation or frost days, 
whereas only the year 2005 and 2015 contain data on gross cell production and nightlights, respectively, 
which we use to approximate subnational per capita income. In a standard Ordinary Least Square 
regression framework, we estimate the effect of temperature on four different measures for regional per 
capita income, regional per capita GDP, regional growth of per capita GDP, cluster nightlights and 
cluster gross cell production. 
Even though correlations between regional temperature and (proxies for) regional incomes 
indicate a clear negative effect, empirical results suggest the absence of any systematic link between 
them. This implies that, in contrast to the cross-country literature, we cannot confirm that regions (within 
a country) are per se wealthier (poorer) only because they are colder (hotter). In more detail, our results 
show that 
• there is hardly any link between average temperature between 1950 and 2000 and regional per 
capita GDP, as coefficients tend to be insignificant (only one very parsimonious empirical setting reveals 




poorer regions or regions with a low educational standard experience a particularly pronounced 
disadvantage from higher temperatures; 
• nightlights in 2015 are 18-40% higher if the average temperature in a cluster increases by one 
degree; this positive effect is more pronounced in summer than in winter, whereas strong temperature 
fluctuations are generally harmful; findings tend to be less distinct in relatively poor clusters (i.e., below 
average nightlights); 
• temperature is rather unimportant for the regional growth of per capita GDP and gross cell 
production as related specifications reveal particularly ambiguous results; 
• for all measures of income we find no clear indication for a non-linear relation with temperature. 
1.4 NOTES TO THE READER 
This doctoral thesis presents three different research efforts to explain divergent regional 
economic development. The design of this book is to contribute to the broader discussions on the 
influence of culture, development aid and temperature on subnational development. Even though, all 
three empirical studies have the regional perspective as common theme they are designed as standalone 
article-like papers. Modified versions of the papers, that form the basis of Chapters 2-4, have been 
presented at both local and international conferences. In addition, Chapter 2 (‘The Influence of the 
Cultural Values Independence and Obedience on Regional Incomes: Econometric Evidence’) was 
published at Papers in Regional Science in March 20194. Chapter 3 (‘Evaluating water- and health-
related development projects: A cross-project and micro-based approach’) was published at the Journal 
of Development Studies in December 20205. An earlier version is available as an AidData Working 
Paper published in 20206. Finally, a modified version of Chapter 4 (‘The Link between Regional 
Temperature and Regional Incomes: Econometric Evidence with Sub-National Data’) is now accepted 
for publication in a special issue of Economic Policy on the economics of climate change (expected 
publication date in April 2021). An earlier working paper is available at CREMA since April 20207. 
The above mentioned chapters in this book include additional material and are more extensive than their 
respective candidates that are already published. 
  
 
4 Greßer, Christina, and David Stadelmann. 2019. ‘The Influence of the Cultural Values Independence and Obedience on 
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Project and Micro-Based Approach.” The Journal of Development Studies 0 (0): 1–19. 
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CHAPTER 2 THE INFLUENCE OF THE CULTURAL VALUES INDEPENDENCE AND 





Employing subnational panel data for 1,204 regions from 1980 to 2010, we show that 
regional appreciation of the cultural value Independence has a positive and statistically significant 
association with regional per capita income, whereas the value Obedience exerts a negative effect. 
Our data allow us to exploit within-country-year variation by including country-time fixed effects 
to mitigate issues of omitted variable bias which are usually present when analyzing cross-
national data. A large array of robustness tests supports an effect of cultural values on regional 
per capita income. Interacting regional culture with national institutions reveals that stronger 
national institutions moderate the impact of the regional cultural values. 
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Culture is commonly regarded as customary beliefs and values that societies transmit from 
generation to generation (see e.g., Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011, 2017, Greif, 1994, Landes, 1999, 
Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2013 for a review). Particularly, the cultural values independence and 
individualism have been linked to increases in income per capita across countries. Such values put 
emphasis on personal freedom and achievement. Conversely, cultural values related to obedience, 
collectivism or conformity to a group seem to be, if anything, negatively related to economic 
development (see e.g., Alesina and Giuliano, 2015, Fernandez, 2011, Hofstede, 2001). To gauge the 
relationship between culture and economic development, researchers have largely been constrained to 
data at the national level. This raises the difficulty of separating culture from unobservable country-
specific characteristics, such as political institutions or history (see e.g., Dearmon and Grier, 2009, Licht 
et al., 2007). 
We contribute to the existing literature by investigating the link between culture and income per 
capita at the regional (i.e., subnational) level instead of analyzing the cross-country (i.e., national) level. 
In particular, we analyze the regional representation of the cultural values Independence and Obedience, 
which have been shown to matter in the cross-country literature, to explain regional income differences 
(see e.g., Harger and Hall, 2015, Hofstede, 1984, Kitayama et al., 2010, Tabellini, 2010)9. Independence 
and Obedience capture concepts of culture and serve as relevant proxies to connect to previous research 
efforts and to extend the literature from the national to the regional level. Gathering regional cultural 
data for 1,204 regions in 66 countries and merging this data to existing information on regional incomes 
(subnational GDP per capita) for the period between 1980 and 2010 allows us to account for country-
time specific unobservables with fixed effects when investigating the relationship between culture and 
economic development, i.e., we can account for anything that is unique for a specific nation and time 
period (e.g., Spain in 2000). The panel structure of our dataset even allows us to account for region-
specific fixed effects, i.e., we can investigate the effect of changes in regional culture over time on 
changes in regional incomes. This approach reduces bias resulting from omitted variables which 
ultimately could not be avoided in cross-country research. Thereby, it contributes to overcoming relevant 
endogeneity issues in the literature. Moreover, we also attempt to introduce a regional instrumental 
variable that measures the genetic distance to Great Britain to address potential remaining endogeneity 
concerns (see e.g., Chiao and Blizinsky, 2010, Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011, 2017, Way and 
 
9  The influence of independence and obedience has not been discussed extensively in the literature of culture on economic 
growth. Whereas obedience is used in a few economic research efforts (see e.g., Harger and Hall, 2015, Tabellini, 2010), 
the wealth-independence relationship is mainly explored by the psychological literature (see e.g., Hofstede, 2001, Kitayama 
et al., 2010). Nevertheless, both variables are linked to Hofstede’s cultural dimensions of individualism and collectivism 
through the distance to the ruling power (independent cultures are characterized by low power distance/individualism, 
whereas obedient cultures reflect high power distance/collectivism). Both individualism and collectivism have been shown 
to be highly relevant in the growth literature (see e.g., Alesina and Giuliano, 2015, Ball, 2001, Guiso et al., 2006, Kaasa et 
al., 2014, Kyriacou, 2016). We explore whether independence and obedience yield similar results and extend the analysis 




Lieberman, 2010 for cross-country evidence with a similar instrument). Finally, our subnational data 
allows us to explore moderating effects of national institutions10 on how regional culture affects 
regional incomes11. 
Recent studies (see e.g., Cui, 2017, Dincer and Uslaner, 2010, Guiso et al., 2016, Tabellini, 2010) 
hypothesize that a unified national culture is inexistent in most countries. Moreover, past changes of 
country borders (e.g., East and West Germany, former Yugoslavia, etc.) further complicate the 
conceptualization of a measure for national culture as previously done by the literature. Thus, our 
analysis of regional data contributes to existing knowledge by providing a more comprehensive 
understanding of the relationship between regional culture and economic development within regions, 
instead of focusing on countries only. 
Our empirical results show a statistically significant and positive (negative) relationship between 
the regional appreciation of the cultural value Independence (Obedience) and regional per capita income. 
Thus, our results provide complementary support for existing cross-country studies which investigate 
proxies for national culture and economic development. We also show that the link between regional 
culture and regional incomes per capita is economically relevant. Importantly, the implied relationship 
holds when accounting for country-time fixed effects and a number of other relevant regional control 
variables (including regional human capital, religion and trust), i.e., omitted variable issues are unlikely 
to drive our results. Robustness tests tend to support the link between culture and economic development 
even when regional fixed effects are introduced. Evidence from instrumental variable regressions 
suggest a marginal causal effect of the cultural appreciation of Independence on regional per capita 
income, though the effects are statistically less robust mainly due to data availability issues which 
systematically decrease the number of regions that we can investigate. Interestingly, strong national 
institutions such as the rule of law or high government effectiveness systematically moderate the positive 
(negative) impact of Independence (Obedience) on regional incomes, i.e., in countries with stronger 
national institutions, cultural values matter less for per capita incomes. Thus, regional culture and 
national institutions seem to act as substitutes. Our analysis and data provide new insights to the existing 
literature and potential avenues for future research. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 presents the related literature and 
Section 2.3 describes our data and methodology. Results are presented in Section 2.4 and Section 2.5 
offers concluding remarks. 
 
10 We will use three indicators from the World Development Indicators (Rule of Law, Absence of Corruption, Government 
Effectiveness). For simplicity, we refer to them as measures of national institutions. These indicators correlate well with 
other measures of institutions commonly used in the literature (such as measures for executive constrains or protection of 
property rights). 
11 Such moderating effects of institutions are relevant due to strong correlations between culture and national institutions (see 
e.g., Dearmon and Grier, 2009, Licht et al., 2007). Tabellini (2010) even argues that culture and institutions cannot be 




2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Our paper relates to and extends the existing literature on culture and economic development 
which has mostly focused on differences between nations. The topic came into more prominent focus 
when Greif (1994) and Landes (1999) argued for a fundamental role of culture on economic growth. By 
comparing cultural groups in selected countries and their historic economic development, the authors 
attested selected cultural characteristics to tip the scale towards successful or unsuccessful development. 
Subsequent studies broadly support their conclusions that particular cultural values related to 
independence, individualism, valuing achievements by social status rewards, personal freedom etc. 
positively impact the long-term growth of countries (see e.g., Alesina and Giuliano, 2015, Davis, 2016, 
Fernandez, 2011, Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011, 2017, Guiso et al., 2006, Hofstede, 2001). More 
individualistic countries have been suggested to bring out more innovations and an efficient public 
sector. On the other hand, the cross-country literature argues that values such as obedience, collectivism, 
high in-group pressure, etc. may favor corruption and nepotism, leading to lower growth and lower 
incomes per capita in the long-run, but the association between culture and corruption is still an open 
research question (see e.g., Ball, 2001, Chambers and Hamer, 2012, Kyriacou, 2016, Debski et al., 
2018). It is argued that cultural values are rigid and dependent on the individual’s geographical origin, 
which might be one reason for persistent income differences despite countless policy efforts (Alesina et 
al., 2013, Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011, Nunn, 2012). 
We consider the regional (i.e., subnational) appreciation of the value Independence to capture the 
idea of an independent and individualistic society which has been found to positively impact economic 
growth. The positive relationship between average levels of individualism and wealth has been 
investigated and the existing findings have been reinforced by the literature, mainly in the field of 
psychology (see e.g., Georgas et al., 2004, Grossmann and Varnum, 2015, Hofstede, 1984, Kitayama et 
al., 2010). Whereas the economic literature has not yet discussed independence as such (due to data 
availability in cross-country research, they focused on related values such as individualism or trust), the 
value obedience gained attention when Harger and Hall (2015) or Tabellini (2010) found a robustly 
negative link between obedient cultures and economic development. This paper re-opens the discussion 
on the influence of independence on economic development and considerably extends the existing 
literature on the value obedience by providing a regional analysis. 
To address endogeneity issues between culture and development, the literature suggested 
instruments at the national level such as language patterns (Kashima and Kashima, 1998), religious 
compositions (La Porta et al., 1998) or historical institutions and literacy rates (Tabellini, 2010). 
Recently, particular attention was given to instruments that are based on genetic information (e.g., blood 
types, frequency of selected genes or allele types or historical prevalence of infectious diseases). It is 
argued that certain genetic predispositions (inherited from parents to their children) lead to the adaption 




al., 2008, Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011, 2017, Murray and Schaller, 2010, Nikolaev and 
Salahodjaev, 2017). Inspired by the proposed instrument, we try to construct a similar genetic 
instrument. This is possible only for a limited number of regions (though a relevant one in comparison 
to the number of countries usually analyzed). As we use regional instead of national data, endogeneity 
concerns linked to omitted variable bias of the cross-country literature can be systematically reduced as 
we can include country-time fixed effects in our setting. 
A small number of studies tries to avoid the caveats of cross-country studies and explores the 
relationship between cultural measures and income within countries. The results are intriguing and show 
that belief in one’s own ability and independence to complete tasks enhances civic capital in Italian 
regions (see e.g., Guiso et al., 2016); that trust/social capital positively impacts economic development 
in U.S. states and Chinese provinces (see e.g., Cui, 2017, Dincer and Uslaner, 2010); that Protestantism 
(as a proxy for Christian commercial culture) promotes development of Chinese provinces and 
prefectures during 1978 to 2008 (see e.g., Shi et al., 2014); that tolerance and openness affect the 
distribution of human capital and technology and therefore the attraction of talent in Swedish regions 
(see e.g., Florida and Mellander, 2007). However, these articles usually focus on a single country only. 
As an exception, Falk et al. (2018) use global data with stated preferences of more than 80,000 
individuals, to explore both the variation across and within countries. All the literature focusing on the 
effects of cultural differences within countries highlights that within-country heterogeneity is large, a 
fact that the cross-country literature cannot account for. We extend this literature by analyzing a large 
number of regions in numerous countries. 
More closely linked to our endeavor are a limited number of studies which analyze European 
regions and focus on cultural indicators such as social capital, trust, and obedience, among others (see 
e.g., Akçomak and ter Weel, 2009, Beugelsdijk et al., 2004, Forte et al., 2015, Kaasa et al., 2014, 
Schneider et al., 2000, Tabellini, 2010)12. These studies tend to find weaker effects of culture on 
economic growth than what was found by the cross-country literature. Our contribution lies in the 
investigation of a significantly larger number of regions (between 10 to 20 times as many) from countries 
across the world, which find themselves in different states of economic development and institutional 
settings. 
Given potential associations between national institutions and culture, a closer look at the 
mediating effects of institutional environments is required. From the literature, we may expect an 
interaction between national institutions and cultural traits (see e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2001, Dearmon 
and Grier, 2009, Hall and Jones, 1999, Licht et al., 2007). As implied by Gorodnichenko and Roland 
(2011, 2017) and Tabellini (2010), exploring mediating effects of institutional quality (e.g., Government 
Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Absence of Corruption) could improve the understanding how culture 
 




affects income. We follow this line of research and investigate the mediating role of institutions by 
analyzing interactions between national institutions and regional culture. 
2.3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
2.3.1 Data and matching 
In a large data effort, we aggregate and merge three existing data sources to obtain a new dataset 
containing cultural and economic variables for 1,204 regions over a time span of 1980 to 2010. The two 
main data sources for cultural variables are the World Value Survey13 and European Value Survey14. 
Regarding economic variables, we employ a recent dataset established by Gennaioli et al. (2014) on 
regions around the world. 
Similar to the established literature, we use questions from the World and European Value 
Surveys (WVS and EVS) to measure relevant aspects of cultural values. The two surveys report 
individual answers to a set of questions in more than 80 countries and within six time waves (starting 
1981 and ending 2014). Regarding the choice of questions, we follow Gorodnichenko and Roland (2011, 
2017), Tabellini (2010), Kaasa et al. (2014), and Harper (2004). The mention of Independence as an 
important quality is taken as an indicator for individuals who also value achievement, individualism, 
and self-assertion. On the other hand, the mention of Obedience as a cultural value rather represents 
conformity to a group which supports a collectivistic cultural understanding15. 
In the cross-country literature, individual responses to WVS or the EVS questions are aggregated 
by forming means across individuals to obtain country level average values (see e.g., Gorodnichenko 
and Roland, 2011, 2017, Guiso et al., 2011, Tabellini, 2008). The survey respondents can, however, not 
only be allocated to a country but to a specific region within a country. Thus, instead of aggregating 
responses at the country level, our approach consists of aggregating cultural values and other covariates 
(such as trust, religious affiliation, etc.) at the regional level but otherwise following the same procedures 
as the cross-country literature, i.e., we calculate regional averages for the individually expressed values 
Independence and Obedience such that we obtain average expressions of these cultural variables at the 
regional level. Altogether, we obtain data for 2,537 regions that are reported in the WVS/EVS. We note 
that the number of survey respondents per region can in some cases be comparatively low and 
representativeness of the individual responses at the regional level is assured at the national level only. 
We investigate both these issues in an array of robustness tests. Regarding the representativeness of the 
sample of regional respondents, we also compare it with available information on regional population 
 
13 See World Values Survey Association, JDSystems Data Archive (2015). 
14 See GESIS Leibniz Institut für Sozialwissenschaften (2015). 
15 The survey question is: ‘Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you 




data for 138 European regions in 2000 and 145 European regions in 2010 from Eurostat (2018) (see 
Table 1) and find that the sample’s distribution in terms of age groups, gender and employment tends 
to be comparable to the actual population. Comparable data is more difficult to gather for other 
subnational regions around the world such that we cannot perform this comparison for the whole world. 
Table 1: Comparison of Eurostat data and EVS survey data for selected population characteristics 
EVS Surveys 
    % of pop 


















2000               
Male 0.46 0.58           
Female 0.54 0.43           
Total   0.21 0.16 0.20 0.22 0.21 
2010        
Male 0.45 0.57      
Female 0.55 0.47      
Total   0.24 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.17 
              
Eurostat 
2000               
Male 0.50 0.65      
Female 0.50 0.49      
Total   0.19 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.15 
2010        
Male 0.50 0.69      
Female 0.50 0.57      
Total   0.18 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.19 
                
Note: The table shows population characteristics (gender, employment, age groups) in order to 
compare their distribution within European regions. Distributions are calculated for 138 regions in 
2000 and 145 regions in 2010 from a dataset comprising ‘A’ matched regions from Gennaioli et al. 
(2014) and the European Value Survey and the same regions in the Eurostat Data bank. 
 
Moreover, regression results also remain comparatively robust if we only focus on regions where 
population characteristics of the respondents do not deviate from the regional population data provided 
by Eurostat by more than 5% (see Table 4 for these tests). We provide information on the number of 
respondents for each region in Table 29. We systematically test whether our results are driven by regions 
where we only have a low number of observations and find that this is not the case. 
In order to test the effect of culture on income (measured in terms of regional GDP per capita), 
we need to combine our measures of regional culture from the WVS and EVS with regional data on 
GDP and further regional control variables. Gennaioli et al. (2014) have created a dataset that contains 
information on GDP for over 1,527 regions (mainly states and provinces) in over 80 countries. Matching 
the Gennaioli et al. (2014) regions with the regions that are reported in the World and European Value 




a total of 3,030 observations16. This matching process was done mainly manually and relied on 
geographical software where possible. In the matching process, we ensure that the largest possible 
number of WVS/EVS regions is matched to regions for which income data is available, i.e., we match 
the cultural data to the income data from Gennaioli et al. (2014). Matching is performed based on 
geographical boundaries. In few cases, the WVS/EVS regions are geographically smaller or larger than 
the regions employed by Gennaioli et al. (2014) so that final boundaries overlap. We grade our matches 
according to six quality levels which range between an exact match (quality mapping A), an aggregation 
of smaller WVS/EVS regions to larger regions where income is available (quality mappings B and C), 
an aggregation of larger WVS/EVS regions to smaller regions where income is available (quality 
mappings D and E) to matches based on an individual informed case by case assessment (quality 
mapping F). This procedure solves the induced trade-offs when matching several datasets with (partly) 
non-fully identical entities. Employing quality levels allows us to match all available data and test the 
robustness of the results when only analyzing precise geographical matches. This allows other 
researchers to employ our matching procedure and to explore other aspects of culture and income or 
human capital accumulation17. The quality grades are reported in Table 8 in the Appendix. They are 
employed in several robustness tests in Table 3 and Table 4, which all yield very similar results. 
Figure 1 shows the map of regions included in our dataset. Noticeably, almost all Asian, South 
American, and Oceanian regions as well as all regions from North America and Europe are included in 
the sample, although Africa remains under-represented. 
  
 
16 Due to a restriction regarding the overlap of available years in both datasets, we allow for a maximum time lag of (minus) 
10 years in order to be able to match a high number of regions precisely. By doing so, we also reduce the risk of endogeneity 
as we regress past cultural values on today’s GDP. Alternatively, we provide robustness tests for a reduced time lag (2 years 
only) as well as for averaged data over three 10-year-periods (to reduce the number of missing years between survey waves) 
which yield similar results (Table 3 and Table 4). Detailed information on available years, matched regions and quality 
grades can be found in Table 28, Table 29and Table 30. 
17 To further insure consistency, we also had student research assistants perform the matching independently and their results 
were cross-checked. This process did not lead to any matching changes for quality grade A and only to small differences 
with respect to the other quality grades. Empirical results for the link between culture and income at the regional level 




Figure 1: Map of included regions (grey-shaded) 
 
In our empirical analysis, we control for a comprehensive list of regional-level variables which 
we also constructed from the WVS/EVS, obtained from Gennaioli et al. (2014) or derived with 
geographical information system software (see ArcGIS, 2017 or Jetter et al., 2017). We wish to briefly 
explain the intuition for the major control variables. Substantial cross-country literature, such as Barro 
(1991), de la Fuente and Doménech (2006) or Cohen and Soto (2007), points to the role of education, 
which could affect culture and regional income levels at the same time. Carmignani (2015), Gennaioli 
et al. (2014), Mitton (2016), Dell et al. (2009), or Warner (2002) find geographic variables, such as 
temperature, latitude or ocean access, to be predictors for income levels. Bloom and Sachs (1998), 
Gennaioli et al. (2013), and Jetter et al. (2017) support the predictive power of the distance to the coast 
and the population density. Moreover, we account for the level of trust18 as well as religious 
denomination (regional percentage of Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, atheists and others) as 
both factors are related to culture and find support in the literature to affect income (see e.g., Knack and 
Keefer, 1997, Whiteley, 2000, Guiso et al., 2009, Barro and McCleary, 2003, 2006). 
Although culture is often argued to be exogenous and we lag our cultural variables, we also 
attempt to provide an instrument for cultural values based on genetic information. Similar to the 
literature, we assume that individuals who are genetically susceptible to infectious and chronical 
illnesses tend to develop cultural coping strategies, such as ethnocentrism or skepticism. These strategies 
are supposed to work against the development of cultural values like individualism or independence (see 
 




e.g., Chiao and Blizinsky, 2010, Fincher et al., 2008, Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011, 2017, Murray 
and Schaller, 2010, Nikolaev and Salahodjaev, 2017, Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009)19. 
Finally, we gather national level data on institutional quality to investigate moderating effects of 
institutions and regional culture (see e.g., Dearmon and Grier, 2009, Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011, 
2017, Tabellini, 2010). In particular, we rely on three measures for the quality of institutions 
(Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Absence of Corruption) from the World Development 
Indicators (2017). 
Further descriptions, descriptive statistics and data sources of all our variables can be found in 
Table 9 in the Appendix. 
2.3.2 Empirical methodology 
We aim to analyze whether regions where inhabitants on average highly appreciate the cultural 
value Independence have a higher regional GDP per capita while regions that value Obedience are less 
wealthy. Our empirical strategy starts with a conventional regression control framework to predict the 
logarithm of regional GDP per capita. However, contrary to cross-country analyses, our setting allows 
us to analyze the link between regional cultural values and regional GDP per capita. Due to the regional 
focus, we can account for country-, time-, and country-time-specific heterogeneity by including a set of 
fixed effects. Our initial estimation equation to explain GDP per capita in region 𝑟 of country 𝑖 at time 
𝑡 is specified as follows 
 𝐿𝑛(GDP per capita)𝑟,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽(𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑟,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑿𝒓,𝒊,𝒕𝛾 + 𝜔𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑟,𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
where 𝑿𝒓,𝒊,𝒕 represents the vector of control variables discussed above. 𝜔𝑖, 𝜆𝑡, and 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 introduce 
country, time, and country-time fixed effects, respectively. 𝜖𝑟,𝑖,𝑡 is an error term. Country fixed effects 
account for any country-specific unobservables (e.g., Argentina’s colonial history), time fixed effects 
account for contemporary global phenomena, and in specifications with country-time fixed effects we 
control for everything that is specific in a given country and time period (e.g., German rule of law in the 
2000-2010 period)20. 
Although culture is supposed to be exogenous and relatively persistent, we observe some variation 
over time in the extent of our cultural measures Independence and Obedience at the regional level. This 
variation allows us to augment our estimation equation by regional fixed effects in further empirical 
tests. By accounting for regional and time fixed effects, we evaluate the robustness of the link between 
culture and income per capita. Moreover, we implement an instrumental variable approach to try to deal 
 
19 Please find more information in Exhibit 1 in the Supplementary Material. 





with potential remaining endogeneity issues (mainly reverse causality) which are not captured by our 
fixed effects approach. 
We also explore interactions with national institutions to investigate moderating effects of 
national institutions on the relationship between regional culture and regional GDP. Our estimation 
equation to investigate moderating effects is specified as follows 
 𝐿𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)𝑟,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1(𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑟,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 (𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑎𝑤21)
𝑖,𝑡
+ 
 + 𝛽3(𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑟,𝑖,𝑡 ∙ (𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑎𝑤)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑿𝒓,𝒊,𝒕𝛾 + 𝜔𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜖𝑟,𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
where the interaction term 𝛽3 captures whether a strong Rule of Law moderates the effect of 
regional culture on income per capita. Apart from analyzing interactions between culture and the Rule 
of Law, we also investigate other proxies for the quality of institutions, in particular Absence of 
Corruption and Government Effectiveness. These institutional variables correlate with other institutional 
measures (see e.g., Ang et. al, 2018). As institutions are nation-specific, we do not include country-time 
fixed effects in this specification but only country and time fixed effects. We hypothesize that stronger 
national institutions reduce the absolute influence of culture on income, i.e., in countries with strong 
institutions, culture plays a smaller role. Significant results for 𝛽3 can be interpreted as evidence that 
culture and institutions function as substitutes. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that 
explores the moderating effects of national institutions on the effect that regional cultural values have 
on regional incomes per capita. 
2.4 THE LINK BETWEEN REGIONAL CULTURE AND REGIONAL INCOMES 
Figure 2 provides a central motivation for our regional analysis. It presents the relationship 
between our two cultural variables Independence and Obedience and the regional log GDP per capita 
for the whole sample of 3,002 regional observations. We observe that Independence is positively related 
to income, whereas Obedience shows a negative correlation22. Thus, the broad insight of the existing 
literature analyzing differences between countries carries on to the regional level. 
  
 
21 We will use Absence of Corruption and Government Effectiveness as additional variables for the quality of institutions from 
the World Development Indicators. 
22 Independence and Obedience themselves are negatively correlated such that regions who value Independence tend to value 




Figure 2: The link between regional incomes per capita and regional cultural values 
 
 
Note: Scatterplots summarize all available observations per region between 1980 and 2010. 
 
It is interesting and relevant to note that there is a large heterogeneity regarding these cultural 
values and regional incomes per capita within countries too. In Figure 3, we illustrate this heterogeneity 
for several countries from different continents (Australia, Canada, Chile, India, Turkey). The scatterplots 
highlight the extent of within-country heterogeneity and the positive (negative) link between 
Independence (Obedience) and incomes within countries. 
Employing regional data allows us to investigate within-country heterogeneity of culture and 
income which cross-country research on the topic was unable to exploit. Take India as a case in point 
which is known to be a culturally diverse country: between Indian regions, incomes per capita differ by 
over two log points, and cultural values differ to a larger degree. Taking an average national value for 
culture in India neglects this heterogeneity23. A similar pattern can also be observed for other countries 
and even in countries with a supposedly more unified culture (such as Turkey), but we still observe non-
 
23Of course, one could argue that cultural values are also different when comparing different municipalities within a region in 
India. While this is true, we consider the focus on regions a significant improvement in comparison to the cross-country 
literature. Arguably, for less populous countries with many regions, cultural differences between municipalities within 




negligible differences in cultural values. Likewise to cross-country analyses, we still face the fact that 
our regions vary in size (population or area) and in levels of development. Our approach precisely allows 
us to control for more heterogeneity than the cross-country literature as we can account for country-time 
fixed effects24, i.e., a regional analysis allows further insights than focusing on the national level only. 
Figure 3: Heterogeneity within countries and links between regional incomes per capita and regional 
cultural values for selected countries 
 
 
Note: Scatterplots summarize all available observations per region between 1980 and 2010 for countries 
Australia, Canada, Chile, India and Turkey. 
 
24 We are facing robust results even when we weight our cultural variables with regional population or income or when looking 




2.4.1 Main Econometric results 
In Table 2, we present results of our main estimation equation (1). We systematically find a 
positive and statistically significant link between the cultural value Independence (specifications 1-4) 
and regional GDP per capita. Obedience, on the other hand, always shows a negative and statistically 
significant association with regional incomes per capita (specifications 5-8). 
In columns (1) and (5), we account for country, time, and country-time fixed effects but do not 
include any control variables25. This setting captures all national and time specific factors which could 
influence the link between culture and regional incomes per capita. The fact that both cultural variables 
stay significant after the implementation of our fixed effects strategy suggests that regional culture may 
exert an effect on regional GDP which is independent of any potential concept of national culture. 
National culture and changes in national culture are by construction fully captured by our fixed effects 
strategy. The magnitude of the link suggests that a 10-percentage point increase in the share of 
respondents that value Independence increases regional GDP per capita by more than 5 percent. 
Similarly, though with a negative sign, a 10-percentage point increase in the share of respondents that 
value Obedience decreases regional GDP per capita by about 6 percent. 
We account for an initial set of regional covariates in specifications (2) and (6). Here, we mainly 
include geographical control variables such as latitude, measures for distance to coast, risk of malaria, 
population density, etc. After controlling for these variables which may potentially influence culture and 
regional GDP, we still find a statistically significant coefficient for regional cultural values. The 
magnitude is slightly smaller than without controls but still of economic relevance. 
While control variables beyond geographic variables are hard to obtain, we made an effort and 
gathered regional education levels, trust and religious affiliations which we merge to our dataset. Such 
variables could affect regional GDP and regional cultural values at the same time, introducing a potential 
omitted variable bias in past estimations even when introducing fixed effects. To investigate whether 
the control of such regional covariates affects the relationship between culture and regional incomes, we 
include them in specifications (3) and (7). Again, we observe that the association between culture and 
regional incomes is statistically significant, although the magnitude of the effect becomes smaller once 
more. 
 




Table 2: Baseline regressions for the effect of Independence and Obedience with a full and a reduced set of controls on regional per capita income 
Dependent variable: ln(Regional 
GDP per capita) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Independence 
0.534*** 0.361*** 0.142** 0.134**         
(0.083) (0.072) (0.069) (0.067)         
Obedience 
        -0.616*** -0.384*** -0.124* -0.119* 
        (0.083) (0.069) (0.064) (0.063) 
Latitude 
  0.019*** 0.015*** 0.014***   0.018*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)   (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
Inverse distance to coast 
  0.151 -0.194     0.11 -0.202   
  (0.248) (0.219)     (0.248) (0.218)   
Malaria ecology 
  0.052*** 0.029** 0.032**   0.049*** 0.028** 0.031** 
  (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)   (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
Ln(Oil Gas Production) 
  2.05 2.132     1.958 2.054   
  (2.53) (2.141)     (2.575) (2.166)   
Ln(Pop density) 
  0.033*** -0.006     0.034*** -0.005   
  (0.012) (0.011)     (0.012) (0.011)   
Capital in region 
  0.504*** 0.266*** 0.255***   0.497*** 0.264*** 0.254*** 
  (0.046) (0.046) (0.043)   (0.046) (0.045) (0.042) 
Temperature 
  -0.007 0.003     -0.006 0.003   
  (0.005) (0.004)     (0.005) (0.004)   
Landlockedregion 
  -0.151*** -0.103*** -0.094***   -0.155*** -0.105*** -0.096*** 
  (0.025) (0.021) (0.021)   (0.025) (0.022) (0.021) 
Length coast 
  0.00003** 0.00002* 0.00002**   0.00003** 0.00002* 0.00002** 
  (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)   (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
Border to other regions 
  -0.073** -0.069** -0.031   -0.076** -0.070** -0.032* 
  (0.033) (0.029) (0.019)   (0.034) (0.029) (0.019) 




  (0.021) (0.017)     (0.021) (0.017)   
Years education 
    0.256*** 0.254***     0.257*** 0.255*** 
    (0.017) (0.017)     (0.017) (0.017) 
Trust 
    0.005       0.016   
    (0.07)       (0.07)   
Christian 
    -0.046       -0.053   
    (0.093)       (0.092)   
Muslim 
    -0.300* -0.262     -0.280* -0.240 
    (0.173) (0.168)     (0.17) (0.165) 
Hindu 
    -0.224       -0.236   
    (0.452)       (0.459)   
Buddhist 
    1.138*** 1.116***     1.103*** 1.083*** 
    (0.333) (0.325)     (0.33) (0.322) 
Noreligion 
    0.274*** 0.273***     0.260*** 0.262*** 
    (0.074) (0.075)     (0.073) (0.074) 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 3,002 3,001 2,290 2,290 3,002 3,001 2,290 2,290 
R² 0.876 0.909 0.942 0.942 0.877 0.909 0.942 0.942 

















F Statistic 108.5*** 144.8*** 224.9*** 236.5*** 109.5*** 145.1*** 224.9*** 236.4*** 
Note: The regressions estimate the effect of culture (Independence, Obedience) on logarithmized regional GDP p.c. for the full dataset including all 
control variables (1-3) and (5-7) and a reduced set with significant control variables only (4) and (8) i.e. without inverse distance to coast, Ln(Oil Gas 
Production), logarithmized population density, Temperature, the number of borders to other countries, percentage of trusting people, Christians and 
Hindus; and country, time, and country-time fixed effects. Robust clustered standard error estimates (Region-level) are presented below the 





We consider specifications (3) and (7) the most stringent and conservative setting. In this setting, 
we predict that an increase of the regional share of people who appreciate the cultural value 
Independence by 10-percentage points raises regional GDP per capita by about 1.4 percent, while a 
similar increase in the regional share of people who value Obedience is associated with a decrease in 
regional GDP per capita by about 1.2 percent26. 
We also provide estimations for specifications where we exclude statistically insignificant 
controls to ensure that our results are not driven by them. These results are presented in specifications 
(4) and (8). Again, both regional cultural variables show the now common relationship with incomes 
per capita at the regional level. 
The R² in all our specifications suggests a good predictive quality of our estimation model and 
this type of analysis. The country, time, and country-time fixed effects take out most of the variation in 
regional GDP per capita and additional controls explain a relatively small fraction of the remaining 
variation. 
Our results are consistent with the cross-country evidence from Gorodnichenko and Roland 
(2017), who find a robust positive although slightly smaller effect of Hofstede’s individualism index on 
income per worker, and from Tabellini (2010), who finds a consistently negative impact of Obedience 
on yearly growth. Thus, our baseline results suggest that cultural variables matter for income per capita 
and that existing cross-country results carry on to the regional level. This is relevant because if we had 
found that culture at the regional level was irrelevant for incomes per capita, the potential 
generalizability of the existing cross-country literature would have to be questioned to a relevant degree. 
At the same time the above results suggest that regional culture matters independently of any potential 
concept of national culture. 
2.4.2 Robustness tests 
Table 3 investigates the robustness of our main results along several dimensions for the cultural 
value Independence in panel (a) and the cultural value Obedience in panel (b)27.
 
26 These results support the view that Obedience is the opposite of Independence as it roughly affects income to the same 
extent but in different directions. 




Table 3: Robustness tests for the effect of Independence (panel a) and Obedience (panel b) on regional per capita income 
  
(1) 
Resp. > 50 
(2) 

























Country FE YES YES NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-Time FE YES YES NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Region FE NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Control set 1 NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Control set 2 NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Panel (a): Independence 
Independence 
0.811*** 0.195** 0.135*** 0.200*** -4.422 3.367* 0.598*** 0.164* 0.405*** 0.124 
(0.116) (0.087) (0.042) (0.051) (10.082) (1.857) (0.103) (0.089) (0.096) (0.092) 
Observations 2,368 1,865 3,002 2,290 539 438 2,201 1,800 1,425 952 























F Statistic (1)-(4); 
Wald test (5)-(6) 
89.7*** 203.6*** 96.58*** 104.4*** 8.23*** 26.3*** 118.6*** 221.8*** 61.94*** 112.7*** 
Weak instruments         0.257 0.554         
Wu-Hausman 
Test 





Panel (b): Obedience 
Obedience 
-0.954*** -0.202** 0.046 0.087 -3.871 9.080 -0.801*** -0.143* -0.485*** -0.070 
(0.130) (0.093) (0.054) (0.063) (8.594) (12.596) (0.103) (0.082) (0.100) (0.081) 
Observations 2,368 1,865 3,002 2,290 539 438 2,201 1,800 1,425 952 























F Statistic (1)-(4); 
Wald test (5)-(6) 
90.91*** 203.7*** 95.56*** 102.2*** 14.65*** 31.53*** 121.1*** 221.7*** 62.46*** 112.4*** 
Weak instruments     0.062* 0.0357*     
Wu-Hausman 
Test 
    0.003** 0.173     
Note: The regressions estimate the effect of culture (Independence, Obedience) on logarithmized regional GDP p.c. for (1-2) a data subsample with 
respondents per regions >50 including all control variables and country, time, and country-time fixed effects, (3-4) regressions with regional and time 
fixed effects, (5-6) 2SLS regressions with logarithmized genetic distance to the South East of the United Kingdom (Ln(Genetic distance B*27)) as 
instrument including all control variables and country, time, and country-time fixed effects, (7-8) a data sample with three 10 year averages (1980-
1990; 1991-2000; 2001-2010) and (9-10) a data subsample with quality mappings A, B, C including all control variables and country, time, and 
country-time fixed effects. Robust clustered standard error estimates (Region-level) are presented below the coefficients. Significance levels are 
indicated by *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; Control variables set 1 includes the following covariates: Latitude, Inverse distance to coast, Malaria 
ecology, Ln(Oil Gas Production), Ln(Pop density), Capital in region, Temperature, Landlockedregion, Length coast, Border to other regions and the 
number of borders to other countries. Control variables set 2 includes the following covariates: Years education, Trust, Christian, Muslim, Hindu, 
Buddhist, No religion and other religion (omitted category). Endogeneity tests (Weak instrument and Wu-Hausman) are given for specifications 





Firstly, we consider a subsample that includes data for those regions where the number of 
respondents is above 50 in specifications (1) with all fixed effects but without controls and in 
specification (2) with all fixed effects and all covariates. While any threshold is to some degree arbitrary, 
we choose a threshold of 50 respondents as this assures a (subjectively and statistically) relevant number 
of interviewed individuals as well as a sufficiently large sample for our analysis. Indeed, approximately 
80% of the original sample contains more than 50 respondents per region. This approach also reduces 
the potential risk of distortion by outliers and may help improve the representativeness of our samples. 
Regarding our results, the cultural value Independence remains a positive and statistically significant 
predictor for regional GDP per capita, while the cultural value Obedience is negatively associated with 
regional GDP per capita. Quantitatively, the magnitude of the link between culture and income grows 
stronger compared to the results in Table 2 which raises our confidence that our results are not an artifact 
of issues of representativeness. Adding to this issue, we will provide further evidence (see Table 4) that 
our results are overall robust towards the variation of the 50-respondents-threshold and other quality 
checks regarding the data. We first set the threshold to regions with at least 100 (approx. 60% of the 
original sample remain) and then 150 (approx. 45% of the original sample remain) respondents. 
Secondly, we specify a ratio of respondents to regional population exceeding 0.01% as a further test. 
Moreover, Table 4 also shows that results remain valid for further variations of data matching qualities 
(employing data with matching quality A and data with matching quality D, E, F separately). 
In specifications (3) and (4) of Table 3, we turn to a highly conservative setting by employing 
region fixed effects and year fixed effects instead of country-time fixed effects. The inclusion of region 
fixed effects takes out time-invariant across-region variation such that we only exploit changes in 
regional culture over time. This approach further mitigates the risk of omitted variable bias to a 
substantial degree. The set of control variables naturally excludes time-invariant regional variables (e.g., 
distance to coast) when we estimate with region fixed effects. The empirical results reveal again a 
comparatively robust relationship between regional Independence and regional incomes per capita. An 
increase in the share of people who value Independence over time by ten percentage points is linked to 
an increase in regional GDP by 1.3 to 2%.28 Obedience meanwhile loses its statistical significance. 
We show results of our second stage instrumental variable estimations in specifications (5) and 
(6) using genetic distance as an instrument. Our instrument follows Gorodnichenko and Roland (2011, 
2017) and measures the genetic distance in terms of the allele frequency HLA-B*27. The cross-country 
literature has shown allele frequency to be a relevant instrument and also suggested that culture is 
exogenous to income per capita. We provide a discussion of this instrumental variable strategy in 
Exhibit 1 in the Supplementary Material. Unfortunately, the instrument is only available for 191 regions 
 
28 However, since aggregate psychological traits are rather slow-moving factors, the model might identify sampling variation 
instead of actual structural changes in such traits. Given a large number of robustness tests (including 10-year-averages, that 
potentially take out a lot of the variation) and that we matched economic and cultural data with a time lag of up to ten years, 




due to data restrictions. Thus, we observe a substantial reduction in observations below 20% of the 
original number. While endogeneity tests suggest some explanatory power of the instrument for the 
variable Obedience, it is at best a weak instrument for Independence (results for the first-stage regression 
show a significant coefficient in the presence of all covariates). The coefficients of the second stage 
regressions tend to show that the effects are insignificant when employing the IV strategy for the reduced 
sample. Thus, although our cultural variables are lagged, we would like to mention the caveat that we 
cannot fully exclude a potential reverse causality in our previous findings following standard 
econometric procedures29. Moreover, despite the theoretic evidence for the suitability of genetic 
distance as an instrument for the influence of culture on income, we can hardly confirm it empirically30. 
We note again that it is particularly difficult to find a suitable instrument for culture, especially when 
analyzing culture at the regional level. Moreover, we point to the large literature which treats culture as 
exogenous and provides evidence for this assumption. 
As EVS/WVS survey data is reported in six time waves only and we face many missing years, 
we also provide results for three ten-year periods, where we average survey data for these three decades 
(7-8). The association between culture and regional incomes per capita remains robust and their 
magnitude changes to a marginal degree. 
Finally, we exclude regions with a potentially less reliable data matching quality level i.e., we use 
a sample of mapping grades A to C only (see Table 8). Even though the number of observations 
decreases, we can still observe the previously found impact of Independence and Obedience in 
specification (9), which is still robust with control set I but becomes statistically insignificant at 
conventional levels once control set II is added (specification 10). 
Our analysis involves an intense data effort regarding matching regions at the geographical level. 
To systematically investigate the robustness of our main results, we offer a large array of further 
robustness tests which we describe in Table 4. With small exceptions, the results support the previously 
found association between regional cultural values and regional incomes per capita especially in the 
absence of control set II which yields few of our specifications statistically significant at conventional 
levels. 
Table 4 briefly describes the performed tests and gives the respective number of observations (for 
regressions without control variables as adding controls reduces the sample to some extent). It also 
 
29 The relationship between our cultural variables and incomes per capita remains overall robust when we investigate the 
subsample of 191 regions but do not employ our instrument. Thus, it is likely that the instrument employed in the cross-
country literature cannot be extended to the regional level. 
30 The HLA-type B*27 might not be adequate to capture the required genetic information in order to depict a comprehensive 
picture of genetic differences. Even though endogeneity tests suggest some relevance of our instrument we observe no 
correlation with our endogenous variables. Potentially, this might be due to the low number of observations, or a biased set 
of allele data caused by non-randomly selected individuals. In general, it remains demanding to use genetic differences as 




provides two regression results (one without and the other with all covariates) for each of our two cultural 
variables when country-time fixed effects are employed. 
We briefly describe the main results here: Firstly, we provide two tests (1-2) in order to account 
for the regional heterogeneity and weight our cultural variables with regional population and income to 
ensure that our results are not driven by very small or poor regions (and vice versa). Results confirm our 
baseline regressions and support the positive influence of Independence and negative influence of 
Obedience for our total of 1,204 regions. Secondly, we further investigate the issue of representability 
of our data. Consequently, we complement and confirm our previous robustness checks with data 
subsamples of regions with quality mapping A and D, E and F as well as for data subsamples that show 
a relatively high number of respondents compared to regional populations (3-7). 
As stated earlier, we find that the sample’s distribution in terms of age groups, gender, and 
employment is broadly comparable to the actual population reported for around 140 European regions 
in 2000 and 2010 (see Table 1) for which we can make direct comparisons. Assuming that this holds 
for all available survey years, we run our baseline regressions for the entire set of European regions 
available in EVS and Eurostat (8), as well as for three subsets containing regions where the distribution 
of regional survey characteristics deviates by a maximum of 5% from the distribution in the total 
population (9-11). Results confirm the positive (negative) link between Independence (Obedience) and 
regional incomes but are sensitive to the inclusion of control variables which is most likely due to a 




Table 4: Summary of robustness tests for the effect of Independence and Obedience on regional per capita income 
  Test Description Regions Results for Independence Results for Obedience 




FE and no 
controls 
(2) 
FE and all 
controls 
(1) 
FE and no 
controls 
(2) 





Cultural variables are 
weighted with the 
inverse of the logarithm 
of the regional 
population 
1,204 (3,002) 
Confirmed with the exception that 
Independence turns insignificant as 
soon as one adds control set II 
Confirmed 




Cultural variables are 
weighted with the 
inverse of the logarithm 












Baseline regressions for 
Gennaioli et al. (2014) 
regions that were 
matched with WVS/EVS 
regions with mapping 
quality A 
572 (1,166) 
Confirmed with the exception that 
Independence turns insignificant as 
soon as one adds control set II 
Confirmed with the exception that 
Obedience turns insignificant as soon 
as one adds control set II 







mapping D, E, 
F 
Baseline regressions for 
Gennaioli et al. (2014) 
regions that were 
matched with WVS/EVS 
regions with mapping 
quality D, E, F 
794 (1,577) 
Confirmed 
Confirmed with the exception that 
Obedience turns insignificant as soon 
as one adds control set II 





Baseline regressions for 
regions with a relatively 
high ratio of respondents 













Baseline regressions for 
regions that report at 
least 100 respondents 
910 (1,815) 
Confirmed Confirmed 





Baseline regressions for 
regions that report at 
least 150 respondents 
762 (1,364) 
Confirmed with the exception that 
Independence turns insignificant as 
soon as one adds control set II 
Confirmed 






Baseline regressions for 
all survey regions 
(quality mapping A) that 
are available in Eurostat 
database 
168 (557) 
Confirmed with the exception that 
Independence turns insignificant as 
soon as one adds control set I 
Confirmed with the exception that 
Obedience turns insignificant as soon 
as one adds control set II 






Baseline regressions for 
survey regions (quality 
mapping A) that are 
available in Eurostat 
database and that have a 
comparable gender 
distribution (i.e. +-5%) 
117 (391) 
Confirmed with the exception that 
Independence turns insignificant as 
soon as one adds control set I 
Confirmed with the exception that 
Obedience turns insignificant as soon 
as one adds control set I 






Baseline regressions for 
survey regions (quality 
mapping A) that are 
available in Eurostat 
database and that have a 
comparable employment 
ratio (i.e. +-5%) 
48 (166) 
Not confirmed Confirmed 










Baseline regressions for 
survey regions (quality 
mapping A) that are 
available in Eurostat 
database and that have a 
comparable share of 
people between 15 and 
24 years (i.e. +-5%) 
97 (314) 
Confirmed with the exception that 
Independence turns insignificant as 
soon as one adds control set I 
Confirmed with the exception that 
Obedience turns insignificant as soon 
as one adds control set I 





Baseline regressions for 
regions where the 
instrument 
(logarithmized distance 
of B*27 allele to South 
East of United Kingdom) 
is available 
191 (539) 
Confirmed with the exception that 
Independence turns insignificant as 
soon as one adds control set II 
Confirmed with the exception that 
Obedience turns insignificant as soon 
as one adds control set II 
0.940 (0.343)** 0.066 (0.245) -1.052 (0.321)** -0.192 (0.179) 
(13) OECD regions 
Baseline regressions for 




Confirmed with the exception that 
Obedience turns insignificant as soon 
as one adds control set II 




Baseline regressions for 
a subsample of regions 




Confirmed with the exception that 
Obedience turns insignificant as soon 
as one adds control set II 





Baseline regressions for 
a subsample of regions 




Confirmed with the exception that 
Obedience turns insignificant as soon 
as one adds control set II 








Baseline regressions for 
a subsample of regions 
in Asia 
344 (733) 
Confirmed with the exception that 
Independence turns insignificant as 
soon as one adds control set II 
Confirmed with the exception that 
Obedience turns insignificant as soon 
as one adds control set II 




Baseline regressions for 




Confirmed with the exception that 
Obedience turns insignificant as soon 
as one adds control set II 
0.499 (0.100)*** 0.159 (0.087)* -0.559 (0.084)*** -0.073 (0.060) 
(18) 
Results for the 
year 2010 
Baseline regressions for 
the year 2010 
817 (817) 
Partly confirmed; even though results 
stay robust with control set I only, 
one yields a negative (non-
significant) impact of Independence 
on regional GDP 
Confirmed with the exception that 
Obedience turns insignificant as soon 
as one adds control set II 
0.521 (0.144)*** -0.136 (0.175) -0.924 (0.178)*** -0.110 (0.202) 
(19) 
Results for the 
year 2000 
Baseline regressions for 
the year 2000 
721 (721) 
Confirmed 
Partly confirmed; results turn 
insignificant as soon as control set I is 
added and one yields a positive (non-
significant) impact of Obedience on 
regional GDP in specification (2) 







regions with a 
reduced 
timelag 
Baseline regressions for 
a subsample of 
Gennaioli et al. (2014) 
regions that were 
matched with WVS/EVS 
regions with a maximum 
timelag of 2 years 
(instead of 10 years in all 
other regressions) 
934 (2,048) 
Confirmed with the exception that 
Independence turns insignificant as 
soon as one adds control set II 
Confirmed with the exception that 
Obedience turns insignificant as soon 
as one adds control set II 
0.414 (0.098)*** 0.082 (0.073) -0.565 (0.089)*** -0.106 (0.074) 
Note: The regressions estimate the effect of culture (Independence, Obedience) on logarithmized regional GDP p.c. for a number of robustness checks 
including country, time, and country-time fixed effects and robust clustered standard error estimates (Region-level); Coefficients (Std. Errors) for 
specifications without controls are reported in columns (1), whereas coefficients (Std. errors) for specifications with all control variables (Set I and II) 
are reported in columns (2); Control variable set I includes the following covariates: Latitude, Inverse distance to coast, Malaria ecology, Ln(Oil Gas 
Production), Ln(Pop density), Capital in region, Temperature, Landlockedregion, Length coast, Border to other regions and the number of borders to 
other countries; Control variable set II includes the following covariates: Years education, Trust, Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, No religion and 





In specification (12) we provide evidence that regions where the instrument for genetic distance 
is available, confirm the previously stated association between culture and income. We are looking at 
various data subsamples that represent regional specifics and that might reveal a potentially interesting 
variation of cultural values: OECD countries; regions with a share of Christians exceeding 50%; regions 
not containing the national capital; Asian regions and European regions (13-17). We also account for 
the bias of very different time periods (previously we were looking at a time span from 1980 to 2010) 
and consider results for the year 2010 and 2000 separately (18-19). In addition, when matching our two 
datasets, we reduce our originally permitted time lag of ten years to two years only which yields us with 
even more accurate results although for a significantly smaller dataset (20). All these tests provide 
further evidence regarding the existence of a non-negligible positive link between the cultural value 
Independence and regional incomes per capita while the link between the cultural value Obedience and 
regional incomes per capita is negative. 
2.4.3 Moderating national institutions 
The difficulty of separating the effects of national institutions from those of national culture have 
been highlighted in the literature (see e.g., Dearmon and Grier, 2009, Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011, 
2017, Licht et al., 2007). Diverse attempts to disentangle the two factors have not yet led to a 
comprehensive and consistent answer whether culture affects institutions or vice versa. Our data 
indicates a correlation of approximately 0.3 between our two regional cultural factors and three different 
measures for the national institutional quality (Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Absence of 
Corruption). Particularly, regarding corruption some literature suggests that a corruption-prone culture 
which is predominantly found in regions with a tendency to appreciate Obedience (see e.g., Ball, 2001, 
Chambers and Hamer, 2012, Kyriacou, 2016) will influence the power or even existence of an anti-
corruption policy and vice versa. Our data does not allow us to investigate potentially causal links 
between culture and diverse institutional variables including corruption. However, employing regional 
culture and including country and time fixed effects contributes to solving the challenge of capturing the 
effect of national institutions over time and of separating it from the effects of regional culture. 
Moreover, we can take a fresh look at potential moderating links between culture and institutions. The 
relevant research question here is whether regional cultural variables have the potential to affect links 
between national institutions and income. To do so, we perform a more refined analysis with our regional 
data to investigate the interaction effects between regional culture and national institutions which the 
previous literature was unable to do. In Table 5, we estimate equation (2) to explore the moderating role 
of three measures for institutional quality (Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Absence of 




The coefficients of all national institutional variables show a positive influence of institutions on 
regional GDP in all specifications, even when controlling for country and time fixed effects31. 
Moreover, we also observe that the regional cultural values of Independence and Obedience remain 
statistically relevant, although they become less robust when adding controls for human capital and 
religion (control set II). 
We are particularly interested in the interaction terms between national institutions and regional 
culture. The interaction terms reveal that national institutions have a relevant moderating power on the 
influence of regional culture on regional GDP per capita. The significant interaction terms with 
Independence show a negative sign, meaning that the overall positive influence of Independence is 
reduced in the presence of strong institutions, i.e., higher Government Effectiveness, higher Rule of Law 
or higher Absence of Corruption at the national level reduces the influence of regional culture on regional 
GDP. Similarly, the negative effect of Obedience is weakened by strong institutions, which is expressed 
by the positive sign of the interaction terms with Rule of Law and Absence of Corruption. 
These results support the view that national institutions and cultural values act as substitutes, i.e., 
with strong institutions, culture is less important while in nations with weak institutions, cultural traits 
matter more for economic development. This interpretation is consistent with results from Knack and 
Keefer (1997) who find that the effect of trust is lower in countries with high institutional quality. It also 
supports findings by Ahlerup et al. (2009) who argue that culture is more important in countries with 
low institutional quality.
 
31 Note that when estimating with country-time fixed effects as in previous estimations, national institutions cannot be included 




Table 5: The moderating role of national institutions (Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, Absence of Corruption) for the effect of Independence and 
Obedience on regional per capita income 
Dependent variable: 
ln(Regional GDP per 
capita) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Control variables set 1 NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Control variables set 2 NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Panel (a): Independence 
Independence 
0.712*** 0.565*** 0.006 0.811*** 0.648*** -0.018 0.735*** 0.609*** 0.116 
(0.167) (0.142) (0.171) (0.183) (0.158) (0.185) (0.158) (0.136) (0.162) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
1.664*** 1.675*** 1.182***             




-0.562** -0.532** 0.242             
(0.241) (0.218) (0.256)             
Rule of Law 
      1.871*** 1.830*** 0.920***       
      (0.26) (0.216) (0.341)       
Independence x Rule of 
Law 
      -0.593** -0.531** 0.332       
      (0.254) (0.234) (0.275)       
Absence of Corruption 
            1.740*** 1.803*** 1.058*** 
            (0.219) (0.184) (0.329) 
Independence x Absence 
of Corruption 
            -0.625** -0.641*** 0.074 
            (0.245) (0.226) (0.259) 
Observations 2,132 2,132 1,424 2,132 2,132 1,424 2,132 2,132 1,424 
R² 0.864 0.9 0.936 0.863 0.899 0.936 0.862 0.899 0.936 
























Panel (b): Obedience 
Obedience 
-0.670*** -0.431*** -0.184 -0.976*** -0.656*** -0.251 -0.896*** -0.628*** -0.302 
(0.182) (0.161) (0.191) (0.202) (0.181) (0.203) (0.185) (0.165) (0.186) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
1.652*** 1.559*** 1.435***             
(0.186) (0.154) (0.191)             
Obedience x Government 
Effectiveness 
0.146 0.156 0.002             
(0.28) (0.25) (0.279)             
Rule of Law 
      1.642*** 1.568*** 1.086***       
      (0.257) (0.218) (0.355)       
Obedience x Rule of Law 
      0.742** 0.589** 0.123       
      (0.294) (0.267) (0.289)       
Absence of Corruption 
            1.306*** 1.316*** 1.179*** 
            (0.205) (0.175) (0.275) 
Obedience x Absence of 
Corruption 
            0.847*** 0.787*** 0.309 
            (0.3) (0.28) (0.293) 
Observations 2,132 2,132 1,424 2,132 2,132 1,424 2132 2132 1424 
R² 0.865 0.9 0.937 0.864 0.899 0.936 0.863 0.898 0.936 



















F Statistic 165.7*** 203.7*** 247.7*** 164.7*** 201.8*** 244.8*** 163.4*** 200.6*** 244.9*** 
Note: The regressions estimate the effect of regional culture (Independence, Obedience) on logarithmized regional GDP p.c. in regressions with national 
institutions (Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption) as well as their interaction with culture, including all control variables and 
country and time fixed effects. Robust clustered standard error estimates (Region-level) are presented below the coefficients. Significance levels are 
indicated by *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; Control variables set 1 includes the following covariates: Latitude, Inverse distance to coast, Malaria ecology, 
Ln(Oil Gas Production), Ln(Pop density), Capital in region, Temperature, Landlockedregion, Length coast, Border to other regions and the number of 
borders to other countries. Control variables set 2 includes the following covariates: Years education, Trust, Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, No 





We further explore such interactions between regional culture and national institutions in Table 
6 and Table 7. In particular, we extract countries with a federal system of government from our sample 
(Forum of Federations, 2007) and rerun the regressions of Table 5 for federal and centralized state 
systems. National institutions still have a strong effect on regional incomes in centralized state systems 
but lose their moderating role for regional culture. This is suggestive for the view that regional culture 
is more important in centralized states where regional culture can substitute the role of inexistent 
regional institutions. This contrasts with countries under a federal system as they are to some extent also 
characterized by more decentralized institutions that might themselves act as substitutes for regional 
culture32. 
Altogether, our results suggest that national institutions have a moderating effect on the link 
between regional culture and regional incomes per capita, which is consistent with the view that culture 
and institutions can act as substitutes.
 
32 Unfortunately, we cannot explore potential moderating effects of regional institutions further as such data is not available 




Table 6: The moderating role of institutions (Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, Absence of Corruption) on Independence and Obedience for a subsample 
of countries with a federal state system 
Dependent variable: 
ln(Regional GDP per 
capita) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Control variables set 1 NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Control variables set 2 NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Panel (a): Independence 
Independence 
0.690* 0.725** 0.637* 1.219*** 1.129*** 0.591 1.034*** 1.034*** 0.653* 
(0.38) (0.329) (0.366) (0.401) (0.328) (0.415) (0.34) (0.29) (0.362) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
1.847*** 1.864*** -0.091             




-0.595 -0.735* -0.294             
(0.463) (0.416) (0.494)             
Rule of Law 
      2.113*** 2.237*** 0.765       
      (0.45) (0.353) (0.55)       
Independence x Rule of 
Law 
      -1.148** -1.069** -0.265       
      (0.484) (0.417) (0.571)       
Absence of Corruption 
            2.617*** 3.075*** -0.494 
            (0.574) (0.476) (0.738) 
Independence x Absence 
of Corruption 
            -1.165*** -1.272*** -0.33 
            (0.447) (0.396) (0.552) 
Observations 684 684 518 684 684 518 684 684 518 
R² 0.847 0.89 0.914 0.846 0.889 0.914 0.843 0.887 0.914 
























Panel (b): Obedience 
Obedience 
-0.332 0.194 -0.156 -0.518 0.173 -0.282 -0.333 0.141 -0.118 
(0.474) (0.383) (0.408) (0.505) (0.419) (0.429) (0.427) (0.355) (0.394) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
2.024*** 2.053*** 0.411             
(0.332) (0.274) (0.481)             
Obedience x Government 
Effectiveness 
0.033 -0.414 0.157             
(0.588) (0.489) (0.491)             
Rule of Law 
      1.970*** 2.182*** 0.879       
      (0.518) (0.421) (0.584)       
Obedience x Rule of Law 
      0.375 -0.313 0.317       
      (0.611) (0.516) (0.526)       
Absence of Corruption 
            2.382*** 2.712*** 0.009 
            (0.534) (0.478) (0.566) 
Obedience x Absence of 
Corruption 
            0.349 -0.066 0.135 
            (0.588) (0.506) (0.541) 
Observations 684 684 518 684 684 518 684 684 518 
R² 0.846 0.888 0.912 0.842 0.885 0.912 0.839 0.883 0.912 



















F Statistic 150.8*** 147.1*** 134.5*** 145.8*** 142.3*** 135.1*** 143.1*** 139.6*** 134.3*** 
Note: The regressions estimate the effect of regional culture (Independence, Obedience) on logarithmized regional GDP p.c. in regressions with national 
institutions (Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption) as well as their interaction with culture for a subset of federalist countries, 
including all control variables and country and time fixed effects. Robust clustered standard error estimates (Region-level) are presented below the 
coefficients. Significance levels are indicated by *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; Control variables set 1 includes the following covariates: Latitude, Inverse 
distance to coast, Malaria ecology, Ln(Oil Gas Production), Ln(Pop density), Capital in region, Temperature, Landlockedregion, Length coast, Border to 
other regions and the number of borders to other countries. Control variables set 2 includes the following covariates: Years education, Trust, Christian, 





Table 7: The moderating role of institutions (Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, Absence of Corruption) on Independence and Obedience for a subsample 
of countries with a centralized state system 
Dependent variable: 
ln(Regional GDP per 
capita) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Control variables set 1 NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Control variables set 2 NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Panel (a): Independence 
Independence 
0.635*** 0.496*** 0.096 0.631*** 0.499*** 0.005 0.553*** 0.431*** 0.085 
(0.198) (0.167) (0.214) (0.217) (0.189) (0.224) (0.186) (0.16) (0.201) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
1.833*** 1.778*** 2.200***             




-0.333 -0.409 -0.004             
(0.342) (0.317) (0.341)             
Rule of Law 
      1.648*** 1.542*** 1.300***       
      (0.321) (0.276) (0.475)       
Independence x Rule of 
Law 
      -0.284 -0.365 0.205       
      (0.343) (0.323) (0.334)       
Absence of Corruption 
            1.493*** 1.510*** 1.424*** 
            (0.256) (0.226) (0.524) 
Independence x Absence 
of Corruption 
            -0.18 -0.312 0.006 
            (0.342) (0.331) (0.342) 
Observations 1,448 1,448 906 1,448 1,448 906 1,448 1,448 906 
R² 0.856 0.9 0.945 0.856 0.899 0.944 0.856 0.899 0.944 























Panel (b): Obedience 
Obedience 
-0.627*** -0.537*** -0.184 -0.987*** -0.783*** -0.291 -0.999*** -0.823*** -0.408* 
(0.206) (0.184) (0.226) (0.235) (0.215) (0.24) (0.206) (0.188) (0.217) 
Government Effectiveness 
1.665*** 1.412*** 2.186***             
(0.273) (0.216) (0.328)             
Obedience x Government 
Effectiveness 
-0.259 0.254 -0.046             
(0.403) (0.344) (0.393)             
Rule of Law 
      1.539*** 1.288*** 1.537***       
      (0.278) (0.23) (0.432)       
Obedience x Rule of Law 
      0.525 0.713* 0.117       
      (0.409) (0.368) (0.382)       
Absence of Corruption 
            1.207*** 1.054*** 1.478*** 
            (0.243) (0.204) (0.463) 
Obedience x Absence of 
Corruption 
            0.757* 1.067*** 0.484 
            (0.4) (0.378) (0.394) 
Observations 1,448 1,448 906 1,448 1,448 906 1,448 1,448 906 
R² 0.859 0.9 0.946 0.859 0.9 0.945 0.859 0.901 0.945 


















F Statistic 142.9*** 177.5*** 225.1*** 143.2*** 177.6*** 221*** 143.2*** 178.4*** 221.5*** 
Note: The regressions estimate the effect of regional culture (Independence, Obedience) on logarithmized regional GDP p.c. in regressions with national 
institutions (Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption) as well as their interaction with culture for a subset of centralized countries, 
including all control variables and country and time fixed effects. Robust clustered standard error estimates (Region-level) are presented below the 
coefficients. Significance levels are indicated by *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; Control variables set 1 includes the following covariates: Latitude, Inverse 
distance to coast, Malaria ecology, Ln(Oil Gas Production), Ln(Pop density), Capital in region, Temperature, Landlockedregion, Length coast, Border to 
other regions and the number of borders to other countries. Control variables set 2 includes the following covariates: Years education, Trust, Christian, 





2.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper complements the literature on the relationship between culture and economic 
development in two new ways: First, we shift the view from the potential effects of a national culture 
on national GDP to the regional (subnational) level by composing a new dataset that contains 1,204 
regions. This allows us to analyze the impact of regional cultural variables on regional incomes per 
capita. Empirically, we can control for country-, time- and country-time-specific effects to tackle an 
important number of endogeneity concerns. According to the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
contribution that does so for a large set of different regions around the world. We show that intra-country 
heterogeneity in culture and incomes is relevant and that regional cultural values of Independence and 
Obedience are robustly associated with regional incomes. 
Second, our data allows us to address the relationship between culture and national institutions, 
which has been a major concern in past research efforts. Our findings suggest that national institutions 
have the potential to moderate the influence of regional cultural variables. In countries with strong 
national institutions, e.g., a high rule of law, the link between regional culture and regional incomes is 
weaker such that culture and institutions can be seen as substitutes. 
We conduct a large set of checks to ensure the robustness of our main insights. Particularly, we 
investigate the robustness to different subsamples and try to address the likelihood of remaining potential 
endogeneity concerns in our estimates. Most of our results are statistically robust, but limitations remain 
which we would like to outline for future research efforts. Our approach allows us to account for country-
time fixed effects and regional fixed effects (in robustness tests) to overcome omitted variable issues 
present in the cross-country literature but, of course, some issues stemming from potentially unobserved 
regional covariates might still be present. In that sense, our analysis is an improvement in comparison 
to the existing literature, but it requires to be extended by collecting additional time-variant control 
variables at the regional level beyond the effort that we have already made. For example, our dataset 
lacks information on migration within countries. Migration affects the composition of the population 
within regions and thereby potentially the shares of people holding certain cultural values. Although 
there are theoretically appealing suggestions for instruments for culture based on genetic distance, these 
instruments do not seem to perform particularly well empirically, and from a strict econometric 
viewpoint, one instrument can at most be used for one cultural variable33. The performance of genetic 
distance for regional culture might be seen as mediocre to a certain degree. Culture itself is, of course, 
also a fluid concept which depends on individual interpretation of the questions asked in surveys. 
Muthukrishna et al. (2020) argue that psychological data are dominated by samples drawn from Western, 
 





educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) nations, which limits the comparability of 
survey answers across the world. 
We employ Independence and Obedience as our cultural proxies. They are supposedly related to 
individualism (valuing achievements) and collectivism (conformity to a group), respectively. However, 
it is not yet entirely clear how diverse measures of culture relate to each other, and most of them are 
based on stated values. More generally speaking, there might be a significant (regional) difference in the 
interpretation of the values Independence and Obedience. Exploring such differences in interpretation 
might be a promising avenue for future research. We also suggest that future research should explore 
which other aspects of culture (norms, beliefs) are most favorable for economic development. We 
provide detailed information of matching regional data in Table 30 which should facilitate the 
exploration of other aspects of culture to future researchers. Thus, we propose to look more often at 
regional differences, as within-country variation turns out to be relatively important. 
Regarding policy consequences, our results suggest that certain regional cultural characteristics 
are potentially favorable for regional economic prosperity. At the same time, our results point to the 





2.6 APPENDIX CHAPTER 2 
Table 8: Data matching quality levels 
Variable Description Example 
A 
Region name in Gennaioli et al. (2014) 
exactly corresponds to WVS/EVS region. 
Gennaioli et al. (2014): Tirana; WVS: AL: 
Tirana 
B 
Region name in Gennaioli et al. (2014) is a 
very close approximation to WVS/EVS 
region. 
 
OR: Region in one dataset contains an 
additional smaller (in terms of population) 
region that is not included in the region of 
the other dataset. 
Gennaioli et al. (2014): Distrito Federal; 
WVS: MX: Zona metropolitana 
 
OR: Gennaioli et al. (2014): Ankara and 
Kirikkale; WVS: TR: Ankara (center) 
C 
Region in Gennaioli et al. (2014) is higher 
aggregated than the WVS/EVS region. 
Several WVS/EVS were summarized in 
order to exactly match the corresponding 
Gennaioli et al. (2014) region. 
Gennaioli et al. (2014): Prov. Brabant; 
EVS: BE: Vlaams Brabant, BE: Waals-
Brabant 
D 
See C, but summarized regions in 
WVS/EVS lack one or more region(s) in 
order to fully represent the corresponding 
Gennaioli et al. (2014) region. 
Gennaioli et al. (2014): Jylland; EVS: DK: 
Danmark - Midtjylland, DK: Danmark - 
Nordjylland 
E 
Region in WVS/EVS is higher aggregated 
than the Gennaioli et al. (2014) region. 
WVS/EVS data for one region is (fully) 
allocated to several regions in Gennaioli et 
al. (2014) as both dataset report an an 
official regional division. 
Gennaioli et al. (2014): Arizona, Colorado, 
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, 
Wyoming; WVS: US: Rocky Mountain 
States 
F 
See E, but WVS/EVS report an unofficial 
regional division and therefore fail to fully 
represent one or more Gennaioli et al. 
(2014) region(s). 
Gennaioli et al. (2014): Berat; Elbasan; 





Table 9: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Median Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Obs Source 
Corr w/ Ln 
(GDPregion) 
Ln(GDPregion) 
Logarithm of the gross domestic 
product per capita in a region (in 
constant 2005 PPP US$). 





Percentage of respondents in a region 
that mention “independence” as an 
important quality for children (Survey 
variable: A029). 





Percentage of respondents in a region 
that mention “obedience” as an 
important quality for children (Survey 
variable: A042). 




Trust (control set 
2) 
Percentage of respondents in a region 
that generally trust other people (Survey 
variable: A165). 





(control set 2) 
Percentage of respondents in a region 
that reported "Christian" as their 
religious denomination (answers 
include "Catholic: doesn't follow rules", 
"Christian", "Christian Fellowship", 
"Christian Reform", "Greek Catholic", 
"Other: Christian com", "Protestant", 
"Roman Catholic") (Survey variable: 
F025). 






Percentage of respondents in a region 
that reported "Muslim" as their religious 
denomination (Survey variable: F025). 





(control set 2) 
Percentage of respondents in a region 
that reported "No religion" as their 
religious denomination (Survey 
variable: F025). 









Percentage of respondents in a region 
that reported "Hindu" as their religious 
denomination (Survey variable: F025). 





(control set 2) 
Percentage of respondents in a region 
that reported "Buddhist" as their 
religious denomination (Survey 
variable: F025). 






Percentage of respondents in a region 
that reported a religious denomination 
other than Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, 
Hindu or no religion (e.g., 
Confucianism, Zionist, Taoist, 
Anglican, not availabel etc.) (Survey 
variable: F025). 






The index captures the "perceptions of 
the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies." The 
index originally ranged between -2.5 
and +2.5, with higher values indicating 
stronger governance performance, but 
was normed to range from 0 to 1. 








Rule of Law 
The index captures the “perceptions of 
the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, 
the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence”. The 
index originally ranged between -2.5 
and +2.5, with higher values indicating 
stronger governance performance, but 
was normed to range from 0 to 1. 






The index captures the "perceptions of 
the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including 
both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as "capture" of the 
state by elites and private interests." 
The index originally ranged between -
2.5 and +2.5, with higher values 
indicating stronger governance 
performance, but was normed to range 
from 0 to 1. 






The variable captures the 
(logarithmized) genetic distance to the 
South West of the United Kingdom in 
terms of the regional allele frequency 
B*27. The variable is calculated by 
substracting the allele frequency of 
B*27 in the South West of the UK from 
the allele frequency B*27 in any given 
region. The distance is given as non-
negative values (modulus |x|). 
-3.28 -3.51 0.74 -6.91 -2 1,147 
González-





Latitude of the centroid of each region 
calculated in ArcGIS. 









to coast (control 
set 1) 
The ratio of 1 over 1 plus the region's 
average distance to the nearest coastline 
in thousands of kilometres. Higher 
values for this variable indicate that a 
region is closer to the coast, smaller 
values indicate larger average distances 
to the coast. Gennaioli et al. (2014) 
create an equal distance projection of 
the Collins-Bartholomew World Digital 
Map and a map of the coastlines. With 
these two maps Gennaioli et al. (2014a) 
create a raster with the distance to the 
nearest coastline of each cell in a given 
region. In order to obtain the average 
distance to the nearest coastline, the 
authors sum the distance to the nearest 
coastline of all cells within each region 
and divide that sum by the number of 
cells in the region. 





(control set 1) 
The “malaria ecology” index of 
Kiszewski et al. (2004) measures the 
risk of being infected by Malaria. The 
index variable ranges from 0 to 39 with 
higher values indicating a higher risk 
and thus less Malaria stability. The 
index takes into account both climatic 
factors and the dominant vector species 
to give an overall measure of the 
component of malaria variation that is 
exogenous to human intervention. The 
index is calculated for grid squares of 
one half degree longitude by one half 
degree latitude. Regional averages are 
calculated via ArcGIS. 









(control set 1) 
(Logarithmized) cumulative oil, gas 
and liquid natural gas production from 
the time production began to 2000. Oil 
and liquid natural gas were collected in 
millions of barrels. Gas was collected 
in billions of cubic feet and divided by 
6 to convert to millions of barrels of oil 
equivalents. 





(control set 1) 
Logarithm of the population density 
which is measured as people per square 
kilometres in a region. 




Capital in region 
(control set 1) 
Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the 
region contains a national capital city, 0 
otherwise. 





(control set 2) 
Average years of schooling from 
primary school onwards for the 
population aged 15 years or older in a 
region. 





(control set 1) 
Monthly average of daily mean 
temperature (Celsius) averaged across 
all data points within the subnational 
region. 





Inverse of the logarithm of the 
population in a region. 





Inverse of the logarithm of the 
population in a country. 






(control set 1) 
Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the 
region is landlocked, 0 otherwise. 
1 0.57 0.50 0 1 7,493 ArcGIS -0.18 
Length coast 
(control set 1) 
Length of coast in km. 0 405 3,431 0 
103,2
25 
7,490 ArcGIS 0.09 
Border to other 
regions (control 
set 1) 
Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the 
region has a border to another region in 
a neighboring country, 0 otherwise. 






(control set 1) 
Number of borders to other countries 
incl. a region's own country border. 





CHAPTER 3 EVALUATING WATER- AND HEALTH-RELATED DEVELOPMENT 





We present a micro-based approach to evaluate the effect of water- and health-related 
development projects which can complement established evaluation methods. We collect information 
from 1.8 million individuals from DHS clusters (Demographic and Health Surveys) in 38 developing 
economies between 1986 and 2017. By geocodes, we combine cluster information with over 14,000 
subnational projects from the World Bank. We then investigate the impact of the projects employing 
fixed effects estimation techniques. Our findings indicate that the time to gather water and child 
mortality tend to decrease when projects are realized. The quality of drinking water and sanitation 
facilities are also positively affected by projects. Our data allows us to account for cluster heterogeneity, 
which is a significant extension to the cross-country literature. Various robustness checks, covering data 
and methodological refinements, support our main findings. 
 
 
JEL-Classification: O10; O22; R11 
Keywords: Evaluation; development projects; drinking water; sanitation; child mortality 
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More than 2 billion people live with high water stress and about 4 billion people suffer from 
severe water scarcity at least one month per year (UNESCO, 2019). Access to clean water is often 
considered a priority when it comes to development. Improved sanitation and improved drinking water 
are argued to have a global average benefit-cost ratio of 5.5 and 2.0 respectively (see e.g., Hutton, 2013, 
Whittington et al., 2012). The poor in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa may particularly benefit from 
investments in Water, Sanitation and Health (WASH) as they can lead to declining mortality and gains 
towards global equity (see e.g., Jeuland et al., 2013). Support for WASH from international institutions 
and development agencies gains importance. We suggest a new cross-project and micro-based approach 
to evaluate WASH project’s effectiveness and investigate mediating factors for their success or failure. 
Macro-level studies (mostly cross-country) have analyzed the effectiveness of aid on growth and 
economic outcomes.35 A growing literature turns away from the macro-perspective and follows a micro-
based approach to evaluate development interventions (Cameron et al., 2016). Economists such as Esther 
Duflo and Abhijit Banerjee (e.g., in Banerjee and Duflo, 2012, Duflo et al., 2013) are agents for this 
micro-based approach and for randomized control trials (RCT)36 to identify causal effects and assess 
the effectiveness of development projects. Nevertheless, it has been criticized that findings of RCTs 
have limited external validity (even if single projects are successful, this does not ensure success on the 
macro-level, in other countries, etc.) and unless large sums are invested, the approach is hardly scalable 
(e.g., Deaton, 2010 and Deaton and Cartwright, 2018). While long-term follow-ups of RCTs are possible 
(see e.g., Baird et al., 2016 or Bouguen et al., 2019), such studies involve considerable expenses and 
challenges. 
We present an approach that allows ex-post evaluations of multiple development projects 
worldwide from a micro perspective which can serve as a complement to standard RCTs and other 
evaluation approaches. We follow research efforts that investigated the effectiveness of development 
work in the WASH sector where data is reasonably good and readily available (Botting et al., 2010, 
Gopalan and Rajan, 2016, Wayland, 2017, Wolf, 2007) and focus on the effect of development projects 
on the following four indicators: access to and quality of drinking water, toilet types and child mortality. 
We investigate the impact of projects on welfare of individuals from across the world. This allows us to 
account for regional heterogeneity and it highlights that our evaluation approach is scalable. To elaborate 
our approach, we use data from the World Bank37 and combine it with data from various Demographic 
 
35 This literature offers contradicting results (see the literature review below and the meta-studies by Doucouliagos and Paldam, 
2009, Mekasha and Tarp, 2013). 
36 Its principle consists in randomly assigning individuals to a treatment and a control group, which guarantees that 
unobservable characteristics are not reflected in the assignment and therefore any differences can be attributed to the impact 
of the treatment. 
37 We use geocoded data from World Bank projects, due to the institution’s importance and its publicly available and 




and Health Surveys by geocode references. Thereby, we link World Bank projects with welfare 
outcomes of individuals in the vicinity of such projects and compare these individuals to others that 
could not have profited from them. We obtain a dataset that contains information on water and health-
related questions for 1.8 million individuals from 38 countries. One third of these individuals had access 
to the services of 14,301 World Bank projects.38 To our knowledge our dataset is the largest ever 
employed to evaluate effects of multiple development projects on individual welfare. Our approach can 
be extended to other agencies and national programs. 
The structure of our dataset allows us to account for time invariant unobservables with fixed 
effects at the level of clusters, which are a small geographical unit of a few square kilometers from the 
Demographic and Health Surveys. This fixed effects approach reduces bias resulting from omitted 
variable bias, which could not be avoided in cross-country or even cross-regional studies. 
Our empirical results suggest that the current and sector-independent presence of the World Bank 
through its projects has a negative and statistically significant effect on the time that individuals need to 
walk to the next drinking water source as well as the mortality of children in comparison to individuals 
that did not live in the vicinity of such projects. Projects also have a positive impact on the quality of 
drinking water and the quality of toilet facilities. Effects are stronger for World Bank projects which 
specifically target the water and sanitation sector. All results are robust to fixed effects strategies and 
various robustness tests. Regarding mechanisms, World Bank projects are more effective in relatively 
high developed clusters with well-educated individuals living in low-income countries. However, 
projects might lack sustainability as the effect of past projects is mostly dominated by the effect of 
current projects39. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the related literature, 
Section 3.3 describes data and methodology, Section 3.4 lists all results of baseline regressions and 
robustness tests as well as mechanisms and Section 3.5 offers concluding remarks. 
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
By combining data from the World Bank and Demographic and Health Surveys, we are able to 
provide a new cross-project and micro-based evaluation approach for numerous development projects 
 
38 Projects are counted by a unique identification number, which is a reference to the project type as well as the region it is 
conducted in. In most cases a project is planned to be conducted in a number of subnational regions, whereas every regional 
project (even though the setup is identical) has its own ID. 
39 As the correlation between past and current projects is approximately 0.34, we need to assume that this result is partly driven 
by the fact that current projects can be (to some extent) predicted from past projects i.e., the World Bank does not 




in different countries. Regarding our application, we extend the existing literature on the evaluation of 
development projects, in the field of water, sanitation and child health. 
The UNESCO 2019 World Water Development Report states that “access to water supply and 
sanitation services are essential to overcoming poverty and addressing various other social and 
economic inequities” (UNESCO, 2019, p.201). The World Health Organization and UNICEF (2017) 
suggest that severe economic damage due to health problems can be caused by a lack of safely managed 
drinking water services (for 29% of the global population) and safely managed sanitation services (39% 
of global population). A large array of studies have analyzed the effects of water and sanitation quality 
as well as their reachability on health indicators, such as diarrhea or maternal mortality (e.g., Benova et 
al., 2014, Norman et al., 2010, Wang and Hunter, 2010). Often, evidence is derived within regions or 
countries (Bhalotra et al. (2017) for Mexico; Boone et al. (2011) for Madagascar; Duflo et al. (2015) 
and Dwivedi et al. (2018) for India; Gross et al. (2017) for rural Benin; Koolwal and van de Walle (2013) 
for a range of developing countries; Zhang (2012) for rural China). Special attention was attracted by 
the economic effects of a reduction in water collection time on women (e.g., Gross et al., 2017, Ilahi and 
Grimard, 2000, Koolwal and van de Walle, 2013, Ray, 2007, Sorenson et al., 2011). Given past research 
efforts, recent meta studies still suggests a higher tendency of water sources in low-income countries 
and rural areas to contain fecal contamination (see the review by Bain et al., 2014) but a substantially 
lower risk of diarrheal morbidity if interventions promote point-of-use filters, high-quality piped water 
to premises, sewer connections or hand-washing with soap (see the reviews by Wolf et al., 2014, 2018). 
Potentially due to financial, political or institutional insufficiencies in low-income countries, non-
governmental organizations as well as supra-national organizations gain importance. Edwards (2015) 
and Quibria (2014) provide comprehensive overviews of literature dealing with the effectiveness of 
development aid in general. Studies are split over their findings on whether aid is effective (e.g., 
Asteriou, 2009, Clemens et al., 2012, Dalgaard et al., 2004, Fayissa and El-Kaissy, 1999, Karras, 2006, 
Kotsadam et al., 2018, Mekasha and Tarp, 2013, Minoiu and Reddy, 2010, Roodman, 2007, etc.), 
ineffective (Burnside and Dollar, 2000, 2004, Easterly, 2003, Liew et al., 2012, Malik, 2008, Moyo, 
2010, Rajan and Subramanian, 2008, etc.) or irrelevant (Bhattarai, 2016, C.-J. Dalgaard and Hansen, 
2001, Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2009, Ekanayake and Chatrna, 2010, Hansen and Tarp, 2001, etc.) for 
long-term growth. In response to such ambiguous results, Banerjee and Duflo (2012) emphasized the 
need to conduct randomized control trials (RCTs) to evaluate the effectiveness of specific policy and 
development interventions. They state that RCTs provide valuable information that can guide reforms 
and aid programs as they take all project-specific circumstances into account. Due to limited external 
validity, project success cannot be guaranteed if circumstances change. Moreover, it is expensive and 
for the case of past projects impossible to evaluate development projects on a larger scale with RCTs. 
Thus, alternative evaluation methods are relevant. We suggest an alternative approach between macro 




Amongst the vast literature on the evaluation of aid in general, there are various efforts that assess 
sector-specific aid, such as improvements in the WASH sector, on a cross-project basis: Botting et al. 
(2010) find that access to safe water is 4 to 18 times more likely in countries that receive higher Official 
Development Assistance (ODA); Hopewell and Graham (2014) find that 60-80% of the targeted 31 
cities in Sub-Sahara Africa experienced an increasing access to improved water supply and improved 
sanitation; results from Wayland (2017) indicate that households located near WASH aid projects are 
significantly more likely to use improved sources of drinking water and sanitation and are therefore 
exposed to a lower risk of water-related illnesses; Salami et al. (2014) stress the importance of 
development aid (from the African Development Bank (AfDB)) for the provision of water and sanitation 
facilities for Kenya, Burkina Faso, Madagascar and Uganda; results from Gopalan and Rajan (2016) 
suggest that development aid produces a positive effect on improved access to water supply and 
sanitation; and Wolf (2007) finds a positive association between aid volatility and outcomes in water 
and sanitation. Rutstein (2000), Woldemicael (2000), Gunther and Fink (2010), Fink et al. (2011), and 
Ezeh et al. (2014) find a negative association between the quality of sanitation and water facilities and 
the mortality of children. The results from Kotsadam et al. (2018) or Bendavid and Bhattacharya (2014) 
indicate that geographical proximity to active health aid reduces infant mortality and increases life 
expectancy. Among others, Kremer et al. (2011) and Njuguna (2019) argue that health effects can be 
realized through investments in spring protection and sanitation facilities in Kenya. We focus on 
development projects financed by the World Bank and on outcomes related to the WASH sector. 
The World Bank, being the largest financier of development aid,40 and its projects were evaluated 
by few independent impact evaluations:41 Dreher et al. (2013) examine the ex-post performance ratings 
of (politically motivated) World Bank projects; Dollar and Svensson (2000) analyze the causes of 
success or failure of adjustment programs, using a new database on 220 reform programs; Kaufmann 
and Wang (1995) investigate the relationship between economy-wide policies and the performance of 
investment projects in education and health sectors; Isham and Kaufmann (1999) test how country 
characteristics and policies affect World Bank-funded investment productivity; Kareiva et al. (2008) 
evaluate biodiversity-focused World Bank projects with regards to poverty reduction and private sector 
development; Newman et al. (2002) conducted an impact evaluation of small‐scale rural infrastructure 
projects in health, water, and education financed by the Bolivian Social Investment Fund; Wagstaff and 
Yu (2007) and Zhang (2012) investigate the effect of a health reform in China and of a major water 
quality improvement program in rural China on the health of adults and children. By combining 
information on World Bank projects with individual responses to water- and health-related questions 
 
40 See Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development Germany (2019) 
41 The World Bank Group itself has an independent evaluation function, which assesses the performance of the institution’s 
policies, projects and processes (IEG Methodology, 2019). Most certainly, this body has more insights into projects than the 




from worldwide Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), we contribute to better understanding 
whether projects were successful or not.42 
3.3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.3.1 Data and Matching 
We combine data from various Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) with World Bank 
projects based on the geographical proximity of their latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates, i.e., we 
perform matching by geocodes. 
The DHS program is implemented by ICF International and is mainly funded by the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID). Since 1984 it collects nationally-representative 
household survey data through more than 400 surveys, in more than 90 countries. Usually, sample size 
per country and year lies between 5,000 and 30,000 respondents and surveys are conducted about every 
5 years to allow comparisons over time (see ICF International (2019b) for more information). Their 
surveys are complemented with a variety of geographic information from the Geographic Information 
System (GIS), which makes it possible to merge DHS data with other datasets. 
For our analysis we use existing DHS grouping of individual respondents into geographical 
clusters, which are a representative selection of (segments of large) Enumeration Areas (EA), a statistical 
unit created as a counting unit for a census.43 Figure 4 presents an exemplary cluster in Mali taken from 
the DHS Sampling Manual (ICF International, 2012). 
  
 
42 The DHS data is frequently used to analyze health- and water-related questions. E.g., Capuno et al. (2015), Fotso et al. 
(2007), Doherty et al. (2016), Liwin and Houle (2019), Harttgen et al. (2019), Li et al. (2019) and Wang (2002) look at child 
mortality in the Philippines, South Africa, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Asian and Sub-Saharan countries, African countries and 
low-income countries. 
43 The use of DHS clusters and the individual level data therein distinguishes our approach from a recent working paper 





Figure 4: Location map of an exemplary cluster in Mali 
 
For every survey year, DHS selects a number of EAs by probability proportional to size and a 
number of households by equal probability systematic sampling (see ICF International (2012) for more 
information). Clusters are consecutively numbered, and their center is indicated through the 
specification of latitude and longitude.44 Due to changing EAs or reasons to protect the privacy of 
respondents (e.g., displacement of up to 10 km; see ICF International (2019a)) cluster coordinates might 
deviate from the coordinates of the respective cluster in the first survey year.45 The selection process of 
clusters and households by the DHS allows for a theoretically non-biased statistical analysis and the 
DHS provides arguably one of the largest, thoroughly conducted surveys in the field of demographics 
and health. We will employ data of about 1.8 million individual answers from 153 surveys in 38 
countries. 
The focus of our analysis is on the effectiveness of World Bank projects regarding individual 
welfare in a certain geographic area. Similar to the literature, we use the following four dependent 
variables to evaluate the effectiveness of World Bank projects. Firstly, we have created an index variable 
 
44 For instance, in the case of Senegal, DHS conducted nine surveys between 1992 and 2016. The country is separated into a 
maximum of 14 gapless and non-overlapping regions (which resemble Senegal’s current political regions) and further 
divided into 258 to 428 clusters for which between 6,310 and 19,441 interviews were conducted. On average this 
corresponds to around 50 respondents per cluster. 
45 Details and discussion of the panel structure of the DHS data, can be found in Exhibit 2. In a robustness check we create a 




called Quality of drinking water which recodes individual qualitative responses to the question ‘What is 
your main source of drinking water’ into numerical values reflecting the quality of drinking water. It 
ranges between 1 and 5.46 Quality of drinking water is positively correlated (0.29) with a composite for 
nightlights, which can be seen as a proxy for the development state of the area (see e.g., Henderson et 
al., 2012). We also capture individual responses to the question ‘How many minutes does it take you to 
get to the water source for drinking water?’, called Time to water. Thirdly, we introduce another index 
variable called Type of toilet, which is also recoded from a qualitative description of the used toilet 
facility into numeric values ranging from 0 to 5.47 Lastly, we want to explore the effect of the presence 
of the World Bank on child health. We employ a variable called Deceased children that summarizes 
answers to the following question related to child mortality: ‘How many of your own children (boys and 
girls) have died?’. 
In addition to our four dependent variables we add various control variables linked to geographic 
conditions (such as rainfall, temperature, distance to rivers/sea and borders, droughts, malaria 
prevalence, nightlight composite and a dummy for whether the cluster is considered to be urban or rural), 
population, average education level and age, religious shares and the relation to and gender of the 
household head. Further data descriptions, descriptive statistics and sources can be found in Table 18 
and Table 31 in the Appendix and in the Supplementary Material. 
For our analysis we use individual data for countries, for which we found ongoing or past World 
Bank activities and where we have at least two DHS survey years available. We end up with data for 38 
countries, 20 of them are lower-income, 13 are lower-middle income and 5 are upper-middle-income 
countries according to the World Bank classification, from 153 surveys, containing 1,793,783 individual 
responses to water and health specific questions. 
We merge individual responses from the DHS with data on World Bank projects between 1986 
and 201748 based on respective geocodes available in both datasets. In order to match every World 
Bank project with at least one DHS selected cluster, we allow for small deviations in their latitude and 
longitude coordinates.49 Figure 5 depicts an illustrative example for the matching procedure for one of 
 
46 For instance, rainwater is of low quality (integer equals 1) and improved drinking water that is piped into the dwelling is of 
high quality (integer equals 5). 
47 Similarly to Quality of drinking water, a qualitative description of the toilet facility was transformed into a numeric value, 
for example a flush toilet takes a value of 5. 
48 The database contains information on project sector, status, lending instrument, start and end date, board approval date etc. 
It also lists the exact project location i.e., country, region and geocodes. Regional projects are planned by the respective 
national line ministries, with support from World Bank task team leaders and other stakeholders. Projects are then signed 
off by the national ministry of finance and the World Bank. Geographic spillovers over administrative regions may occur. 
Our matching procedure is based on geocodes and not on administrative borders. More information can be found at World 
Bank (2018) or at World Bank (2013). 
49 Further details and discussion of the matching procedure can be found in Exhibit 3. Differences start from 0.05 degrees and 
gradually increase in 0.01 steps until at least one match is obtained. A 0.05 degree change in latitude always corresponds to 




the 18 regions in Angola in the survey year 2015, with support of DHS Data and ICF International 
(2012). In the exemplary region Moxico, DHS selected 32 clusters and we identified twelve clusters to 
have access to one of the three currently present World Bank projects. 
Figure 5: Illustrative mapping example for clusters in Moxico (Angola) and World Bank projects 
 
In the example we were able to identify 12 clusters to have access to one of the three World Bank 
projects at that time. Clusters with access to World Bank projects will serve as the treated group while 
the remainder serves as the non-treated group. Performing our geographic based matching, we can 
analyze 14,301 ongoing and 4,231 past World Bank projects on welfare of individuals within DHS 
clusters. 
We code a dummy variable whether a World Bank project is currently running in a cluster, i.e., 
whether it is ongoing and started at least one year before a survey was conducted, such that an individual 
could benefit from it. For further investigations we code past World Bank projects i.e., projects that have 
ended at the latest in the same year than the respective survey in the cluster. By this, we find that on 
average 26% of our respondents had access to ongoing projects and about 8% to past projects. Further, 
we distinguish between projects in the water sector and all other sectors (such as infrastructure, health, 
energy etc.).50 Lastly, we not only track the presence of a project (dummy variable), but also the number 
 
50 Usually, World Bank budgets are not 100% dedicated to a single sector. We therefore choose the sector with the highest 





of ongoing and past projects, their budgets in U.S. Dollars51 and the number of years that lie between 
the completion of a past project and the respective survey. All data can be requested from the authors 
and will be made available online once the paper is published. 
3.3.2 Identification Strategy 
We analyze whether an individual, living in a geographic DHS cluster that is close to a World 
Bank project, experiences improvements in the access to and the quality of drinking water, in sanitation 
facilities and in child mortality, compared to an individual not living in the vicinity of a World Bank 
project. 
Given our data, the empirical strategy is straightforward and employs a conventional regression 
control approach. Our baseline setting allows us to account for cluster- and time-specific heterogeneity 
by the inclusion of corresponding fixed effects. Our estimation equation to predict LIFE_QUALITY52 
of individual i in cluster c at time t is specified as follows: 
(LIFE_QUALITY)𝑖,c,𝑡 = 𝛽(𝑊𝐵𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡)c,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑿𝒊,𝐜,𝒕 + 𝜔𝑐 + 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,c,𝑡 (1) 
where WBcurrent is a dummy variable, which is 1 if individual i was interviewed in a cluster 
which is in the vicinity of an ongoing World Bank project and 0 if not. 𝑿𝒊,𝒄,𝒕 represents the vector of 
control variables and 𝜔𝑐 and 𝜋𝑡 introduce cluster and time fixed effects, respectively. Cluster fixed 
effects account for any constant cluster-specific unobservables (e.g., cluster-specific culture that 
promotes business acumen, strong village leaders promoting development rather than nepotism etc.) 
whereas time fixed effects account for contemporary global phenomena. As clusters are nested within 
countries, cluster fixed effects capture automatically all country-specific time-invariant variables. As 
such, we are able to identify the effect of World Bank projects by comparing the ceteris-paribus situation 
before and after the project. Basically, we have a Diff-in-Diff setting which analyses the differential 
effect of a treatment (i.e., World Bank project) on a treatment group (i.e., access to World Bank project) 
versus a control group (i.e., no access to World Bank project). We use a large amount of observational 
study data with the intention to complement experimental research. 𝜖𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 is an error term.53 
3.4 THE INFLUENCE OF WORLD BANK PROJECTS ON INDIVIDUAL WELFARE 
3.4.1 Main Empirical Results 
Table 10 presents the results for equation (1) regarding the effect of current World Bank projects 
on the water collection time, the quality of drinking water, the type of toilets and the number of deceased 
 
51 The World Bank reports budgets on country-level only. Therefore, we need to assume that the budget is split equally among 
regions, which leaves us with a low variation. 
52 LIFE_QUALITY is either time to water, quality of drinking water, quality of toilets or the number of deceased children. 




children, separately. We always account for a full set of fixed effects to exclude the influence of potential 
cluster- or time-specific effects. 
In regressions without control variables (specifications (1), (3), (5), (7)) we find that the presence 
of a World Bank project reduces the average walking time to the next drinking water source by 5 minutes 
and the average number of deceased children by 0.1. In addition, the presence of a World Bank project 
improves the quality of drinking water as well as the type of toilet that is being used by around 0.5 to 
0.6 points (which reflects an increase of about 10%). In all specifications the coefficients of interest are 
statistically significant. Thus, our results suggest that the presence of a World Bank project positively 
affects the quality of life of near-by individuals in comparison to an individual in a control cluster which 
did not see any World Bank project. 
In specifications (2), (4), (6) and (8) we account for a set of geography-, religion- and household-
specific control variables which are increasing the explanatory power of our model. The intention of 
their inclusion is to further reduce potential omitted variable bias. We are aware that some of our controls 
may be seen as endogenous such as, for example night time luminosity as a proxy for economic activity 
or malaria. Still, we think that reporting these correlations and including a large set of controls is of 
value to the reader. Reassuringly, results are robust with or without the inclusion of controls as well as 
when different subsets of controls are included (results not shown). We face a reduction of observations, 
as not all control variables are available for all individuals. Our main findings remain statistically 
significant with somewhat smaller magnitudes. We observe that World Bank projects contribute to a 
reduction of time to water (3 minutes) and deceased children54 (0.02 children) and an increase of the 
quality of drinking water (0.11) and the type of toilet (0.06). 
 
54 It might be that the variable includes children that have died decades ago, when the World Bank hadn’t even started to fund 
such projects. We tested our results for different age subsamples (11-25; 26-35; 36-45; older than 45). We do not expect 
younger generations (younger than 35) to have lost children decades ago, but still observe a significant effect of World Bank 
projects on the number of deceased children if no further covariates are included (potentially because they significantly 




Table 10: Baseline regressions for the effect of current World Bank projects on time to water, quality of drinking water, type of toilet and number of 



























Current World Bank 
Project Dummy 
-4.810*** -2.962*** 0.596*** 0.114*** 0.533*** 0.056* -0.107*** -0.017** 
(0.297) (0.716) (0.018) (0.033) (0.016) (0.031) (0.004) (0.007) 
Nightlights_Composite 
  -0.128**   0.033***   0.021***   -0.003*** 
  (0.061)   (0.003)   (0.004)   (0.001) 
Pop 
  0.000   0.00000***   0.00000***   -0.00000*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Pop_density 
  0.0002**   -0.00001***   0.00002***   -0.00000* 
  (0.0001)   (0.000)   (0.00001)   (0.000) 
Drought_Episodes 
  -0.079   -0.001   0.009*   0.002* 
  (0.139)   (0.006)   (0.005)   (0.001) 
Malaria_2000_2015 
  -2.918**   -0.09   0.212***   -0.014 
  (1.322)   (0.067)   (0.05)   (0.011) 
Proximity_to_National_ 
Borders 
  0.000   -0.00000**   0.000   -0.00000*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Proximity_to_Water 
  0.000   -0.00000***   -0.00000***   0.00000*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Rainfall_1985_2015 
  -0.001   -0.0003***   0.0001***   -0.00002** 
  (0.001)   (0.00004)   (0.00004)   (0.00001) 
Jan_Dec_Temp 
  0.667***   0.036***   -0.041***   0.004** 
  (0.134)   (0.007)   (0.006)   (0.001) 
Urban 
  -7.248***   1.275***   0.932***   -0.148*** 
  (0.625)   (0.037)   (0.034)   (0.007) 
Years_educ 
  0.115***   0.007***   0.012***   -0.014*** 
  (0.034)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001) 




  (0.007)   (0.0003)   (0.0003)   (0.0003) 
Relation_Household_ 
head 
  -0.048*   0.008***   0.022***   0.002*** 
  (0.028)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.0004) 
Gender_household_ 
head 
  -0.417**   -0.037***   0.073***   0.028*** 
  (0.172)   (0.006)   (0.007)   (0.003) 
Christian 
  1.042***   -0.055***   -0.049***   0.029*** 
  (0.325)   (0.011)   (0.01)   (0.005) 
Muslim 
  0.156   0.026   0.008   0.089*** 
  (0.445)   (0.018)   (0.018)   (0.007) 
No_religion 
  1.717**   -0.275***   -0.436***   0.084*** 
  (0.808)   (0.033)   (0.03)   (0.013) 
Traditional 
  1.787*   -0.245***   -0.457***   0.158*** 
  (0.958)   (0.045)   (0.051)   (0.029) 
Cluster FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,368,255 244,498 1,596,132 284,508 1,742,308 293,810 1,793,783 301,728 
R² 0.329 0.374 0.459 0.585 0.417 0.444 0.091 0.228 

















F Statistic 21.83*** 15.95*** 39.29*** 42.79*** 35.69*** 25.04*** 5.128*** 9.508*** 
Note: The regressions estimate the effect of the existence of a current World Bank Project on four dependent variables: time to water, quality of 
drinking water, type of toilet, deceased children. Regressions are run with the full dataset without and with the full set of control variables as well as 
cluster and time fixed effects. Robust clustered standard error estimates (Cluster-level) are presented below the coefficients. The omitted category for 




Given our evaluation approach and the size of our dataset, we briefly refer to some potentially 
interesting covariates. There are a few covariates that seem to have a significant influence on our 
variables in question: nightlights composite seems to be an indicator for the development status of the 
cluster, as higher nightlights reduce time to water and the number of deceased children and it increases 
the quality of drinking water and the type of toilet. Similar correlations hold for individuals living in 
urban areas. Higher malaria prevalence (linked to humidity of the area), lower average yearly 
temperature and a male head of the household (potentially linked to a higher income) are related to a 
lower walking time to the next drinking water source. Higher education is negatively related to the 
number of diseased children and positively related to the quality of drinking water and the type of toilet, 
pointing to potential selection effects of the educated. Religious affiliations of the questioned individuals 
show associations with all four dependent variables. 
In addition to the presence of a World Bank project (indicated by a dummy variable), we conduct 
the same set of regressions as in Table 10 for the number of current World Bank projects instead of the 
pure presence of one or more projects. Table 11 shows that the number of projects has a statistically 
significant effect on the quality of life of individuals. For every additional project in the cluster, time to 
water is reduced by 1 minute, the quality of drinking water and the quality of toilet is increased by 0.16 
and the number of deceased children is reduced by 0.03 when no additional controls apart from fixed 
effects are added. The case with control variables still shows significant results (except for child 
mortality) but with smaller magnitudes. Thus, more projects are associated with higher outcomes. The 
reduced magnitude of the coefficients in comparison to Table 10 suggests that not only the number of 
projects is of relevance but potentially the pure presence of the World Bank with one project can help 
to induce positive effects. Under the assumption that our fixed effects strategy captures all relevant 
confounding factors, World Bank projects causally affect the time to water sources, the quality of 
drinking water and the type of toilets, while there is no statistically significant relationship with the 




Table 11: Baseline regressions for the effect of the number of World Bank projects on time to water, quality of drinking water, type of toilet and number 

















Type of toilet 
(6) 







No of Current World 
Bank Projects 
-1.043*** -0.760*** 0.164*** 0.037*** 0.164*** 0.031*** -0.027*** 0.001 
(0.079) (0.231) (0.006) (0.012) (0.005) (0.012) (0.001) (0.003) 
Nightlights_Composite 
  -0.114*   0.032***   0.020***   -0.003*** 
  (0.062)   (0.003)   (0.004)   (0.001) 
Pop 
  0.000   0.00000***   0.00000***   -0.00000*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Pop_density 
  0.0002**   -0.00001***   0.00002***   -0.00000* 
  (0.0001)   (0.000)   (0.00001)   (0.000) 
Drought_Episodes 
  -0.098   -0.0001   0.009*   0.002* 
  (0.138)   (0.006)   (0.005)   (0.001) 
Malaria_2000_2015 
  -2.889**   -0.094   0.207***   -0.014 
  (1.318)   (0.067)   (0.049)   (0.011) 
Proximity_to_ 
National_Borders 
  0.000   -0.00000**   0.000   -0.00000*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Proximity_to_Water 
  0.000   -0.00000***   -0.00000**   0.00000*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Rainfall_1985_2015 
  -0.001   -0.0003***   0.0001***   -0.00002*** 
  (0.001)   (0.00004)   (0.00004)   (0.00001) 
Jan_Dec_Temp 
  0.685***   0.035***   -0.042***   0.004** 
  (0.134)   (0.007)   (0.006)   (0.001) 
Urban 
  -7.647***   1.287***   0.931***   -0.153*** 
  (0.611)   (0.036)   (0.034)   (0.007) 
Years_educ 
  0.116***   0.007***   0.012***   -0.014*** 





  -0.008   0.002***   0.005***   0.032*** 
  (0.007)   (0.0003)   (0.0003)   (0.0003) 
Relation_Household_ 
head 
  -0.049*   0.008***   0.022***   0.002*** 
  (0.029)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.0004) 
Gender_household_ 
head 
  -0.415**   -0.037***   0.073***   0.028*** 
  (0.172)   (0.006)   (0.007)   (0.003) 
Christian 
  1.050***   -0.055***   -0.049***   0.029*** 
  (0.326)   (0.011)   (0.01)   (0.005) 
Muslim 
  0.154   0.026   0.008   0.089*** 
  (0.445)   (0.018)   (0.018)   (0.007) 
No_religion 
  1.717**   -0.275***   -0.436***   0.084*** 
  (0.807)   (0.033)   (0.03)   (0.013) 
Traditional 
  1.833*   -0.246***   -0.457***   0.158*** 
  (0.954)   (0.044)   (0.051)   (0.029) 
Cluster FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,368,255 244,498 1,596,132 284,508 1,742,308 293,810 1,793,783 301,728 
R² 0.328 0.374 0.457 0.585 0.418 0.445 0.090 0.228 

















F Statistic 21.74*** 15.93*** 38.99*** 42.77*** 35.78*** 25.05*** 5.104*** 9.506*** 
Note: The regressions estimate the effect of the number of current World Bank Projects on four dependent variables: time to water, quality of drinking 
water, type of toilet, deceased children. Regressions are run with the full dataset without and with the full set of control variables as well as cluster and 
time fixed effects. Robust clustered standard error estimates (Cluster-level) are presented below the coefficients.  The omitted category for the religious 





Our main results are largely consistent with the literature (see e.g., Botting et al., 2010, Gopalan 
and Rajan, 2016 and Wayland, 2017 who all run country-level analyses for individual instead of cluster 
level analyses55). We systematically extend and refine existing analyses and show that past results are 
upheld in a more conservative setting at cluster-level with a large set of fixed effects. 
For now, we looked at all World Bank projects – independent of their target sector e.g., water and 
sanitation, infrastructure, health, etc. The fact that our findings are sector-independent suggests that the 
pure presence and visibility of the World Bank in certain clusters may have spillover effects on the four 
water and health related indicators we are interested in. 
3.4.2 Robustness Tests 
In Table 12 we present the results for different robustness tests. They provide overall support for 
the previously found links between the presence of the World Bank and our four dependent variables 
for individual welfare, although statistical significance is in some cases not achieved when additional 
covariates are entered next to the fixed effects. 
From survey year to survey year clusters do not have precisely the same latitude and longitude in 
some instances which might affect the precision of our matching procedure. Such deviations tend to be 
small and can be associated with changes in subnational administration units or the protection of the 
privacy56 of respondents and household members by DHS. For a first robustness test presented in row 
(1), we create a subsample that contains only those clusters that deviate to a maximum of 10% from the 
latitude of the first survey year. Our results are robust for this reduced set of comparable clusters with a 
small decrease of magnitude for the case without controls (1) and an even smaller change in coefficients 
for the case with controls (2). 
Next, we substitute the cluster fixed effects with administrative region-time (row 2) and country-
time (row 3) fixed effects, respectively. The empirical results reveal again a robust negative relationship 
between World Bank projects and time to water and number of deceased children and a positive 
relationship with quality of drinking water and type of toilet. Quantitatively, coefficients tend to be 
slightly reduced in the setting with region-time fixed effects but increased in the setting with country-
time fixed effects. 
In row (4), we are looking at the influence of the target sector the World Bank operates in. All 
previous results have shown that any project, independent of its sector, has an effect on individual 
welfare. We now investigate if this holds when investigating only water related projects (e.g., building 
 
55 The country-level perspective of these studies limits their observations to a few hundred. Due to our cluster focus we are 
able to include close to 2 million observations which is a multiple of several thousands. 
56 Through the displacement of EAs in urban areas by up to two kilometers and up to five kilometers for rural EAs, with one 
percent of randomly selected rural clusters displaced by a distance of up to ten kilometers, DHS ensures that neither the 




reservoir dam, installing sewage systems etc.). Coefficients are statistically significant in estimations 
without additional controls. The effect of water projects in regressions without controls is higher than in 
our baseline regressions. Thus, World Bank projects seem to achieve their aims.57 
We also explore whether results vary if we consider answers of female respondents only (row 5). 
The literature argues that women often tend to be a target group and therefore might benefit more from 
water-related development projects. We are looking at surveys that questioned only women, assuming 
that the effect of projects for female respondents might be higher, especially for the variable time to 
water (e.g., Gross et al., 2017, Ilahi and Grimard, 2000, Koolwal and van de Walle, 2013, Ray, 2007, 
Sorenson et al., 2011). We observe a relevant drop in the number of observations, as the DHS data does 
not provide gender information on a respondent’s basis. Instead, we can distinguish only between the 
fact that the survey targets both sexes (dummy equals 0) or women only (dummy equals 1). Our previous 
results emerge in cases without additional control variables. Thus, our results do not allow us to conclude 
that women or men profit more from World Bank projects. Lastly, we add a linear and a quadratic time 
trend to our regression (consequently dropping time fixed effects) and receive again support of our 
baseline results with only minor changes in coefficients for our four dependent variables. In addition, 
we have three observations: first, in the presence of all control variables, the reduction in time to water 
through World Bank intervention is even higher (by 1.12 minutes) with the passing of time. However, 
indicated by a significantly positive quadratic time trend (0.02), this reinforcing effect occurs only for a 
few years and is weakened or even reversed afterwards. The same logic holds for the improvement of 
toilet facilities, with a positive coefficient of the linear time trend (0.03) and a negative quadratic time 
trend (-0.001); second, independent of the inclusion of control variables, we observe that the positive 
effect of World Bank projects on the quality of drinking water is weakened over time (between 0.01 and 
0.04). Our results suggest that this relation is non-linear, as indicated by a significantly positive 
coefficient of between 0.001 and 0.002 for the quadratic time trend; and third, regarding the number of 
deceased children, we obtain ambiguous results for the effect of time, as we observe a changing sign for 
the linear trend (from -0.007 to 0.005), but a consistently negative coefficient of the quadratic term (-
0.0001 and -0.0004). 
In a similar manner, we provide the same robustness tests for the number of current World Bank 
projects presented in  
Table 13. In most cases we see the results of our baseline regressions with the full dataset (Table 
11) confirmed, with only a few previously significant results to be sensitive towards the inclusion of 
control variables. In case (1), where we excluded clusters with a large deviation in latitude and longitude 
over time, we observe that improvements of the reachability and quality of drinking water, the quality 
 
57 If we add both dummies to the specification (i.e., any World Bank project and water related World Bank project) our results 
for water projects remain robust with slightly lower coefficients. In almost all cases (except for the specification with time 




of toilet facilities and the number of deceased children are slightly smaller than depicted in Table 11 
(especially in specifications without further covariates). The same holds for case (2) with the substitution 
of cluster and time fixed effects with region-time fixed effects. The substitution with country-time fixed 
effects (case (3)) on the other hand leads to an increase in the coefficient’s magnitude, which could be 
due to the less stringent estimation setting. In case (4) we focus on the impact of the number of World 
Bank projects in the field of water and sanitation and similarly to regressions with the respective dummy 
variable (reflecting the presence of a currently ongoing World Bank project) we observe an even stronger 
improvement of the four variables in question. Considering surveys with female respondents only (case 
(5)) we find that results of specifications without controls are very similar to corresponding results in 
Table 11. However, after the inclusion of further covariates we end up with insignificant results, which 
might be due to the considerable drop in observations. Lastly, we include a linear and quadratic time 





Table 12: Robustness tests for the effect of current World Bank projects on four selected water and health indicators 
  Test Description Variable 
Results for Current World Bank (Water) 
Project Dummy 
        
(1) 
FE and no controls 
(2) 
FE and all controls 
(1) Comparable Clusters 
Some cluster's latitude and longitude (e.g., 
cluster number 1 in Egypt) show a 
significant deviation from the latitude and 
longitude reported in the first survey year 
(due to change of borders, protection of 
exact individual's location etc.). We create 
a subsample with clusters that deviate to a 
maximum of 10% from the first survey 
year in order to have a set of comparable 
clusters and conduct baseline regressions 
with cluster fixed effects and clustered 
standard errors on cluster-level. 
Time to water 
Confirmed 
-3.296*** (0.415) -2.812** (1.217) 
895,014 143,255 
Quality of drinking 
water 
Confirmed 
0.496*** (0.024) 0.084* (0.048) 
1,062,392 164,609 
Type of toilet 
Confirmed for the case without controls 









We conduct baseline regressions with 
region-time fixed effects and clustered 
standard errors on region-level. 
Time to water 
Confirmed 
-3.549*** (0.498) -3.120*** (0.664) 
1,368,255 244,498 
Quality of drinking 
water 
Confirmed 
0.423*** (0.027) 0.147*** (0.039) 
1,596,132 284,508 
Type of toilet 
Confirmed 













We conduct baseline regressions with 
country-time fixed effects and clustered 
standard errors on country-level. 
Time to water 
Confirmed 
-5.015*** (1.085) -2.894*** (0.923) 
1,368,255 244,498 
Quality of drinking 
water 
Confirmed 
0.669*** (0.071) 0.166*** (0.058) 
1,596,132 284,508 
Type of toilet 
Confirmed 




-0.109*** (0.013) -0.014*** (0.005) 
1,793,783 301,728 
(4) 
Water World Bank 
Projects 
Previous regressions consider the sector-
independent presence of a World Bank 
project. Here, we conduct baseline 
regressions with current World Bank 
projects in the field of water, sanitation and 
sewage. We include cluster fixed effects 
and clustered standard errors on cluster-
level. 
Time to water 
Confirmed 
-5.605*** (0.428) -5.609*** (0.930) 
1,368,255 244,498 
Quality of drinking 
water 
Confirmed for the case without controls 
0.624*** (0.028) 0.009 (0.045) 
1,596,132 284,508 
Type of toilet 
Confirmed for the case without controls 
0.525*** (0.026) -0.037 (0.046) 
1,742,308 293,810 
Deceased children 
Confirmed for the case without controls 







We create a subsample with surveys that 
report answers of female interviewees only 
and conduct baseline regressions with 
cluster fixed effects and clustered standard 
errors on cluster-level. 
Time to water 
Confirmed for the case without controls 
-2.721*** (0.611) -1.370 (2.785) 
296,306 32,598 
Quality of drinking 
water 
Confirmed for the case without controls 
0.484*** (0.048) -0.007 (0.092) 
426,161 50,251 
Type of toilet 
Confirmed for the case without controls 
0.438*** (0.040) 0.107 (0.074) 
467,137 52,215 
Deceased children 
Confirmed for the case without controls 
-0.063*** (0.008) -0.019 (0.016) 
481,511 53,132 
(6) Time trends 
We conduct baseline regressions with 
linear and squared time trends (without 
time fixed effects). 
Time to water 
Confirmed 
-4.779*** (0.293) -3.806*** (0.721) 
1,368,255 244,498 
Quality of drinking 
water 
Confirmed 
0.577*** (0.018) 0.158*** (0.032) 
1,596,132 284,508 
Type of toilet 
Confirmed 




-0.105*** (0.004) -0.013* (0.007) 
1,793,783 301,728 
Note: The regressions estimate the effect of the existence of a current World Bank (water) project on four dependent variables (time to water, quality of 
drinking water, type of toilet, deceased children) for a number of robustness checks including fixed effects and robust clustered standard error 
estimates; Coefficients (Clustered Std. Errors) for specifications without controls are reported in columns (1), whereas coefficients (Clustered Std. 
errors) for specifications with all control variables are reported in columns (2); The number of observations is listed below the respective coefficient 
(Clustered Std. Error). Control variables are: Nightlights_Composite, Pop, Pop_density, Drought_Episodes, Malaria_2000_2015, 
Proximity_to_National_Borders, Proximity_to_Water, Rainfall_1985_2015, Jan_Dec_Temp, Urban, Years_educ, Age, Relation_Household_head, 
Gender_household_head, Christian, Muslim, No_religion, Traditional. The omitted category for the religious denomination is "Other". Significance 





Table 13: Robustness tests for the effect of the number of current World Bank projects on four selected water and health indicators 
  Test Description Variable 
Results for Number of Current World Bank 
(Water) Projects 
        
(1) 
FE and no controls 
(2) 
FE and all controls 
(1) Comparable Clusters 
Some cluster's latitude and longitude (e.g., 
cluster number 1 in Egypt) show a 
significant deviation from the latitude and 
longitude reported in the first survey year 
(due to change of borders, protection of 
exact individual's location etc.). We create 
a subsample with clusters that deviate to a 
maximum of 10% from the first survey 
year in order to have a set of comparable 
clusters and conduct baseline regressions 
with cluster fixed effects and clustered 
standard errors on cluster-level. 
Time to water 
Confirmed 
-0.573*** (0.082) -0.746* (0.399) 
895,014 143,255 
Quality of drinking 
water 
Confirmed 
0.109*** (0.006) 0.030** (0.016) 
1,062,392 164,609 
Type of toilet 
Confirmed 
0.122*** (0.006) 0.029* (0.016) 
1,166,117 169,372 
Deceased children 
Confirmed for the case without controls 





We conduct baseline regressions with 
region-time fixed effects and clustered 
standard errors on region-level. 
Time to water 
Confirmed 
-0.857*** (0.198) -0.745** (0.337) 
1,368,255 244,498 
Quality of drinking 
water 
Confirmed 
0.123*** (0.016) 0.047*** (0.014) 
1,596,132 284,508 
Type of toilet 
Confirmed 
0.122*** (0.013) 0.028*** (0.016) 
1,742,308 293,810 
Deceased children 
Confirmed for the case without controls 









We conduct baseline regressions with 
country-time fixed effects and clustered 
standard errors on country-level. 
Time to water 
Confirmed for the case without controls 
-1.195*** (0.388) -0.618 (0.497) 
1,368,255 244,498 
Quality of drinking 
water 
Confirmed 
0.196*** (0.038) 0.054*** (0.016) 
1,596,132 284,508 
Type of toilet 
Confirmed 
0.191*** (0.024) 0.038** (0.018) 
1,742,308 293,810 
Deceased children 
Confirmed for the case without controls 
-0.030*** (0.005) -0.001 (0.002) 
1,793,783 301,728 
(4) 
Water World Bank 
Projects 
Previous regressions consider the sector-
independent presence of a World Bank 
project. Here, we conduct baseline 
regressions with current World Bank 
projects in the field of water, sanitation and 
sewage. We include cluster fixed effects 
and clustered standard errors on cluster-
level. 
Time to water 
Confirmed 
-2.320*** (0.208) -2.848*** (0.549) 
1,368,255 244,498 
Quality of drinking 
water 
Confirmed for the case without controls 
0.275*** (0.014) 0.011 (0.022) 
1,596,132 284,508 
Type of toilet 
Confirmed for the case without controls 
0.262*** (0.012) -0.035 (0.023) 
1,742,308 293,810 
Deceased children 
Confirmed for the case without controls 







We create a subsample with with surveys 
that report answers of female interviewees 
only and conduct baseline regressions with 
cluster fixed effects and clustered standard 
errors on cluster-level. 
Time to water 
Confirmed for the case without controls 
-1.370*** (0.306) -0.554 (0.944) 
296,306 32,598 
Quality of drinking 
water 
Confirmed for the case without controls 
0.169*** (0.014) -0.013 (0.027) 
426,161 50,251 
Type of toilet 
Confirmed for the case without controls 
0.162*** (0.013) 0.038 (0.028) 
467,137 52,215 
Deceased children 
Confirmed for the case without controls 
-0.019*** (0.003) 0.004 (0.006) 
481,511 53,132 
(6) Time trends 
We conduct baseline regressions with 
linear and squared time trends (without 
time fixed effects). 
Time to water 
Confirmed 
-1.042*** (0.080) -1.020*** (0.244) 
1,368,255 244,498 
Quality of drinking 
water 
Confirmed 
0.160*** (0.006) 0.045*** (0.011) 
1,596,132 284,508 
Type of toilet 
Confirmed for the case without controls 
0.157*** (0.005) 0.019 (0.012) 
1,742,308 293,810 
Deceased children 
Confirmed for the case without controls 
-0.026*** (0.001) 0.002 (0.003) 
1,793,783 301,728 
Note: The regressions estimate the effect of the number of current World Bank (water) projects on four dependent variables (time to water, quality of 
drinking water, type of toilet, deceased children) for a number of robustness checks including fixed effects and robust clustered standard error 
estimates; Coefficients (Clustered Std. Errors) for specifications without controls are reported in columns (1), whereas coefficients (Clustered Std. 
errors) for specifications with all control variables are reported in columns (2); The number of observations is listed below the respective coefficient 
(Clustered Std. Error). Control variables are: Nightlights_Composite, Pop, Pop_density, Drought_Episodes, Malaria_2000_2015, 
Proximity_to_National_Borders, Proximity_to_Water, Rainfall_1985_2015, Jan_Dec_Temp, Urban, Years_educ, Age, Relation_Household_head, 
Gender_household_head, Christian, Muslim, No_religion, Traditional. The omitted category for the religious denomination is "Other". Significance 






Mediation effects of education and economic activity 
Past literature has outlined that the effectiveness of aid is dependent on the general state of 
development in the considered area (see e.g., Burnside and Dollar, 2000, Collier and Dollar, 2002, 
Chauvet and Guillaumont, 2003, etc.). Assuming that the effectiveness of World Bank projects is also 
dependent on the state of development, we explore potential mediating effects of three different 
development indicators (education, nightlights and income) in Table 14. We start by separating our 
sample into highly educated individuals (years of schooling equal or above sample mean) and 
individuals with low education in rows (1) and (2) of Table 14 respectively. All previous results emerge 
for individuals with low and high education. Comparing the coefficients suggests that individuals with 
a higher education may benefit more from World Bank projects as they tend to have significantly shorter 
ways to the next drinking water source than less educated individuals. For the other three variables, 
quality of drinking water, type of toilet and number of deceased children, we find no tangible difference, 
whereas results for the latter are mostly insignificant in the presence of control variables. 
Next, we explore whether World Bank projects are more beneficial for individuals living in 
clusters with a high (equal or above sample median) or a low nightlights composite in rows (3) and (4), 
respectively. We see a tendency for all our four variables, that World Bank projects tend to be more 
successful in ‘brighter’ clusters. 
Previous results are also confirmed when we go from the development state of clusters (expressed 
in terms of nightlights) to the development state of countries and distinguish between low- and middle-
income countries (rows 5 and 6). In all regressions without controls we find higher coefficients for 





Table 14: First mechanism testing the effect of current World Bank projects on four selected water and health indicators for clusters in different 
development states (expressed in terms of education, nightlights and income) 
  Test Description Variable 
Results for Current World Bank Project 
Dummy 
        
(1) 
FE and no controls 
(2) 
FE and all controls 
(1) High education 
We create a subsample with individuals 
that have years of schooling equal to or 
above the mean for the entire sample and 
conduct baseline regressions with cluster 
fixed effects and clustered standard errors 
on cluster-level. 
Time to water 
Confirmed 
-5.851*** (0.415) -3.071*** (0.880) 
408,493 109,593 
Quality of drinking 
water 
Confirmed 
0.586*** (0.021) 0.106*** (0.039) 
469,265 129,501 
Type of toilet 
Confirmed for the case without controls 
0.422*** (0.017) 0.059 (0.037) 
519,513 134,329 
Deceased children 
Confirmed for the case without controls 
-0.052*** (0.004) -0.006 (0.009) 
536,597 137,991 
(2) Low education 
We create a subsample with individuals 
that have year's of schooling below the 
mean for the entire sample and conduct 
baseline regressions with cluster fixed 
effects and clustered standard errors on 
cluster-level. 
Time to water 
Confirmed 
-4.944*** (0.291) -2.664*** (0.740) 
529,181 134,905 
Quality of drinking 
water 
Confirmed 
0.608*** (0.020) 0.115*** (0.035) 
598,501 155,007 
Type of toilet 
Confirmed 










(3) High nightlights 
We create a subsample with individuals 
that have a nightlights composite equal to 
or above the mean for the entire sample and 
conduct baseline regressions with cluster 
fixed effects and clustered standard errors 
on cluster-level. 
Time to water 
Confirmed for the case with controls 
-2.590*** (0.405) -1.980 (1.259) 
577,233 110,688 
Quality of drinking 
water 
Confirmed 
0.322*** (0.025) 0.141** (0.066) 
727,862 130,383 
Type of toilet 
Confirmed 
0.364*** (0.025) 0.163** (0.071) 
818,599 137,853 
Deceased children 
Confirmed for the case with controls 
-0.049*** (0.005) -0.015 (0.013) 
845,622 141,703 
(4) Low nightlights 
We create a subsample with individuals 
that have a nightlights composite below the 
mean for the entire sample and conduct 
baseline regressions with cluster fixed 
effects and clustered standard errors on 
cluster-level. 
Time to water 
Confirmed 
-2.272*** (0.651) -2.453* (1.440) 
695,428 133,810 
Quality of drinking 
water 
Confirmed for the case without controls 
0.108*** (0.030) 0.072 (0.058) 
781,702 154,125 
Type of toilet 
Confirmed for the case without controls 











Lower middle income 
and higher middle 
income 
We create a subsample with countries that 
are classified as lower-middle or higher-
middle-income-countries and conduct 
baseline regressions with cluster fixed 
effects and clustered standard errors on 
cluster-level. 
Time to water 
Confirmed 
-3.435*** (0.617) -2.056* (1.132) 
424,488 90,869 
Quality of drinking 
water 
Confirmed 
0.427*** (0.028) 0.271*** (0.072) 
527,653 92,670 
Type of toilet 
Confirmed 
0.513*** (0.031) 0.308*** (0.072) 
616,716 100,262 
Deceased children 
Confirmed for the case without controls 
-0.079*** (0.007) -0.006 (0.013) 
635,145 103,134 
(6) Low-income countries 
We create a subsample with countries that 
are classified as low-income-countries and 
conduct baseline regressions with cluster 
fixed effects and clustered standard errors 
on cluster-level. 
Time to water 
Confirmed 
-5.366*** (0.371) -3.348*** (0.908) 
801,309 153,629 
Quality of drinking 
water 
Confirmed for the case without controls 
0.692*** (0.023) 0.031 (0.036) 
920,341 191,838 
Type of toilet 
Confirmed for the case without controls 




-0.126*** (0.005) -0.022*** (0.008) 
961,519 198,594 
Note: The regressions estimate the effect of the existence of a current World Bank project on four dependent variables (time to water, quality of 
drinking water, type of toilet, deceased children) for a number of subsets including fixed effects and robust clustered standard error estimates; 
Coefficients (Clustered Std. Errors) for specifications without controls are reported in columns (1), whereas coefficients (Clustered Std. errors) for 
specifications with all control variables are reported in columns (2); The number of observations is listed below the respective coefficient (Clustered 
Std. Error). Control variables are: Nightlights_Composite, Pop, Pop_density, Drought_Episodes, Malaria_2000_2015, Proximity_to_National_Borders, 
Proximity_to_Water, Rainfall_1985_2015, Jan_Dec_Temp, Urban, Years_educ, Age, Relation_Household_head, Gender_household_head, Christian, 






Table 15: First mechanism testing the effect of the number of current World Bank projects on four selected water and health indicators for clusters in 
different development states (expressed in terms of education, nightlights and income) 
  Test Description Variable 
Results for Number of Current World Bank 
Projects 
        
(1) 
FE and no controls 
(2) 
FE and all controls 
(1) High education 
We create a subsample with individuals 
that have years of schooling equal to or 
above the mean for the entire sample and 
conduct baseline regressions with cluster 
fixed effects and clustered standard errors 
on cluster-level. 
Time to water 
Confirmed 
-1.169*** (0.090) -0.912*** (0.287) 
408,493 109,593 
Quality of drinking 
water 
Confirmed 
0.153*** (0.007) 0.031** (0.014) 
469,265 129,501 
Type of toilet 
Confirmed 
0.128*** (0.005) 0.025* (0.014) 
519,513 134,329 
Deceased children 
Confirmed for the case without controls 
-0.013*** (0.001) 0.002 (0.003) 
536,597 137,991 
(2) Low education 
We create a subsample with individuals 
that have years of schooling below the 
mean for the entire sample and conduct 
baseline regressions with cluster fixed 
effects and clustered standard errors on 
cluster-level. 
Time to water 
Confirmed 
-1.014*** (0.074) -0.599** (0.240) 
529,181 134,905 
Quality of drinking 
water 
Confirmed 
0.150*** (0.007) 0.040*** (0.012) 
598,501 155,007 
Type of toilet 
Confirmed 
0.143*** (0.005) 0.036*** (0.013) 
676,336 159,481 
Deceased children 
Confirmed for the case without controls 






(3) High nightlights 
We create a subsample with individuals 
that have a nightlights composite equal to 
or above the median for the entire sample 
and conduct baseline regressions with 
cluster fixed effects and clustered standard 
errors on cluster-level. 
Time to water 
Confirmed 
-0.474*** (0.072) -0.698* (0.358) 
577,233 110,688 
Quality of drinking 
water 
Confirmed 
0.086*** (0.005) 0.042*** (0.016) 
727,862 130,383 
Type of toilet 
Confirmed 
0.107*** (0.006) 0.061*** (0.018) 
818,599 137,853 
Deceased children 
Confirmed for the case with controls 
-0.010*** (0.001) -0.004 (0.004) 
845,622 141,703 
(4) Low nightlights 
We create a subsample with individuals 
that have a nightlights composite below the 
median for the entire sample and conduct 
baseline regressions with cluster fixed 
effects and clustered standard errors on 
cluster-level. 
Time to water 
Confirmed for the case without controls 
-0.761*** (0.288) -0.555 (0.731) 
695,428 133,810 
Quality of drinking 
water 
Confirmed for the case without controls 
0.045*** (0.016) 0.007 (0.033) 
781,702 154,125 
Type of toilet 
Confirmed for the case without controls 
0.054*** (0.014) -0.016 (0.025) 
824,080 155,957 
Deceased children 
Confirmed for the case without controls 







Lower middle income 
and higher middle 
income 
We create a subsample with countries that 
are classified as lower-middle or higher-
middle-income-countries and conduct 
baseline regressions with cluster fixed 
effects and clustered standard errors on 
cluster-level. 
Time to water 
Confirmed 
-0.762*** (0.111) -0.680* (0.358) 
424,488 90,869 
Quality of drinking 
water 
Confirmed 
0.113*** (0.008) 0.052** (0.024) 
527,653 92,670 
Type of toilet 
Confirmed 
0.156*** (0.010) 0.056** (0.024) 
616,716 100,262 
Deceased children 
Confirmed for the case without controls 
-0.017*** (0.002) 0.006 (0.005) 
635,145 103,134 
(6) Low-income countries 
We create a subsample with countries that 
are classified as low-income-countries and 
conduct baseline regressions with cluster 
fixed effects and clustered standard errors 
on cluster-level. 
Time to water 
Confirmed 
-1.315*** (0.122) -0.680** (0.312) 
801,309 153,629 
Quality of drinking 
water 
Confirmed 
0.219*** (0.010) 0.027** (0.013) 
920,341 191,838 
Type of toilet 
Confirmed 




-0.035*** (0.002) -0.006* (0.003) 
961,519 198,594 
Note: The regressions estimate the effect of the number of current World Bank projects on four dependent variables (time to water, quality of drinking 
water, type of toilet, deceased children) for a number of robustness checks including fixed effects and robust clustered standard error estimates; 
Coefficients (Clustered Std. Errors) for specifications without controls are reported in columns (1), whereas coefficients (Clustered Std. errors) for 
specifications with all control variables are reported in columns (2); The number of observations is listed below the respective coefficient (Clustered 
Std. Error). Control variables are: Nightlights_Composite, Pop, Pop_density, Drought_Episodes, Malaria_2000_2015, Proximity_to_National_Borders, 
Proximity_to_Water, Rainfall_1985_2015, Jan_Dec_Temp, Urban, Years_educ, Age, Relation_Household_head, Gender_household_head, Christian, 






Table 15 reveals results for the varying intensity of the World Bank, reflected by the number of 
currently ongoing projects, in clusters of different development states. However, unlike in regressions 
with the dummy variable Current World Bank projects, we get more ambiguous results. First, we 
observe that the number of projects seems to be equally important (or unimportant) for environments 
with high or low education. Second, in clusters with a high nightlights intensity we see that the effect of 
a higher number of projects is approximately twice as strong for the variables Type of toilet and Quality 
of drinking water (in specifications without controls). The opposite is true for improvements in Time to 
Water, which seems to be more susceptible to a higher number of projects in clusters with low 
nightlights. Third, we see a tendency that more projects in low-income countries can achieve higher 
improvements in water-, sanitation- and health-related indicators than a higher number of projects in 
lower and higher middle income countries (again, only in specifications without control variables). 
Persistent effects of World Bank projects 
In a second mechanism we explore the relevance of already completed World Bank projects, i.e., 
projects that ended at the latest in the year of the respective DHS survey. We augment our estimation 
equation as follows: 
(LIFE_QUALITY)𝑖,c,𝑡 = 𝛽1(𝑊𝐵𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡)𝑖,c,𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑊𝐵𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡)𝑖,c,𝑡 + + 𝛽3(𝑊𝐵𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡)𝑖,c,𝑡 ∙
(𝑊𝐵𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡)𝑖,c,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑿𝒊,𝐜,𝒕 + 𝜔𝑐 + 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,c,𝑡   (2) 
with 𝛽2 capturing the lasting effect of past projects. 𝛽3 is an interaction term between current and 
past projects and reflects whether current projects have an even larger effect if there already has been a 
past project in the same geographic area. 
Thereby, we investigate whether the quality of life of individuals is rather influenced in the short-
term (i.e., the effect of an ongoing project is dominant), in the long-term (i.e., the effect occurs a few 
years after a project was completed) or in circumstances where a past project is followed up by a new 
project. The interest lies in contributing to the question of the sustainability of development projects (see 
e.g., Gary and Maurel, 2015, Easterly, 2014, Moyo, 2010). Note that potential effects of past projects 






























Past World Bank 
Projects Dummy 
-4.478*** -5.868*** -4.986*** -2.159 0.421*** 0.047 -0.001 0.081 
(0.437) (1.011) (1.002) (2.098) -0.028 -0.051 (0.054) (0.128) 
Current World Bank 
Projects Dummy 
    -2.099*** -1.862**     0.114*** 0.121*** 
    (0.717) (0.741)     (0.035) (0.036) 
Current World Bank 
Projects Dummy x 
Past World Bank 
Projects Dummy 
      -3.455       -0.104 
      (2.267)       (0.137) 
Cluster FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Control variables NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES 
Observations 1,368,255 244,498 244,498 244,498 1,596,132 284,508 284,508 284,508 
R² 0.327 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.449 0.585 0.585 0.585 

















F Statistic 21.7*** 15.96*** 15.98*** 15.98*** 37.74*** 42.73*** 42.78*** 42.78*** 
Note: The regressions estimate the effect of the existence and the number of a past and a current World Bank Project (and their interaction) on four 
dependent variables: time to water, quality of drinking water, type of toilet, deceased children. Regressions are run with the full dataset without and 
with the full set of control variables as well as cluster and time fixed effects. Robust clustered standard error estimates (Cluster-level) are presented 
below the coefficients. Control variables are: Nightlights_Composite, Pop, Pop_density, Drought_Episodes, Malaria_2000_2015, 
Proximity_to_National_Borders, Proximity_to_Water, Rainfall_1985_2015, Jan_Dec_Temp, Urban, Years_educ, Age, Relation_Household_head, 
Gender_household_head, Christian, Muslim, No_religion, Traditional. The omitted category for the religious denomination is "Other". Significance 





























Past World Bank 
Projects Dummy 
0.393*** -0.055 -0.083* -0.034 -0.091*** 0.001 0.008 -0.002 
(0.024) (0.045) (0.047) (0.083) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.023) 
Current World Bank 
Projects Dummy 
    0.068** 0.072**     -0.018*** -0.019*** 
    (0.032) (0.034)     (0.007) (0.007) 
Current World Bank 
Projects Dummy x 
Past World Bank 
Projects Dummy 
      -0.062       0.013 
      (0.096)       (0.025) 
Cluster FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Control variables NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES 
Observations 1,742,308 293,810 293,810 293,810 1,793,783 301,728 301,728 301,728 
R² 0.411 0.444 0.444 0.444 0.090 0.228 0.228 0.228 

















F Statistic 34.71*** 25.04*** 25.05*** 25.05*** 5.068*** 9.506*** 9.507*** 9.506*** 
Note: The regressions estimate the effect of the existence and the number of a past and a current World Bank Project (and their interaction) on four 
dependent variables: time to water, quality of drinking water, type of toilet, deceased children. Regressions are run with the full dataset without and 
with the full set of control variables as well as cluster and time fixed effects. Robust clustered standard error estimates (Cluster-level) are presented 
below the coefficients. Control variables are: Nightlights_Composite, Pop, Pop_density, Drought_Episodes, Malaria_2000_2015, 
Proximity_to_National_Borders, Proximity_to_Water, Rainfall_1985_2015, Jan_Dec_Temp, Urban, Years_educ, Age, Relation_Household_head, 
Gender_household_head, Christian, Muslim, No_religion, Traditional. The omitted category for the religious denomination is "Other". Significance 





Table 16 summarizes the results for four different specifications for each of our dependent 
variables. Columns (1), (5), (9) and (13) show regressions for the dummy variable for past projects 
without any covariates and without the control for current projects. Coefficients for past projects have 
the same sign as coefficients for current projects in earlier specifications. They suggest a statistically 
significant effect of past projects on our four indicators. However, except for the variable time to water, 
all coefficients reflecting the influence of past World Bank projects lose their significance as soon as 
control variables are included (columns (2), (6), (10) and (14)). Columns (3), (7), (11) and (15) now also 
add the dummy variable current projects. Current projects have a statistically significant effect on our 
welfare indicators but now the coefficient for past projects becomes statistically insignificant in most 
cases. Only the variable time to water seems to benefit from current and past projects, whereas the 
latter’s effect is twice as strong. The remaining columns show the results for the interaction term between 
current and past projects, which is never statistically significant. Current World Bank projects continue 
to exert a positive and statistically significant influence on individual welfare, i.e., current projects 
decrease the time to water, increase the quality of drinking water, improve the reported toilet type and 
decrease child mortality. 
Overall, the results in Table 16 suggest that effects of past projects are likely to subside over time. 
Only current projects seem to have an effect on individual welfare. Consequently, the long-term 
sustainable effects of World Bank projects might be questioned. The World Bank also tends to fund the 
same sub-regions where they have observed satisfying impact, great need, reliable staff, etc. A 
correlation coefficient between past and current projects of 0.34 supports this assumption. 
3.4.4 Discussion and Caveats 
By combining World Bank data with information from the DHS, we are able to analyze a large 
number of development projects over time and investigate their potential to affect individual outcomes. 
Cluster fixed effects and the addition of control variables allow us to tackle relevant empirical issue in 
the literature and our approach serves as an inexpensive complement to the experimental evaluation of 
single development projects. 
Our paper makes a contribution in setting up matched geocoded data on a large scale. Aggregation 
of data used by other approaches can bias results, so the opportunity to assess impacts at the highly 
disaggregated (local) level is a plus relative to country-level studies or cross-country analysis. Moreover, 
we pool data on many projects across many locations and, thus, can potentially make more generalizable 
statements. 
As mentioned above, DHS perturbs the locations to improve anonymity of the data. This is a well-
documented procedure. We account for larger perturbations in robustness tests. 
The geocoded nature of the data may also provide an opportunity to study geographic spillovers 




such a study would be a natural extension to our setting and may further help to account for the fact that 
World Bank projects are implemented in different locations due to diverse factors. While fixed effects 
allow to account for some of these factors, projects are also allocated due to policy considerations. 
Moreover, World Bank projects might lead to other World Bank or NGO projects that happen at the 
same time in the same location. As common in the literature, we cannot account for all NGO projects 
that could happen in the vicinity of our treated clusters as NGO projects are not systematically geocoded 
at the present time. If World Bank projects tend to congregate, i.e., the same places that have WASH 
projects also tend to have health projects, our results could overstate potential gains. We note that our 
baseline results are significant when specifically focusing on WASH projects and when analyzing any 
type of World Bank project. 
Our cross-project, micro-based evaluation approach follows a bottom-up perspective and tries to 
bring observational data as closely to an experimentally inspired setting as possible. It allows to 
investigate a large number of projects ex-post using readily available information. It is easily extendable 
to other settings. Importantly, our data cannot only be used to complement RCTs but also to complement 
and re-evaluate qualitative studies by investigating projects within specific countries where reports exist. 
We provide such an evaluation below as an example. 
3.4.5 Complementing Existing Evidence from World Bank Reports 
Doing our evaluations ex-post, we can also compare our results with analyses of a specific country 
and compare it with the project evaluation performed by the World Bank itself in a number of cases. 
Thereby our broad quantitative approach may also enrich more qualitative reports and evaluations. We 
perform one such country specific evaluation and comparison below as an illustration. 
We choose Senegal, as it passed through the highest number of DHS surveys, each with a large 
number of respondents, and as it was a popular target of World Bank water projects. To be concrete, our 
analysis for Senegal estimates the effect of eight different World Bank water projects58 on the answers 
from more than 100,000 individuals collected by nine DHS rounds. Table 17 shows us similar results 
to our baseline regressions from Table 10 for regressions without control variables. 
Results are sensitive towards the inclusion of covariates and turn insignificant. Nevertheless, they 
suggest a certain level of effectiveness of World Bank projects. Comparing these quantitative results 
with the corresponding reports59 from the World Bank for their own water projects, we find an 
accordance between both. We would like to outline three projects.60 
 
58 Three projects had a second phase with additional financing (recorded under a different project ID). 
59 World Bank project reports can be accessed by entering the respective project IDs at the ‘Documents & Reports’ webpage 
of the World Bank (World Bank (2020)). 
60 The five other World Bank projects in the water sector are assumed to have a more indirect impact on our target variables 
and are therefore not described in this paper: ‘Senegal River Basin Multi-purpose Water Resources Development Project’ 




Firstly, the ‘Water and Sanitation Millennium Project’ (P109986), which aims at (among others) 
facilitating the rehabilitation of boreholes, water storage facilities, and pumping equipment. The World 
Bank evaluated the project as highly satisfactory as 654,520 people directly benefitted and the targets of 
increasing the number of people with access to improved water sources and households with new water 
and sewerage connections were surpassed. 
Secondly, the ‘Senegal Urban Water and Sanitation Project’ (P150351 and P162537 for additional 
financing) encompassed the improvement of water services and access to safe drinking water, the 
rehabilitation of water infrastructure, the increased access to improved sanitation and sewerage services 
and the institutional strengthening and project management. It was rated as satisfactory, as the targets 
for new piped household water connections and for the number of people in urban areas with access to 
improved water sources were met, but it failed to provide the targeted number of people with access to 
enhanced water supply services, the targeted water production and water storage capacity and the 
targeted construction of new household sewer connections. 
  
 
financing), ‘Building Resilience through Innovation, Communication and Knowledge Services’ (P130888), ‘Senegal River 
Basin Climate Change Resilience Development Project’ (P131323 and P131353 for additional financing), and ‘Senegal 




Table 17: Baseline regressions for the effect of current World Bank projects on time to water, quality of 
drinking water, type of toilet and number of deceased children for Senegal 
Dependent variable 
(1) 
Time to water 
(2) 







Current World Bank  
Project Dummy 
-3.796*** -0.221 0.306*** -0.027 
(1.028) (1.759) (0.055) (0.081) 
Cluster FE YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES 
Control variables NO YES NO YES 
Observations 96,636 9,914 125,741 18,271 
R² 0.104 0.274 0.211 0.563 









F Statistic 25.7*** 8.954*** 77.08*** 56.04*** 
          
Dependent variable 
(5) 
Type of toilet 
(6) 







Current World Bank  
Project Dummy 
0.625*** -0.067 -0.110*** -0.004 
(0.050) (0.086) (0.009) (0.012) 
Cluster FE YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES 
Control variables NO YES NO YES 
Observations 129,714 18,756 134,314 19,372 
R² 0.158 0.359 0.036 0.172 









F Statistic 55.48*** 25.04*** 11.43*** 9.615*** 
Note: The regressions estimate the effect of the existence of a current World Bank Project in 
Senegal on four dependent variables: time to water, quality of drinking water, type of toilet, 
deceased children. Regressions are run with the data for Senegal without and with the full set of 
control variables as well as cluster and time fixed effects. Robust clustered standard error estimates 
(Cluster-level) are presented below the coefficients. Control variables are: Nightlights_Composite, 
Pop, Pop_density, Drought_Episodes, Malaria_2000_2015, Proximity_to_National_Borders, 
Proximity_to_Water, Rainfall_1985_2015, Jan_Dec_Temp, Urban, Years_educ, Age, 
Relation_Household_head, Gender_household_head, Christian, Muslim, No_religion, Traditional. 
The omitted category for the religious denomination is "Other". Significance levels are indicated by 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
Thirdly, the ‘Senegal Rural Water and Sanitation Project’ (P164262) aimed at improving rural 
water supply, water services and access as well as sanitation and the adequate disposal of wastewater 
and sludge. Alike the ‘Senegal Urban Water and Sanitation Project’ it was rated satisfactory as more 
progress is needed to reach targets for improved community water points, piped water systems with 
chlorination devices, for bacterial standards in water sample tests and for household latrines and sewer 
connections. As in the Bank’s goal attainment reports, our analysis would concur that there is a positive 




3.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper suggests a micro-based approach to evaluate the effect of water- and health-related 
development projects. We extracted around 1.8 million responses from 153 Demographic and Health 
Surveys on distance to drinking water and its quality, toilet types and the number of deceased children. 
Through a geocode-matching, we combine these data with the presence of World Bank projects. 
Thereby, we obtain a new dataset which allows us to investigate the relevance of World Bank projects 
on individual welfare. Our setting allows us to employ fixed effects strategies to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity. Thus, we can evaluate whether individual welfare within the same cluster of the DHS 
where a project took place improved over time in comparison to a control cluster with no project. 
Our results suggest that the presence of the World Bank and the number of projects are improving 
water and health indicators. The results are robust towards changes in the estimation equation and data 
refinements. Our fixed effects account for all time-invariant variation across clusters. However, we also 
find that only current World Bank projects seem to systematically influence outcomes, highlighting the 
importance of analyzing the long-term sustainability in future studies which can be done using our 
approach. In addition, our results suggest that projects are generally more successful in relatively well-
developed areas (but located in low-income countries) and in environments with better educated 
individuals. Future research may investigate whether different project targets and project setups yield 
different results by investigating the effect of specific projects or types of projects. Finally, we believe 
that also different target groups benefit differently from development projects. 
Our research effort encompasses a new approach for micro-based ex-post evaluation of specific 
projects employing individual level data. Our approach might serve as an alternative to standard macro-
level cross-country studies. At the same time it serves as a complement to standard RCTs. By matching 
readily available survey data with information on development projects through geocodes, we can 
evaluate a large number of projects ex-post and at low costs.61 While the precision of such an evaluation 
is potentially lower than a specifically targeted RCT for a single project, the possibility to investigate a 
large number of development projects ex-post may make our approach attractive for other researchers 
who wish to complement the insights of field experiments and explore the long-term impacts of projects. 
 
61 Assuming that a standard RCT in a developing country costs only USD 50.000, investigating 14,301 ongoing World Bank 
projects would have cost USD 715 million. The costs of our approach comprised only the salary of a PhD student for a year 




3.6 APPENDIX CHAPTER 3 
Table 18: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Median Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Obs Source 
Quality of drinking 
water 
Main source of drinking water for household 
members. Variable was recoded from a 
qualitative description into numeric values 
ranging from 1.1 (e.g., river, canal) to 5.4 (e.g., 
piped water into dwelling). The integer captures 
the quality of drinking water and the first decimal 
number captures how easily this source can be 
reached. 
4.0 3.5 1.6 1.0 5.0 1,596,132 DHS 
Time to water 
Time taken to get to the source of drinking water 
(in minutes). 
1.0 13.6 30.7 0.0 995.0 1,368,255 DHS 
Type of toilet 
Type of toilet facility in the household. Variable 
was recoded from a qualitative description into 
numeric values ranging from 0 (e.g., no facility) 
to 5.4 (e.g., flush to piped sewer system), 
capturing the quality of the toilet facility and its 
reachability. 
3.0 2.8 1.7 0.0 5.0 1,742,308 DHS 
Deceased children 
Total number of sons and daughters who have 
died. 
0.0 0.4 0.9 0.0 20.0 1,793,783 DHS 
Current World Bank 
Project Dummy 
Dummy variable equals 1 if individuals in the 
respective cluster have access to the services of 
any ongoing World Bank project; 0 otherwise 
(requirement: project is running for at least 1 year 
before the survey was conducted). 








Number of Current 
World Bank Projects 
Number of ongoing World Bank projects to 
which the individuals in the respective cluster 
have access. 





Current World Bank 
Water Project Dummy 
Dummy variable equals 1 if individuals in the 
respective cluster have access to the services of 
an ongoing World Bank Water project; 0 
otherwise (requirement: project is running for at 
least 1 year before the survey was conducted). 





Number of Current 
World Bank Water 
Projects 
Number of ongoing World Bank Water projects 
to which the individuals in the respective cluster 
have access. 





Past World Bank 
Project Dummy 
Dummy variable equals 1 if individuals in the 
respective cluster have access to the services of 
any past World Bank project; 0 otherwise 
(requirement: project is completed at the latest in 
the same year the respective survey was 
conducted). 





Number of Past World 
Bank Projects 
Number of ongoing World Bank projects to 
which the individuals in the respective cluster 
have access. 






The average annual rainfall (in millimeters per 
year) within the 2 km (urban) or 10 km (rural) 
buffer surrounding the DHS survey cluster. The 
data is averaged for 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 
2005, 2010 and 2015. 
1,068 1,156 754 0.0 5,263 1,669,102 DHS 
Drought_Episodes 
The average number of drought episodes 
(categorized between 1 (low) and 10 (high)) for 
the areas within the 2 km (urban) or 10 km (rural) 
buffer surrounding the DHS survey cluster. 





The average monthly temperature (in degree 
Celsius) within the 2 km (urban) or 10 km (rural) 
buffer surrounding the DHS survey cluster for the 
months January to December. The data was 
averaged for the respective year. 
24.5 282 7,916 -1.9 1,317,091 1,655,272 DHS 
Proximity_to_Water 
The geodesic distance to either a lake or the 
coastline. 




The geodesic distance to the nearest international 
borders. 
41,052 70,801 79,453 0 594,383 1,692,667 DHS 
Malaria_2000_2015 
The average parasite rate of plasmodium 
falciparum in children between the ages of 2 and 
10 years within the 2 km (urban) or 10 km (rural) 
buffer surrounding the DHS survey cluster. The 
data is averaged for 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015 
and ranges between 0 and 1. 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 1,099,719 DHS 
Nightlights_ 
Composite 
The average nighttime luminosity (in hours) of 
the area within the 2 km (urban) or 10 km (rural) 
buffer surrounding the DHS survey cluster. 
0.1 5.0 13.4 0.0 140.9 1,691,248 DHS 
Urban 
Dummy variable equals 1 if place of household 
residence was qualified as urban; 0 if rural. 
0.0 0.4 0.5 0 1 1,785,184 DHS 
Pop 
The average number of individuals living within 
the 2 km (urban) or 10 km (rural) buffer 
surrounding the DHS survey cluster in 2005, 
2010, 2015. 
34,522 95,586 194,267 0 6,407,341 1,689,641 DHS 
Pop_density 
The average number of people in 2000, 2005, 
2010, 2015 in clusters whose centroid falls within 
a radius of 10 km (for rural points) or 2 km (for 
urban points). That average was then divided by 
the area of those clusters. 





Highest year of education gives the years of 
education completed.  
4.0 4.2 2.4 0.0 19.0 1,236,047 DHS 
Age 
Age of interviewed individual at the time of the 
survey. 
28.0 29.1 9.6 11.0 64.0 1,793,783 DHS 
Christian 
Dummy variable equals 1 if interviewed person 
states to be a Christian; 0 otherwise. 
0.0 0.4 0.5 0 1 1,524,191 DHS 
Muslim 
Dummy variable equals 1 if interviewed person 
states to be a Muslim; 0 otherwise. 
0.0 0.4 0.5 0 1 1,524,191 DHS 
No_religion 
Dummy variable equals 1 if interviewed person 
states to be an atheist; 0 otherwise. 
0.0 0.0 0.2 0 1 1,524,191 DHS 
Traditional 
Dummy variable equals 1 if interviewed person 
states to be a traditionalist; 0 otherwise. 
0.0 0.0 0.1 0 1 1,524,191 DHS 
Other 
Dummy variable equals 1 if interviewed person 
states to be none of the before stated religion 
(e.g., Buddhist, Jewish etc.); 0 otherwise. 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0 1 1,524,191 DHS 
Relation_Household_ 
head 
Relationship to the head of the household ranging 
between 1 (head) and 14 (not related at all, e.g. 
maid). 
2.0 3.6 3.0 1.0 14.0 1,785,042 DHS 
Gender_household_ 
head 
Dummy variable equals 1 if household head is a 
man; 0 otherwise. 












We study the effect of temperature on economic development on the subnational level, 
employing cross-sectional data for up to 15,533 subnational units from two distinct sources. In 
contrast to the existing cross-country literature on the temperature-income relationship, our 
setting allows us to exploit subnational heterogeneity through the inclusion of country fixed 
effects and mitigate omitted variable bias. We find no negative relationship between regional 
temperature and four different measures of economic development (per capita GDP, growth of 
per capita GDP, nightlights and gross cell production). We also test whether temperature is non-
linearly related to income (with hotter regions being potentially particularly prone to adverse 
effects of temperature on income) but find no evidence in favor of such a relationship. Finally, 
we examine whether the effect of temperature on economic development is especially pronounced 
in poorer regions (e.g., due to weaker adaptation), but find no robust evidence for this proposition. 




JEL-Classification: Q54; Q56; R11 
Keywords: Regional temperature; regional incomes; subnational data; non-linearity 
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The role of climate change and related temperature increases for economic development has 
received renewed attention in the cross-country literature in recent years (e.g., Burke et al., 2015, 2018, 
Dell et al., 2009, 2012, Lanzafame, 2014). Numerous studies find significant negative effects of higher 
temperature on income. Furthermore, some contributions to the literature suggest a non-linear, inverted-
U relationship between income and temperature, meaning that colder countries (with average yearly 
temperatures of up to 13-16 degrees) might benefit from increasing temperatures, while hotter countries 
tend to lose (e.g., Burke et al., 201563, 2018, Deryugina and Hsiang, 2014, Nordhaus, 2006, Zhao et al., 
2018). Finally, relatively poorer countries could suffer more from higher temperatures, partly due to 
being located in hotter parts of the world and partly due to fewer (financial) means to adapt to 
temperature alterations (e.g., Dell et al., 2012, Moore and Diaz, 2015, Zhao et al., 2018). 
Our contribution to the recent literature on the temperature-income relationship is three-fold. First, 
we correlate subnational data on temperature with subnational data on economic variables (e.g., regional 
GDP per capita). We gathered two datasets on climatic and economic indicators for a large number of 
world-wide regions. Depending on the variables in use, we are able to include between 1,542 to 15,533 
subnational units, which cover mainly developed (data from Gennaioli et al. (2014) from 1950 to 2010) 
as well as developing countries (data from Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) with data on cells 
for 2005 and 2015) from all continents. Both datasets allow us to account for the within-country 
heterogeneity in temperatures and incomes, an aspect that is by construction neglected when only taking 
a cross-country perspective.64 
Second, the use of regional data allows us to account for country fixed effects, thereby holding 
constant everything that is specific to a country such as country-specific policies, institutions, colonial 
history or aspects of culture. Thereby, we are able to draw conclusions on the relationship between 
regional temperature and regional incomes while accounting for relevant other influences. In particular, 
the relationship between temperatures and incomes could be affected by adaptation possibilities which, 
in turn, might be driven by country-specific effects that we account for. 
Third, we explore the effect of temperature on four different measures for subnational incomes: 
regional GDP per capita, growth of GDP per capita from 1950 to 2010, gross cell production within a 
DHS cluster, as well as nightlights within a DHS cluster. 
 
63 Even though Burke et al. (2015) also use micro-level data to fit their response functions, they report most findings on the 
country-level, which is why we cited them together with other cross-country studies. 
64 For example, in Russia we have a spread of 5,000 miles in distance, of 24 degrees in average temperature (between Republic 
of Sakha and Krasnodar Region) and of 47,265 USD in per capita income (between Republic of Ingushetia and Tyumen 




While countries are the most common units for analyzing the link between temperatures and 
economic development (e.g., Burke et al., 2015, 2018, Dell et al., 2009, 2012), some literature has 
explored within-country variation. Nordhaus (2006) relies on the G-Econ database employing proxies 
of economic activity65 for all large countries measured at a 1° latitude by 1° longitude scale. Other 
literature focuses on the link between temperature for regions but is mainly limited to the United States 
(see e.g., Colacito et al., 2019, Dell et al., 2009, Deryugina and Hsiang, 2014) and recently China (see 
Li et al., 2019). In contrast to them, our analysis is global. Most closely related to us is Zhao et al. (2018) 
who consider grid cells and data across different continents but rely again on the G-Econ database 
developed by Nordhaus (2006). Instead of grid cells, we employ meaningful subnational administrative 
regions and typical economic indicators such as regional GDP per capita as reported by the national 
statistical offices and we employ data based on surveys from the DHS.66 Thereby, our regional setting 
is directly comparable to the cross-country literature which focusses on national GDP per capita. 
Using data for 1,542 subnational administrative regions from different continents (data gathered 
by Gennaioli et al. (2014)) yields no systematic relationship between temperature and regional GDP per 
capita as well as between temperature and GDP growth.67 There is also no systematic difference in the 
effect of temperature on regional economic development between rich and poor regions. Furthermore, 
we find no systematic evidence for any inverted-U relationship between regional temperature and 
income as well as growth. Employing data from the Demographic and Health Surveys, we find, if 
anything, a positive (though usually statistically insignificant) relationship between temperature and 
nightlights within a DHS cluster. The relationship between temperature and gross cell production within 
a DHS cluster is, if anything, slightly negative, with no difference between rich and poor regions. There 
is again no evidence for an inverted-U relationship between temperature and nightlights nor for 
temperature and gross cell production. A series of extensions and sensitivity checks (e.g., including 
maximum and minimum temperatures) support our interpretations as our results continue to yield zero 
effects of temperatures on different regional income measures. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides theoretical 
considerations and a literature review. Section 4.3 describes data sources and our empirical 
methodology. Section 4.4 presents our results and offers interpretations. We conclude with Section 4.5. 
 
65 Nordhaus (2006) data covers 25,572 terrestrial grid cells and includes several measures of economic activity such as proxies 
for income by industry, employment by industry, urban and rural population or employment. 
66 Moreover, we employ DHS data to analyze enumeration areas, called clusters, and explore the commonly used proxies for 
economic activity such as gross cell production and nightlights. 
67 Potential effect sizes are small and comparatively precisely estimated, which may point to the absence of any (generalized) 




4.2 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
4.2.1 Theoretical Considerations 
Recently, there has been renewed interest in exploring the relationship between temperature and 
economic indicators such as per capita GDP or growth, which has been driven by evidence for 
anthropogenic climate change (e.g., Carleton and Hsiang, 2016, Dell et al., 2014). There are different 
pathways through which higher temperatures may be detrimental to economic development (e.g., Burke 
et al., 2015, Easterly and Levine, 2003, Gallup et al., 1999): 
1. Higher temperatures adversely affect agricultural production, e.g., by contributing to water 
stress or the spread of plant pests. Especially when economies are poor and dependent on agriculture, 
such adverse effects may hurt overall economic development. 
2. Higher temperatures may affect human productivity in general. For instance, with higher 
temperatures it becomes more exhaustive for the human body to regulate its temperature. Increased heat 
stress in turn will adversely affect labor performance and productivity. The adverse effects of heat stress 
may also be felt in non-agrarian sectors of the economies. 
3. Higher temperatures may also contribute to the spread of debilitating diseases (e.g., Malaria, 
Dengue fever) by facilitating the spread of disease vectors (e.g., mosquitos). These diseases will 
adversely affect the accumulation of human capital (e.g., by contributing to school absenteeism or 
permanent mental or physical disability), which in turn will discourage economic development. 
4. Higher temperatures may also have long-run effects on political and economic institutions by 
affecting the modes of agricultural production (e.g., family vs. plantation farming) and the suitability of 
land for foreign settlers due to the incidence of specific diseases. For instance, especially debilitating 
diseases may have prevented the spread of inclusive institutions (e.g., sound property rights) by 
discouraging European settlements in many parts of the world and instead given rise to more extractive 
modes of production (e.g., the use of forced labor) and more extractive economic and political 
institutions. Extractive institutions (e.g., weak property rights, a weak rule of law) in turn are anticipated 
to discourage innovation and investment, thus leading to lower levels of economic development 
compared to economies that enjoy more inclusive economic and political institutions. 
4.2.2 Country Level Evidence 
The relationship between temperature and income is usually investigated at the country level. For 
instance, Dell et al. (2009) find a negative relationship between income per capita and temperature; 
countries in the year 2000 experience a drop in income of 8.5% with every degree increase in 
temperature. Hsiang (2010) comes to a similar conclusion, finding that a temporary one degree increase 
in surface temperature is associated with a contemporaneous 2.5% reduction in non-agricultural 
production output for 28 countries in the Caribbean and Central America. For more than 160 countries, 




continues to be unmitigated. Lanzafame (2014) investigates the short- and long-term effect of weather 
shocks on income of 36 African countries, finding that African economies are damaged by such shocks. 
Schlenker and Lobell (2010) report a negative association between temperature and agricultural output 
in Sub-Saharan African countries. 
4.2.3 Evidence at the Sub-National Level 
Within-country differences in incomes can be substantial (e.g. Acemoglu and Dell, 2010). By 
construction, cross-country studies cannot systematically investigate the within-country heterogeneity 
regarding temperature and economic development. Some recent studies have started to re-analyze the 
income-temperature relationship by using county or (geographical) grid cell level data. Nordhaus (2006) 
analyzes 25,572 grid cells (on a 1° latitude by 1° longitude scale) and finds a 0.9-3% decrease in 
economic activity (depending on the specific proxy of economic activity) due to temperature rises. Dell 
et al. (2009) find that a one degree rise in temperature is related to a 1.2-1.9% decline in municipal 
income for 7,684 municipalities in 12 countries in the Americas; interestingly, their results also suggest 
that the within-country cross-sectional correlation is substantially weaker than any cross-country 
correlation.68 Zhao et al. (2018) analyze 10,597 global grid cells using data from Nordhaus (2006) and 
find a weak negative association between temperature and economic activity. Focusing only on China, 
Li et al. (2019) consider data from 31 Chinese provinces, finding that temperature exerts both positive 
and negative effects on economic growth depending on the level of average temperature. A similar result 
is obtained by Deryugina and Hsiang (2014) who focus on the United States. Finally, Colacito et al. 
(2019) suggest that a rise in the average summer temperature in the United States leads to a reduction in 
the annual state growth rate of 0.15 to 0.25 percentage points. 
4.2.4 Non-Linear Effects 
The literature provides some evidence in favor of a non-linear relationship between temperature 
and income. Two cross-country studies by Burke et al. (2015, 2018) examine this non-linearity for more 
than 160 countries and find the relationship to be concave, with productivity being highest at 
approximately 13 degrees and strongly declining at higher temperatures. This is in line with Deryugina 
and Hsiang (2014), Nordhaus (2006) and Zhao et al. (2018) who find evidence in favor of an inverted 
U-shape with a maximum at about 15, 12 and 16 degrees, respectively. Li et al. (2019) places the 
‘beneficial’ temperature threshold at 23.37 degrees, meaning that almost all Chinese provinces could 
experience positive effects from rising temperatures. Schlenker and Lobell (2010) also find a strong non-
linear relationship between temperatures and corn, soybean, and cotton yields. On the other hand, Dell 
et al. (2009, 2012) and Lanzafame (2014) find little or no evidence that the relationship between income 
and temperature is non-linear. 
 
68 Acemoglu and Dell (2010) highlight that the magnitude of the link between temperature and income in Dell et al. (2009), 





A concern of the existing literature is the rate of adaptation to climate change. This rate has to be 
considered when estimating the potentially negative consequences of temperature increases (e.g., Moore 
and Diaz, 2015). Indeed, Dell et al. (2009) suggest that approximately half of the negative effect of 
temperature increase on income is eliminated through adaptation in the long-run. According to Dell et 
al. (2012), the main factor governing adaptation and thus accounting for the amount of economic damage 
due to rising temperatures is a country’s income level. Here, poorer countries are expected to see lower 
rates of adaptation (e.g., in terms of using better machinery to compensate for reduced crop yields) and 
may thus experience stronger adverse economic effects. Indeed, several studies distinguish between rich 
and poor countries or regions and find that the negative effect of temperature tends to be more relevant 
for poor areas (Dell et al., 2012, Zhao et al., 2018). Burke et al. (2015, 2018), on the other hand, find no 
difference in the effect of temperature on income in rich and poor countries, respectively. 
4.3 DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
4.3.1 Data 
We employ two distinct datasets that allow us to estimate the link between regional temperatures 
on measures of regional economic development. Temperature as well as GDP per capita at the regional 
level and regional growth of GDP per capita from 1950 to 2010 are drawn from Gennaioli et al. (2014), 
while further climate data as well as gross cell production and nightlights come from the Demographic 
and Health Surveys (DHS). Further descriptions, descriptive statistics and data sources of all our data 
can be found in Table 26 in the Appendix. 
First, we use a dataset collected by Gennaioli et al. (2014) that contains economic as well as 
geographic variables for 1,542 regions (mainly administrative units such as states and provinces) in 83 
countries around the world. As for the GDP per capita and GDP per capita growth data at the subnational 
level, Gennaioli et al. (2014) collect data from national/regional statistical offices between 1950 and 
2010. The sample covers more than 90% of the world’s GDP and includes a large number of countries 
and regions from Asia, South America, Oceania, North America and Europe. African regions are under-
represented due to data constrains; they represent about 4% of all regions in the dataset. In total, we have 
approximately 9,500 data points available when using the Gennaioli et al. (2014) dataset. 
The dataset includes a variable measuring regional temperature, obtained from the WorldClim 
database. This variable indicates the average temperature per region between 1950 and 2000. Thereby, 
we follow Dell et al. (2009) who also use temperature data that is averaged over the 1950-2000 period.69 
Consequently, our analysis explores whether relatively warmer regions are more or less wealthy than 
 
69 Cross-country studies have usually yearly or five-yearly average temperature data available (e.g., Burke et al., 2015, 2018). 




relatively colder regions, controlling for country fixed effects and other characteristics. We start 
exploring the full panel dataset and then construct seven cross-sections for the years 1950, 1960, 1970, 
1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010 to compare the effects of different temperature levels on regional GDP over 
time. This allows us to draw potential insights regarding adaptation to hotter temperatures: if 
comparatively warmer subnational regions within a country are equally rich as medium or colder 
regions, adaptation to hotter or colder temperatures might be possible within reasonable time frames. 
Second, we also employ a dataset comprised of DHS data. The DHS program primarily collects 
representative household survey data in the field of demographics and health in more than 90 countries; 
to date there are approximately 400 surveys available. The program is implemented by ICF International 
and is mainly funded by the United States Agency for International Development, which allows DHS to 
conduct national surveys at least every five years with an average sample size of between 5,000 to 30,000 
respondents (see ICF International (2019) for more information). DHS covers a large number of African 
countries which constitutes a valuable supplement to the Gennaioli et al. (2014) dataset. DHS survey 
data contains a variety of geographic information which are obtained from the Geographic Information 
System (GIS). In particular, we have temperature, precipitation, frost days, wet days, etc. available. This 
information is available for small geographical units called clusters.70 
GDP data does not exist on the cluster-level, therefore, we use two alternative variables to capture 
average income of a cluster: nightlights which is the average nighttime luminosity of the area (composite 
cloud-free radiance values) available for 2015 and gross cell production (GCP) which is the average 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in 2005 US dollars for the 2 km (urban) or 10 km (rural) buffers 
surrounding the DHS survey cluster (see DHS Sampling Manual at ICF International (2012)). We thus 
have available two separate cross-sectional samples for 2005 with 31 surveys and 14,130 cluster-level 
observations and for 2015 with 37 surveys and 15,533 cluster-level observations.71 
4.3.2 Empirical Strategy 
Our cross-sectional databases from Gennaioli et al. (2014) and DHS (2005, 2015) allow us to 
examine whether warmer regions (clusters) tend to be less or more wealthy than their colder 
counterparts. Our empirical strategy follows a regression approach common in the literature. Using 
Gennaioli et al. (2014) data, our first equation to estimate regional GDP per capita in region r of country 
i at time t is specified as follows: 
𝐿𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)𝑟,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽(𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑟,𝑖 + 𝜔𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜖𝑟,𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
 
70 Clusters are a representative selection of Enumeration Areas, a statistical unit for population census (see ICF International 
(2012) for the selection process of Enumeration Areas, clusters and households by DHS). 
71 To get a high number of observations we included surveys that were conducted three years before or after 2005 and 2015, 




where 𝜔𝑖 and 𝜆𝑡 are country and time fixed effects and 𝜖𝑟,𝑖,𝑡 is an error term72. Country fixed 
effects account for any country-specific and time-invariant unobservables such us colonial history, 
national institutions etc. They can be employed because we analyze regional temperature and regional 
incomes. Time fixed effects capture contemporary global phenomena. As our regional temperature 
variable is time-invariant, this setting does not capture changes in regional GDP per capita over time. 
To analyze how regional temperature affects regional GDP per capita at different time periods (decades) 
we also estimate a sequence of seemingly unrelated regressions in sensitivity tests below, among other 
tests. 
Most recent studies of the temperature-income relationship employ fixed effects strategies, while the 
use of further control variables is rare (e.g., Burke et al., 2015, 2018, Deryugina and Hsiang, 2014, Li et 
al., 2019).73 In particular, the recent literature does not systematically take account of changes in 
property rights, democracy, international trade patterns, social and demographic variables, education, 
disease etc. While aware of the shortcomings, we follow the literature for our main results and proceed 
to run parsimonious models that do not include further controls in the baseline estimations. It might be 
argued that such a parsimonious strategy gives any potential relationship between regional temperature 
and income a comparatively high chance to emerge. If regions within the same country follow a similar 
development trajectory as the country as a whole, we would expect fundamental differences due to 
climatic conditions that persist over longer time periods to emerge as a potentially relevant explanatory 
variable. For example, if higher temperatures were linked to the spread of diseases, not accounting for 
the disease environment overemphasizes the link between temperature and income. Indeed, previous 
studies that account for additional covariates usually found limited effects of temperature or related 
variables on GDP per capita or growth in cross-country regressions (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2001; Rodrik 
et al., 2004; Sala-I-Martin et al., 2004). In an attempt to further explore such matters too, we include 
several regional and national control variables to our baseline regressions and discover that the effect of 
temperature is rather sensitive towards their inclusion (Table 24). 
In a second model, we replace regional per capita GDP by the per capita GDP growth rate between 
the first and the last available regional GDP entry recorded. Our panel data turns into a cross-section 
with the following estimation equation: 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑟,𝑖 = 𝛽(𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑟,𝑖 + 𝜔𝑖 + 𝜖𝑟,𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
 
72 If not indicated differently, we apply robust standard errors clustered at the country-level. Following Cameron and Miller 
(2015) we cluster standard errors at the country-level as observations regarding temperature within countries are not 
independently and identically distributed. We assume that even though, regression model errors are independent across 
countries they are correlated within countries. 
73 There are a few exceptions: Dell et al. (2009) use a set of geographic variables such as distance to coast; Hsiang (2010) 
controls for cyclone activities; Zhao et al. (2018) uses a set of economic and geographic controls such as population growth 




Similarly, we employ country fixed effects in a regression setting for the DHS data samples. We 
predict nightlights and gross cell production of region r in country i in year 2015 and 2005 by employing 
the following equations: 
𝑛𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑟,𝑖,2015 = 𝛽(𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑟,𝑖,2015 + 𝜔𝑖 + 𝜖𝑟,𝑖,2015 (3) 
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟,𝑖,2005 = 𝛽(𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑟,𝑖,2005 + 𝜔𝑖 + 𝜖𝑟,𝑖,2005 (4) 
Following the literature (e.g., Burke et al., 2015, 2018, Dell et al., 2009, 2012, Lanzafame, 2014), 
we expect the temperature-income relationship to be negative in models (1) to (4), i.e., we expect hotter 
regions to be less wealthy. 
To account for adaptation effects and further exploit regional heterogeneity, we estimate 
additional models that include an interaction term with the dummy variable Poor that equals 1 if a 
region’s income is below the average of the full sample and 0 otherwise (see also Dell et al., 2012, Zhao 
et al., 2018 for similar approaches). According to the literature, we hypothesize that the potential 
negative effect of temperature on income (𝛽2) is stronger in relatively poorer regions due to weaker 
adaptation. 
Finally, to consider potential non-linearities in the temperature-income relationship (where the 
adverse effect of higher temperatures may be particularly pronounced in hotter regions), we add a 
squared temperature to all our models. Here, we follow Burke et al. (2015, 2018), Deryugina and Hsiang 
(2014) and Nordhaus (2006). 
4.4 THE LINK BETWEEN REGIONAL TEMPERATURE AND REGIONAL INCOMES 
4.4.1 Correlations 
Figure 6 shows the relationship between temperature and our four dependent variables: regional 







Figure 6: The link between regional incomes and regional temperature 
 
 
Except for regional growth rates (where correlation is close to zero), we observe a negative relationship 
between temperature and income, i.e., hotter regions tend to be less wealthy. This is consistent with 
insights from the existing cross-country literature (e.g., Burke et al., 2015, 2018, Dell et al., 2009, 2012). 
However, Figure 6 highlights that there is substantial variation in temperature and each of the regional 
outcome measures. Indeed, the richest region in our dataset (Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates) is 
also among the hottest, with an average temperature of 27.3°C. Moreover, some exceptionally cold 
regions such as the Tyumen region in Russia or the Yukon Territory in Canada are among the richest 




nightlight intensity. As a sensitivity test, we eliminate such potential outliers74 from the analysis (results 
are presented in (Table 25). In any event, heterogeneity within countries matters substantially and 
alongside country specific characteristics. 
The large heterogeneity within countries highlights the relevance of our analysis as an important 
extension to the existing cross-country literature. Figure 7 emphasizes this heterogeneity in selected 
countries for (the log of) regional GDP per capita (China, Colombia, Russia and United States) and (the 
log of) nightlights (Malawi, Namibia, Zambia, Zimbabwe).75 In all cases we observe a substantial 
spread of income and temperature, given that all countries are of considerable size and therefore cover 
various climatic zones and, potentially, exhibit different levels of economic development between 
regions. Take Russia for instance: West and East are separated by more than 5,000 miles. Average yearly 
regional temperature ranges from -13 degrees (Republic of Sakha) to +11 degrees (Krasnodar Region), 
whereas per capita income ranges from 2,025 USD (Republic of Ingushetia) to 49,290 USD (Tyumen 
region). 
Figure 7: Heterogeneity within countries and links between regional incomes/nightlights and 
temperature for selected countries 
 
In sum, regions or clusters within a country can be relatively hot or cold and relatively poor or 
rich. The variation is substantial. By using national averages only, the cross-country literature cannot 
account for this considerable spread, meaning that an adverse relationship between temperature and 
income at the country level may be due to this rather high level of aggregation. Meanwhile, our regional 
approach allows us to investigate any potentially highly relevant within-country heterogeneity, while 
 
74 Outliers are selected by plotting distribution curves and eliminating isolated regions that represent very high values of our 
four dependent variables. 




also being able to account for country specific characteristics with country fixed effects. Thereby it 
naturally extends and complements the existing literature. 
4.4.2 Main Econometric Results 
Table 19 shows the relationship between regional temperature on regional per capita income 
(specifications (1)-(4)) and its growth rate between the first and the last available GDP p.c. data point 
available (specifications (5)-(8)). We now always account for country heterogeneity by including 
country fixed effects, which capture all national characteristics that could influence the relationship 
between temperature and income. Time fixed effects can only be applied when regional incomes shows 
variation over time (specifications (1)-(4)). In specifications on growth (columns (5)-(8)), meanwhile, 
we just have one observation per region. 
In the parsimonious specification (1), the coefficient for the relationship between temperature and 
log regional GDP p.c. is negative, close to zero (with a point estimate of -0.004) and statistically 
insignificant at conventional levels. Thus, accounting for country specific heterogeneity, there is no 
systematic link between regional temperature and regional incomes. Given that the coefficient estimate 
is small and the standard error estimate is not unreasonably large, the specification tends to provide 
evidence of absence of any link between regional temperature and regional incomes. Put differently, 
regions within a country are not systematically wealthier or poorer only because they are colder or hotter. 
In specification (5) we investigate the link between regional temperature and regional growth when 
controlling for country fixed effects. Here, we again observe no clear relationship between the two 
variables. We also note that the addition of regional temperature to the model does not improve the 
overall fit of the model, i.e., when estimating a pure fixed effects model without any controls the R² is 
0.86 when regional GDP is the dependent variable and 0.62 when growth is the dependent variable. 
Including regional temperature increases R² by 0.0002 and 0.0019, respectively. This is suggestive that 
regional temperature tends to have a comparatively small explanatory power for GDP and growth. 
In a second step, we include a dummy variable called Poor for whether a region is below the 
sample average of regional GDP per capita (dummy equals 1) or above (dummy equals 0). We then 
interact this dummy variable with temperature to explore whether the effect of temperature on GDP per 
capita or growth is more relevant in poorer regions. The variable Poor itself must have a significantly 
negative coefficient when explaining regional GDP per capita. A positive coefficient in the growth 
regressions would be consistent with conditional convergence. We observe a significant drop in regional 
GDP per capita by 61% and a statistically insignificant increase in growth if the region is poor. 
Temperature continues to have no effect on regional incomes, independent of whether the region is 
considered poor or rich (specification (2)). The interaction term is positive and statistically significant 
in specification (6) i.e., growth tends to be higher in poorer and warmer regions when differentiating 




Potential effects of temperature on income might be non-linear, following an inverted U-shape. 
For instance, Burke et al. (2018) and Zhao et al. (2018) find that economic growth is concave in 
temperature, meaning that cooler regions might actually benefit from a rise in temperature (e.g., as 
agricultural productivity improves), while already warmer regions lose. In contrast to this literature, 
specification (3) tends to show a U-shape when employing regional data, suggesting that the negative 
effect of temperature on income is reversed when the average annual temperature exceeds 13°. 
Interpreting these results, we must keep in mind that regions from Gennaioli et al. (2014) in general are 
relatively cool with an average annual temperature of about 14 degrees; for instance, many African 
regions, which may have driven previous results due to their dependence on agriculture, are not included 
in this sample (however they are included in the DHS samples below). Moreover, there are numerous 
hot regions in the sample which, at the same time, have high incomes. 
A large strand of the literature points to the role of education in economic development, with 
higher levels of education being conducive to economic progress (e.g., Barro, 1991, Bowles, 1972, 
Mincer, 1974). We include years of education in our regression and interact it with temperature, too. 
This allows us to explore whether temperature has weaker effects on income in relatively well-educated 
regions; potentially, assuming that education is more positively correlated with adaptation, this allows 
regions with high education levels to maintain their income levels. However, while years of education 
have a strong and statistically significant effect on regional GDP per capita (with every additional year 
of schooling raising GDP p.c. by 24% (specification (4)), we find that its effect is independent of 
temperature. Again, for regional growth we find no effect of temperature (specification (8)). 
The results of Table 19 show that the findings of past literature (see e.g., Burke et al., 2015, 2018, 
Dell et al., 2009, 2012, or Lanzafame, 2014) are not that robust when transferred to the regional level. 
Controlling for country specific heterogeneity, there is no support for the view that warmer regions are 
systematically poorer than colder regions. The estimated coefficients of temperature are close to zero, 
while being comparatively precisely estimated, indicating that there is no effect of regional temperature 
on regional incomes and growth. Moreover, poorer regions do not seem to suffer more from hotter 
temperatures than richer regions. It is important to note that heterogeneity within countries, i.e., among 
regions within a country, is substantial regarding temperature and income. This suggests that there is no 
systematic link between warmer temperatures and incomes, with national institutions, national policy or 



























-0.004 0.007 -0.025** 0.012 0.040 -0.016 0.022 0.069 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.027) (0.027) (0.042) (0.052) 
Poor 
  -0.612***       0.211     
  (0.114)       (0.371)     
temperature x 
Poor 
  -0.013       0.065**     
  (0.009)       (0.030)     
temperature² 
    0.001*       0.001   
    (0.001)       (0.002)   
Years of 
Education 
      0.238***       -0.072 




      -0.002       -0.004 
      (0.002)       (0.005) 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO 
Observations 9,472 9,472 9,472 7,504 1,527 1,527 1,527 1,505 
R² 0.858 0.884 0.86 0.893 0.626 0.631 0.626 0.627 

















F Statistic 445.6*** 553.3*** 447.3*** 506.9*** 29.49*** 29.38*** 29.14*** 29.15*** 
Note: The regressions estimate the effect of temperature on logarithmized regional GDP p.c. and regional growth in regressions with the dummy variable 
Poor (1 if regional GDP is below sample average; 0 otherwise) and its interaction with temperature, Years of education its interaction with temperature, as 
well as temperature squared. Regressions are run with the Gennaioli et al. (2014) dataset with country and partly time fixed effects. Robust clustered 





In a similar manner, we run the model as outlined above employing our two DHS samples. The 
unit of observations are DHS clusters76. We use the logarithm of nightlights77 and gross cell production 
(GCP) as dependent variables. Here, we are dealing with cross-sectional data, as our variables nightlights 
and gross cell production are only available for 2015 and 2005, respectively. We again account for 
country fixed effects. Results of estimation equations (3) and (4) are presented in Table 20. The results 
suggest a positive relationship between the cluster temperature and nightlights within a cluster, i.e., with 
every increase in temperature we observe an increase in nightlights by 18% to 40%. In relatively poor 
regions, this positive effect is somewhat less pronounced (specification (2)). We also find that the 
relationship between temperature and nightlights does not follow a non-linear pattern as the coefficient 
for the squared term of temperature is insignificant. 
The relationship of temperature with gross cell production is ambiguous. If anything, temperature 
seems to have a small but negative effect on gross cell production, i.e., results suggest that higher 
temperatures in a cluster tend to reduce gross cell production in 2005 by approximately 3%. This only 
holds in the presence of the dummy variable Poor, which is the only other significant variable in our 
model (specification (5)). 
  
 
76 DHS also report the respective subnational region and country for every cluster. 
77 The dataset contains approximately 3,000 zero values for nightlights (which might not necessarily imply complete darkness 





Table 20: Baseline regressions for the effect of temperature on nightlights in 2015 and gross cell 



















0.181*** 0.203*** 0.397** -0.012 -0.026** 0.054 
(0.067) (0.059) (0.191) (0.011) (0.012) (0.063) 
Poor 
  -2.370**     -1.428***   
  (0.977)     (0.358)   
temperature x 
Poor 
  -0.084**     0.018   
  (0.04)     (0.013)   
temperature² 
    -0.005     -0.002 
    (0.005)     (0.001) 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Observations 15,533 15,533 15,533 14,130 14,130 14,130 















F Statistic 257.3*** 546.6*** 251.5*** 2,382*** 3,493*** 2,318*** 
Note: The regressions estimate the effect of temperature on logarithmized regional nightlights 
(gross cell production) in regressions with the dummy variable Poor (1 if regional nightlights (gross 
cell production) is below sample average; 0 otherwise) and its interaction with temperature, as well 
as temperature squared. Nightlights (gross cell production) regressions are run with DHS data for 
the year 2015 (2005) with country fixed effects. Robust clustered standard error estimates (country-
level) are presented below the coefficients. Significance levels are indicated by *p<0.1; **p<0.05; 
***p<0.01. 
 
4.4.3 Extensions and Sensitivity Tests 
In the following, we present five empirical extensions, aiming at refining our previous 
estimations. 
First, we reconsider our subnational administrative data and create seven year-subsamples, i.e., 
one cross-section for every first year of a new decade (1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010). We 
proceed with our three main specifications (as seen in Table 19 and Table 20) for every year-subsample. 
The results for the seven cross-sections displayed in Table 21 confirm the ambiguous effect of regional 
temperature on regional GDP per capita. While we observe a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between temperature and log GDP per capita in a few cases, this effect is sensitive to 
alterations in specifications in all year-subsamples. For all specifications, the effect of regional 
temperature on regional GDP per capita is small, as shown by the coefficient estimates ranging between 
0.004 to 0.033; that is, regions within a country that are one degree warmer than the average region of 
the country tend to have a 0.4% to 3.3% smaller GDP. When interacted with Poor, we only find 
significantly negative coefficients in subsamples for 1950 and 1960. We might conclude that poorer 




methods (such as improvements in medicine, agriculture etc.) that decoupled temperature effects from 
income. As in Table 19, there does not seem to be a clear non-linear relationship between regional 
















































-0.030*** 0.009 -0.031 -0.021*** -0.004*** -0.01 -0.013 -0.003 -0.011 -0.005 
(0.011) (0.016) (0.02) (0.007) (0.0004) (0.016) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) 
Poor 
  0.092     -0.11     -0.443***     
  (0.196)     (0.12)     (0.129)     
temperature x 
Poor 
  -0.044**     -0.018*     -0.011     
  (0.02)     (0.009)     (0.013)     
temperature² 
    0.00001     -0.0004     -0.0001   
    (0.001)     (0.001)     (0.001)   
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Observations 210 210 210 285 285 285 316 316 316 537 























F Statistic 136.9*** 132.3*** 129.9*** 135.5*** 138*** 131*** 172.1*** 178.4*** 167.2*** 261.3*** 
Note: The regressions estimate the effect of temperature on logarithmized regional GDP p.c. in regressions with the dummy variable Poor (1 if regional 
GDP is below sample average; 0 otherwise) and its interaction with temperature, as well as temperature squared. Regressions are run with Gennaioli et 
al. (2014) data subsamples for the years 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010 with country fixed effects. Robust clustered standard error estimates 




















































-0.012** -0.01 0.01 0.008 -0.009 -0.006 0.003 -0.033** -0.007 0.003 -0.033** 










(0.262)   (0.427)   (0.112)   (0.09)  
temperature x 
Poor 
0.015   0.003   -0.008   -0.012  
(0.012)   (0.015)   (0.012)   (0.008)  
temperature² 
 0.0002   0.001   0.001**   0.001** 
 (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001) 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Observations 537 537 844 844 844 1,209 1,209 1,209 1,051 1,051 1,051 

























F Statistic 273*** 255.8*** 205.9*** 256.4*** 207.5*** 211.2*** 302.2*** 215.6*** 89.96*** 145.2*** 91.42*** 
Note: The regressions estimate the effect of temperature on logarithmized regional GDP p.c. in regressions with the dummy variable Poor (1 if 
regional GDP is below sample average; 0 otherwise) and its interaction with temperature, as well as temperature squared. Regressions are run with 
Gennaioli et al. (2014) data subsamples for the years 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010 with country fixed effects. Robust clustered standard 





To refine our results from Table 20, we employ the DHS data and account for a popular critique 
of using average temperature, namely that temperature averages neglect potentially large variation in 
temperature between months or even days (e.g., Barreca, 2012, Deschênes and Greenstone, 2007, 
Ranson, 2014, Schlenker and Lobell, 2010). DHS enables us to calculate the difference between the 
lowest and highest monthly temperature per year and regress it on the logarithm of nightlights in 2015 
and gross cell production in 2005. Results are presented in Table 22. We find a statistically significantly 
negative impact of strong fluctuations, accounting for a reduction in nightlights by 16% with every 
additional degree between minimum and maximum temperature in rich regions. Interestingly, this effect 
is almost cancelled out if we are dealing with poor regions (positive coefficient of 0.13). We find no 
robust relationship between temperature fluctuations and gross cell production as shown in columns (3) 
and (4) of Table 22. 
Table 22: Baseline regressions for the effect of temperature fluctuations on nightlights and gross cell 











-0.122 -0.163** -0.020 -0.033 
(0.087) (0.066) (0.02) (0.03) 
Poor 
  -5.489***   -1.212*** 
  (0.349)   (0.179) 
Diff_min_max_temp x 
Poor 
  0.132***   0.024 
  (0.039)   (0.03) 
Country FE YES YES YES YES 
Time FE NO NO NO NO 
Observations 15,533 15,533 14,130 14,130 
R² 0.371 0.58 0.84 0.891 









F Statistic 247.4*** 549.1*** 2381*** 3491*** 
Note: The regressions estimate the effect of the difference between the highest and the lowest 
temperature (measured in a year) on logarithmized regional nightlights (gross cell production) in 
regressions with the dummy variable Poor (1 if regional nightlights (gross cell production) is below 
sample average; 0 otherwise) and its interaction with temperature. Nightlights (gross cell 
production) regressions are run with DHS data for the year 2015 (2005) with country fixed effects. 
Robust clustered standard error estimates (country-level) are presented below the coefficients. 
Significance levels are indicated by *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
Third, we exploit our two DHS cross-sections for the difference of summer and winter 
temperatures, expressed by temperature measured in December and July. As DHS data contains mostly 
countries from the southern hemisphere, we summarize December temperature to be summer time and 
July temperatures to be winter time. As in Table 20, the results in Table 23 show that nightlights are 
positively correlated with warmer temperatures in December, indicated by statistically significantly 




Effects of winter time temperatures are less clear, as temperature exerts a much smaller, but still positive, 
effect on nightlights (0.15 in column (4) or 0.12 when interacted with Poor (column (5)). Interestingly, 
being relatively poor (in terms of nightlights) in July is more than thrice as harmful than being poor in 
December, which is potentially due to the fact that fewer sunlight hours in winter (around July) have to 
be compensated with electricity, which is often unstable or unaffordable in developing regions (see 
Adeoye and Spataru, 2019, Jiang et al., 2020 for different season-dependent electricity demands in 
developing countries). This, in return, might explain the stronger negative effect of Poor on gross cell 
production (columns (8) and (11)). Whereas temperature in December seems to have no effect on GCP, 
we observe a negative relationship between temperature in July and GCP of around 0.02 to 0.03. As in 
all our previous results, we find no support that the relationship between temperature and income 




Table 23: Baseline regressions for the effect of temperature in December and July on nightlights and gross cell production in 2015 and 2005 when 















0.231*** 0.253*** 0.346***       
(0.071) (0.049) (0.082)       
Poor 
  -2.114***     -7.194***   
  (0.597)     (0.742)   
dec_temperature x Poor 
  -0.106***         
  (0.024)         
dec_temperature² 
    -0.003       
    (0.003)       
jul_temperature 
      0.152*** 0.02 0.045 
      (0.056) (0.044) (0.352) 
jul_temperature x Poor 
        0.123***   
        (0.036)   
jul_temperature² 
          0.002 
          (0.008) 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Observations 15,533 15,533 15,533 15,533 15,533 15,533 
R² 0.387 0.586 0.388 0.378 0.581 0.378 
































0.004 -0.001 0.072       
(0.013) (0.02) (0.046)       
Poor 
  -1.021*     -1.375***   
  (0.619)     (0.285)   
dec_temperature x Poor 
  -0.0001         
  (0.025)         
dec_temperature² 
    -0.002       
    (0.001)       
jul_temperature 
      -0.019** -0.027*** -0.036 
      (0.009) (0.01) (0.044) 
jul_temperature x Poor 
        0.016   
        (0.013)   
jul_temperature² 
          0.0004 
          (0.001) 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Observations 14,130 14,130 14,130 14,130 14,130 14,130 
R² 0.839 0.89 0.841 0.841 0.892 0.841 












(df = 14,097) 
F Statistic 2,372*** 3,445*** 2,327*** 2,400*** 3,519*** 2,326*** 
Note: The regressions estimate the effect of the July and December temperature on logarithmized regional nightlights (gross cell production) in regressions 
with the dummy variable Poor (1 if regional nightlights (gross cell production) is below sample average; 0 otherwise) and its interaction with temperature, 
as well as July and December temperature squared. Nightlights (gross cell production) regressions are run with DHS data for the year 2015 (2005) with 
country fixed effects. Robust clustered standard error estimates (country-level) are presented below the coefficients. Significance levels are indicated by 




Due to the exclusion of further control variables, our previous settings gave regional temperature 
a high chance to emerge as an explanatory factor for income differences. Even though this approach is 
commonly used in recent cross-country literature (e.g., Burke et al., 2015, 2018, Deryugina and Hsiang, 
2014, Li et al., 2019), we would like to provide an initial attempt to include regional and national control 
variables that are available and that we believe to be relevant for predicting income. In fact, we observe 
that various subnational geography- and population-specific variables exert a much stronger effect on 
(proxies for) subnational incomes whereas the effect of temperature tends to be rather unimportant. 
Covariates presented in Table 24 add between 0.01 and 0.1 to R² in regressions with per capita GDP 
and per capita GDP growth and between 0.05 and 0.2 in regressions with nightlights, whereas 
regressions with GCP lose about 0.1 in explanatory power. 
For estimating regional per capita income, we observe that latitude, national GDP, education, the 
fact that the region contains the national capital and the number of adjacent national borders exert a 
positive effect of between 0.02 to 0.9, whereas the fact that the region is landlocked or shares borders 
with a region of another country negatively affects regional incomes of between 0.08 to 0.12. GDP 
growth on the other hand, is highly influenced by national GDP (coefficient of +10 to +11) and to a 
much smaller extend by latitude (coefficient of -0.04). Nightlights tend to be higher in urban areas 
(captured by global human footprint with a coefficient of 0.14) and in areas that are equipped for 
irrigation (coefficient of 0.06), but lower in areas with a high Malaria incidence (coefficient of -6). And 
lastly, GCP is negatively affected by latitude (coefficient of -0.03) and the average number of people 





Table 24: Baseline regressions for the effect of temperature on regional incomes, regional growth, 
nightlights and gross cell production with control variables when accounting for country and partly 



















0.005 0.015* -0.004 0.022 -0.02 0.015 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.028) (0.028) (0.051) 
Poor 
  -0.343***     0.126   
  (0.086)     (0.385)   
temperature x 
Poor 
  -0.013**     0.047   
  (0.007)     (0.029)   
Temperature² 
    0.0003     0.0003 
    (0.0005)     (0.002) 
Landlocked 
country 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Landlocked 
region 
-0.126*** -0.110*** -0.118*** -0.079 -0.098 -0.072 
(0.041) (0.038) (0.04) (0.11) (0.11) (0.118) 
distance_to_ 
coast 
-0.00000* -0.0000 -0.00000* -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
km_length_ 
coast 
-0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00002) 
nat_borders 
-0.081*** -0.083*** -0.082*** 0.218 0.213 0.218 
(0.025) (0.021) (0.025) (0.23) (0.227) (0.229) 
no_nat_ 
borders 
0.043* 0.044** 0.045** -0.196 -0.194 -0.194 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.02) (0.154) (0.15) (0.156) 
Latitude 
0.018** 0.017* 0.018** -0.036** -0.036** -0.036** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) 
Area_sqkm 
0.00000** 0.00000** 0.00000** -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Malaria_ 
ecology 
0.03 0.028 0.027 0.019 0.016 0.016 




1.371 1.672 1.203 9.046 8.114 8.953 
(2.236) (1.682) (2.22) (9.739) (9.859) (9.42) 
Ln_Pop_ 
density 
-0.0003 0.001 0.003 -0.06 -0.059 -0.057 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.074) (0.075) (0.065) 
Capital is in 
Region 
0.335*** 0.282*** 0.329*** 0.319 0.385* 0.315 
(0.049) (0.044) (0.047) (0.217) (0.221) (0.209) 
Ln_GDP_ 
country 
0.905*** 0.736*** 0.906*** -11.07*** -9.906*** -11.10*** 
(0.104) (0.091) (0.103) (2.299) (1.947) (2.349) 
Years of 
Education 
0.166*** 0.148*** 0.166*** -0.105 -0.09 -0.105 
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.092) (0.093) (0.089) 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES NO NO NO 
Observations 7,500 7,500 7,500 1,505 1,505 1,505 






































0.036 0.028 0.455 -0.011 -0.065 0.041 
(0.049) (0.077) (0.333) (0.013) (0.044) (0.044) 
Poor 
  -1.389     -2.308*   
  (1.786)     (1.328)   
temperature x 
Poor 
  0.01     0.062   
  (0.064)     (0.047)   
Temperature² 
    -0.01     -0.001 
    (0.008)     (0.001) 
Latitude 
-0.032 -0.028 -0.028 -0.033** -0.021* -0.032** 
(0.037) (0.035) (0.038) (0.016) (0.012) (0.016) 
All_Population_ 
Count 
0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.00000 0.00000   
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)   
Aridity 
-0.016 -0.014 -0.014 -0.003 -0.003   
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.01) (0.009)   
drought_ 
episodes 
0.050* 0.042 0.051* -0.012 -0.009 -0.012 




-0.0002** -0.0002* -0.0002** 0.00001 0.00003   
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00003) (0.00003)   
Frost_Days 
0.151 0.19 0.337 0.249 0.219   
(0.894) (0.873) (0.945) (0.228) (0.177)   
global_human_ 
footprint 
0.141*** 0.132*** 0.140*** 0.002* 0.002** 0.002* 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
growing_season_ 
length 
0.019 0.015 0.025 -0.03 -0.024 -0.029 
(0.078) (0.076) (0.08) (0.032) (0.03) (0.032) 
Irrigation 
0.057*** 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ITN_Coverage 
0.908 1.244* 0.942 -0.550* -0.575* -0.563** 
(0.589) (0.638) (0.576) (0.284) (0.311) (0.274) 
Malaria_ 
Incidence 
-6.267* -5.965* -6.302* -0.078 0.03 -0.09 
(3.779) (3.56) (3.81) (0.561) (0.534) (0.559) 
Malaria_ 
Prevalence 
2.077 2.016 1.952 -0.019 -0.121 -0.023 
(3.195) (3.143) (3.19) (0.486) (0.467) (0.487) 
PET 
-0.319 -0.256 -0.296 -0.057 -0.06 -0.053 
(0.441) (0.421) (0.44) (0.068) (0.065) (0.066) 
proximity_to_ 
national_borders 
-0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 0.00000 -0.00000 0.00000 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Proximity_to_ 
Protected_Areas 
0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
proximity_to_ 
water 
0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Rainfall 
0.0005* 0.0004 0.0005* 0.0002* 0.0001 0.0002* 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Slope 
-0.055 -0.057 -0.055 -0.02 -0.014 -0.019 
(0.056) (0.053) (0.056) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017) 
Wet_Days 
0.03 0.039 0.018 -0.013 -0.002 -0.014 
(0.078) (0.076) (0.076) (0.02) (0.02) (0.021) 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Observations 5,231 5,231 5,231 5,218 5,218 5,218 


















F Statistic 191.1*** 188.0*** 187.2*** 417.8*** 504.6*** 408.1*** 
Note: The regressions estimate the effect of temperature on logarithmized regional GDP p.c., 
regional growth, logarithmized nightlights and logarithmized gross cell production in 
regressions with the dummy variable Poor (1 if regional GDP/nightlights/gross cell production 
is below sample average; 0 otherwise) and its interaction with temperature, temperature squared, 
as well as with a large number of control variables. Regressions are run with the Gennaioli et al. 
(2014), the DHS 2015 and the DHS 2005 dataset with country and partly time fixed effects. 
Robust clustered standard error estimates (country-level) are presented below the coefficients. 
Significance levels are indicated by *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
In a final sensitivity test, we want to account for the fact that some regions might be characterized 
by exceptionally high income, growth rates, nightlights and gross cell production. Even though these 
regions represent the actual status quo, we define them as potential outliers and exclude them from our 
analysis presented in Table 25. 
. Outliers are identified by plotting the four distribution curves and eliminating scattered regions 
that are on the far right side of the respective curve. A quick comparison of Table 19 and Table 20 with 
results from Table 25 reveal that extreme outliers do not change the impact of temperature on regional 
incomes, nightlights and GCP. Only regressions on regional GDP growth show different signs and 
magnitudes, but as results continue to be statistically insignificant, these findings can be neglected. We 
conclude that for a set of normally distributed regions, within-country heterogeneity matters to a 





Table 25: Baseline regressions for the effect of temperature on regional incomes, regional growth, 
nightlights and gross cell production when accounting for country and partly time fixed effects in 



















-0.004 0.008 -0.025** -0.002 -0.032 -0.001 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.025) (0.013) 
Poor 
  -0.580***     0.534*   
  (0.108)     (0.318)   
temperature 
x Poor 
  -0.014     0.031   
  (0.010)     (0.022)   
temperature² 
    0.001     -0.00003 
    (0.001)     (0.001) 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES NO NO NO 
Observations 9,273 9,273 9,273 1,495 1,495 1,495 















F Statistic 434.8*** 538.6*** 435.4*** 52.7*** 54.0*** 52.0*** 



















0.180*** 0.207*** 0.387** -0.006 -0.013 0.074 
(0.068) (0.060) (0.195) (0.010) (0.009) (0.052) 
Poor 
  -2.260**     -1.157***   
  (0.986)     (0.387)   
temperature 
x Poor 
  -0.086**     0.009   
  -0.039     (0.014)   
temperature² 
    -0.005     -0.002 
    (0.005)     (0.001) 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Observations 15,096 15,096 15,096 13,487 13,487 13,487 















F Statistic 206.5*** 462.9*** 201.9*** 2,541*** 4,022*** 2,483*** 
Note: The regressions estimate the effect of temperature on logarithmized regional GDP p.c., regional 
growth, logarithmized nightlights and logarithmized gross cell production in regressions with the 
dummy variable Poor (1 if regional GDP/nightlights/gross cell production is below sample average; 0 
otherwise) and its interaction with temperature, as well as temperature squared. Regressions are run 
with a subset to the Gennaioli et al. (2014), the DHS 2015 and the DHS 2005 dataset without outliers 
(details can be requested from the authors) with country and partly time fixed effects. Robust clustered 
standard error estimates (country-level) are presented below the coefficients. Significance levels are 





4.4.4 Discussion and Caveats 
With this research effort, we aim at contributing to the discussion on whether hotter climate is 
related to lower income. We explore specifically whether hotter regions have a lower income compared 
to colder regions, independent of any country-specific circumstances such as institutions. Previous 
empirical and theoretical contributions have argued that hot temperature may have a direct impact on 
human productivity, labor morale and productivity or on the spread of diseases; hot temperatures may 
furthermore have an indirect impact on development by contributing to the emergence of extractive 
institutions (e.g., Easterly and Levine, 2003, Gallup et al., 1999). Consequently, hotter regions might be 
characterized by lower per capita incomes. However, our results for several thousand subnational 
administrative units and DHS clusters suggest that there is no systematic effect of regional temperature 
on regional incomes. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that some of the richest regions in the world 
are among the hottest and among the coldest in the world (e.g., regions in the United Arab Emirates or 
Canada). We also find little evidence that poorer regions experience more income losses from hotter 
temperatures. 
Interpreting our findings, we must highlight several caveats regarding out data. First, when 
focusing on subnational administrative units (data from Gennaioli et al., 2014), we employ average 
temperature data for a time period of fifty years, while subnational per capita GDP is available for several 
years in this time period. Thus, we do not analyze income changes due to changes in yearly temperature. 
DHS on the other hand, provides us with two cross-sections for the years 2005 and 2015. Empirically, 
this leaves us unable to include region fixed effects or country-time fixed effects, where the latter would 
allow us to account for anything that is unique for a specific nation and time period. Thus, we cannot 
explore how changes in temperature affect changes in GDP per capita for a specific region, i.e., we do 
not know whether a region in the United Arab Emirates becoming even hotter would experience a 
decrease in GDP per capita. Put differently, due to the cross-sectional character of the DHS data, we are 
restricted to exploring differences between regions rather than differences over time. Therefore, we 
caution to draw any direct conclusion regarding the effects of (future) anthropogenic climate change.78 
At the same time, the world regions provide numerous examples that hot temperatures can go along with 
high incomes similarly as cold temperatures may go along with high incomes too. It might be possible 
to learn from these regions in terms of coping with high and/or increasing temperatures. The reasons for 
the economic success of hot regions should be further explored. 
Second, due to their unavailability on the regional level, we are not able to add many potentially 
time-variant control variables that may explain regional incomes. Precipitation, extreme weather events 
such as cyclone activity, population specifics, regional institutions, regional ethno-linguistic diversity, 
redistribution, etc. are only a few examples from past literature. Similar to the cross-country literature, 
 
78 Of course, we also worry that there might be a bias against researchers who find no evidence that hotter temperatures 




potential omitted variable bias cannot be fully ruled out even if we include country fixed effects, i.e., 
while regional temperature is certainly external to a region’s GDP, it does not need to be exogenous. 
Moreover, migration between regions within a country tends to be easier than migration between 
countries. Temperature could be correlated with migration; in turn, migration could be related to 
economic activity per capita which would then be a potential confounding factor in our analysis.79  
Third, general caution must be exercised when dealing with historical subnational temperature 
datasets, as weather station data is usually much sparser, often interpolated or modeled, or found to be 
misaligned with original measurements because of rounding or conversion errors (see e.g., Nese, 1994, 
Rhines et al., 2015). In addition, climate observations often underlie measurement biases due to 
undesired instrument exposures, which can account for measurement errors of up to 3.6 degrees (see 
Mahmood et al., 2006). In consequence, we cannot be sure whether our null results represent the absence 
of a causal relationship or whether they come from an unprecisely measured temperature (or even 
economic activity) on the subnational level. 
Fourth, a potential distortion of results might originate from the structure of the data which is 
based on political boundaries (data from Gennaioli et al., 2014) or unequally sized clusters not covering 
the entire regional or national territory (data from DHS). Assuming that boundaries are drawn based on 
the number of inhabitants (more but smaller numbers of states and provinces in highly populated areas) 
and that people naturally prefer to live and work in more moderate climatic zones, our sample might be 
biased towards more temperate geographical units. By this, our results stand in contrast to e.g., Nordhaus 
(2006) who uses equally-sized grid cell data and consequently analyzes regional incomes in 
environments of severe and less severe climatic circumstances. 
In addition to tackling these data-related caveats, we see further potential for future research in 
revealing the underlying reasons for why our results differ substantially from past (cross-country) 
literature. Here, we would encourage to extend our research in the following manner: first, instead of 
reporting average effects for the entire sample, it would be interesting to further explore the distribution 
of possible relationships between incomes and temperature across countries. Results can then be directly 
compared with authors such as Li et al. (2019) for China or Deryugina and Hsiang (2014) and Colacito 
et al. (2019) for the United States; second, even though our analysis reveals no effect of temperature on 
GDP per capita or GDP per capita growth, we get a relatively consistent positive effect on nightlights. 
As this result is rather contra-intuitive, assuming that nightlights is a relevant proxy for subnational 
incomes, it needs to be further discussed. A potential explanation can be found in the season-dependent 
electricity demands of developing countries (see e.g., Adeoye and Spataru (2019) or Jiang et al. (2020), 
which might be an indication for a shift of work- and non-work-related activities to cooler hours (i.e., 
 
79 Beine and Parsons (2015) do not find direct effects of long‐run climatic factors on international migration employing data 




late evening or night) during hotter time periods. Exploring this phenomena with nocturnal temperatures 
or with several data subsamples expressing regions with a high and low latitude (corresponding to 
generally cooler or hotter regions) would be a potential option to test this hypothesis; and third, it would 
be interesting to explore a potential direct effect of extreme weather events on health- and mortality 
indicators and a consequent indirect effect on regional incomes (see e.g., Barreca et al., 2016). If done 
for several time periods, we might also get an indication for how well people and their health adapted to 
extreme weather over time. 
Ultimately, we would be interested in providing an answer to the question how future climate 
change and associated increases in temperatures will affect future livelihoods and welfare. We 
approximate welfare by looking at regional GDP per capita. Our cross-sectional analysis is informative 
but not fully conclusive as the data lacks temperature variations within regions over time. Nevertheless, 
we might be able to derive a few cautious interpretations regarding anthropogenic climate change from 
the observed variation across space. First, our results suggest that adaptation to different temperatures 
within countries was possible in the past. For instance, adaptation may have been achieved thanks to 
innovation, specialization within countries, regional migration or fiscal equalization systems. Such 
mechanisms may help to weaken the adverse effects of climate change for hotter (and colder) regions in 
the future, too. Second, if national factors (such as political institutions) continue to be important drivers 
of economic growth, adaptation may be facilitated and may reduce any potential direct adverse effects 
of increased temperatures. While adaptation to higher temperatures was possible in the past, we might 
still face new challenges if temperatures and adaptation costs increase rapidly and substantially. Thus, 
our results do not exclude that a more robust negative link between temperatures and regional incomes 
might emerge in the future. On the other hand, if poorer and hotter regions grow more quickly thanks to 
improvements along other dimensions, we might continue to find no link between temperature and 
regional incomes as long as all the other factors that drive economic development are adequately 
accounted for. 
4.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper explores the impact of temperature on income for a large number of subnational 
regions and clusters. We use data on temperature, GDP per capita and GDP per capita growth for 1,542 
administrative regions in 83 countries for the years 1950 to 2010 from Gennaioli et al. (2014). Moreover, 
we employ data on temperature, nightlights for 15,533 subnational clusters for the year 2015 in 37 
countries and gross cell production for 14,130 subnational clusters for the year 2005 in 31 countries, 
using additional data from the Demographic and Health Surveys. This subnational focus allows us to 
account for country fixed effects and therefore control for any factors that are country specific but 




We are unable to identify a consistent and robust link between regional temperature and regional 
incomes. We observe, if anything, a quantitatively negligible negative relationship between regional 
temperature and regional GDP per capita. This relationship is sensitive to different specifications. We 
also do not find that there are systematic differences in the role of temperature in regional incomes 
between rich and poor regions. We find a relatively stable positive relationship between temperature and 
nightlights that is slightly weakened for poor regions. The relationship between temperature and growth 
or gross cell production is ambiguous. Regardless of which regional income proxy is employed, we find 
no support for a non-linear relationship between temperature and income at the regional level. 
Compared to the cross-country literature on the temperature-income relationship, our approach 
using subnational data allows us to account for a heterogeneity within a country. We are also able to add 
to the discussion on the non-linearity assumption of the temperature-income relationship as well as to 
the discussion whether poor regions suffer more from hot temperatures due to a failure of sufficiently 
adapting to them. Currently, the missing time variation of the temperature variable at the regional and 
the cluster level is a caveat of our approach. Ideally, we would want to analyze regional temperature for 
every year from 1950 onwards so that we can employ region fixed effects80. This would allow for an 
even more stringent testing of the relationship than with country fixed effects. Until then, we caution to 
remain critical towards transferring the negative effect of temperature on income found in the cross-
country literature to the regional level. We think that far more research is required in this domain to 
establish clear-cut results and offer policy conclusions. 
 
 
80 In cooperation with the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung we were able to merge subnational income data 
(based on the shapefiles created by Gennaioli et al. (2014)) with newly collected temperature data. This is still in progress 




4.6 APPENDIX CHAPTER 4 
Table 26: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Median   Mean  
 Std. 
Dev.  
 Min   Max   Obs  
Variables used in regressions with Ln(GDP_region) (Source: Gennaioli et al. (2014)) 
Ln(GDP_region) 
Logarithm of the gross domestic product per capita 
in a region (in constant 2005 PPP US$). 
8.83 8.82 1.16 5.24 12.02 9,472 
Temperature 
Temperature (Celsius) averaged for the period 1950 
to 2000 within the sub-national region. 
12.60 14.18 8.06 -14.49 28.19 9,472 
Poor 
Dummy variable equals 1 if region is below sample 
average regarding per capita GDP; 0 otherwise. 
1.00 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 9,472 
Years of education 
Average years of schooling from primary school 
onwards for the population aged 15 years or older in 
a region. 
7.41 7.21 3.25 0.39 13.76 7,504 
Landlocked country 
Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the country is 
landlocked; 0 otherwise. 
0.00 0.10 0.30 0 1 9,472 
Landlocked region 
Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the region is 
landlocked; 0 otherwise. 
1.00 0.54 0.50 0 1 9,472 
nbr 
Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the region has 
a border to another region in a neighboring country; 
0 otherwise. 
0.00 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00 9,487 
nbr_nr 
Number of borders to other countries incl. A 
region's own country border. 
1.00 1.59 0.87 0.00 8.00 9,487 
Latitude 
Latitude of the centroid of each region calculated in 
ArcGIS. 
37.47 33.50 16.47 0.02 69.95 9,472 





The “malaria ecology” index of Kiszewski et al. 
(2004) measures the risk of being infected by 
Malaria. The index variable ranges from 0 to 39 
with higher values indicating a higher risk and thus 
less Malaria stability. The index takes into account 
both climatic factors and the dominant vector 
species to give an overall measure of the component 
of malaria variation that is exogenous to human 
intervention. The index is calculated for grid 
squares of one half degree longitude by one half 
degree latitude. Regional averages are calculated 
via ArcGIS. 
0.01 1.09 2.72 0.00 28.68 9,472 
Ln(Cum_Oil_Gas_ 
Prod) 
(Logarithmized) cumulative oil, gas and liquid 
natural gas production from the time production 
began to 2000. Oil and liquid natural gas were 
collected in millions of barrels. Gas was collected in 
billions of cubic feet and divided by 6 to convert to 
millions of barrels of oil equivalents. 
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.12 9,472 
Ln(Pop_density) 
Logarithm of the population density which is 
measured as people per square kilometres in a 
region. 
4.12 4.02 1.74 -4.65 10.06 9,472 
Capital is in Region 
Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the region 
contains a national capital city; 0 otherwise. 
0.00 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 9,467 
Ln(GDP_country) 
Logarithm of the gross domestic product per capita 
in a country (in constant 2005 PPP US$). 
9.00 9.00 1.05 5.90 11.56 9,472 
Variables used in regressions with Growth (Source: Gennaioli et al. (2014)) 
Growth 
Growth of gross domestic product per capita in a 
region (in constant 2005 PPP US$) between the first 
and the last available year. 
0.89 1.79 2.73 -0.73 38.12 1,527 
Temperature 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(GDP_region). 





see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(GDP_region). 
1.00 0.87 0.34 0 1 1,527 
Years of education 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(GDP_region). 
6.90 7.01 2.95 0.99 12.95 1,505 
Landlocked country 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(GDP_region). 
0.00 0.13 0.34 0 1 1,527 
Landlocked region 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(GDP_region). 
1.00 0.60 0.49 0 1 1,527 
nbr 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(GDP_region). 
0.00 0.47 0.50 0 1 1,527 
nbr_nr 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(GDP_region). 
1.00 1.63 0.85 0.00 8.00 1,527 
Latitude 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(GDP_region). 
38.17 34.02 16.83 0.02 69.95 1,527 
Ln(Area_sqkm) 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(GDP_region). 
9.31 9.50 1.68 3.34 15.18 1,527 
Malaria_ecology 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(GDP_region). 
0.01 1.20 3.12 0.00 28.68 1,527 
Ln(Cum_Oil_Gas_P
rod) 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(GDP_region). 
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.12 1,527 
Ln(Pop_density) 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(GDP_region). 
4.15 4.07 1.70 -4.03 9.73 1,527 
Capital is in Region 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(GDP_region). 
0.00 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00 1,527 
Ln(GDP_country) 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(GDP_region). 





Variables used in regressions with Ln(Nightlights_Composite) (Source: DHS (2015)) 
Ln(Nightlights_ 
Composite) 
Logarithm of the average nighttime luminosity of 
the area (Composite cloud-free radiance values) 
within the 2 km (urban) or 10 km (rural) buffer 
surrounding the DHS survey cluster location in 
2015. 
-0.78 -1.02 3.34 -11.92 4.94 15,948 
temperature 
The average yearly temperature (in °C) within the 2 
km (urban) or 10 km (rural) buffer surrounding the 
DHS survey cluster location. 
23.19 22.52 4.36 -3.77 30.38 18,604 
Poor 
Dummy variable equals 1 if region is below sample 
average regarding nightlights; 0 otherwise. 
1.00 0.78 0.41 0 1 19,036 
Diff Max Min 
The difference between the average annual 
maximum and minimum temperature (in °C) within 
the 2 km (urban) or 10 km (rural) buffer 
surrounding the DHS survey cluster location. 
5.42 7.62 5.76 0.56 29.24 18,604 
Temperature 
December 
The average monthly temperature in December (in 
°C) within the 2 km (urban) or 10 km (rural) buffer 
surrounding the DHS survey cluster location. 
22.83 20.85 6.21 -13.66 29.68 18,604 
Temperature July 
The average monthly temperature in July (in °C) 
within the 2 km (urban) or 10 km (rural) buffer 
surrounding the DHS survey cluster location. 
24.57 22.96 5.16 2.03 34.52 18,604 
Precipitation 
The average precipitation measured within the 2 km 
(urban) or 10 km (rural) buffer surrounding the 
DHS survey cluster (in milimeters) in 2015. 
87.11 89.13 59.99 0.17 368.69 17,289 
Latitude Latitude 8.27 7.49 17.99 -30.59 42.43 19,051 
Ln(pop) 
The logarithm of the count of individuals living 
within the 2 km (urban) or 10 km (rural) buffer 
surrounding the DHS survey cluster in 2015 
(number of people). 





The dataset represents the average yearly 
precipitation divided by average yearly potential 
evapotranspiration in 2015, an aridity index defined 
by the United Nations Environmental Programme 
(UNEP). Index between 0 (most arid) and 300 
(most wet). 
23.37 24.88 18.12 0.02 136.13 17,289 
drought_episodes 
The average number of drought episodes 
(categorized between 1 (low) and 10 (high)) for the 
areas within the 2 km (urban) or 10 km (rural) 
buffer surrounding the DHS survey cluster location 
based on 1980-2000 precipitation data. 
5.00 5.43 2.68 1.00 10.00 13,205 
Enhanced_ 
Vegetation_Index 
The average vegetation index value within the 2 km 
(urban) or 10 km (rural) buffer surrounding the 
DHS survey cluster in 2015. Vegetation index value 
between 0 (least vegetation) and 10000 (Most 
vegetation). 
3,043.00 2,965.72 1,085.59 7.00 6,093.00 18,683 
Frost_Days 
The average number of days in which the minimum 
temperatures of the location surrounding the DHS 
survey cluster within 2 km (urban) or 10 km (rural) 
buffers met the criteria to be categorized as a 
“frosty” day in 2015. Frost days is a synthetic 
measurement that is based off of the minimum 
temperature. The full formula to calculate the 
number of days can be found in the cited Harris et 
al. (2014) or in New, Hulme, and Jones (2000). 






The average of an index between 0 (extremely 
rural) and 100 (extremely urban) for the location 
within the 2 km (urban) or 10 km (rural) buffer 
surrounding the DHS survey cluster based on 1995-
2004 data. It is created from nine global data layers 
covering human population pressure (population 
density), human land use and infrastructure (built-
up areas, nighttime lights, land use/land cover), and 
human access (coastlines, roads, railroads, 
navigable rivers). 
36.79 43.15 20.11 0.00 100.00 18,971 
growing_season_ 
length 
The length of the growing season in days (reported 
in one of 16 categories) for the area within the 2 km 
(urban) or 10 km (rural) buffer surrounding the 
DHS survey cluster location based on data collected 
between 1961 and 1991. 1: 0 days; 2: 1 - 29 days; 3: 
30 - 59 days; 4: 60 - 89 days; 5: 90 - 119 days; 6: 
120 - 149 days; 7: 150 - 179 days; 8: 180 - 209 
days; 9: 210 - 239 days; 10: 240 - 269 days; 11: 270 
- 299 days; 12: 300 - 329 days; 13: 330 - 364 days; 
14: < 365 days; 15: 365 days; 16: > 365 days. 
9.00 8.27 3.57 1.00 16.00 18,465 
Irrigation 
The average proportion of the area within the 2 km 
(urban) or 10 km (rural) buffer surrounding the 
DHS survey cluster location equipped for irrigation 
in 2005. 
0.10 9.40 20.26 0.00 100.00 18,604 
ITN_Coverage 
The average number of people within the 2 km 
(urban) or 10 km (rural) buffer surrounding the 
DHS survey cluster location who slept under an 
insecticide treated net the night before they were 
surveyed in 2015. 





(Rate!)The average number of people per year who 
show clinical symptoms of plasmodium falciparum 
malaria within the 2 km (urban) or 10 km (rural) 
buffer surrounding the DHS survey cluster location 
in 2015. 
0.17 0.20 0.15 0.00 0.71 10,202 
Malaria_ 
Prevalence 
The average parasite rate of plasmodium falciparum 
(PfPR) in children between the ages of 2 and 10 
years old within the 2 km (urban) or 10 km (rural) 
buffer surrounding the DHS survey cluster location 
in 2015. 
0.11 0.17 0.15 0.00 0.81 10,202 
PET 
The average annual potential evapotranspiration 
(PET) (millimeters per year) within the 2 km 
(urban) or 10 km (rural) buffer surrounding the 
DHS survey cluster location in 2015. 
3.77 3.84 0.77 1.93 7.33 17,289 
Ln(proximity_to_ 
national_borders) 
The logarithmized geodesic distance (meters) to the 
nearest international borders in 2014. 
10.34 10.11 1.59 1.23 13.30 19,052 
Ln(Proximity_to_ 
Protected_Areas) 
The logarithmized geodesic distance (meters) to the 
nearest protected area as defined by the United 
Nations Environment World Conservation 
Monitoring Centre in 2017. Examples of protected 
places include national parks, national forests, and 
national seashores. The dataset includes both 
aquatic and terrestrial protected areas. 
10.82 10.61 1.15 1.89 13.36 18,876 
Ln(proximity_to_ 
water) 
The logarithmized geodesic distance (meters) to 
either a lake or the coastline in 2017. For this 
extraction we used only the lakes dataset (L2) at full 
resolution and the shoreline dataset (L1), also at full 
resolution, in the GSHHG database. The datasets 
used were based on the World Vector Shorelines, 
CIA World Data Bank II, and Atlas of the 
Cryosphere. 





The average annual rainfall (in millimeters) within 
the 2 km (urban) or 10 km (rural) buffer 
surrounding the DHS survey cluster location in 
2015. 
1,003.75 1,063.54 723.33 0.00 5,574.00 18,805 
Slope 
Slope (in degrees) is a measurement of how rough 
the terrain around a DHS cluster is in 1996. The 
United States Geological Survey GTOPO30 digital 
elevation model was processed into slope by using 
the slope tool in ArcMap 10.5.0. 
0.85 1.81 2.35 0.00 23.13 19,004 
Wet_Days 
The average number of days receiving rainfall 
within the 2 km (urban) or 10 km (rural) buffer 
surrounding the DHS survey cluster location in 
2015. 
8.29 8.32 4.32 0.00 23.67 17,289 
Variables used in regressions with Ln(Gross_Cell_Production) (Source: DHS (2005)) 
Ln(Gross_Cell_ 
Production) 
Logarithm of the average Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP) in 2005 US dollars for the 2 km (urban) or 10 
km (rural) buffers surrounding the DHS survey 
cluster. 
7.30 7.49 0.94 2.13 12.98 14,332 
temperature 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(Nightlights_Composite) with data from 2005. 
23.64 22.79 4.26 -0.50 30.55 14,594 
Poor 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(Nightlights_Composite) with data from 2005. 
1.00 0.66 0.47 0 1 14,332 
Diff Max Min 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(Nightlights_Composite) with data from 2005. 
5.39 7.35 5.23 0.55 21.41 14,594 
Temperature 
December 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(Nightlights_Composite) with data from 2005. 
23.06 21.00 5.55 -6.22 29.70 14,594 
Temperature July 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(Nightlights_Composite) with data from 2005. 
24.86 23.24 5.42 1.76 35.66 14,594 
Precipitation 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(Nightlights_Composite) with data from 2005. 





see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(Nightlights_Composite) with data from 2005. 
10.94 8.80 17.17 -30.53 42.43 14,910 
Ln(pop) 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(Nightlights_Composite) with data from 2005. 
10.31 10.20 1.76 0.67 15.47 14,451 
Aridity 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(Nightlights_Composite) with data from 2005. 
22.46 25.98 18.94 0.01 103.05 13,733 
drought_episodes 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(Nightlights_Composite) with data from 2005. 
5.00 5.03 2.90 1.00 10.00 10,250 
Enhanced_ 
Vegetation_Index 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(Nightlights_Composite) with data from 2005. 
2,982.00 2,990.85 1,124.38 39.00 6,246.00 14,642 
Frost_Days 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(Nightlights_Composite) with data from 2005. 
0.00 0.53 1.72 0.00 26.81 13,733 
global_human_ 
footprint 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(Nightlights_Composite) with data from 2005. 
38.51 44.60 19.63 0.00 100.00 14,878 
growing_season_ 
length 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(Nightlights_Composite) with data from 2005. 
9.00 8.42 3.80 1.00 16.00 14,470 
Irrigation 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(Nightlights_Composite) with data from 2005. 
0.12 9.29 19.84 0.00 100.00 14,594 
ITN_Coverage 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(Nightlights_Composite) with data from 2005. 
0.01 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.42 7,666 
Malaria_Incidence 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(Nightlights_Composite) with data from 2005. 
0.30 0.31 0.19 0.00 0.75 7,666 
Malaria_ 
Prevalence 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(Nightlights_Composite) with data from 2005. 
0.25 0.29 0.22 0.00 0.97 7,666 
PET 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(Nightlights_Composite) with data from 2005. 
3.82 3.92 0.83 2.21 7.65 13,733 
Ln(proximity_to_ 
national_borders) 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(Nightlights_Composite) with data from 2005. 






see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(Nightlights_Composite) with data from 2005. 
10.73 10.49 1.21 2.90 13.03 14,766 
Ln(proximity_to_ 
water) 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(Nightlights_Composite) with data from 2005. 
10.65 10.33 1.75 0.09 13.46 14,788 
Rainfall 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(Nightlights_Composite) with data from 2005. 
1,045.00 1,159.44 811.64 0.00 4,875.00 14,673 
Slope 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(Nightlights_Composite) with data from 2005. 
0.83 1.77 2.23 0.00 22.80 14,881 
Wet_Days 
see description of variables used in regressions with 
Ln(Nightlights_Composite) with data from 2005. 





CHAPTER 5 SUMMARY, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
5.1 SUMMARY 
Neglecting heterogeneity and differences within countries has been a major caveat of much of 
past research in development economics. Instead of comparing Moscow region and Kamchatka Krai, 
the two most apart regions in Russia, cross-country literature compares Russia and the United States. 
Whereas it makes sense to analyze and compare some factors at the national level (i.e., those that are 
collated by national statistical offices), it constitutes a great loss of information to aggregate variables 
that are characterized by a substantial subnational variation such as culture, development aid or 
temperature. Consider for instance the distinct cultural habits and (economic) behaviors of inhabitants 
of North and South Italy or West and East Germany – four areas with very persistent income differences 
despite various national efforts for unification; consider the different opportunities and economic status 
of individuals living in areas that have been beneficiaries of development aid, potentially because it is 
the birthplace of the current prime minister or because there is a political interest in developing a certain 
area due to oil or other resource deposits; or consider the different challenges and opportunities of 
individuals living in the Yukon Territory and Nova Scotia in Canada or Yakutia and Krasnodar region 
in Russia where annual temperature differs by more than 20 degrees. If culture, development aid and 
temperature do in fact play a role in explaining economic development, as suggested by the cross-
country literature, then it seems negligent to disregard their distinct within-country heterogeneity. 
We are convinced that there is a substantial need in the literature to account for subnational 
differences and therefore the aim of this doctoral thesis is to explore subnational variation in culture, 
development aid and temperature and its impact on economic income. We employed empirical analyses 
using data from a large number of subnational regions or even individuals from countries all around the 
world. Datasets originated either from surveys, from the World Bank or from national/regional statistical 
offices that were (if needed) combined based on region names or geocodes. 
Our empirical strategy follows a fixed effects regression approach that is common also in the 
cross-country literature but with the distinction that we can control for country, time and sometimes 
even region (subnational) fixed effects, i.e., all country-, time- and region-specific unobservables are 
accounted for. By this, we can re-open rather old discussions on influence factors of (regional) economic 
development: (i) Can different cultural conventions, such as conformity to a group, individualism, 
personal freedom, obedience etc. explain income differences? (ii) Can development aid help to improve 
the quality of living with regards to water and sanitation and have a lasting impact on individual health? 
(iii) Can hotter temperatures and the inability to adapt to them be a major explaining factor for why some 




By answering these questions from a new perspective, i.e., a subnational perspective, we provide 
a substantial contribution and extension to existing literature and are able to give valuable policy 
recommendations. We are aware of the given caveats of our analyses and therefore provide several 
recommendations for future research as well. 
5.2 MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This thesis processes three distinct research questions that are all aiming at explaining persistent 
differences in subnational incomes. We are exploiting the variation of culture, development aid and 
temperature, which all have been subject to numerous renowned research efforts, but have never been 
analyzed in a comprehensive and elaborate manner for a large number of worldwide subnational regions. 
Chapter 2 takes up the question on whether and to what extent culture influences economic 
growth. More specific, we are analyzing whether the regional appreciation of the cultural value 
Independence (Obedience) positively (negatively) affects regional per capita income as it is suggested 
by previous cross-country studies. Undertaking a major data matching effort, we combine cultural, 
economic, geographical, religious and educational variables for 1,204 (subnational) regions across 66 
countries between 1980 and 2010. This dataset allows us to include country-time fixed effects, which 
reduces the risk of omitted variable bias, issues of endogeneity and the neglection of within-country 
heterogeneity. In addition, we introduce a new genetic instrument, reflecting the genetic distance to the 
United Kingdom, which is supposed to resolve remaining endogeneity concerns. Lastly, the dataset also 
enables us to include three measures of national institutional quality, Government Effectiveness, Rule of 
Law and Absence of Corruption, and clearly separate their effects from regional culture, which has been 
a major concern of cross-country literature. To the best of our knowledge, this research effort is the first 
contribution that comprehensively analyses the culture-income debate for such a large number of 
worldwide regions. 
For a large number of tests, including data refinements and alterations in the empirical setup, we 
find a very consistent and positive impact of the regional share of people who appreciate Independence 
and want to transfer this value to their children on regional per capita income. The regional appreciation 
of the value Obedience on the other hand exerts a robustly negative effect on regional per capita income. 
We find national institutions to have a strong mediating power on the effect of culture on income, i.e., 
stronger institutions can function as a substitute for regional culture. This is even more pronounced in 
countries with a centralized state system, where we can assume that regional institutions are absent. 
Even though we put a lot of effort in finding a relevant instrument on the regional level to control for 
reversed causality between culture and economic outcomes, we find only low evidence for the relevance 




Our insights lead us to the conclusion that despite all other potential reasons for diverging 
economic development, regional differences in cultural traits matter. Therefore, policy interventions 
must be carefully attuned to regional characteristics of culture, norms and behaviors, which are formed 
by parental education, migration background, religion and many more, and cannot be assumed to be 
unified for the entire country. Results and policy implications from cross-country literature must 
therefore be treated with caution. Just to mention a few examples from our analysis, we find that the 
appreciation of the value Obedience is more harmful for per capita income in non-Christian regions (i.e., 
in regions with less than 50% Christians); that the appreciation of the value Independence is less 
important for economic outcomes in regions that do not contain the capital city; and even though the 
appreciation of Independence is similarly important, Asian regions tend to have a 15% lower per capita 
income from appreciating Obedience compared to European regions. 
Nevertheless, as a result of globalization and almost unlimited access to worldwide knowledge, 
education and technology, we can assume that also successful behavior, norms and values are 
internationally observed and adopted. Consequently, it is the researchers in economics to extract the 
cultural characteristics that are favorable for (regional) economic prosperity and incentivize them 
through national and regional policies and the formation of strong national institutions. This is in line 
with our findings, that strong national institutions can serve as a substitute for regional culture, that 
might not be characterized by the right features for regional economic growth. They are particularly 
important in countries with a centralized state system, as (inexistent) subnational institutions cannot 
compensate for critical and growth unfriendly characteristics of the prevalent regional culture. 
Chapter 3 of this thesis examines the relationship between World Bank development projects and 
the improvements of quality and reachability of drinking water, toilet facilities and child mortality 
(measured by the number of deceased children). To be more concrete, we are comparing the average 
living situation of individuals in a small geographical unit who have or had access to a World Bank 
project with the average living situation of those without access. By considering the answers on 
individual welfare of close to two million respondents from 153 Demographic and Health Surveys 
conducted across the world, we are able to present a micro-based and ex-post approach to measure the 
relevance of World Bank development projects in the field of water, sanitation and health. If geocodes 
are available, this approach can be extended to any other institution, sector or target group. By this, we 
provide an inexpensive and large-scale approach to complement experimental studies81 (such as 
Randomized Control Trials) but with the advantage to provide external validity. Our setting also allows 
us to account for any regional specifics and unobserved heterogeneity through the employment of 
subnational fixed effects. Our results reveal that the presence of the World Bank, spread across 38 
 
81 We show that the results of experiment-based evaluation of World Bank projects (in respective reports composed by the 
World Bank evaluation group) and of our empirics coincide for the case of water-related projects in Senegal. This 




developing economies between 1986 and 2017, seems to have a positive impact on the quality of living 
of individuals living close to the Bank’s projects. Their impact remains visible in a large number of 
robustness tests and data refinements. 
The findings of Chapter 3 can directly be translated into three policy recommendations: first, we 
find that projects are particularly effective in relatively well-developed areas both in terms of education 
of individuals and in terms of nightlights intensity, which has been frequently used as a proxy for per 
capita income. This implies, that development institutions might want to initiate projects in accordingly 
characterized areas as implementation might me easier due to available infrastructure, qualification of 
people, reachability by staff and implementers (better developed areas are usually closer to bigger cities) 
etc. Experiences and potential spill-over effects gained through quick wins in higher developed areas 
can then be transferred conveniently to other areas that might be more remote and characterized by a 
low coverage of educational institutions, electricity, paved roads etc. The fact that we found higher 
effects of World Bank projects in low-income countries potentially implies that these countries are 
characterized by a lower starting point of water quality and reachability, of toilet facilities and of infant 
mortality and that significant improvements can be easier realized through relatively low financial and 
personnel efforts; second, we find that the mere presence of the World Bank suffices to realize 
improvements in the water, sanitation and health sector. But targeting these sectors through specifically 
planned projects (e.g., building a dam, installing piped water systems, providing access to adequate 
disposal of wastewater etc.) and directly channeled financial flows leads to even higher improvements 
in time to water, the quality of drinking water, the quality of toilets and the number of deceased children. 
This indicates that the World Bank (or any other developing institution) can count on spill-over effects 
but should carefully plan projects according to their aspirations; and third, our results indicate that the 
sustainability of World Bank projects can be further expanded (e.g., through monitoring, regular 
maintenance, trainings of local staff, creating effective incentive structures that guarantee the appropriate 
use of public facilities etc.) as effects of past projects in our analysis are rarely significant and if so their 
effects are always dominated by the effects of ongoing projects. 
Chapter 4 explores whether regions with a hotter average temperature have a lower per capita 
income compared to their colder counterparts. Here, we follow past research that associates hotter 
temperature with lower human productivity, higher prevalence of debilitating diseases, agricultural 
losses etc. and in consequence with lower income. For this endeavor, we collected information on 
regional economic (per capita GDP, growth of per capita GDP, nightlights and gross cell production), 
as well as regional climatic indicators (temperature, precipitation, distance to coast, etc.) for a large 
number of subnational units, ranging between 1,542 and 15,533, in 31 to 83 countries. Our data 
originates from two sources, Demographic and Health Surveys and Gennaioli et al. (2014), and allows 
us to explore subnational incomes disparities that arise from changes in the average temperature between 
1950 and 2000 and from cross-region temperature differences in the years 2005 and 2015. Despite 




past attempts to quantify the effect that temperature exerts on economic development. First, we are 
transferring the cross-country discussion to the subnational level, with a large number of subnational 
units, and are therefore able to account for a distinct within-country heterogeneity. Second, we include 
country and time fixed effects which enable us to control for any (unobservable) country-specifics, such 
as institutional, historical or cultural characteristics. Third, given that we are working with several data 
sources, we test the effect of regional temperature on several measures/proxies for per capita income, 
which provides us more insights into subnational economic performance. 
Our findings from a variety of tests suggest that there is no systematic link between subnational 
temperature and income, given that results are hardly significant let alone consistent in sign and 
magnitude and highly sensitive towards changes in the empirical estimation setting. Nevertheless, we 
observe a tendency that regional per capita income is negatively correlated with temperature, whereas 
subnational nightlights are generally positively affected with its magnitude being dependent on the 
extent of temperature fluctuations and seasonality. Regardless, of which proxy for regional incomes we 
use, we find only little indication that poorer regions are (still) more prone to adverse effects of 
temperature or that the income-temperature relationship is non-linear. 
We might argue that adaptation possibilities, given on the country-level and accounted for through 
the inclusion of fixed effects, can explain the inconsistent effect of temperature on income on the 
subnational level. This hypothesis gets support from performed sensitivity tests, revealing that higher 
levels of education, which might encourage the invention and use of adaptation measures, seems to be 
unimportant for the temperature-income relationship on the subnational level; and that the significantly 
negative effect of temperature on regional incomes of poorer regions disappears after 1970, potentially 
because suitable adaptation methods decoupled the adverse effects of temperature from income. 
Given certain caveats of our analysis, mainly the missing time dimension in our temperature data, 
we restrain from giving clear-cut and quantifiable policy implications. However, there are two guiding 
principles that are valid, independent of future evidence from upcoming research. First, transferring the 
negative effect found in various cross-country research to the subnational level seems premature and 
presumably inaccurate. Consequently, (national) policy targets should be geared to differences in 
regional development and regional temperature, which are certainly more distinct in some countries but 
principally present in all countries. This implies, that not all parts of a country are similarly vulnerable 
to changing climatic conditions and that they need regionally adjusted policy interventions. Policy 
makers should encourage regionally-focused research in order to make more profound decisions for e.g., 
greenhouse gas mitigation strategies. Second, a hotter average temperature does not seem to constitute 
a systematic and inevitable disadvantage even for poorer geographies. There are numerous examples 
that hot temperatures can go along with high economic performance and vice versa as observed within 




should be neglected but that adaptation e.g., through improved medical services for tropical diseases or 
enhanced machinery to compensate for reduced crop yields, is relevant and most importantly feasible. 
5.3 FUTURE RESEARCH 
We are convinced that if culture or its aspects is examined in a comparative analysis, it must be 
investigated on the subnational level, as it shows a distinct variation within countries. Chapter 2 in this 
doctoral thesis provides such a subnational analysis of the relationship between culture, measured by the 
regional appreciation of the values Independence and Obedience, and regional per capita income. Even 
though we find very consistent and unambiguous results for the two values, we rely on future research 
endeavors to bullet-proof our results and derive concrete policy implications. We would like to outline 
the most promising avenues for future research, that are based on our available data and methods. First, 
we are aware that Independence and Obedience hardly capture all aspects of culture that have been 
discussed in previous literature, such as trust, social capital, individual responsibility, tolerance, 
creativity, etc. In addition, we must take into account that both variables are derived from survey 
questions, which can be interpreted in very subjective ways and that are lived out very differently across 
families. In our opinion, exploring the impact of other aspects of culture, captured by survey-based as 
well as by more objective data sources, on the subnational level, is one of the most promising extensions 
of the analysis presented in Chapter 2. 
Another interesting research avenue would be the examination of migration flows that might 
unroot certain cultural traits and transfer them to regions with a completely different prevailing culture. 
In a globalized world, that is characterized by a more or less flexible allocation of human capital, we 
would be particularly interested in the following questions: how much are regional incomes affected by 
migrants and their behaviors and norms?; to what extent do migrants retain their original cultural imprint 
and to what extent do they adapt a new culture?; under what circumstances, when and how long is current 
economic development affected by different cultures due to migration? Especially the time dimension 
(not only with regards to migration) mentioned in the last question has been frequently discussed in past 
literature. Up to date, it is not clear how long it takes until a cultural change affects economic output and 
therefore regressing a random past culture on today’s income is prone to interpretation errors. 
And thirdly, even though we present a variety of control variables and introduce a theoretically 
approved empirical instrument for the regional level, we cannot completely rule out remaining 
endogeneity concerns and would like to see this issue further discussed in future regionally-focused 
research attempts. 
We have shown that and how our approach presented in Chapter 3 can be extended to other 
institutions, geographies, sectors etc. in order to evaluate development aid. Hereby, we provide an 




studies or from field experiments to explore the effectiveness of development projects. Therefore, it 
would be interesting to see our results re-tested for different settings and proof its validity outside the 
presented analysis. In addition, as pointed out in the section on Discussion and Caveats, we would like 
our research to be brought forward in the following aspects. 
In our research we simply consider whether the World Bank is present or not, but we do not look 
at how its effects differ for different project types (e.g., lending instrument, bottom-up vs. top-down 
execution, payment and reimbursement modalities, etc.), setups (e.g., project costs and length, etc.), 
targets (e.g., number of beneficiaries, number of newly installed facilities, etc.) or target groups (e.g., 
women, children, unemployed, etc.). We also did not explore potential spill-over effects that were 
indicated by our results, by revealing positive effects of the World Bank on water and health related 
indicators even though we did not control for the original target sector the World Bank aimed at (e.g., 
infrastructure, energy, etc.). Apart from including subnational fixed effects, we need to further work on 
controlling for considerations that might have led to the existing allocations of projects, that might not 
be purely need-based but based on policy considerations, on the distribution of other development 
activities in particular from NGOs, on good experiences with the staff, the population or the geographic 
location of previous projects, etc. Including these aspects in future endeavors, might further sharpen our 
causality assumptions, i.e., that the World Bank is indeed responsible for the positive development of 
the water and health indicators in question. 
In Chapter 4 we attempt to clarify the relationship between per capita income and temperature for 
the subnational level, but find no consistent or systematic link for a large number of regions and various 
measures for income. This constitutes a strong support for Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)’s theory that 
it is not temperature (among others) but the lack of inclusive institutions that leads to the failing of 
nations. Interpreting our findings, we need to point to several caveats related to data availability that 
need to be addressed in future research. 
The primary issue of our data is the missing variation of temperature over time, which restricts us 
to exploring differences between regions rather than differences over time. Gennaioli et al. (2014) data 
provides us with only one temperature record per region, that is averaged over a time span of fifty years, 
whereas DHS data limits the availability of regional nightlights and gross cell production to the years 
2015 and 2005. Basically, we are unable to analyze the effects that a rising average subnational 
temperature exerts on the development of subnational incomes, and consequently we cannot directly 
estimate the consequences of anthropogenic climate change. Adding the time dimension would also 
enable us to further explore the crucial role of adaptation, for which we received several clear indications 
from our sensitivity tests. Empirically, we are unable to include country-time or region fixed effects, 
which would allow us to account for any (unobservable) particularities of a certain region or of a certain 
country in a certain time period, which clearly increases the risk of omitted variable bias. Apart from the 




that also might have a crucial impact on subnational incomes. In Chapter 4 we already provide a range 
of geographic control variables, but many other influence factors specific to population, culture, 
institutions, etc. might be of particular relevance. Even though many past efforts have restrained from 







Exhibit 1: Further information on our instrumental variable approach 
Although culture is often argued to be exogenous, we provide an initial attempt to control for 
endogeneity between regional incomes and culture by applying an instrumental variable approach based 
on genetic information. 
We received inspiration from a number of research efforts that explored instruments based on 
genetic information (e.g., blood types, frequency of selected genes or allele types or historical prevalence 
of infectious diseases). It is argued that certain genetic predispositions (inherited from parents by their 
children) lead to the adaption of different cultural values affecting economic behavior (see e.g., Chiao 
and Blizinsky, 2010, Fincher et al., 2008, Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011, 2017, Murray and Schaller, 
2010, Nikolaev and Salahodjaev, 2017). Similar to the literature, we assume that individuals who are 
genetically susceptible to infectious and chronical illnesses tend to develop cultural coping strategies, 
such as ethnocentrism or skepticism. These strategies are supposed to work against the development of 
cultural values like individualism or independence (see e.g., Chiao and Blizinsky, 2010, Fincher et al., 
2008, Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011, 2017, Murray and Schaller, 2010, Nikolaev and Salahodjaev, 
2017, Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009). The literature argues that there are no direct effects from genes to 
the wealth of countries such that the exclusion restriction is fulfilled82. We assume that this will hold at 
the regional level too and measure the genetic distance in terms of the frequency of the Human 
Leukocyte Antigen (HLA)83 B*27 for 200 out of 1,204 regions. This naturally restricts the scope of our 
instrumental variable. Allele frequency B*27 is a potential indicator for values linked to independence 
and obedience as their carriers have improved survival chances in HIV (see e.g., den Uyl et al., 2004, 
Gao et al., 2005, Magierowska et al., 1999) and are less susceptible to the infection with influenza virus, 
herpes simplex type 2 virus or Epstein-Barr virus (see e.g., Brooks et al., 1998, Martinez et al., 2004, 
Voeten et al., 2000). It can be seen as a neutral genetic marker that does not affect a human’s general 
fitness (intelligence, ability to run etc.). We use the Euclidean distance of the allele frequencies HLA 
B*27 as our instrument84 and thereby, we closely follow Gorodnichenko and Roland (2011, 2017). 
As shown above (see Table 3) our results show rather insignificant effects when culture is 
instrumented with the genetic instrument. This raises the question whether the instrument suggested at 
 
82 We are aware that this assumption might not be fulfilled but we directly follow the literature of our choices. 
83 The Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) is an indicator for how well the immune system works and how likely the carrier is 
genetically susceptible to infectious and chronical diseases. Potential instruments can be found among the several hundred 
types of HLA-B alleles, which are associated with infectious diseases like HIV, Hepatitis B and Leprosy (Blackwell et al., 
2009). Information on the allele frequency of HLA B*27 can be extracted from the Allele Frequency Net Database (2015). 
84 Searching within Great Britain, which was found to be one of the most individualistic countries (see Hofstede, 2001), and 
assuming that individualistic societies bring out relatively more innovations (see e.g., Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011, 
2017), we select England’s South East, which leads the list of patents (Intellectual Property Office, 2016), as a reference 




the national level can be generalized to the regional level. We consider it an important and interesting 
future research endeavor to explore potential regional instruments for culture. 
Exhibit 2: Further information on the panel structure and the inclusion of cluster fixed effects in DHS 
data 
DHS clusters are consecutively numbered and most cluster numbers are repeated in all available 
survey years (e.g., cluster number 4 in Senegal is repeated in eight survey years). However, this does 
not necessarily mean that identical cluster numbers identify the exact same cluster over time. This affects 
the panel structure of the entire sample. 
We state clearly in the manuscript that cluster centers, for which we have geocodes available, 
might deviate over time. Such deviations tend to be small and can in many cases be associated with 
changing Enumeration Areas or reasons to protect the privacy of respondents (this is a well-documented 
procedure; displacement of up to 10 km are possible). In some instances it can also mean that clusters 
are simply not identical. 
Table 27 shows coordinates of cluster number 4 in Senegal in available survey years. Calculating 
respective distances in kilometers from coordinates, reveals that the two most distant cluster centers are 
only 31.5km away from each other. We assume time-invariant cluster-specifics (e.g., sea access) do not 
change, given this rather small dislocation. 
Table 27: Geocodes for cluster number 4 in Senegal in available survey years 
Cluster 4 in Senegal 
Available survey years Latitude Longitude 
1992/1993 14.750 -17.400 
1997 14.736 -17.446 
2005 14.770 -17.158 
2008/2009 14.704 -17.467 
2012/2013 14.703 -17.443 
2014 14.712 -17.465 
2015 14.719 -17.498 
2016 14.740 -17.498 
 
To perform this calculation exercise for every available cluster (approx.. 50,000 clusters reported 
in at least two survey years) was not possible given our tools at hand. However, we created two data 
subsamples where latitude coordinates85 of the same cluster number deviated to a maximum of 5% and 
10%86. This gives us 24,556 and 31,779 clusters for which we assume that they are comparable over 
 
85 As changes in longitude depend on the respective latitude, we calculated deviations only with regards to latitude. 
86 It must be noted that percentage changes of geocodes correspond to different distances in km, depending on whether a cluster 
is close to a pole or close to the equator. However, it should be enough to make assumptions on whether a cluster is 




time (i.e., that cluster-specific time-invariant factors do not change due to small dislocations). Figure 8 
shows a histogram that illustrates the panel structure of the entire sample and for two sub-samples that 
allow for a maximum deviation in a cluster’s latitude of 5% and 10%. 
Figure 8: Number and repetitions of clusters for three DHS data samples 
 
Applying our estimation equation for the two subsamples as well as for regressions with region-
time and country-time fixed effects reveals robust results. There are only marginal changes in the 
magnitude of coefficients compared to the baseline setting with cluster and time fixed effects. An 
anecdotal example for Senegal in Chapter 3.4.5 also confirms our results. 
Therefore, we think that our cluster fixed effects approach is generally valid. However, we would 
like to encourage future research to re-allocate individual responses into equally-sized clusters that can 
be unambiguously identified over time. 
Exhibit 3: Matching procedure of DHS clusters to World Bank projects 
The matching of DHS clusters and World Bank projects was performed based on the geographic 
coordinates of the DHS cluster centroids and those of subnational World Bank projects. This was a very 
time-intensive procedure as our two databases contain around 14,000 World Bank projects and 50,000 
clusters (reported in 153 surveys) that had to be merged individually according to year and geocodes. 
We aimed at matching every project to at least one DHS selected cluster and therefore we had to 
allow for some deviations in their latitude and longitude coordinates. Differences started from 0.05 
degrees and gradually increased in 0.01 steps until at least one match was obtained. A 0.05 degree change 
in latitude always corresponds to a change of 5.6 km. Depending on the latitude, a 0.05 degree change 
























Number of repetitions (years)
Entire sample (total 50,970 clusters)
10% deviation in latitude (total 31,779 clusters)




we had to assume that if a World Bank project is close to a cluster center then all individuals in that 
cluster have access. 
Our baseline results are based on all matches, irrespective of corresponding distances between clusters 
and projects. However, as illustrated in Figure 9 more than 72% of individuals (335,440 of 468,457) 
could be merged with a maximum distance of 5.6km. We believe that it is fair to assume that a cluster 
centroid being 5.6km away from a project can still be considered as treated. Our results with this subset 
(i.e., maximum deviation in both latitude and longitude of 0.05) remain robust and reveal an even higher 
impact of the World Bank presence on our four variables. 
We are aware that our approach allows for different radiuses around a project location in which a 
match with a cluster is obtained. However, as we introduce a new approach to the literature our aim was 
it to match as many projects as possible. 
We clearly recommend the matching procedure for future research. Ideally, both cluster centroids 
and World Bank projects should be uploaded into a geographical system (e.g., GIS). A circle with a 
given radius (that decides over “access” or “no access”) around cluster centroids would quickly identify 
available World Bank projects within this radius. Even though, this still does not control for the fact that 
clusters vary in size and therefore an individual living at the edge of a large cluster (i.e., far away from 
the cluster centroid) might still end up with no access to the project (even though the cluster was 
classified as treated), this would improve our matching substantially. However, only with geocoded 





Figure 9: Matching of respondents and current and past World Bank projects with corresponding 























































Table 28: Introduction to Table 29 and Table 30 
Column Description Example 
Table 29 
Country Country name according to Gennaioli et al. (2014) Switzerland 
Gennaioli et al. (2014) 
Region 
Region name according to Gennaioli et al. (2014) [subsample: only 
regions with a WVS/EVS match] 
Aargau 
Number of years Number of available years 2 (i.e. 2000, 2010) 
Total respondents over 
all years 
Sum of all respondents from available years 226 (i.e. 53 respondents in 2000 and 173 respondents in 
2010) 
Average respondents 
over all years 
Average respondents per year 113 (i.e. average over respondents in years 2000 and 2010) 
Minimum respondents Minimum respondents in one of the available years 53 respondents (in 2000) 
Maximum respondents Maximum respondents ind one of the available years 173 respondents (in 2010) 
      
Table 30 
Country Country name according to Gennaioli et al. (2014) Albania 
Gennaioli et al. (2014) 
Region 
Region name according to Gennaioli et al. (2014) [subsample: only 
regions with a WVS/EVS match] 
Tirana 
WVS/EVS Region Region name according to WVS/EVS classifications that was matched to 
the corresponding Gennaioli et al. (2014) region 
AL: Tirana 
Gennaioli et al. (2014) 
matched year(s) 






Source Source for data from value surveys as respondent's answers can origin 
either from WVS (World Value Survey) or EVS (European Value 
Survey: "Region where the interview was conducted" (variable X048) or 
"Region: NUTS-2 code" (variable X048B)) 
WVS: AL: Tirana 
X048 (EVS): AT: Burgenland 
X048B (EVS): AT: Ostösterreich - Burgenland 
Quality level 
of matching (QM) 
Regional matching was classified in six different quality levels (see table 
A.1) 
Qualiy matching "A" for Tirana (Gennaioli et al. (2014)) 
and AL: Tirana (WVS) 
WVS/EVS Region 
used more than once 
Some regions for the value surveys were very large and contain several 
Gennaioli et al. (2014) regions (labelled "Yes"). Therefore we used 
respondent's data from one WVS/EVS region for several smaller 
Gennaioli et al. (2014) regions. Through this measure we were able to 
obtain more matches. We are aware that we assume that answers from a 
large region are identical for its smaller units. 
"AL: Center" (WVS/EVS) was matched to three Gennaioli 
et al. (2014) regions i.e. "Berat", "Durres" and "Elbasan" 




Table 29: Details on respondents per Gennaioli et al. (2014) Region 






over all years 
Average 
respondents 





Switzerland Aargau 2 226 113 53 173 
Italy Abruzzo 4 117 29 16 47 
Brazil Acre 1 402 402 402 402 
Turkey Adana, Gaziantep 2 206 103 37 169 
Turkey Afyonkarahisar 1 63 63 63 63 
Mexico Aguascalientes 4 323 81 12 191 
El Salvador Ahuachapán 1 62 62 62 62 
Japan Aichi 5 929 186 162 225 
Latvia Aizkraukle district 1 20 20 20 20 
Jordan Ajloun 2 98 49 48 50 
Norway Akershus 2 363 182 116 247 
Japan Akita 5 765 153 133 187 
Kazakhstan Akmola & Astana City 1 130 130 130 130 
Kazakhstan Aktobe 1 68 68 68 68 
United States Alabama 4 517 129 84 160 
Brazil Alagoas 2 108 54 20 88 
United States Alaska 1 3 3 3 3 
Spain Álava 4 287 72 64 86 
Romania Alba 4 486 122 10 244 
Spain Albacete 4 230 58 42 77 
Canada Alberta 3 493 164 137 181 
Portugal Alentejo 2 235 118 55 180 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Alexandria 1 201 201 201 201 
Portugal Algarve 3 192 64 40 92 




Kazakhstan Almaty 1 288 288 288 288 
Spain Almería 4 960 240 212 272 
France Alsace 3 256 85 49 107 
Guatemala Alta Verapaz 1 225 225 225 225 
Russian Federation Altai Republic 2 433 217 198 235 
Russian Federation Altai Territory 2 433 217 198 235 
Latvia Aluksne district 1 10 10 10 10 
Lithuania Alytaus apskritis 1 302 302 302 302 
Turkey Amasya 2 292 146 36 256 
Brazil Amazonas, MG, MG do Sul, Rondônia, 
Roraima 
2 462 231 60 402 
Peru Amazonas,PE 1 397 397 397 397 
Jordan Amman 2 773 387 377 396 
Thailand Amnat Chaeron / Ubon Ratchathani 1 535 535 535 535 
Russian Federation Amur Region 3 387 129 121 145 
Vietnam An Giang 1 312 312 312 312 
Greece Anatoliki Makedonia & Thraki 1 90 90 90 90 
Peru Ancash 3 319 106 50 204 
India Andhra Pradesh 4 665 166 143 200 
Thailand Ang Tong 1 583 583 583 583 
China Anhui 3 475 158 50 314 
Turkey Ankara and Kirikkale 2 228 114 88 140 
Turkey Antalya 2 96 48 30 66 
Colombia Antioquia 1 722 722 722 722 
Chile Antofagasta 4 534 134 68 163 
Japan Aomori 5 765 153 133 187 
Switzerland Appenzell A&I Rh. 2 259 130 18 241 
Peru Apurímac 1 117 117 117 117 




France Aquitaine 3 375 125 103 163 
Romania Arad 4 174 44 20 76 
Chile Araucanía 3 501 167 41 232 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Ardebil 2 76 38 26 50 
Peru Arequipa 3 469 156 90 284 
Romania Arges 4 375 94 31 217 
United States Arizona 4 349 87 40 170 
United States Arkansas 4 624 156 119 198 
Russian Federation Arkhangelsk Region 2 133 67 40 93 
India Assam w/ Mizoram 2 113 57 52 61 
Russian Federation Astrakhan Region 3 937 312 281 373 
Spain Asturias 4 289 72 34 118 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Aswan 1 993 993 993 993 
Chile Atacama 3 323 108 20 155 
Colombia Atlantico 2 1,384 692 631 753 
Kazakhstan Atyrau 1 42 42 42 42 
Norway Aust-Agder 2 139 70 15 124 
France Auvergne 3 379 126 47 209 
Spain Ávila 4 277 69 16 101 
Peru Ayacucho 3 618 206 50 284 
Turkey Aydin 1 377 377 377 377 
Vietnam Bac Lieu / Ca Mau 1 312 312 312 312 
Vietnam Bac Ninh / Bac Giang / Ha Bac 2 324 162 144 180 
Romania Bacau 4 391 98 19 230 
Hungary Bács-Kiskun 2 65 33 13 52 
Spain Badajoz 4 251 63 33 115 
Germany, West Baden-Wurttemberg 5 1,126 225 160 328 
Brazil Bahia 2 978 489 70 908 




Mexico Baja California Sur 4 615 154 10 429 
Guatemala Baja Verapaz 1 225 225 225 225 
Vietnam Bak Kan / Thai Nguyen 1 180 180 180 180 
Spain Balears, Illes 4 210 53 23 80 
Pakistan Balochistan 1 101 101 101 101 
Jordan Balqa 2 137 69 60 77 
Latvia Balvi district 1 16 16 16 16 
Thailand Bangkok Metropolis 1 583 583 583 583 
Slovak Republic Banskobystrický kraj 4 1,009 252 139 362 
Hungary Baranya 2 67 34 31 36 
Spain Barcelona 4 1,292 323 46 637 
Bangladesh Barisal 2 183 92 78 105 
Switzerland Basel-Land 2 232 116 59 173 
Switzerland Basel-Stadt 2 192 96 19 173 
Italy Basilicata 4 54 14 3 21 
France Basse-Normandie 3 503 168 41 322 
Latvia Bauskas rajons 1 23 23 23 23 
Germany, West Bavaria 5 1,317 263 173 378 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Behera 1 1,129 1,129 1,129 1,129 
China Beijing 4 508 127 25 314 
Hungary Békés 2 94 47 46 48 
Russian Federation Belgorod Region 3 901 300 138 419 
Vietnam Ben Tre 1 312 312 312 312 
Indonesia Bengkulu 1 200 200 200 200 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Beni Suef 1 1,129 1,129 1,129 1,129 
Albania Berat 2 492 246 229 263 
Germany, West Berlin 3 458 153 135 164 
Switzerland Bern w/ Jura 2 414 207 139 275 




India Bihar 4 857 214 147 275 
Romania Bihor 4 191 48 31 76 
Vietnam Binh Dinh 1 127 127 127 127 
Vietnam Binh Duong / Binh Phuoc 1 207 207 207 207 
Vietnam Binh Thuan / Ninh Thuan 1 127 127 127 127 
Chile Biobío 4 858 215 199 232 
Kyrgyz Republic Bishkek 1 260 260 260 260 
Romania Bistrita-Nasaud 4 285 71 8 222 
Croatia Bjelovar-Bilogora 2 509 509 509 509 
Bulgaria Blagoevgrad 4 669 167 39 408 
Sweden Blekinge 1 1 1 1 1 
Colombia Bogota 2 688 344 330 358 
Colombia Bolivar,CO 1 631 631 631 631 
Ireland Border 2 331 166 134 197 
Denmark Bornholm 3 385 128 5 370 
Serbia Borski 1 600 600 600 600 
Hungary Borsod-A-Z 2 129 65 55 74 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosansko-podrinjski k. 1 935 935 935 935 
Romania Botosani 4 316 79 23 230 
France Bourgogne 3 500 167 38 322 
Colombia Boyaca 2 1,765 883 621 1,144 
Romania Braila 4 294 74 17 217 
Germany, East Brandenburg 4 960 240 169 402 
Serbia Branicevski 1 600 600 600 600 
Romania Brasov 4 325 81 30 222 
Slovak Republic Bratislavský kraj 4 424 106 41 159 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Brcko 1 32 32 32 32 
Germany, West Bremen 5 94 19 8 26 




Canada British Columbia 3 623 208 192 239 
Croatia Brod-Posavina 2 509 509 509 509 
Russian Federation Bryansk Region 3 1,429 476 419 530 
Romania Bucuresti [Bucharest] 4 625 156 97 235 
Hungary Budapest 3 497 166 138 185 
Argentina Buenos Aires 3 1,228 409 300 509 
Turkey Burdur 1 107 107 107 107 
Bulgaria Burgas 4 490 123 85 196 
Austria Burgenland 3 176 59 50 65 
Spain Burgos 4 277 69 16 101 
Thailand Buri Ram 1 535 535 535 535 
Turkey Bursa, Istanbul, Kocaeli 2 306 153 47 259 
Korea, Rep. Busan 3 278 93 90 98 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Bushehr 2 55 28 25 30 
Norway Buskerud 2 258 129 67 191 
Romania Buzau 4 312 78 20 217 
Indonesia C. Java 2 654 327 200 454 
Indonesia C. Sulawesi 1 32 32 32 32 
El Salvador Cabañas 1 33 33 33 33 
Spain Cáceres 4 132 33 27 40 
Spain Cádiz 4 896 224 208 262 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Cairo 1 400 400 400 400 
Peru Cajamarca 3 879 293 85 397 
Italy Calabria 4 243 61 25 86 
Romania Calarasi 4 266 67 10 217 
Colombia Caldas 1 722 722 722 722 
United States California 4 615 154 133 170 
Italy Campania 4 742 186 102 313 




Spain Cantabria 4 174 44 32 56 
Vietnam Cao Bang 1 180 180 180 180 
South Africa Cape Province 4 2,867 717 196 947 
Denmark Capital region 7 1,097 157 41 370 
Australia Capital Territory 2 744 372 26 718 
Colombia Caqueta 1 142 142 142 142 
Romania Caras-Severin 4 156 39 11 76 
Spain Castellón/Castelló 4 556 139 122 162 
Colombia Cauca 2 1,150 575 486 664 
Latvia Cçsu rajons 1 30 30 30 30 
Brazil Ceará 2 128 64 40 88 
Philippines Central Visayas 2 600 300 300 300 
Morocco Central,MOR 2 253 127 50 203 
France Centre 3 519 173 57 322 
Portugal Centro 3 748 249 135 428 
Spain Ceuta y Melilla 1 4 4 4 4 
Thailand Chachoengsao 1 583 583 583 583 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Chaharmahal and Bakhtiyari 2 68 34 30 38 
Thailand Chai Nat 1 583 583 583 583 
Thailand Chaiyaphum 1 535 535 535 535 
El Salvador Chalatenango 1 45 45 45 45 
France Champagne-Ardenne 3 490 163 28 322 
India Chandigarh 1 25 25 25 25 
Thailand Chanthaburi 1 583 583 583 583 
Russian Federation Chelyabinsk Region 3 817 272 207 326 
Ukraine Cherkasy 2 68 34 24 44 
Ukraine Chernihiv 2 63 32 24 39 
Ukraine Chernivtsi 2 52 26 24 28 




Thailand Chiang Rai 1 206 206 206 206 
Mexico Chiapas 4 928 232 60 453 
Japan Chiba 5 1,891 378 320 450 
Mexico Chihuahua 4 723 181 60 429 
Guatemala Chimaltenango 1 335 335 335 335 
Guatemala Chiquimula 1 225 225 225 225 
Bangladesh Chittagong 2 199 100 78 121 
Colombia Choco 2 1,150 575 486 664 
Thailand Chon Buri 1 583 583 583 583 
Kyrgyz Republic Chui Oblast 1 21 21 21 21 
Russian Federation Chukotka Autonomous Okrug 3 387 129 121 145 
Thailand Chumphon 1 197 197 197 197 
Korea, Rep. Chungbuk 4 299 75 30 174 
Korea, Rep. Chungnam w/ Daejeon 4 314 79 45 174 
Russian Federation Chuvash Republic 2 261 131 117 144 
Serbia City of Belgrade 1 280 280 280 280 
Croatia City of Zagreb 2 543 543 543 543 
Argentina Ciudad de Bs. As. 3 670 223 202 263 
Spain Ciudad Real 4 422 106 65 177 
Romania Cluj 4 375 94 31 222 
Mexico Coahuila 4 679 170 36 429 
Mexico Colima 2 291 146 100 191 
United States Colorado 4 278 70 40 99 
Bangladesh Comilla 1 88 88 88 88 
United States Connecticut 4 405 101 60 121 
Romania Constanta 4 172 43 27 52 
Chile Coquimbo 4 333 83 46 123 
Argentina Córdoba,ARG 2 215 108 80 135 




Spain Coruña (A) 4 656 164 86 306 
Romania Covasna 4 279 70 14 222 
Ukraine Crimea & Sevastopol 2 145 73 71 74 
Hungary Csongrád 2 113 57 37 76 
Spain Cuenca 4 253 63 51 77 
Colombia Cundinamarca 2 1,765 883 621 1,144 
El Salvador Cuscatlán 1 44 44 44 44 
Peru Cusco 3 242 81 50 117 
Vietnam Da Nam / Quang Nam 2 259 130 127 132 
Korea, Rep. Daegu 3 195 65 60 75 
Vietnam Dak Lack 2 163 82 65 98 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Dakahlia 1 1,129 1,129 1,129 1,129 
Sweden Dalarna 1 19 19 19 19 
Romania Dambovita 4 291 73 12 217 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Damietta 1 1,129 1,129 1,129 1,129 
Latvia Daugavpils rajons 1 57 57 57 57 
United States Delaware 4 811 203 118 258 
India Delhi 3 156 52 38 75 
Bangladesh Dhaka 2 277 139 78 199 
Albania Dibra 2 433 217 215 218 
United States District of Columbia 4 811 203 118 258 
Mexico Distrito Federal,MEX 4 993 248 156 425 
Ukraine Dnipropetrovsk 2 408 204 112 296 
Latvia Dobeles rajons 1 20 20 20 20 
Bulgaria Dobrich 4 448 112 30 187 
Romania Dolj 4 268 67 33 118 
Poland Dolnoslaskie 3 219 73 25 115 
Ukraine Donetsk 2 269 135 118 151 




Vietnam Dong Thap 1 312 312 312 312 
Netherlands Drenthe 3 106 35 15 60 
Croatia Dubrovnik-Neretva 2 369 369 369 369 
Mexico Durango 4 637 159 20 429 
Albania Durres 2 492 246 229 263 
Indonesia E. Java 1 507 507 507 507 
Macedonia East 2 305 153 130 175 
United Kingdom East Anglia 4 247 62 43 85 
Iran, Islamic Rep. East Azarbayejan 2 330 165 145 185 
Kazakhstan East Kazakhstan 1 131 131 131 131 
Philippines Eastern Visayas 2 600 300 300 300 
Turkey Edirne 2 417 209 40 377 
Japan Ehime 5 1,183 237 190 272 
Guatemala El Petén 1 335 335 335 335 
Guatemala El Progreso 1 225 225 225 225 
Albania Elbasan 2 492 246 229 263 
Italy Emilia-Romagna 4 431 108 74 145 
Turkey Erzincan 1 40 40 40 40 
Guatemala Escuintla 1 130 130 130 130 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Esfahan 2 334 167 153 181 
Brazil Espírito Santo 2 938 469 30 908 
Finland Etelã-Suomi w/ Uusimaa 3 1,393 464 258 573 
Bangladesh Faridpur 2 134 67 56 78 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Fars 2 309 155 150 159 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Fayoum 1 1,129 1,129 1,129 1,129 
Hungary Fejér 2 67 34 24 43 
Norway Finnmark Finnmárku 1 18 18 18 18 
Albania Fleri 1 747 747 747 747 




Uruguay Florida,URU 1 50 50 50 50 
United States Florida,US 4 811 203 118 258 
France Franche-Comté 3 230 77 23 107 
Switzerland Freiburg 2 315 158 40 275 
Netherlands Friesland 3 124 41 17 75 
Italy Friuli-Venezia Giulia 4 132 33 22 42 
China Fujian 4 510 128 25 314 
Japan Fukui 5 929 186 162 225 
Japan Fukuoka 5 1,183 237 190 272 
Japan Fukushima 5 765 153 133 187 
Denmark Fyn 4 594 149 75 350 
Bulgaria Gabrovo 4 469 117 20 179 
Romania Galati 4 240 60 28 118 
Korea, Rep. Gangwon 4 233 58 45 93 
China Gansu w/ Inner Mongolia & Ningxia 2 50 25 25 25 
Sweden Gävleborg 2 52 26 25 27 
Netherlands Gelderland 3 427 142 73 210 
Switzerland Genf 2 279 140 85 194 
United States Georgia 4 811 203 118 258 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Gharbia 1 1,129 1,129 1,129 1,129 
Vietnam Gia Lia / Kon Tum 1 98 98 98 98 
Japan Gifu 5 929 186 162 225 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Gilan 2 195 98 95 100 
Turkey Giresun 1 256 256 256 256 
Spain Girona 4 699 175 46 234 
Romania Giurgiu 4 292 73 9 217 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Giza 1 1,129 1,129 1,129 1,129 
Albania Gjirokastra 2 715 358 353 362 




Brazil Goiás, DF, Tocantins 2 198 99 60 138 
Slovenia Gorenjska 4 422 106 103 111 
Slovenia Goriska 4 239 60 45 77 
Romania Gorj 4 170 43 10 118 
Spain Granada 4 960 240 212 272 
Switzerland Graubünden 2 250 125 9 241 
Netherlands Groningen 3 143 48 37 62 
Spain Guadalajara 4 253 63 51 77 
Mexico Guanajuato 4 453 113 72 191 
China Guangdong w/ Hainan 3 627 209 50 399 
China Guangxi 3 520 173 25 399 
Guatemala Guatemala City 1 310 310 310 310 
Mexico Guerrero 4 559 140 48 316 
Spain Guipúzcoa 4 284 71 64 86 
China Guizhou 4 609 152 65 399 
India Gujarat 4 425 106 96 125 
Latvia Gulbenes rajons 1 14 14 14 14 
Japan Gumma 5 1,891 378 320 450 
Korea, Rep. Gyeongbuk 3 234 78 60 99 
Korea, Rep. Gyeonggi 3 701 234 176 270 
Korea, Rep. Gyeongnam w/ Ulsan 3 250 83 75 100 
Hungary Gyor-M-S 2 181 91 27 154 
Vietnam Ha Tinh / Nghe An 2 278 139 81 197 
Vietnam Hai Duong 1 291 291 291 291 
Vietnam Hai Phong 1 291 291 291 291 
Hungary Hajdú-Bihar 2 116 58 51 65 
Sweden Halland 2 56 28 23 33 
Germany, West Hamburg 5 170 34 20 53 




Vietnam Hanoi / Ha Tay 2 490 245 199 291 
Romania Harghita 4 279 70 15 222 
Estonia Harju county 2 472 236 39 433 
India Haryana 3 128 43 34 50 
Bulgaria Haskovo 4 683 171 96 301 
Turkey Hatay 1 107 107 107 107 
France Haute-Normandie 3 510 170 48 322 
United States Hawaii 1 4 4 4 4 
China Hebei 3 454 151 65 314 
Norway Hedmark 2 128 64 47 81 
China Heilongjiang 3 409 136 25 260 
China Henan 3 494 165 75 314 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Herceg-bosanski k. 1 935 935 935 935 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Hercegovacko-nerevtvanski k. 1 935 935 935 935 
Germany, West Hesse 5 665 133 89 191 
Hungary Heves 2 84 42 38 46 
Mexico Hidalgo 4 785 196 36 599 
Estonia Hiiu county 2 62 31 3 59 
Japan Hiroshima 5 1,183 237 190 272 
Vietnam Ho Chi Minh City|Ho Chi Minh 2 335 168 128 207 
Japan Hokkaido 5 765 153 133 187 
Norway Hordaland 2 312 156 131 181 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Hormozgan 2 90 45 45 45 
Peru Huancavelica 1 204 204 204 204 
Peru Huánuco 2 248 124 44 204 
China Hubei 4 418 105 50 138 
Spain Huelva 4 960 240 212 272 
Spain Huesca 4 164 41 37 48 




Colombia Huila 1 722 722 722 722 
China Hunan 3 490 163 41 399 
Romania Hunedoara 4 385 96 49 222 
Japan Hyogo 5 959 192 161 228 
Romania Ialomita 4 277 69 8 217 
Romania Iasi 4 386 97 27 230 
Japan Ibaraki 5 1,891 378 320 450 
Peru Ica 2 249 125 45 204 
United States Idaho 4 215 54 48 59 
Estonia Ida-Viru county 2 316 158 148 168 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Ilam 2 42 21 20 22 
France Île-de-France 3 678 226 183 296 
Romania Ilfov 4 268 67 10 217 
United States Illinois 4 988 247 167 329 
Korea, Rep. Incheon 3 170 57 50 60 
United States Indiana 4 988 247 167 329 
United States Iowa 4 417 104 72 172 
Greece Ipeiros & Dytiki Makedonia 1 90 90 90 90 
Jordan Irbid 2 362 181 179 183 
Russian Federation Irkutsk Region 2 236 118 92 144 
Japan Ishikawa 5 929 186 162 225 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Ismailia 1 174 174 174 174 
Turkey Isparta 1 108 108 108 108 
Kyrgyz Republic Issyk-Kul Oblast 1 124 124 124 124 
Croatia Istria 2 369 369 369 369 
Finland Itã-Suomi 3 412 137 58 208 
Ukraine Ivano-Frankivsk 2 78 39 36 42 
Russian Federation Ivanovo Region 3 1,293 431 344 530 




Guatemala Izabal 1 225 225 225 225 
Turkey Izmir 2 190 95 74 116 
Serbia Jablanicki 1 600 600 600 600 
Spain Jaén 4 960 240 212 272 
Indonesia Jakarta 1 199 199 199 199 
Kyrgyz Republic Jalal-Abad Oblast 1 147 147 147 147 
Guatemala Jalapa 1 225 225 225 225 
Mexico Jalisco 5 1,024 205 100 495 
Indonesia Jambi 1 200 200 200 200 
Sweden Jämtland 2 16 8 2 14 
Jordan Jarash 2 105 53 45 60 
Estonia Järva county 2 460 230 27 433 
Hungary Jász-N-Sz 2 90 45 41 49 
Latvia Jçkabpils rajons 1 29 29 29 29 
Latvia Jelgavas rajons 2 51 26 18 33 
Korea, Rep. Jeollanam-do w/ Gwangju 3 195 65 60 75 
Korea, Rep. Jeonbuk 3 155 52 45 60 
Russian Federation Jewish Autonomous Region 3 387 129 121 145 
China Jiangsu 4 514 129 25 314 
China Jiangxi 4 473 118 25 314 
Czech Republic Jihocecký kraj 4 487 122 62 187 
Czech Republic Jihomoravský kraj 4 1,162 291 185 430 
China Jilin 4 410 103 25 260 
Estonia Jõgeva county 2 198 99 30 168 
Malaysia Johor 1 140 140 140 140 
Sweden Jönköping 2 135 68 58 77 
Slovenia Jugovzhodna Slovenija 4 255 64 45 77 
Peru Junín 3 315 105 50 204 




Serbia Juzno–backi 1 320 320 320 320 
Serbia Juzno–banatski 1 320 320 320 320 
Denmark Jylland 4 2,099 525 494 583 
Russian Federation Kabardino-Balkaria 2 427 214 190 237 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Kafr El Sheikh 1 1,129 1,129 1,129 1,129 
Japan Kagawa 5 1,183 237 190 272 
Japan Kagoshima 5 1,183 237 190 272 
Thailand Kalasin 1 535 535 535 535 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Kaliobia 1 1,129 1,129 1,129 1,129 
Sweden Kalmar 2 50 25 17 33 
Russian Federation Kaluga Region 3 1,293 431 344 530 
Thailand Kam Phaeng Phet 1 206 206 206 206 
Russian Federation Kamchatka 3 387 129 121 145 
Japan Kanagawa 5 1,891 378 320 450 
Thailand Kanchanaburi 1 583 583 583 583 
United States Kansas 4 417 104 72 172 
Russian Federation Karachay-Cherkess Republic 2 427 214 190 237 
Kazakhstan Karagandy 1 130 130 130 130 
Jordan Karak 2 126 63 49 77 
Croatia Karlovac 2 509 509 509 509 
Czech Republic Karlovarský kraj 4 584 146 93 207 
India Karnataka 4 467 117 102 150 
Austria Karnten 3 342 114 108 121 
Bulgaria Karzhali 4 554 139 30 301 
Turkey Kastamonu 2 296 148 40 256 
Lithuania Kauno apskritis 1 246 246 246 246 
Malaysia Kedah and Perlis 1 90 90 90 90 
Malaysia Kelantan 1 57 57 57 57 




Greece Kentriki Makedonia 1 240 240 240 240 
United States Kentucky 4 481 120 84 160 
India Kerala 4 298 75 59 100 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Kerman 2 180 90 89 91 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Kermanshah 2 153 77 70 83 
Russian Federation Khabarovsk Territory 3 387 129 121 145 
Vietnam Khanh Hoa 1 127 127 127 127 
Ukraine Kharkiv 2 164 82 69 95 
Ukraine Kherson 2 69 35 34 35 
Ukraine Khmelnytskiy 2 68 34 24 44 
Thailand Khon Kaen 1 535 535 535 535 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Khorasan & Yazd 2 442 221 217 225 
Bangladesh Khulna 2 113 57 36 77 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Khuzestan 2 241 121 112 129 
Vietnam Kien Giang 1 312 312 312 312 
Turkey Kirklareli 1 377 377 377 377 
Russian Federation Kirov Region 2 261 131 117 144 
Ukraine Kirovohrad 2 57 29 21 36 
Lithuania Klaipedos apskritis 1 204 204 204 204 
Japan Kochi 5 1,183 237 190 272 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Kohgiluyeh and Boyerahmad 2 52 26 25 27 
Serbia Kolubarski 1 600 600 600 600 
Hungary Komárom-E 2 67 34 30 37 
Turkey Konya 2 117 59 48 69 
Croatia Koprivnica-Križevci 2 543 543 543 543 
Albania Korca 2 715 358 353 362 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Kordestan 1 49 49 49 49 
Slovenia Koroska 4 143 36 24 46 




Kazakhstan Kostanai 1 89 89 89 89 
Russian Federation Kostroma Region 3 1,293 431 344 530 
Thailand Krabi 1 197 197 197 197 
Czech Republic Kraj Vysocina 4 686 172 80 295 
Czech Republic Královéhradecký kraj 3 485 162 80 241 
Croatia Krapina-Zagorje 2 543 543 543 543 
Latvia Krâslavas rajons 1 21 21 21 21 
Russian Federation Krasnodar Region 3 824 275 190 397 
Russian Federation Krasnoyarsk Territory 2 236 118 92 144 
Greece Kriti 2 119 60 39 80 
Sweden Kronoberg 2 59 30 22 37 
Poland Kujawsko-Pomorskie 3 170 57 37 74 
Albania Kukes 2 433 217 215 218 
Latvia Kuldîgas rajons 1 20 20 20 20 
Japan Kumamoto 5 1,183 237 190 272 
Russian Federation Kurgan Region 3 817 272 207 326 
Russian Federation Kursk Region 2 259 130 121 138 
Ukraine Kyiv_city 2 137 69 60 77 
Ukraine Kyiv_sub 2 115 58 55 60 
Japan Kyoto 5 959 192 161 228 
Bulgaria Kyustendil 4 680 170 50 408 
Kazakhstan Kyzylorda 1 57 57 57 57 
El Salvador La Libertad,ES 1 124 124 124 124 
Peru La Libertad,PER 3 558 186 51 397 
El Salvador La Paz,ES 1 60 60 60 60 
El Salvador La Unión 1 60 60 60 60 
Estonia Lääne county 2 80 40 21 59 
Estonia Lääne-Viru county 2 221 111 53 168 




Peru Lambayeque 3 557 186 65 397 
Thailand Lampang 1 206 206 206 206 
Thailand Lamphun 1 206 206 206 206 
Indonesia Lampung 1 98 98 98 98 
Vietnam Lang Son 1 180 180 180 180 
France Languedoc-Roussillon 3 397 132 57 235 
Italy Lazio 4 540 135 97 177 
Russian Federation Leningrad Region 3 745 248 177 349 
Spain León 4 607 152 16 279 
Albania Lezha 2 433 217 215 218 
China Liaoning 4 509 127 25 260 
Czech Republic Liberecký kraj 3 566 189 103 241 
Chile Libertador General Bernardo O'Higgins 4 317 79 38 123 
Latvia Liepâjas rajons 2 72 36 24 48 
Italy Liguria 4 270 68 28 140 
Croatia Lika-Senj 2 369 369 369 369 
Peru Lima w/ Callao 3 1,589 530 440 650 
Latvia Limbaþu rajons 1 21 21 21 21 
Netherlands Limburg 3 227 76 34 101 
France Limousin 3 290 97 18 163 
Russian Federation Lipetsk Region 2 259 130 121 138 
Portugal Lisboa 4 941 235 83 364 
Spain Lleida 4 699 175 46 234 
Poland Lódzkie 4 192 64 13 100 
Thailand Loei 1 535 535 535 535 
Italy Lombardia 4 970 243 154 318 
Vietnam Long An 1 312 312 312 312 
Thailand Lop Buri 1 583 583 583 583 




Peru Loreto w/ Ucayali 3 507 169 50 397 
France Lorraine 3 267 89 60 107 
Chile Los Lagos 4 581 145 73 232 
United States Louisiana 4 749 187 144 244 
Bulgaria Lovech 4 588 147 132 160 
Germany, West Lower Saxony 5 916 183 104 272 
Poland Lubelskie 4 157 52 5 83 
Poland Lubuskie 3 93 31 13 42 
Latvia Ludzas rajons 1 19 19 19 19 
Spain Lugo 4 354 89 69 112 
Ukraine Luhansk 2 290 145 82 208 
Switzerland Luzern 2 148 74 49 99 
Ukraine Lviv 2 151 76 71 80 
Jordan Ma’an 2 84 42 36 48 
Serbia Macvanski 1 600 600 600 600 
Jordan Madaba 2 87 44 39 48 
India Madhya Pradesh 4 589 147 104 200 
Latvia Madonas rajons 1 30 30 30 30 
Peru Madre de Dios 1 117 117 117 117 
Spain Madrid 4 1,349 337 160 526 
Thailand Mae Hong Son 1 206 206 206 206 
Jordan Mafraq 2 139 70 67 72 
Russian Federation Magadan Region 3 387 129 121 145 
Chile Magallanes y Antártica Chilena 1 236 236 236 236 
Thailand Maha Sarakham 1 535 535 535 535 
India Maharashtra 4 849 212 194 250 
United States Maine 4 379 95 60 121 
Spain Málaga 4 960 240 212 272 




Poland Malopolskie 3 251 84 34 121 
Kazakhstan Manghistau 1 39 39 39 39 
Turkey Manisa 2 109 55 24 85 
Canada Manitoba 3 192 64 60 71 
Romania Maramures 4 167 42 15 76 
Brazil Maranhão 2 138 69 50 88 
Italy Marche 4 184 46 17 70 
Lithuania Marijampoles apskritis 1 197 197 197 197 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Markazi 2 119 60 59 60 
United States Maryland 4 811 203 118 258 
United States Massachusetts 4 379 95 60 121 
Chile Maule 4 475 119 62 233 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Mazandaran & Golestan 2 294 147 60 234 
Poland Mazowieckie 3 296 99 4 188 
Germany, East Mecklenburg-West Pomerania 4 673 168 113 255 
Croatia Medimurje 2 543 543 543 543 
Romania Mehedinti 4 324 81 19 156 
Malaysia Melaka 1 30 30 30 30 
Argentina Mendoza 2 130 65 40 90 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Menoufia 1 1,129 1,129 1,129 1,129 
Turkey Mersin 1 31 31 31 31 
Colombia Meta 1 170 170 170 170 
Philippines Metro Manila 3 900 300 300 300 
Mexico Mexico 5 1,601 320 192 599 
United States Michigan 4 988 247 167 329 
Mexico Michoacan 5 1,100 220 72 528 
Ireland Mid-East w/ Dublin 2 881 441 338 543 
France Midi-Pyrénées 3 365 122 93 163 




United Kingdom Midlands 4 920 230 114 336 
Ireland Mid-West,IRE 1 118 118 118 118 
Japan Mie 5 959 192 161 228 
Brazil Minas Gerais 2 1,138 569 230 908 
Philippines Mindanao 3 900 300 300 300 
United States Minnesota 4 509 127 72 173 
United States Mississippi 4 481 120 84 160 
United States Missouri 4 417 104 72 172 
Japan Miyagi 5 765 153 133 187 
Japan Miyazaki 5 1,183 237 190 272 
Italy Molise 4 72 18 12 29 
Bulgaria Montana,BUL 4 425 106 72 160 
United States Montana,US 4 278 70 40 99 
Uruguay Montevideo 1 500 500 500 500 
Peru Moquegua 1 284 284 284 284 
Serbia Moravski 1 600 600 600 600 
Czech Republic Moravskoslezský kraj 3 1,810 603 235 1,215 
El Salvador Morazán 1 44 44 44 44 
Norway Møre og Romsdal 2 242 121 61 181 
Mexico Morelos 4 763 191 24 599 
Russian Federation Moscow Region 1 187 187 187 187 
Turkey Mugla 1 24 24 24 24 
Thailand Mukhadan / Nakhon Phanom 1 535 535 535 535 
Spain Murcia 4 290 73 33 110 
Romania Mures 4 331 83 31 222 
Russian Federation Murmansk Region 2 133 67 40 93 
Ukraine Mykolayiv 2 64 32 24 40 
Bangladesh Mymensingh 2 203 102 75 128 




Japan Nagasaki 5 1,183 237 190 272 
Thailand Nakhon Nayok 1 583 583 583 583 
Thailand Nakhon Pathom 1 583 583 583 583 
Thailand Nakhon Ratchasima 1 535 535 535 535 
Thailand Nakhon Sawan 1 206 206 206 206 
Thailand Nakhon Si Thammarat 1 197 197 197 197 
Thailand Nan 1 206 206 206 206 
Japan Nara 5 959 192 161 228 
Thailand Narathiwat 1 197 197 197 197 
Colombia Narino 2 1,150 575 486 664 
Kyrgyz Republic Naryn Oblast 1 80 80 80 80 
South Africa Natal 4 1,973 493 168 620 
Spain Navarra 4 138 35 16 55 
Mexico Nayarit 4 323 81 12 191 
Romania Neamt 4 296 74 15 230 
United States Nebraska 4 417 104 72 172 
Malaysia Negeri Sembilan 1 50 50 50 50 
Switzerland Neuenburg 2 350 175 75 275 
United States Nevada 4 278 70 40 99 
Canada New Brunswick 3 412 137 48 198 
United States New Hampshire 4 379 95 60 121 
United States New Jersey 4 940 235 168 287 
United States New Mexico 4 278 70 40 99 
Australia New South Wales 2 1,172 586 454 718 
United States New York 4 940 235 168 287 
Canada Newfoundland-Labrador 3 266 89 37 134 
Switzerland Nidwalden 1 99 99 99 99 
Austria Niederoesterreich 3 851 284 259 315 




Serbia Nisavski 1 600 600 600 600 
Greece Nisiá Aigaío 2 84 42 14 70 
Slovak Republic Nitriansky kraj 3 893 298 158 563 
Russian Federation Nizhny Novgorod Region 2 261 131 117 144 
Hungary Nógrád 2 38 19 16 22 
Thailand Nong Bua Lam Phu / Udon Thani 1 535 535 535 535 
Thailand Nong Khai 1 535 535 535 535 
Thailand Nonthaburi 1 583 583 583 583 
Netherlands Noord-Brabant 3 568 189 151 242 
Netherlands Noord-Holland 3 591 197 174 211 
France Nord - Pas-de-Calais 3 287 96 84 113 
Norway Nordland 2 183 92 83 100 
Norway Nord-Trøndelag 2 127 64 26 101 
Sweden Norrbotten 2 41 21 11 30 
Portugal Norte 3 1,296 432 346 595 
Colombia Norte de Santander 2 1,765 883 621 1,144 
United Kingdom North 4 404 101 55 135 
United States North Carolina 4 1,022 256 118 418 
United States North Dakota 4 417 104 72 172 
Nigeria North East 2 271 136 51 220 
Kazakhstan North Kazakhstan 1 60 60 60 60 
Germany, West North Rhine-Westphalia 5 2,121 424 289 624 
United Kingdom North West,GB 4 715 179 69 258 
Nigeria North West,NG 2 603 302 209 394 
Morocco North-Central 2 202 101 88 114 
United Kingdom Northern Ireland 3 1,706 569 304 996 
Australia Northern Territory 2 27 14 11 16 
Morocco Northwestern 2 236 118 116 120 




Canada Nova Scotia 3 446 149 48 225 
Russian Federation Novgorod Region 3 602 201 177 219 
Russian Federation Novosibirsk Region 2 433 217 198 235 
Mexico Nuevo Leon 5 931 186 60 429 
Colombia Nuevos Departamentos 1 170 170 170 170 
Pakistan NWFP 1 118 118 118 118 
Mexico Oaxaca 4 571 143 60 316 
Slovenia Obalno-kraska 4 196 49 37 61 
Austria Oberoesterreich 3 750 250 237 271 
Switzerland Obwalden 2 100 50 1 99 
Ukraine Odesa 2 137 69 59 78 
Latvia Ogres rajons 1 23 23 23 23 
United States Ohio 4 1,158 290 180 337 
Japan Oita 5 1,183 237 190 272 
Japan Okayama 5 1,183 237 190 272 
Japan Okinawa 2 462 231 190 272 
United States Oklahoma 4 624 156 119 198 
Czech Republic Olomoucký kraj 4 982 246 178 360 
Romania Olt 4 304 76 26 217 
Russian Federation Omsk Region 2 433 217 198 235 
Canada Ontario 3 1,642 547 476 648 
Poland Opolskie 4 91 30 20 39 
Norway Oppland 2 161 81 80 81 
South Africa Orange Free State 4 595 149 73 203 
Sweden Örebro 2 58 29 3 55 
United States Oregon 4 215 54 48 59 
Russian Federation Orel Region 3 1,293 431 344 530 
Russian Federation Orenburg Region 3 817 272 207 326 




Japan Osaka 5 959 192 161 228 
Kyrgyz Republic Osh Oblast 1 219 219 219 219 
Croatia Osijek-Baranja 2 509 509 509 509 
Norway Oslo 2 365 183 118 247 
Slovenia Osrednjeslovenska 3 740 247 235 266 
Sweden Östergötland 2 36 18 7 29 
Norway Østfold 2 250 125 59 191 
Denmark Østsjælland & Vest- og Sydsjælland 4 763 191 151 263 
Spain Ourense 4 379 95 86 112 
Netherlands Overijssel 3 248 83 68 104 
Malaysia Pahang 1 62 62 62 62 
Spain Palencia 4 277 69 16 101 
Spain Palmas, Las 4 568 142 97 191 
Lithuania Panevezio apskritis 1 229 229 229 229 
Brazil Pará and Amapá 2 118 59 30 88 
Brazil Paraíba 2 128 64 40 88 
Brazil Paraná 2 326 163 80 246 
Czech Republic Pardubický kraj 3 485 162 80 241 
Estonia Pärnu county 2 182 91 64 118 
Peru Pasco 1 204 204 204 204 
Thailand Pattani 1 197 197 197 197 
Kazakhstan Pavlodar 1 78 78 78 78 
France Pays de la Loire 3 422 141 79 201 
Uruguay Paysandú 1 118 118 118 118 
Bulgaria Pazardzhik 4 622 156 40 301 
Serbia Pcinjski 1 600 600 600 600 
Macedonia Pelagonia 2 252 126 121 131 
Greece Peloponnisos & Dytiki Ellada 2 243 122 63 180 




Russian Federation Penza Region 3 937 312 281 373 
Malaysia Perak 1 95 95 95 95 
Russian Federation Perm 3 1,133 378 284 523 
Brazil Pernambuco 2 128 64 40 88 
Bulgaria Pernik 4 649 162 19 408 
Hungary Pest 2 219 110 107 112 
Thailand Phachuap Khiri Khan 1 583 583 583 583 
Thailand Phangnga 1 197 197 197 197 
Thailand Phatthalung 1 197 197 197 197 
Thailand Phayao 1 206 206 206 206 
Thailand Phetchabun 1 206 206 206 206 
Thailand Phetchaburi 1 583 583 583 583 
Thailand Phichit 1 206 206 206 206 
Thailand Phitsanulok 1 206 206 206 206 
Thailand Phra Nakhon Sri Ayuthaya 1 583 583 583 583 
Thailand Phrae 1 206 206 206 206 
Vietnam Phu Yen 1 127 127 127 127 
Thailand Phuket 1 197 197 197 197 
Brazil Piauí 1 88 88 88 88 
France Picardie 3 505 168 43 322 
Italy Piemonte 4 463 116 70 147 
Serbia Pirotski 1 600 600 600 600 
Peru Piura 3 552 184 50 397 
Bulgaria Pleven 4 469 117 39 160 
Bulgaria Plovdiv 4 821 205 137 301 
Czech Republic Plzenský kraj 3 471 157 113 187 
Poland Podkarpackie 3 159 53 13 78 
Poland Podlaskie 3 93 31 10 52 




Serbia Podunavski 1 600 600 600 600 
Finland Pohjois-Suomi 3 354 118 65 162 
France Poitou-Charentes 3 411 137 68 201 
Macedonia Polog 2 303 152 150 153 
Ukraine Poltava 2 100 50 48 52 
Estonia Põlva county 2 245 123 23 222 
Serbia Pomoravski 1 600 600 600 600 
Poland Pomorskie-Zachodniopomorskie 3 286 95 18 138 
Slovenia Pomurska 4 293 73 46 90 
Spain Pontevedra 4 369 92 84 112 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Port Said 1 1,129 1,129 1,129 1,129 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Posavski k. 1 935 935 935 935 
Croatia Požega-Slavonia 2 509 509 509 509 
Thailand Prachin Buri / Sa Kaeo 1 583 583 583 583 
Czech Republic Praha 4 756 189 103 296 
Romania Prahova 4 404 101 56 217 
Thailand Pratum Thani 1 583 583 583 583 
Latvia Preiïu rajons 1 20 20 20 20 
Slovak Republic Presovský kraj 4 1,013 253 128 392 
Croatia Primorje-Gorski Kotar 2 369 369 369 369 
Russian Federation Primorsky Krai 3 453 151 121 187 
Canada Prince Edward Island 3 59 20 10 28 
Belgium Prov. Antwerpen 3 664 221 197 242 
Belgium Prov. Brabant 4 998 250 149 497 
Belgium Prov. Hainaut 3 719 240 218 264 
Belgium Prov. Liège 3 512 171 166 176 
Belgium Prov. Limburg (BE) 3 765 255 102 549 
Belgium Prov. Luxembourg (BE) 3 125 42 40 43 




Belgium Prov. Oost-Vlaanderen 3 539 180 165 209 
Belgium Prov. West-Vlaanderen 3 853 284 164 525 
France Provence-Côte d'Azur-Corse 3 438 146 98 235 
Russian Federation Pskov Region 3 602 201 177 219 
Mexico Puebla 4 880 220 72 599 
Italy Puglia 4 364 91 71 136 
Malaysia Pulau Pinang 1 72 72 72 72 
India Punjab 3 170 57 49 68 
Pakistan Punjab w/ Islamabad 2 743 372 10 733 
Peru Puno 3 419 140 50 284 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Qena 1 993 993 993 993 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Qom 2 75 38 31 44 
Vietnam Quang Binh 1 197 197 197 197 
Vietnam Quang Ngai 1 127 127 127 127 
Vietnam Quang Ninh 1 180 180 180 180 
Vietnam Quang Tri 1 197 197 197 197 
Canada Quebec 3 1,469 490 429 536 
Australia Queensland 2 574 287 256 318 
Mexico Queretaro 4 753 188 24 599 
Guatemala Quetzaltenango 1 335 335 335 335 
Guatemala Quiché 1 335 335 335 335 
Colombia Quindio 1 722 722 722 722 
Mexico Quintana Roo 4 483 121 12 316 
India Rajasthan 4 466 117 102 150 
Bangladesh Rajshahi 2 133 67 54 79 
Bangladesh Rangpur 1 66 66 66 66 
Thailand Ranong 1 197 197 197 197 
Estonia Rapla county 2 460 230 27 433 




Serbia Raski 1 600 600 600 600 
Thailand Ratchaburi 1 583 583 583 583 
Thailand Rayong 1 583 583 583 583 
Bulgaria Razgrad 3 392 131 86 179 
Latvia Rçzeknes rajons 1 20 20 20 20 
Chile Región Metropolitana de Santiago 4 2,288 572 495 698 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Rep. Srpska 1 545 545 545 545 
Russian Federation Republic of Adygea 2 427 214 190 237 
Russian Federation Republic of Bashkortostan 3 819 273 209 326 
Russian Federation Republic of Buryatia 2 236 118 92 144 
Russian Federation Republic of Dagestan 2 427 214 190 237 
Russian Federation Republic of Ingushetia 2 427 214 190 237 
Russian Federation Republic of Kalmykia 3 937 312 281 373 
Russian Federation Republic of Karelia 2 133 67 40 93 
Russian Federation Republic of Khakassia 2 236 118 92 144 
Russian Federation Republic of Komi 2 133 67 40 93 
Russian Federation Republic of Mari El 2 261 131 117 144 
Russian Federation Republic of Mordovia 2 261 131 117 144 
Russian Federation Republic of North Ossetia-Alania 2 427 214 190 237 
Russian Federation Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) 3 387 129 121 145 
Russian Federation Republic of Tatarstan 3 1,253 418 281 689 
Russian Federation Republic of Tyva 2 236 118 92 144 
Guatemala Retalhuleu 1 130 130 130 130 
Germany, West Rhineland-Palatinate 5 418 84 52 124 
United States Rhode Island 4 379 95 60 121 
France Rhône-Alpes 3 497 166 123 209 
Latvia Rîgas rajons 2 423 212 69 354 
Brazil Rio de Janeiro 2 1,098 549 190 908 




Brazil Rio Grande do Sul 2 336 168 90 246 
Spain Rioja, La 4 70 18 8 28 
Colombia Risaralda 1 722 722 722 722 
Ukraine Rivne 2 59 30 24 35 
Turkey Rize 1 256 256 256 256 
Uruguay Rocha 1 41 41 41 41 
Norway Rogaland 2 260 130 124 136 
Thailand Roi Et 1 535 535 535 535 
Russian Federation Rostov Region 2 427 214 190 237 
Bulgaria Ruse 4 385 96 30 179 
Russian Federation Ryazan Region 3 1,293 431 344 530 
Indonesia S. Kalimantan 1 43 43 43 43 
Estonia Saare county 2 77 39 18 59 
Germany, West Saarland 5 116 23 16 35 
Malaysia Sabah w/ Labuan 1 130 130 130 130 
Guatemala Sacatepéquez 1 335 335 335 335 
Japan Saga 5 1,183 237 190 272 
Japan Saitama 5 1,891 378 320 450 
Russian Federation Sakhalin Region 3 387 129 121 145 
Thailand Sakon Nakhon 1 535 535 535 535 
Romania Salaj 4 117 29 8 76 
Spain Salamanca 4 277 69 16 101 
Latvia Saldus district 1 19 19 19 19 
Austria Salzburg 3 286 95 88 101 
Russian Federation Samara Region 3 937 312 281 373 
Turkey Samsun 2 311 156 55 256 
Thailand Samut Prakan 1 583 583 583 583 
Thailand Samut Sakhon 1 583 583 583 583 




Mexico San Luis Potosi 4 377 94 36 191 
Guatemala San Marcos 1 335 335 335 335 
Peru San Martín 2 427 214 30 397 
El Salvador San Miguel 1 96 96 96 96 
El Salvador San Salvador 1 383 383 383 383 
El Salvador San Vicente 1 36 36 36 36 
Turkey Sanliurfa 1 114 114 114 114 
El Salvador Santa Ana 1 108 108 108 108 
Brazil Santa Catarina 2 276 138 30 246 
Argentina Santa Fe 1 220 220 220 220 
Guatemala Santa Rosa 1 130 130 130 130 
Colombia Santander 2 1,765 883 621 1,144 
Brazil São Paulo 2 1,338 669 430 908 
Thailand Saraburi 1 583 583 583 583 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Sarajevski k. 1 935 935 935 935 
Russian Federation Saratov Region 3 937 312 281 373 
Malaysia Sarawak 1 107 107 107 107 
Italy Sardegna 4 155 39 20 57 
Canada Saskatchewan 3 216 72 64 82 
Romania Satu Mare 4 177 44 28 76 
Thailand Satun 1 197 197 197 197 
Slovenia Savinjska 4 522 131 104 158 
Germany, East Saxony 4 1,600 400 289 629 
Germany, East Saxony-Anhalt 4 950 238 169 388 
Switzerland Schaffhausen 2 251 126 10 241 
Germany, West Schleswig-Holstein 5 298 60 22 92 
Switzerland Schwyz 2 109 55 10 99 
United Kingdom Scotland 4 696 174 92 291 




Malaysia Selangor w/ Kuala Lumpur 1 306 306 306 306 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Semnan 2 122 61 25 97 
Korea, Rep. Seoul 4 1,192 298 255 357 
Brazil Sergipe 1 88 88 88 88 
Serbia Severno–backi 1 320 320 320 320 
Serbia Severno–banatski 1 320 320 320 320 
Spain Sevilla 4 1,851 463 214 725 
China Shaanxi 4 350 88 50 138 
China Shandong 3 680 227 100 314 
China Shanghai 4 502 126 25 314 
China Shanxi 3 243 81 25 138 
Japan Shiga 5 959 192 161 228 
Japan Shimane 5 1,183 237 190 272 
Japan Shizuoka 5 929 186 162 225 
Albania Shkoder 2 1,005 503 218 787 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Shrkia 1 1,129 1,129 1,129 1,129 
Bulgaria Shumen 4 451 113 33 187 
Thailand Si Sa Ket 1 535 535 535 535 
Lithuania Siauliu apskritis 1 54 54 54 54 
Croatia Šibenik-Knin 2 369 369 369 369 
Romania Sibiu 4 335 84 25 222 
China Sichuan w/ Chongqing 3 233 78 25 138 
Italy Sicilia 4 578 145 88 200 
Bulgaria Silistra 3 285 95 20 179 
Mexico Sinaloa 4 1,113 278 40 542 
Pakistan Sindh 1 221 221 221 221 
Thailand Singburi 1 583 583 583 583 
Turkey Sinop 1 256 256 256 256 




Iran, Islamic Rep. Sistan and Baluchestan 1 70 70 70 70 
Sweden Skåne 3 981 327 135 636 
Macedonia Skopje 2 573 287 277 296 
Poland Slaskie 3 357 119 21 183 
Bulgaria Sliven 4 490 123 85 196 
Russian Federation Smolensk Region 3 1,293 431 344 530 
Bulgaria Smolyan 4 602 151 20 301 
Vietnam Soc Trang / Can Tho / Hau Gian 2 534 267 222 312 
Sweden Södermanland 2 41 21 17 24 
Bulgaria Sofia 4 751 188 108 408 
Bulgaria Sofia Stolitsa 4 994 249 139 408 
Norway Sogn og Fjordane 2 203 102 22 181 
Guatemala Sololé 1 335 335 335 335 
Switzerland Solothurn 2 331 166 56 275 
Hungary Somogy 2 65 33 31 34 
Vietnam Son La 1 83 83 83 83 
Thailand Songkhla 1 197 197 197 197 
Mexico Sonora 4 667 167 24 429 
El Salvador Sonsonate 1 83 83 83 83 
Spain Soria 4 277 69 16 101 
Norway Sør-Trøndelag 2 163 82 62 101 
Australia South Australia 2 312 156 124 188 
United States South Carolina 4 811 203 118 258 
United States South Dakota 4 417 104 72 172 
Nigeria South East 2 742 371 109 633 
United Kingdom South East w/ London 4 1,109 277 206 403 
Kazakhstan South Kazakhstan 1 226 226 226 226 
United Kingdom South West,GB 4 510 128 83 182 




Morocco South-Central 2 231 116 100 131 
Ireland South-East 2 615 308 72 543 
Macedonia Southwest 2 228 114 108 120 
Ireland South-West 2 704 352 161 543 
Croatia Split-Dalmatia 2 369 369 369 369 
Slovenia Spodnjeposavska 3 121 40 32 45 
Serbia Srednje–banatski 1 320 320 320 320 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Srednjo-bosanski k. 1 935 935 935 935 
Serbia Sremski 1 320 320 320 320 
Switzerland St. Gallen 2 288 144 47 241 
Bulgaria Stara Zagora 4 459 115 40 196 
Russian Federation Stavropol Territory 3 1,258 419 190 831 
Austria Steiermark 3 684 228 218 245 
Greece Sterea Ellada, Attiki, Ionia Nisia 2 1,569 785 649 920 
Sweden Stockholm 3 687 229 193 262 
Czech Republic Stredoceský kraj 3 462 154 97 253 
Romania Suceava 3 151 50 37 60 
Guatemala Suchitepéquez 1 130 130 130 130 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Suez 1 174 174 174 174 
Thailand Sukhothai 1 206 206 206 206 
Serbia Sumadijski 1 600 600 600 600 
Ukraine Sumy 2 74 37 35 39 
Thailand Suphan Buri 1 583 583 583 583 
Thailand Surat Thani 1 197 197 197 197 
Thailand Surin 1 535 535 535 535 
Russian Federation Sverdlovsk Region 3 1,024 341 284 414 
Poland Swietokrzyskie 3 107 36 27 48 
Bangladesh Sylhet 2 157 79 78 79 




Mexico Tabasco 4 515 129 24 316 
Peru Tacna 1 284 284 284 284 
Uruguay Tacuarembó 1 73 73 73 73 
Jordan Tafeila 2 98 49 48 50 
Philippines Tagalog, Luzon, W. Visayas 3 900 300 300 300 
Thailand Tak 1 206 206 206 206 
Kyrgyz Republic Talas Oblast 1 12 12 12 12 
Latvia Talsu rajons 1 24 24 24 24 
Mexico Tamaulipas 4 713 178 60 429 
Russian Federation Tambov Region 2 259 130 121 138 
India Tamil Nadu 4 664 166 129 200 
Bangladesh Tangail 2 159 80 78 81 
Morocco Tansift 2 418 209 200 218 
Chile Tarapacá 4 431 108 65 155 
Bulgaria Targovishte 3 292 97 19 187 
Spain Tarragona 4 657 164 46 228 
Estonia Tartu county 2 334 167 112 222 
Australia Tasmania 2 107 54 43 64 
Vietnam Tay Ninh 1 207 207 207 207 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Tehran 2 939 470 399 540 
Turkey Tekirdag 1 377 377 377 377 
Norway Telemark 2 246 123 55 191 
Romania Teleorman 4 297 74 24 217 
Lithuania Telsiu apskritis 1 279 279 279 279 
United States Tennessee 4 481 120 84 160 
Malaysia Terengganu 1 47 47 47 47 
Ukraine Ternopil 2 60 30 24 36 
Spain Teruel 4 156 39 33 48 




United States Texas 4 624 156 119 198 
Vietnam Thai Binh 1 291 291 291 291 
Vietnam Thanh Hoa 1 197 197 197 197 
Greece Thessalia 2 198 99 98 100 
Vietnam Thua Thien - Hue 1 197 197 197 197 
Switzerland Thurgau 2 278 139 37 241 
Germany, East Thuringia 4 862 216 155 314 
China Tibet 1 25 25 25 25 
Vietnam Tien Giang 1 312 312 312 312 
Romania Timis 4 204 51 38 76 
Albania Tirana 2 314 157 145 169 
Austria Tirol 3 288 96 80 123 
Mexico Tlaxcala 4 731 183 12 599 
Japan Tochigi 5 1,891 378 320 450 
Turkey Tokat 1 108 108 108 108 
Japan Tokushima 5 1,183 237 190 272 
Japan Tokyo 5 1,891 378 320 450 
Spain Toledo 4 237 59 49 77 
Colombia Tolima 1 722 722 722 722 
Hungary Tolna 2 54 27 18 36 
Russian Federation Tomsk Region 2 433 217 198 235 
Serbia Toplicki 1 600 600 600 600 
Italy Toscana 4 365 91 65 132 
Guatemala Totonicapán 1 335 335 335 335 
Japan Tottori 5 1,183 237 190 272 
Japan Toyama 5 929 186 162 225 
Vietnam Tra Vinh / Vinh Long 1 312 312 312 312 
Turkey Trabzon 1 109 109 109 109 




Russian Federation Trans-Baikal Territory 1 100 100 100 100 
South Africa Transvaal 4 4,689 1,172 764 1,394 
Thailand Trat 1 583 583 583 583 
Slovak Republic Trenciansky kraj 3 861 287 140 563 
Italy Trentino-Alto Adige 4 106 27 18 33 
Slovak Republic Trnavský kraj 3 864 288 143 563 
Norway Troms Romsa 1 35 35 35 35 
Argentina Tucumán 2 120 60 25 95 
Latvia Tukums district 1 27 27 27 27 
Russian Federation Tula Region 3 1,293 431 344 530 
Romania Tulcea 4 127 32 20 50 
Peru Tumbes 1 397 397 397 397 
Vietnam Tuyen Quan / Ha Gian 1 180 180 180 180 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Tuzlanski k. 1 935 935 935 935 
Russian Federation Tver Region 3 1,293 431 344 530 
Russian Federation Tyumen Region 2 433 217 198 235 
Russian Federation Udmurt Republic 3 817 272 207 326 
Russian Federation Ulyanovsk Region 3 937 312 281 373 
Italy Umbria 4 134 34 15 59 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Unsko-sanski k. 1 935 935 935 935 
Sweden Uppsala 2 109 55 52 57 
Switzerland Uri 1 99 99 99 99 
Turkey Usak 1 377 377 377 377 
Czech Republic Ústecký kraj 4 671 168 103 222 
El Salvador Usulután 1 76 76 76 76 
United States Utah 4 278 70 40 99 
Thailand Uthai Thani 1 206 206 206 206 
Netherlands Utrecht 3 230 77 34 124 




Thailand Uttaradit 1 206 206 206 206 
Romania Valcea 4 228 57 33 118 
Spain Valencia/València 4 1,059 265 122 408 
Estonia Valga county 2 247 124 25 222 
Finland Väli-Suomi 3 738 246 64 397 
Latvia Valkas rajons 1 16 16 16 16 
Spain Valladolid 4 260 65 16 101 
Italy Valle d'Aosta/Vallée d'Aoste 4 40 10 8 12 
Colombia Valle del Cauca 2 1,150 575 486 664 
Latvia Valmieras rajons 1 29 29 29 29 
Chile Valparaíso 4 637 159 118 207 
Turkey Van 1 114 114 114 114 
Croatia Varaždin 2 543 543 543 543 
Macedonia Vardar 1 129 129 129 129 
Sweden Värmland 2 37 19 12 25 
Bulgaria Varna 4 572 143 114 187 
Hungary Vas 2 68 34 32 36 
Romania Vaslui 4 327 82 22 230 
Sweden Västerbotten 2 87 44 40 47 
Sweden Västernorrland 2 68 34 28 40 
Sweden Västmanland 2 60 30 5 55 
Sweden Västra Götaland 3 447 149 113 217 
Bulgaria Veliko Tarnovo 4 489 122 40 179 
Italy Veneto 4 568 142 84 184 
Latvia Ventspils district 1 7 7 7 7 
Mexico Veracruz 5 995 199 96 318 
United States Vermont 4 379 95 60 121 
Norway Vest-Agder 2 158 79 34 124 




Hungary Veszprém 2 82 41 37 45 
Australia Victoria 2 885 443 364 521 
Bulgaria Vidin 4 332 83 20 160 
Estonia Viljandi county 2 158 79 40 118 
Lithuania Vilniaus apskritis 1 504 504 504 504 
Ukraine Vinnytsya 2 102 51 48 54 
United States Virginia 4 811 203 118 258 
Croatia Virovitica-Podravina 2 509 509 509 509 
Spain Vizcaya 5 563 113 63 232 
Russian Federation Vladimir Region 3 1,293 431 344 530 
Albania Vlora 2 715 358 353 362 
Russian Federation Volgograd Region 3 937 312 281 373 
Russian Federation Vologda Region 3 368 123 40 235 
Ukraine Volyn 2 57 29 24 33 
Austria Vorarlberg 3 186 62 55 70 
Russian Federation Voronezh Region 2 259 130 121 138 
Estonia Võru county 2 256 128 34 222 
Romania Vrancea 3 424 141 33 230 
Bulgaria Vratsa 4 341 85 29 160 
Croatia Vukovar-Syrmia 2 509 509 509 509 
Indonesia W. Java 2 739 370 201 538 
Indonesia W. Nusa Tenggara 1 58 58 58 58 
Switzerland Waadt 2 295 148 101 194 
Japan Wakayama 5 959 192 161 228 
United Kingdom Wales 4 521 130 55 282 
Switzerland Wallis 2 294 147 100 194 
Poland Warminsko-Mazurskie 3 100 33 10 46 
United States Washington 4 215 54 48 59 




Iran, Islamic Rep. West Azarbayejan 2 216 108 106 110 
India West Bengal 4 699 175 155 200 
Germany, West West Berlin 1 48 48 48 48 
Kazakhstan West Kazakhstan 1 64 64 64 64 
United States West Virginia 4 811 203 118 258 
Australia Western Australia 2 360 180 137 223 
Poland Wielkopolskie 3 258 86 47 129 
Austria Wien 3 899 300 293 309 
United States Wisconsin 4 988 247 167 329 
United States Wyoming 4 278 70 40 99 
China Xinjiang 3 371 124 50 260 
Thailand Yala 1 197 197 197 197 
Japan Yamagata 5 765 153 133 187 
Japan Yamaguchi 5 1,183 237 190 272 
Japan Yamanashi 5 929 186 162 225 
Bulgaria Yambol 4 393 98 17 196 
Russian Federation Yaroslavl Region 3 1,293 431 344 530 
Thailand Yasothon 1 535 535 535 535 
Vietnam Yen Bai / Lao Chai / Lao Cai 2 112 56 29 83 
Indonesia Yogyakarta 1 45 45 45 45 
United Kingdom Yorkshire 4 455 114 57 157 
Mexico Yucatan 4 527 132 36 316 
China Yunnan 3 507 169 25 399 
Guatemala Zacapa 1 225 225 225 225 
Mexico Zacatecas 4 345 86 24 191 
Croatia Zadar 2 369 369 369 369 
Croatia Zagreb County 2 543 543 543 543 
Serbia Zajecarski 1 600 600 600 600 




Hungary Zala 2 61 31 23 38 
Spain Zamora 4 277 69 16 101 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Zanjan & Qazvin 2 107 54 44 63 
Serbia Zapadno–backi 1 320 320 320 320 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Zapadno-hercegovacki k. 1 935 935 935 935 
Ukraine Zaporizhzhya 2 123 62 60 63 
Spain Zaragoza 4 315 79 37 132 
Jordan Zarqa 2 310 155 144 166 
Slovenia Zasavska 4 206 52 23 118 
Netherlands Zeeland 3 91 30 23 39 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Zenicko-dobojski k. 1 935 935 935 935 
Kazakhstan Zhambyl 1 98 98 98 98 
China Zhejiang 3 431 144 25 314 
Ukraine Zhytomyr 2 55 28 24 31 
Slovak Republic Zilinský kraj 4 1,024 256 139 362 
Serbia Zlatiborski 1 600 600 600 600 
Czech Republic Zlínský kraj 3 773 258 178 360 
Switzerland Zug 1 99 99 99 99 
Netherlands Zuid-Holland 3 719 240 212 292 






Table 30: Regional Division in Gennaioli et al. (2014) and matching region from WVS/EVS 
Country 
Gennaioli et al. 
(2014) Region WVS/EVS Region 
Gennaioli et al. 
(2014) 







more than once 
Albania Tirana AL: Tirana 2001; 2009 WVS A No 
Argentina Ciudad de Bs. As. AR: Capital Federal 1995; 2000; 2005 WVS A No 
Argentina Córdoba,ARG AR: Córdoba 1995; 2000 WVS A No 
Argentina Mendoza AR: Mendoza 1995; 2000 WVS A No 
Argentina Santa Fe AR: Rosario 1995 WVS A No 
Argentina Santa Fe AR: Santa Fé 1995 WVS A No 
Argentina Tucumán AR: Tucumán 1995; 2000 WVS A No 
Australia Capital Territory AU: Capital territory 2005 WVS A No 
Australia New South Wales AU: New South Wales 2005 WVS A No 
Australia Northern Territory AU: Northern Territory (NT) 1995; 2005 WVS A No 
Australia Queensland AU: Queensland (Qld) 1995; 2005 WVS A No 
Australia South Australia AU: South Australia (SA) 1995; 2005 WVS A No 
Australia Tasmania AU: Tasmania (Tas) 1995; 2005 WVS A No 
Australia Victoria AU: Victoria (Vic) 1995; 2005 WVS A No 
Australia Western Australia AU: Western Australia (WA) 1995; 2005 WVS A No 
Austria Burgenland AT: Burgenland 1990; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Austria Burgenland AT: Ostösterreich - Burgenland 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Austria Karnten AT: Kaernten 1990; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Austria Karnten AT: Südösterreich - Kärnten 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Austria Niederoesterreich AT: Niederoesterreich 1990; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Austria Niederoesterreich AT: Ostösterreich - Niederösterreich 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Austria Oberoesterreich AT: Oberoesterreich 1990; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Austria Oberoesterreich AT: Westösterreich - Oberösterreich 2010 EVS X048B A No 




Austria Salzburg AT: Westösterreich - Salzburg 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Austria Steiermark AT: Steiermark 1990; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Austria Steiermark AT: Südösterreich - Steiermark 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Austria Tirol AT: Tirol 1990; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Austria Tirol AT: Westösterreich - Tirol 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Austria Vorarlberg AT: Vorarlberg 1990; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Austria Vorarlberg AT: Westösterreich - Vorarlberg 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Austria Wien AT: Vienna 1990; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Austria Wien AT: Ostösterreich - Wien 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Bangladesh Barisal BD: Barisal 1999; 2005 WVS A No 
Bangladesh Chittagong BD: Chittagong 1999; 2005 WVS A No 
Bangladesh Comilla BD: Comilla 2005 WVS A No 
Bangladesh Dhaka BD: Dhaka 1999; 2005 WVS A No 
Bangladesh Faridpur BD: Faridpur 1999; 2005 WVS A No 
Bangladesh Mymensingh BD: Mymensingh 1999; 2005 WVS A No 
Bangladesh Rajshahi BD: Rajshahi 1999; 2005 WVS A No 
Bangladesh Rangpur BD: Rangpur 2005 WVS A No 
Bangladesh Sylhet BD: Sylhet 1999; 2005 WVS A No 
Bangladesh Tangail BD: Tangail 1999; 2005 WVS A No 
Belgium Prov. Antwerpen BE: Antwerpen 1995; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Belgium Prov. Antwerpen BE: Vlaams gewest - Prov. 
Antwerpen 
2010 EVS X048B A No 
Belgium Prov. Hainaut BE: Henegouwen 1995; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Belgium Prov. Hainaut BE: Région Wallonne - Prov. Hainaut 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Belgium Prov. Liège BE: Luik 1995; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Belgium Prov. Liège BE: Région Wallonne - Prov. Liège 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Belgium Prov. Limburg (BE) BE: Limburg 1995; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Belgium Prov. Limburg (BE) BE: Vlaams gewest - Prov. Limburg 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Belgium Prov. Luxembourg 
(BE) 




Belgium Prov. Luxembourg 
(BE) 
BE: Région Wallonne - Prov. 
Luxembourg 
2010 EVS X048B A No 
Belgium Prov. Namur BE: Namen 1995; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Belgium Prov. Namur BE: Région Wallonne - Prov. Namur 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Belgium Prov. Oost-Vlaanderen BE: Oost-Vlaanderen 1995; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Belgium Prov. Oost-Vlaanderen BE: Vlaams gewest - Prov. Oost-
Vlaanderen 
2010 EVS X048B A No 
Belgium Prov. West-
Vlaanderen 
BE: West-Vlaanderen 1995; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Belgium Prov. West-
Vlaanderen 
BE: Vlaams gewest - Prov. West-
Vlaanderen 
2010 EVS X048B A No 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Brcko BA: Bosna i Hercegovina - Brcko 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Rep. Srpska BA: Bosna i Hercegovina - Republika 
Srpska 
2010 EVS X048B A No 
Brazil Alagoas BR: AL 2010 WVS A No 
Brazil Bahia BR: BA 2010 WVS A No 
Brazil Ceará BR: CE 2010 WVS A No 
Brazil Espírito Santo BR: ES 2010 WVS A No 
Brazil Maranhão BR: MA 2010 WVS A No 
Brazil Minas Gerais BR: MG 2010 WVS A No 
Brazil Paraíba BR: PB 2010 WVS A No 
Brazil Paraná BR: PR 2010 WVS A No 
Brazil Pernambuco BR: PE 2010 WVS A No 
Brazil Rio de Janeiro BR: RJ 2010 WVS A No 
Brazil Rio Grande do Norte BR: RN 2010 WVS A No 
Brazil Rio Grande do Sul BR: RS 2010 WVS A No 
Brazil Santa Catarina BR: SC 2010 WVS A No 
Brazil São Paulo BR: SP 2010 WVS A No 
Bulgaria Blagoevgrad BG: Blagoevgrad 2000 EVS X048 A No 




Bulgaria Gabrovo BG: Gabrovo 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Bulgaria Haskovo BG: Haskovo 2000; 2005 WVS A No 
Bulgaria Karzhali BG: Kardjali 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Bulgaria Kyustendil BG: Kyustendil 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Bulgaria Lovech BG: Lovech 2000 WVS A No 
Bulgaria Montana,BUL BG: Montana 2000; 2005 WVS A No 
Bulgaria Pazardzhik BG: Pazardijk 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Bulgaria Pernik BG: Pernik 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Bulgaria Pleven BG: Pleven 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Bulgaria Plovdiv BG: Plovdiv 1995; 2000; 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Bulgaria Razgrad BG: Razgrad 2000 WVS A No 
Bulgaria Ruse BG: Ruse 2000; 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Bulgaria Shumen BG: Shumen 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Bulgaria Silistra BG: Silistra 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Bulgaria Smolyan BG: Smolian 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Bulgaria Stara Zagora BG: Stara Zagora 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Bulgaria Targovishte BG: Targovishte 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Bulgaria Varna BG: Varna 2000; 2005 WVS A No 
Bulgaria Veliko Tarnovo BG: Veliko Tarnavo 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Bulgaria Vidin BG: Vidin 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Bulgaria Vratsa BG: Vtatsa 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Bulgaria Yambol BG: Yambol 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Canada Alberta CA: Alberta 1990; 2000; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Canada British Columbia CA: British Columbia 1990; 2000; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Canada Manitoba CA: Manitoba 1990; 2000; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Canada New Brunswick CA: New Brunswick 1990; 2000; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Canada Newfoundland-
Labrador 
CA: Newfoundland 1990; 2000; 2010 EVS X048 A No 




Canada Ontario CA: Ontario 1990; 2000; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Canada Prince Edward Island CA: Prince Edward Island 1990; 2000; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Canada Quebec CA: Quebec 1990; 2000; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Canada Saskatchewan CA: Saskatchewan 1990; 2000; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Chile Región Metropolitana 
de Santiago 
CL: Zona Metropolitana 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
WVS A No 
China Beijing CN: Beijing 1990; 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
China Jilin CN: Jilin 1990; 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
China Shanghai CN: Shanghai 1990; 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
China Tibet CN: Xizang 2005 WVS A No 
China Xinjiang CN: Xinjiang 1990; 2010 WVS A No 
Colombia Bogota CO: Bogotá 2000; 2005 WVS A No 
Croatia Bjelovar-Bilogora HR: County of Bjelovar & Bilogora 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Croatia Brod-Posavina HR: County of Brod and Posavina 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Croatia City of Zagreb HR: City of Zagreb 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Croatia Dubrovnik-Neretva HR: County of Dubrovnik and 
Neretva 
2000 EVS X048 A No 
Croatia Istria HR: County of Istria 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Croatia Karlovac HR: County of Karlovac 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Croatia Koprivnica-Križevci HR: County of Koprivnica & Krizevci 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Croatia Lika-Senj HR: County of Lika and Senj 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Croatia Medimurje HR: County of Medjimurje 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Croatia Osijek-Baranja HR: County of Osijek and Baranja 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Croatia Primorje-Gorski Kotar HR: County of Primorje and Gorski 
Kotar 
2000 EVS X048 A No 
Croatia Sisak-Moslavina HR: County of Sisak and Moslovina 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Croatia Split-Dalmatia HR: County of Split and Dalmatia 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Croatia Varaždin HR: County of Varazdin 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Croatia Virovitica-Podravina HR: County of Virovitica and 
Podravina 




Croatia Vukovar-Syrmia HR: County of Vukovar and Srijem 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Croatia Zagreb County HR: County of Zagreb 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Czech 
Republic 
Jihocecký kraj CZ: Jihoèeský kraj - South Bohemia - 1995; 2000; 2005 WVS A No 
Czech 
Republic 
Jihomoravský kraj CZ: Jihomoravský kraj - South 
Moravia - 
1995; 2000; 2005 WVS A No 
Czech 
Republic 
Kraj Vysocina CZ: Východoèeský kraj - East 
Bohemia - 
1995; 2000; 2005 WVS A Yes 
Czech 
Republic 
Praha CZ: Prague 1995; 2000; 2005 WVS A No 
Czech 
Republic 
Praha CZ: Ceska Republika - Praha 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Czech 
Republic 
Stredoceský kraj CZ: Støedoèeský kraj - Central 
Bohemia - 
1995; 2000; 2005 WVS A No 
Denmark Bornholm DK: Bornholms Amt 1990; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Denmark Fyn DK: Fyns Amt 1985; 1990; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
Alexandria EG: Alexandria 2007 WVS A No 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
Cairo EG: Cairo 2007 WVS A No 
El Salvador Ahuachapán SV: Ahuachapán 1999 WVS A No 
El Salvador Cabañas SV: Cabañas 1999 WVS A No 
El Salvador Chalatenango SV: Chalatenango 1999 WVS A No 
El Salvador Cuscatlán SV: Cuscatlán 1999 WVS A No 
El Salvador La Libertad,ES SV: La Libertad 1999 WVS A No 
El Salvador La Paz,ES SV: La Paz 1999 WVS A No 
El Salvador La Unión SV: La Unión 1999 WVS A No 
El Salvador Morazán SV: Morazán 1999 WVS A No 
El Salvador San Miguel SV: San Miguel 1999 WVS A No 
El Salvador San Salvador SV: San Salvador 1999 WVS A No 
El Salvador San Vicente SV: San Vicente 1999 WVS A No 




El Salvador Sonsonate SV: Sonsonate 1999 WVS A No 
El Salvador Usulután SV: Usulután 1999 WVS A No 
Finland Itã-Suomi FI: Manner-Suomi - Itä-Suomi 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Finland Pohjois-Suomi FI: Manner-Suomi - Pohjois-Suomi 2010 EVS X048B A No 
France Alsace FR: Est - Alsace 2010 EVS X048B A No 
France Aquitaine FR: Sud-Ouest - Aquitaine 2010 EVS X048B A No 
France Auvergne FR: Centre-Est - Auvergne 2010 EVS X048B A No 
France Basse-Normandie FR: Bassin Parisien - Basse-
Normandie 
2010 EVS X048B A No 
France Bourgogne FR: Bassin Parisien - Bourgogne 2010 EVS X048B A No 
France Bretagne FR: Ouest - Bretagne 2010 EVS X048B A No 
France Centre FR: Bassin Parisien - Centre 2010 EVS X048B A No 
France Champagne-Ardenne FR: Bassin Parisien - Champagne-
Ardenne 
2010 EVS X048B A No 
France Franche-Comté FR: Est - Franche-Comté 2010 EVS X048B A No 
France Haute-Normandie FR: Bassin Parisien - Haute-
Normandie 
2010 EVS X048B A No 
France Île-de-France FR: Ile De France 1990; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
France Île-de-France FR: Île de France - Île de France 2010 EVS X048B A No 
France Languedoc-Roussillon FR: Méditerranée - Languedoc-
Roussillon 
2010 EVS X048B A No 
France Limousin FR: Sud-Ouest - Limousin 2010 EVS X048B A No 
France Lorraine FR: Est - Lorraine 2010 EVS X048B A No 
France Midi-Pyrénées FR: Sud-Ouest - Midi-Pyrénées 2010 EVS X048B A No 
France Nord - Pas-de-Calais FR: Nord-Pas-de-Calais - Nord-Pas-
de-Calais 
2010 EVS X048B A No 
France Pays de la Loire FR: Ouest - Pays de la Loire 2010 EVS X048B A No 
France Picardie FR: Bassin Parisien - Picardie 2010 EVS X048B A No 
France Poitou-Charentes FR: Ouest - Poitou-Charentes 2010 EVS X048B A No 
France Provence-Côte d'Azur-
Corse 
FR: Méditerranée - Provence-Alpes-
Côte d’Azur 




France Rhône-Alpes FR: Centre-Est - Rhône-Alpes 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Germany, East Brandenburg DE: Brandenburg 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Germany, East Mecklenburg-West 
Pomerania 
DE: Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Germany, East Mecklenburg-West 
Pomerania 
DE: Mecklenburg-Vorpommern - 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
2010 EVS X048B A No 
Germany, East Saxony DE: Sachsen 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Germany, East Saxony-Anhalt DE: Sachsen-Anhalt 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Germany, East Saxony-Anhalt DE: Sachsen-Anhalt - Sachsen-Anhalt 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Germany, East Thuringia DE: Thueringen 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Germany, East Thuringia DE: Thüringen - Thüringen 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Germany, 
West 
Baden-Wurttemberg DE: Baden-Wurttemberg 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Germany, 
West 
Bavaria DE: Bayern 1985; 1990; 2000; 
2005; 2010 
EVS X048 A No 
Germany, 
West 
Berlin DE: Berlin 2000; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Germany, 
West 
Berlin DE: Berlin - Berlin 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Germany, 
West 
Bremen DE: Bremen 1985; 1990; 2000; 
2005; 2010 
EVS X048 A No 
Germany, 
West 
Bremen DE: Bremen - Bremen 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Germany, 
West 
Hamburg DE: Hamburg 1985; 1990; 2000; 
2005; 2010 
EVS X048 A No 
Germany, 
West 
Hamburg DE: Hamburg - Hamburg 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Germany, 
West 
Hesse DE: Hessen 1985; 1990; 2000; 
2005; 2010 
EVS X048 A No 
Germany, 
West 
Lower Saxony DE: Niedersachsen 1985; 1990; 2000; 
2005; 2010 





DE: Nordrhein-Westfalen 1985; 1990; 2000; 
2005; 2010 






Rhineland-Palatinate DE: Rheinland-Pfalz 1985; 1990; 2000; 
2005; 2010 
EVS X048 A No 
Germany, 
West 
Saarland DE: Saarland 1985; 1990; 2000; 
2005; 2010 
EVS X048 A No 
Germany, 
West 
Saarland DE: Saarland - Saarland 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Germany, 
West 
Schleswig-Holstein DE: Schleswig-Holstein 1985; 1990; 2000; 
2005; 2010 
EVS X048 A No 
Germany, 
West 
Schleswig-Holstein DE: Schleswig-Holstein - Schleswig-
Holstein 
2010 EVS X048B A No 
Germany, 
West 
West Berlin DE: West-Berlin 1980 EVS X048 A No 
Greece Anatoliki Makedonia 
& Thraki 
GR: Voreia Ellada - Anatoliki 
Makedonia, Thraki 
2010 EVS X048B A No 
Greece Kentriki Makedonia GR: Voreia Ellada - Kentriki 
Makedonia 
2010 EVS X048B A No 
Greece Kriti GR: Nisia Aigaiou, Kriti - Kriti 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Greece Thessalia GR: Voreia Ellada - Thessalia 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Guatemala Guatemala City GT: Capital 2005 WVS A No 
Hungary Bács-Kiskun HU: Bács-Kiskun 2010 WVS A No 
Hungary Baranya HU: Baranya 2000; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Hungary Békés HU: Békés 2000; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Hungary Borsod-A-Z HU: Borsod 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Hungary Borsod-A-Z HU: Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 2010 WVS A No 
Hungary Budapest HU: Budapest 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Hungary Csongrád HU: Csongrád 2000; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Hungary Fejér HU: Fejér 2000; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Hungary Gyor-M-S HU: Györ 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Hungary Hajdú-Bihar HU: Hajdú-Bihar 2010 WVS A No 
Hungary Heves HU: Heves 2000; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Hungary Jász-N-Sz HU: Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 2010 WVS A No 




Hungary Komárom-E HU: Komárom-Esztergom 2010 WVS A No 
Hungary Nógrád HU: Nográd 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Hungary Nógrád HU: Nógrád 2010 WVS A No 
Hungary Pest HU: Pest 2000; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Hungary Somogy HU: Somogy 2000; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Hungary Szabolcs-Sz-B HU: Szabolcs 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Hungary Szabolcs-Sz-B HU: Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 2010 WVS A No 
Hungary Tolna HU: Tolna 2000; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Hungary Vas HU: Vas 2000; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Hungary Veszprém HU: Veszprém 2000; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Hungary Zala HU: Zala 2000; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
India Andhra Pradesh IN: Andhra Pradesh 1990; 2000; 2005; 
2010 
WVS A No 
India Bihar IN: Bihar 1990; 2000; 2005; 
2010 
WVS A No 
India Chandigarh IN: Chandigarh 2000 WVS A No 
India Delhi IN: Delhi 1990; 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
India Gujarat IN: Gujarat 1990; 2000; 2005; 
2010 
WVS A No 
India Haryana IN: Haryana 2000; 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
India Karnataka IN: Karnataka 1990; 2000; 2005; 
2010 
WVS A No 
India Kerala IN: Kerala 1990; 2000; 2005; 
2010 
WVS A No 
India Madhya Pradesh IN: Madhya Pradesh 1990; 2000; 2005; 
2010 
WVS A No 
India Maharashtra IN: Maharashtra 1990; 2000; 2005; 
2010 
WVS A No 
India Orissa IN: Orrisa 1990; 2000; 2005; 
2010 
WVS A No 




India Rajasthan IN: Rajasthan 1990; 2000; 2005; 
2010 
WVS A No 
India Tamil Nadu IN: Tamil Nadu 1990; 2000; 2005; 
2010 
WVS A No 
India Uttar Pradesh IN: Uttar Pradesh 1990; 2000; 2005; 
2010 
WVS A No 
India West Bengal IN: West Bengal 1990; 2000; 2005; 
2010 
WVS A No 
Indonesia C. Sulawesi ID: Center Sulawesi 2010 WVS A No 
Indonesia E. Java ID: East Java 2010 WVS A No 
Indonesia Lampung ID: Lampung 2010 WVS A No 
Indonesia S. Kalimantan ID: South Kalimantan 2010 WVS A No 
Indonesia W. Nusa Tenggara ID: West Nusa Tenggara 2010 WVS A No 
Indonesia Yogyakarta ID: Dareah Istimewa Yogyakarta 2010 WVS A No 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
Ardebil IR: Ardabil 2000; 2010 WVS A No 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
Bushehr IR: Bushehr 2000; 2010 WVS A No 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
East Azarbayejan IR: East azarbayjan 2000; 2010 WVS A No 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
Esfahan IR: Isfahan 2000; 2010 WVS A No 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
Fars IR: Fars 2000; 2010 WVS A No 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
Gilan IR: Gilan 2000; 2010 WVS A No 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
Hamedan IR: Hamadan 2000; 2010 WVS A No 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
Hormozgan IR: Hormozgan 2000; 2010 WVS A No 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
Ilam IR: Ilam 2000; 2010 WVS A No 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 






Kermanshah IR: Kermanshah 2000; 2010 WVS A No 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
Khuzestan IR: Khozestan 2000; 2010 WVS A No 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
Kordestan IR: Kordestan 2010 WVS A No 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
Lorestan IR: Lorestan 2000; 2010 WVS A No 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
Markazi IR: Markazi 2000; 2010 WVS A No 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
Qom IR: Ghom 2000; 2010 WVS A No 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
Semnan IR: Semnan 2000; 2010 WVS A No 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
Sistan and Baluchestan IR: Sistan and balouchestan 2010 WVS A No 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
Tehran IR: Tehran 2000; 2010 WVS A No 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
West Azarbayejan IR: West azarbayjan 2000; 2010 WVS A No 
Italy Abruzzo IT: Abruzzo 1990; 2000; 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Italy Abruzzo IT: Sud - Abruzzo 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Italy Basilicata IT: Basilicata 1990; 2000; 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Italy Basilicata IT: Sud - Basilicata 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Italy Calabria IT: Calabria 1990; 2000; 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Italy Calabria IT: Sud - Calabria 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Italy Campania IT: Campania 1990; 2000; 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Italy Campania IT: Sud - Campania 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Italy Emilia-Romagna IT: Emilia-Romagna 1990; 2000; 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Italy Emilia-Romagna IT: Nord-Est - Emilia-Romagna 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Italy Friuli-Venezia Giulia IT: Friuli-Venezia Giulia 1990; 2000; 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Italy Friuli-Venezia Giulia IT: Nord-Est - Friuli-Venezia Giulia 2010 EVS X048B A No 




Italy Lazio IT: Centro - Lazio 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Italy Liguria IT: Liguria 1990; 2000; 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Italy Liguria IT: Nord-Ovest - Liguria 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Italy Lombardia IT: Lombardia 1990; 2000; 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Italy Lombardia IT: Nord-Ovest - Lombardia 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Italy Marche IT: Marche 1990; 2000; 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Italy Marche IT: Centro - Marche 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Italy Molise IT: Molise 1990; 2000; 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Italy Molise IT: Sud - Molise 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Italy Piemonte IT: Piemonte 1990; 2000; 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Italy Piemonte IT: Nord-Ovest - Piemonte 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Italy Puglia IT: Puglia 1990; 2000; 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Italy Puglia IT: Sud - Puglia 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Italy Sardegna IT: Sardegna 1990; 2000; 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Italy Sardegna IT: Isole - Sardegna 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Italy Sicilia IT: Sicilia 1990; 2000; 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Italy Sicilia IT: Isole - Sicilia 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Italy Toscana IT: Toscana 1990; 2000; 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Italy Toscana IT: Centro - Toscana 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Italy Trentino-Alto Adige IT: Trentino-Alto Adige 1990; 2000; 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Italy Trentino-Alto Adige IT: Nord-Est - Provincia Autonoma di 
Trento 
2010 EVS X048B A No 
Italy Umbria IT: Umbria 1990; 2000; 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Italy Umbria IT: Centro - Umbria 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Italy Valle d'Aosta/Vallée 
d'Aoste 
IT: Valle dAoste 1990; 2000; 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Italy Valle d'Aosta/Vallée 
d'Aoste 
IT: Nord-Ovest - Valle d'Aosta/Vallée 
d'Aoste 
2010 EVS X048B A No 
Italy Veneto IT: Veneto 1990; 2000; 2005 EVS X048 A No 




Jordan Ajloun JO: AJLOON 2002; 2010 WVS A No 
Jordan Amman JO: AMMAN 2002; 2010 WVS A No 
Jordan Aqaba JO: AQABA 2002; 2010 WVS A No 
Jordan Balqa JO: BALQA 2002; 2010 WVS A No 
Jordan Irbid JO: IRBID 2002; 2010 WVS A No 
Jordan Jarash JO: JERASH 2002; 2010 WVS A No 
Jordan Karak JO: KARAK 2002; 2010 WVS A No 
Jordan Ma’an JO: MA´AN 2002; 2010 WVS A No 
Jordan Madaba JO: MADABA 2002; 2010 WVS A No 
Jordan Mafraq JO: MAFRAQ 2002; 2010 WVS A No 
Jordan Tafeila JO: TAFILA 2002; 2010 WVS A No 
Jordan Zarqa JO: ZARQA 2002; 2010 WVS A No 
Kazakhstan Almaty KZ: Almaty region 2010 WVS A No 
Kazakhstan Almaty KZ: Almaty 2010 WVS A No 
Kazakhstan Atyrau KZ: Atyrau region 2010 WVS A No 
Kazakhstan East Kazakhstan KZ: East Kazakhstan region 2010 WVS A No 
Kazakhstan Karagandy KZ: Karaganda region 2010 WVS A No 
Kazakhstan Kostanai KZ: Kostanai region 2010 WVS A No 
Kazakhstan Kyzylorda KZ: Kyzyl-Ordynsk region 2010 WVS A No 
Kazakhstan Manghistau KZ: Mangistaus region 2010 WVS A No 
Kazakhstan North Kazakhstan KZ: North Kazakhstan region 2010 WVS A No 
Kazakhstan Pavlodar KZ: Pavlodar region 2010 WVS A No 
Kazakhstan South Kazakhstan KZ: South Kazakhstan region 2010 WVS A No 
Kazakhstan West Kazakhstan KZ: West Kazakhstan region 2010 WVS A No 
Kazakhstan Zhambyl KZ: Zhambalyk region 2010 WVS A No 
Korea, Rep. Busan KR: Pusan / Busan 2000; 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Korea, Rep. Chungbuk KR: Chungbuk / North Chungcheong 2000; 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Korea, Rep. Daegu KR: Taegu / Daegu 2000; 2005; 2010 WVS A No 




Korea, Rep. Gangwon KR: Kangwon / Gangwon Do 2000; 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Korea, Rep. Gyeongbuk KR: Kyeongbuk / North Gyeongsang 2000; 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Korea, Rep. Gyeonggi KR: Kyeonggi / Gyeonggi Do 2000; 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Korea, Rep. Incheon KR: Incheon 2000; 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Korea, Rep. Jeonbuk KR: Jeonbuk / North Jeolla 2000; 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Korea, Rep. Seoul KR: Seoul 1990; 2000; 2005; 
2010 
WVS A No 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
Bishkek KG: Bishkek city 2005 WVS A No 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
Chui Oblast KG: Chui oblast/region 2005 WVS A No 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
Issyk-Kul Oblast KG: Issyk-Kol oblast/region 2005 WVS A No 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
Jalal-Abad Oblast KG: Jalal-Abad oblast/region 2005 WVS A No 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
Naryn Oblast KG: Naryn oblast/region 2005 WVS A No 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
Osh Oblast KG: Osh oblast/region 2005 WVS A No 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
Talas Oblast KG: Talas oblast/region 2005 WVS A No 
Latvia Cçsu rajons LV: Cesu d. 2000 WVS A No 
Latvia Dobeles rajons LV: Dobeles d. 2000 WVS A No 
Latvia Gulbenes rajons LV: Gulbenes d. 2000 WVS A No 
Latvia Jçkabpils rajons LV: Jekapils d. 2000 WVS A No 
Latvia Jelgavas rajons LV: Jelgavas d. 2005 WVS A No 
Latvia Krâslavas rajons LV: Kraslavas d. 2000 WVS A No 
Latvia Kuldîgas rajons LV: Kuldigas d. 2000 WVS A No 
Latvia Liepâjas rajons LV: Liepajas d. 2005 WVS A No 
Latvia Limbaþu rajons LV: Limbazu d. 2000 WVS A No 
Latvia Ludzas rajons LV: Ludzas d. 2000 WVS A No 




Latvia Ogres rajons LV: Ogres d. 2000 WVS A No 
Latvia Preiïu rajons LV: Preilu d. 2000 WVS A No 
Latvia Saldus district LV: Saldus d. 2000 WVS A No 
Latvia Talsu rajons LV: Talsu d. 2000 WVS A No 
Latvia Tukums district LV: Tukuma d. 2000 WVS A No 
Latvia Valkas rajons LV: Valkas d. 2000 WVS A No 
Latvia Valmieras rajons LV: Valmieras d. 2000 WVS A No 
Macedonia Pelagonia MK: Pelagoniski 2000; 2005 WVS A No 
Macedonia Polog MK: Poloski 2000; 2005 WVS A No 
Macedonia Skopje MK: Skopski 2000; 2005 WVS A No 
Macedonia Vardar MK: Vardarska 2000 WVS A No 
Malaysia Johor MY: Johor 2010 WVS A No 
Malaysia Kelantan MY: Kelantan 2010 WVS A No 
Malaysia Melaka MY: Melaka 2010 WVS A No 
Malaysia Negeri Sembilan MY: Negeri Sembilan 2010 WVS A No 
Malaysia Pahang MY: Pahang 2010 WVS A No 
Malaysia Perak MY: Perak 2010 WVS A No 
Malaysia Pulau Pinang MY: Pulau Pinang 2010 WVS A No 
Malaysia Sarawak MY: Sarawak 2010 WVS A No 
Malaysia Terengganu MY: Terengganu 2010 WVS A No 
Mexico Aguascalientes MX: Aguascalientes 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Mexico Baja California Sur MX: Baja California Sur 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Mexico Campeche MX: Campeche 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Mexico Chiapas MX: Chiapas 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Mexico Chihuahua MX: Chihuahua 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Mexico Coahuila MX: Coahuila 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Mexico Distrito Federal,MEX MX: Zona metropolitana 1995; 2000 WVS A No 
Mexico Distrito Federal,MEX MX: Distrito Federal 2005; 2010 WVS A No 




Mexico Guanajuato MX: Guanajuato 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Mexico Guerrero MX: Guerrero 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Mexico Hidalgo MX: Hidalgo 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Mexico Jalisco MX: Jalisco 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Mexico Michoacan MX: Michoacán 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Mexico Morelos MX: Morelos 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Mexico Nayarit MX: Nayarit 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Mexico Nuevo Leon MX: Nuevo León 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Mexico Oaxaca MX: Oaxaca 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Mexico Puebla MX: Puebla 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Mexico Queretaro MX: Querétaro 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Mexico Quintana Roo MX: Quintana Roo 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Mexico San Luis Potosi MX: San Luis Potosí 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Mexico Sinaloa MX: Sinaloa 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Mexico Sonora MX: Sonora 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Mexico Tabasco MX: Tabasco 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Mexico Tamaulipas MX: Tamaulipas 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Mexico Tlaxcala MX: Tlaxcala 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Mexico Veracruz MX: Veracruz 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Mexico Yucatan MX: Yucatán 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Mexico Zacatecas MX: Zacatecas 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Netherlands Drenthe NL: Drenthe 1995; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Netherlands Drenthe NL: Noord-Nederland - Drenthe 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Netherlands Flevoland NL: Flevoland 1995; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Netherlands Flevoland NL: Oost-Nederland - Flevoland 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Netherlands Friesland NL: Friesland 1995; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Netherlands Friesland NL: Noord-Nederland - Friesland 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Netherlands Gelderland NL: Gelderland 1995; 2000 EVS X048 A No 




Netherlands Groningen NL: Groningen 1995; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Netherlands Groningen NL: Noord-Nederland - Groningen 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Netherlands Limburg NL: Limburg 1995; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Netherlands Limburg NL: Zuid-Nederland - Limburg 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Netherlands Noord-Brabant NL: Noord-Brabant 1995; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Netherlands Noord-Brabant NL: Zuid-Nederland - Noord-Brabant 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Netherlands Noord-Holland NL: Noord-Holland 1995; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Netherlands Noord-Holland NL: West-Nederland - Noord-Holland 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Netherlands Overijssel NL: Overijssel 1995; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Netherlands Overijssel NL: Oost-Nederland - Overijssel 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Netherlands Utrecht NL: Utrecht 1995; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Netherlands Utrecht NL: West-Nederland - Utrecht 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Netherlands Zeeland NL: Zeeland 1995; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Netherlands Zeeland NL: West-Nederland - Zeeland 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Netherlands Zuid-Holland NL: Zuid-Holland 1995; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Netherlands Zuid-Holland NL: West-Nederland - Zuid-Holland 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Nigeria North East NG: North East 2008 WVS A No 
Nigeria North West,NG NG: North West 2008 WVS A No 
Norway Akershus NO: Akershus 1995 EVS X048 A No 
Norway Aust-Agder NO: Aust-Agder 1995 EVS X048 A No 
Norway Buskerud NO: Buskerud 1995 EVS X048 A No 
Norway Finnmark Finnmárku NO: Finnmark 1995 EVS X048 A No 
Norway Hedmark NO: Hedmark 1995 EVS X048 A No 
Norway Hordaland NO: Hordaland 1995 EVS X048 A No 
Norway Møre og Romsdal NO: Mxre og Romsdal 1995 EVS X048 A No 
Norway Nordland NO: Nordland 1995; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Norway Nord-Trøndelag NO: Nord-Trxndelag 1995 EVS X048 A No 
Norway Oppland NO: Oppland 1995 EVS X048 A No 




Norway Østfold NO: Xstfold 1995 EVS X048 A No 
Norway Rogaland NO: Rogaland 1995 EVS X048 A No 
Norway Sogn og Fjordane NO: Sogn og Fjordane 1995 EVS X048 A No 
Norway Sør-Trøndelag NO: Sxr-Trxndelag 1995 EVS X048 A No 
Norway Telemark NO: Telemark 1995 EVS X048 A No 
Norway Troms Romsa NO: Troms 1995 EVS X048 A No 
Norway Vest-Agder NO: Vest-Agder 1995 EVS X048 A No 
Norway Vestfold NO: Vestfold 1995 EVS X048 A No 
Peru Ancash PE: Ancash 2010 WVS A No 
Peru Arequipa PE: Arequipa 2001; 2010 WVS A No 
Peru Ayacucho PE: Ayacucho 2010 WVS A No 
Peru Cajamarca PE: Cajamarca 2010 WVS A No 
Peru Cusco PE: Cusco 2001; 2010 WVS A No 
Peru Huánuco PE: Huánuco 2010 WVS A No 
Peru Ica PE: Ica 2010 WVS A No 
Peru Junín PE: Junín 2010 WVS A No 
Peru La Libertad,PER PE: La libertad 2010 WVS A No 
Peru Lambayeque PE: Lambayeque 2010 WVS A No 
Peru Piura PE: Piura 2001; 2010 WVS A No 
Peru Puno PE: Puno 2010 WVS A No 
Peru San Martín PE: San Martín 2010 WVS A No 
Philippines Mindanao PH: MINDANAO 1997; 2006; 2010 WVS A No 
Poland Dolnoslaskie PL: Dolnolslaskie 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Poland Dolnoslaskie PL: Region Póludniowo-Zachodni - 
Dolnoslaskie 
2010 EVS X048B A No 
Poland Kujawsko-Pomorskie PL: Kujawsko-Pomorskie 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Poland Kujawsko-Pomorskie PL: Region Pólnocny - Kujawsko-
Pomorskie 
2010 EVS X048B A No 
Poland Lódzkie PL: Lodzkie 1995; 2000 WVS A No 




Poland Lubelskie PL: Lubelskie 1995; 2000 WVS A No 
Poland Lubelskie PL: Region Wschodni - Lubelskie 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Poland Lubuskie PL: Lubuskie 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Poland Lubuskie PL: Region Pólnocno-Zachodni - 
Lubuskie 
2010 EVS X048B A No 
Poland Malopolskie PL: Malopotskie 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Poland Malopolskie PL: Region Poludniowy -Malopolskie 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Poland Mazowieckie PL: Mazowieckie 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Poland Mazowieckie PL: Region centralny - Mazowieckie 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Poland Opolskie PL: Opolskie 1990; 1995; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Poland Opolskie PL: Region Póludniowo-Zachodni - 
Opolskie 
2010 EVS X048B A No 
Poland Podkarpackie PL: Podkarpackie 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Poland Podkarpackie PL: Region Wschodni - Podkarpackie 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Poland Podlaskie PL: Podlaskie 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Poland Podlaskie PL: Region Wschodni - Podlaskie 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Poland Slaskie PL: Slaskie 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Poland Slaskie PL: Region Poludniowy - Slaskie 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Poland Swietokrzyskie PL: Swietokryskie 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Poland Swietokrzyskie PL: Region Wschodni - 
Swietokrzyskie 
2010 EVS X048B A No 
Poland Warminsko-Mazurskie PL: Warminsko-Mazurskie 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Poland Warminsko-Mazurskie PL: Region Pólnocny - Warminsko-
Mazurskie 
2010 EVS X048B A No 
Poland Wielkopolskie PL: Wielkopolskie 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Poland Wielkopolskie PL: Region Pólnocno-Zachodni - 
Wielkopolskie 
2010 EVS X048B A No 
Portugal Alentejo PT: Alentejo 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Portugal Alentejo PT: Continente - Alentejo 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Portugal Algarve PT: Algarve 1990; 2000 EVS X048 A No 




Portugal Centro PT: Center 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Portugal Centro PT: Continente - Centro 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Portugal Lisboa PT: Continente - Lisboa 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Portugal Norte PT: North 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Portugal Norte PT: Continente - Norte 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Romania Alba RO: Alba 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Romania Arad RO: Arad 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Arges RO: Arges 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Bacau RO: Bacau 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Bihor RO: Bihor 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Bistrita-Nasaud RO: Bistrita-Nasaud 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Botosani RO: Botosani 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Braila RO: Braila 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Brasov RO: Brasov 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Bucuresti [Bucharest] RO: Bucuresti 1995; 2000; 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Buzau RO: Buzau 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Calarasi RO: Calarasi 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Caras-Severin RO: Caras-Severin 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Cluj RO: Cluj 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Constanta RO: Constanta 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Covasna RO: Covasna 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Dambovita RO: Dambovita 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Dolj RO: Dolj 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Galati RO: Galati 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Giurgiu RO: Giurgiu 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Gorj RO: Gorj 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Harghita RO: Harghita 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Hunedoara RO: Hunedoara 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 




Romania Iasi RO: Iasi 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Ilfov RO: Ilfov 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Maramures RO: Maramures County 2000; 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Romania Mehedinti RO: Mehedinti 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Romania Mures RO: Mures 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Neamt RO: Neamt 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Olt RO: Olt 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Prahova RO: Prahova 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Salaj RO: Salaj 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Satu Mare RO: Satu Mare 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Sibiu RO: Sibiu 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Suceava RO: Suceava 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Teleorman RO: Teleorman 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Timis RO: Timis 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Tulcea RO: Tulcea 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Valcea RO: Valcea 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Vaslui RO: Vaslui 2000; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Romania Vrancea RO: Vrancea 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Russian 
Federation 
Moscow Region RU: Moscow 2010 WVS A No 
Slovak 
Republic 
Banskobystrický kraj SK: B. Bystrica County 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Slovak 
Republic 
Bratislavský kraj SK: Bratislava County 1995; 2000; 2005 WVS A No 
Slovak 
Republic 
Bratislavský kraj SK: Slovenská Republika - 
Bratislavský kraj 
2010 EVS X048B A No 
Slovak 
Republic 
Kosický kraj SK: Kosice County 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Slovak 
Republic 






Presovský kraj SK: Presov County 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Slovak 
Republic 
Trenciansky kraj SK: Trencin County 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Slovak 
Republic 
Trnavský kraj SK: Trnava County 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Slovak 
Republic 
Zilinský kraj SK: Zilina County 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Slovenia Gorenjska SI: Gorensjka 1995; 2000; 2005; 
2010 
EVS X048 A No 
Slovenia Goriska SI: Goriska 1995; 2000; 2005; 
2010 
EVS X048 A No 
Slovenia Jugovzhodna Slovenija SI: JV Slovenija 2005; 2010 WVS A Yes 
Slovenia Koroska SI: Koroska 1995; 2000; 2005; 
2010 
EVS X048 A No 
Slovenia Notranjsko-kraska SI: Notr. - Kraska 2005; 2010 WVS A No 
Slovenia Obalno-kraska SI: Obalno-Kraska 1995; 2005; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Slovenia Osrednjeslovenska SI: Osrednja Slovenska 1995; 2000; 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Slovenia Podravska SI: Podravska 1995; 2000; 2005; 
2010 
EVS X048 A No 
Slovenia Pomurska SI: Pomurska 1995; 2000; 2005; 
2010 
EVS X048 A No 
Slovenia Savinjska SI: Savinjska 1995; 2000; 2005; 
2010 
EVS X048 A No 
Slovenia Spodnjeposavska SI: Spodnje Posavska 1995; 2000; 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Slovenia Zasavska SI: Zasavska 1995; 2000; 2005; 
2010 
EVS X048 A No 
Spain Asturias ES: Asturias 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
WVS A No 
Spain Asturias ES: Noroeste - Principado de Asturias 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Spain Balears, Illes ES: Baleares 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
WVS A No 




Spain Cantabria ES: Cantabria 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
WVS A No 
Spain Cantabria ES: Noroeste - Cantabria 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Spain Madrid ES: Madrid 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
WVS A No 
Spain Madrid ES: Comunidad de Madrid - 
Comunidad de Madrid 
2010 EVS X048B A No 
Spain Murcia ES: Murcia 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
WVS A No 
Spain Murcia ES: Sur - Región de Murcia 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Spain Navarra ES: Navarra 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
WVS A No 
Spain Navarra ES: Noreste - Comunidad Foral de 
Navarra 
2010 EVS X048B A No 
Spain Rioja, La ES: Rioja 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
WVS A No 
Spain Rioja, La ES: Noreste - La Rioja 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Sweden Blekinge SE: Blekinge 1990 EVS X048 A No 
Sweden Dalarna SE: Dalarna 2010 WVS A No 
Sweden Gävleborg SE: Gavleborg 1990 EVS X048 A No 
Sweden Gävleborg SE: Gävleborg 2010 WVS A No 
Sweden Halland SE: Halland 1990; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Sweden Jämtland SE: Jamtland 1990; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Sweden Jönköping SE: Jonkoping 1990 EVS X048 A No 
Sweden Jönköping SE: Jönköping 2010 WVS A No 
Sweden Kalmar SE: Kalmar 1990; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Sweden Kronoberg SE: Kronoberg 1990; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Sweden Norrbotten SE: Norbotten 1990; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Sweden Örebro SE: Örebro 2010 WVS A No 
Sweden Östergötland SE: Ostergotland 1990 EVS X048 A No 




Sweden Skåne SE: Skåne 2010 WVS A No 
Sweden Södermanland SE: Sodermanland 1990; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Sweden Stockholm SE: Stor Stockholm 1990; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
Sweden Stockholm SE: Östra Sverige - Stockholm 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Sweden Uppsala SE: Uppsala 1990; 2010 EVS X048 A No 
Sweden Värmland SE: Varmland 1990 EVS X048 A No 
Sweden Värmland SE: Värmland 2010 WVS A No 
Sweden Västerbotten SE: Vasterbotten 1990 EVS X048 A No 
Sweden Västerbotten SE: Västerbotten 2010 WVS A No 
Sweden Västernorrland SE: Vasternorrland 1990 EVS X048 A No 
Sweden Västernorrland SE: Västernorrland 2010 WVS A No 
Sweden Västmanland SE: Vastmanland 1990 EVS X048 A No 
Sweden Västmanland SE: Västmanland 2010 WVS A No 
Sweden Västra Götaland SE: Västra Götaland 2010 WVS A No 
Switzerland Aargau CH: AG 2000 WVS A No 
Switzerland Basel-Land CH: BL 2000 WVS A No 
Switzerland Basel-Stadt CH: BS 2000 WVS A No 
Switzerland Freiburg CH: FR 2000 WVS A No 
Switzerland Genf CH: GE 2000 WVS A No 
Switzerland Graubünden CH: GR 2000 WVS A No 
Switzerland Luzern CH: LU 2000 WVS A No 
Switzerland Neuenburg CH: NE 2000 WVS A No 
Switzerland Obwalden CH: OW 2000 WVS A No 
Switzerland Schaffhausen CH: SH 2000 WVS A No 
Switzerland Schwyz CH: SZ 2000 WVS A No 
Switzerland Solothurn CH: SO 2000 WVS A No 
Switzerland St. Gallen CH: SG 2000 WVS A No 
Switzerland Tessin CH: TI 2000 WVS A No 




Switzerland Thurgau CH: TG 2000 WVS A No 
Switzerland Waadt CH: VD 2000 WVS A No 
Switzerland Wallis CH: VS 2000 WVS A No 
Switzerland Zürich CH: ZH 2000 WVS A No 
Switzerland Zürich CH: Schweiz/Suisse/Svizzera - Zürich 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Turkey Afyonkarahisar TR: Afyonkarahisar 1990 WVS A No 
Turkey Amasya TR: Amasya 1990 WVS A No 
Turkey Edirne TR: Edirne 1990 WVS A No 
Turkey Erzincan TR: Erzincan 1990 WVS A No 
Turkey Izmir TR: Izmir 2000 WVS A No 
Turkey Kastamonu TR: Kastamonu 1990 WVS A No 
Turkey Konya TR: Konya 1990; 2000 WVS A No 
Turkey Malatya TR: Malatya 1990 WVS A No 
Turkey Mugla TR: Muğla 1990 WVS A No 
Turkey Samsun TR: Samsun 1990 WVS A No 
Ukraine Cherkasy UA: Cherkasy oblast 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Ukraine Cherkasy UA: Centre - Cherkasy Oblast 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Ukraine Chernihiv UA: Chernigiv oblast 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Ukraine Chernihiv UA: North - Chernihiv Oblast 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Ukraine Chernivtsi UA: Chernivtsi oblast 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Ukraine Chernivtsi UA: West - Chernivtsi Oblast 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Ukraine Dnipropetrovsk UA: East - Dnipropetrovsk 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Ukraine Donetsk UA: East - Donetsk 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Ukraine Ivano-Frankivsk UA: Ivano-Frankivsk oblast 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Ukraine Ivano-Frankivsk UA: West - Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Ukraine Kharkiv UA: East - Kharkiv 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Ukraine Kherson UA: Kherson oblast 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Ukraine Kherson UA: South - Kherson Oblast 2010 EVS X048B A No 




Ukraine Khmelnytskiy UA: Centre - Khmelnytskyi Oblast 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Ukraine Kirovohrad UA: Kirovograd oblast 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Ukraine Kirovohrad UA: Centre - Kirovohrad Oblast 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Ukraine Kyiv_city UA: Kyiv city 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Ukraine Kyiv_city UA: North - Kyiv 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Ukraine Luhansk UA: Luhansk oblast 2005 WVS A No 
Ukraine Luhansk UA: East - Luhansk Oblast 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Ukraine Lviv UA: Lviv oblast 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Ukraine Lviv UA: West - Lviv Oblast 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Ukraine Mykolayiv UA: Mykolayiv oblast 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Ukraine Mykolayiv UA: South - Mykolaiv Oblast 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Ukraine Odesa UA: South - Odesa 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Ukraine Poltava UA: Poltava oblast 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Ukraine Poltava UA: Centre - Poltava Oblast 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Ukraine Rivne UA: Rivnå oblast 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Ukraine Rivne UA: West - Rivne Oblast 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Ukraine Sumy UA: Sumy oblast 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Ukraine Sumy UA: North - Sumy Oblast 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Ukraine Ternopil UA: Ternopil oblast 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Ukraine Ternopil UA: West - Ternopil Oblast 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Ukraine Vinnytsya UA: Vinnytsia oblast 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Ukraine Vinnytsya UA: Centre - Vinnytsia Oblast 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Ukraine Volyn UA: Volyn oblast 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Ukraine Volyn UA: West - Volyn Oblast 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Ukraine Zakarpattya UA: Zakarpattia oblast 2005 EVS X048 A No 
Ukraine Zakarpattya UA: West - Zakarpattia Oblast 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Ukraine Zaporizhzhya UA: East - Zaporizhia 2010 EVS X048B A No 
Ukraine Zhytomyr UA: Zhitomyr oblast 2005 EVS X048 A No 






East Anglia GB: East Anglia 2000 WVS A No 
United 
Kingdom 
East Anglia GB-GBN: East of England – East 
Anglia 
2010 EVS X048B A No 
United 
Kingdom 
North GB: North 2000; 2005 WVS A No 
United 
Kingdom 
North West,GB GB-GBN: North West 1995; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
United 
Kingdom 
North West,GB GB: North West 2000; 2005 WVS A No 
United 
Kingdom 
Northern Ireland Northern Ireland 1995; 2000 S003 A No 
United 
Kingdom 
Northern Ireland GB-NIR: Northern Ireland - Northern 
Ireland 
2010 EVS X048B A No 
United 
Kingdom 
Scotland GB-GBN: Scotland 1995; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
United 
Kingdom 
Scotland GB: Scotland 2000; 2005 WVS A No 
United 
Kingdom 
South West,GB GB-GBN: South West 1995; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
United 
Kingdom 
South West,GB GB: South West 2000; 2005 WVS A No 
United 
Kingdom 
Wales GB-GBN:Wales 1995; 2000 EVS X048 A No 
United 
Kingdom 
Wales GB:Wales 2000; 2005 WVS A No 
United States Alaska US: Alaska 2010 WVS A No 
United States California US: California 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 A No 
United States Hawaii US: Hawai 2010 WVS A No 
Uruguay Florida,URU UY: Florida 2000 WVS A No 
Uruguay Montevideo UY: Montevideo 2000 WVS A No 
Uruguay Paysandú UY: Paysandú 2000 WVS A No 




Uruguay Tacuarembó UY: Tacuarembó 2000 WVS A No 
Argentina Buenos Aires AR: Gran Buenos Aires 1995; 2000; 2005 WVS B No 
Brazil Pará and Amapá BR: PA 2010 WVS B No 
Bulgaria Burgas BG: Burgaska - province of Burgaska 
- 
1995; 2000; 2005 EVS X048 B No 
Bulgaria Sofia BG: Sofia-province 1995; 2000; 2005 EVS X048 B No 
Bulgaria Sofia Stolitsa BG: Sofia-City 1995; 2000; 2005 EVS X048 B No 
Chile Antofagasta CL: Second Region 1990 WVS B No 
Chile Araucanía CL: Ninth Region 1995 WVS B No 
Chile Atacama CL: Third Region 1995 WVS B No 
Chile Biobío CL: Eighth Region 1990; 1995 WVS B Yes 
Chile Coquimbo CL: Fourth Region 1990; 1995 WVS B Yes 
Chile Libertador General 
Bernardo O'Higgins 
CL: Sixth Region 1990; 1995 WVS B Yes 
Chile Los Lagos CL: Tenth Region 1990; 1995 WVS B Yes 
Chile Maule CL: Seventh Region 1990; 1995 WVS B Yes 
Chile Tarapacá CL: First Region 1990; 1995 WVS B Yes 
Chile Valparaíso CL: Fifth Region 1990 WVS B No 
China Anhui CN: Anhui Province 2005; 2010 WVS B No 
China Fujian CN: Fujian Province 1990; 2005; 2010 WVS B No 
China Guangdong w/ Hainan CN: Guangdong Province 2005; 2010 WVS B No 
China Guangxi CN: Guangxi Province 2005; 2010 WVS B No 
China Guizhou CN: Guizhou Province 1990; 2005; 2010 WVS B No 
China Hebei CN: Hebei Province 2005; 2010 WVS B No 
China Heilongjiang CN: Heilongjiang Province 2005; 2010 WVS B No 
China Henan CN: Henan Province 2005; 2010 WVS B No 
China Hubei CN: Hubei Province 1990; 2005; 2010 WVS B No 
China Hunan CN: Hunan Province 2005; 2010 WVS B No 
China Jiangsu CN: Jiangsu Province 1990; 2005; 2010 WVS B No 




China Liaoning CN: Liaoning Province 1990; 2005; 2010 WVS B No 
China Shaanxi CN: Shaannxi Province 1990; 2005; 2010 WVS B No 
China Shandong CN: Shandong Province 2005; 2010 WVS B No 
China Shanxi CN: Shanxi Province 2005; 2010 WVS B No 
China Sichuan w/ Chongqing CN: Sichuan 2005; 2010 WVS B No 
China Yunnan CN: Yunnan Province 2005; 2010 WVS B No 
China Zhejiang CN: Zhejiang Province 2005; 2010 WVS B No 
Croatia Krapina-Zagorje HR: County of Zagorje 2000 EVS X048 B No 
Croatia Požega-Slavonia HR: County of Pozega 2000 EVS X048 B No 
Croatia Šibenik-Knin HR: County of Sibenik 2000 EVS X048 B No 
Croatia Zadar HR: County of Zadar and Knin 2000 EVS X048 B No 
Czech 
Republic 
Moravskoslezský kraj CZ: Moravia 1995 EVS X048 B No 
Czech 
Republic 
Moravskoslezský kraj CZ: Severomoravský kraj - North 
Moravia - 
1995; 2000 WVS B No 
Czech 
Republic 
Moravskoslezský kraj CZ: Ceska Republika - Stredni 
Morava 
2010 EVS X048B B No 
Denmark Capital region DK: Københavns Amt 1980; 1990; 2000 EVS X048 B No 
Denmark Capital region DK: København 1980; 1995; 2005 EVS X048 B No 
Denmark Capital region DK: Danmark - Hovedstaden 2010 EVS X048B B No 
Estonia Harju county EE: Harjumaa 1996 WVS B No 
Estonia Hiiu county EE: Hiiumaa 1996 WVS B No 
Estonia Ida-Viru county EE: Isa-Virumaa 1996 WVS B No 
Estonia Järva county EE: Jravamaa 1996 WVS B No 
Estonia Jõgeva county EE: Jogevamaa 1996 WVS B No 
Estonia Lääne county EE: Laanemaa 1996 WVS B No 
Estonia Lääne-Viru county EE: Laane-Viruma 1996 WVS B No 
Estonia Pärnu county EE: Parnumaa 1996 WVS B No 
Estonia Põlva county EE: Polvamaa 1996 WVS B No 




Estonia Saare county EE: Saaremaa 1996 WVS B No 
Estonia Tartu county EE: Tartumaa 1996 WVS B No 
Estonia Valga county EE: Valgamaa 1996 WVS B No 
Estonia Viljandi county EE: Vijandimaa 1996 WVS B No 
Estonia Võru county EE: Vorumaa 1996 WVS B No 
Finland Etelã-Suomi w/ 
Uusimaa 
FI: Manner-Suomi - Etelä-Suomi 2010 EVS X048B B No 
Hungary Bács-Kiskun HU: Bács 2000 EVS X048 B No 
Hungary Hajdú-Bihar HU: Hajdu 2000 EVS X048 B No 
Hungary Jász-N-Sz HU: Szolnok 2000 EVS X048 B No 
India Assam w/ Mizoram IN: Assam 2005; 2010 WVS B No 
Indonesia Bengkulu ID: Bengkulu province 2005 WVS B No 
Indonesia C. Java ID: Central Java province 2005; 2010 WVS B No 
Indonesia Jakarta ID: Jakarta province 2005 WVS B No 
Indonesia Jambi ID: Jambi province 2005 WVS B No 










IR: Boyer ahmad 2000; 2010 WVS B No 
Kazakhstan Aktobe KZ: Aktyubinsk region 2010 WVS B No 
Korea, Rep. Chungnam w/ Daejeon KR: Chungnam / South Chungcheong 2000; 2005; 2010 WVS B No 
Korea, Rep. Gyeongnam w/ Ulsan KR: Kyeongnam / South Gyeongsang 2000; 2005; 2010 WVS B No 
Latvia Aizkraukle district LV: Aizkraukles d. 2000 WVS B No 
Latvia Aluksne district LV: Aluksness d. 2000 WVS B No 
Latvia Balvi district LV: Balvu d. 2000 WVS B No 
Latvia Bauskas rajons LV: Bauskas d. 2000 WVS B No 
Latvia Daugavpils rajons LV: Daugavpils 2000 WVS B No 
Latvia Liepâjas rajons LV: Liepaja 2000 WVS B No 




Latvia Rîgas rajons LV: Riga 2000; 2005 EVS X048 B No 
Latvia Ventspils district LV: Ventpils d. 2000 WVS B No 
Lithuania Kauno apskritis LT: Kaunas 2000 WVS B No 
Lithuania Klaipedos apskritis LT: Klaipeda 2000 WVS B No 
Lithuania Panevezio apskritis LT: Panevezys 2000 WVS B No 
Lithuania Siauliu apskritis LT: Siauliai 2000 WVS B No 
Lithuania Vilniaus apskritis LT: South East Lithuania 2000 EVS X048 B No 
Lithuania Vilniaus apskritis LT: Vilnius 2000 WVS B No 
Malaysia Sabah w/ Labuan MY: Sabah 2010 WVS B No 
Malaysia Selangor w/ Kuala 
Lumpur 
MY: Selangor 2010 WVS B No 
Mexico Baja California Norte MX: Baja California 2005; 2010 WVS B No 
Mexico Mexico MX: Zona metropolitana 1980; 1995 WVS B No 
Mexico Mexico MX: Estado de México 2005; 2010 WVS B No 
Morocco Tansift MA: Marrakech Tensift 2005; 2010 WVS B No 
Pakistan Punjab w/ Islamabad PK: Punjab 2000 WVS B No 
Peru Lima w/ Callao PE: GRAN LIMA 2005 WVS B No 
Peru Lima w/ Callao PE: Lima 2001; 2010 WVS B No 
Peru Loreto w/ Ucayali PE: Loreto 2010 WVS B No 
Philippines Metro Manila PH: NCR 1997; 2006; 2010 WVS B No 
Poland Pomorskie-
Zachodniopomorskie 
PL: Pomorsie 2000 EVS X048 B No 
Poland Pomorskie-
Zachodniopomorskie 
PL: Zachodniopomorskie 2000 EVS X048 B No 
Poland Pomorskie-
Zachodniopomorskie 
PL: Region Pólnocno-Zachodni - 
Zachodniopomorskie 
2010 EVS X048B B No 
Poland Pomorskie-
Zachodniopomorskie 
PL: Region Pólnocny - Pomorskie 2010 EVS X048B B No 
Serbia City of Belgrade CS: Belgrad area 2002 WVS B No 
Slovenia Notranjsko-kraska SI: Kraska 1995; 2000 EVS X048 B No 




South Africa Orange Free State ZA: Free State 2000; 2005; 2010 WVS B No 
Spain Ceuta y Melilla ES: Sur - Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta 2010 EVS X048B B No 
Switzerland Appenzell A&I Rh. CH: AI 2000 WVS B No 
Switzerland Bern w/ Jura CH: BE 2000 WVS B No 
Turkey Ankara and Kirikkale TR: Ankara (center) 1990; 2000 WVS B No 
Turkey Antalya TR: Antalya (south) 1990; 2000 WVS B No 
Turkey Isparta TR: Isparta (west) 2000 EVS X048 B No 
Turkey Izmir TR: Izmir (west) 1990 WVS B No 
Turkey Manisa TR: Manisa (west) 1990; 2000 WVS B No 
Turkey Mersin TR: Mersin (south) 2000 EVS X048 B No 
Turkey Sanliurfa TR: Sanliurfa (southeast) 2000 EVS X048 B No 
Turkey Tokat TR: Tokat (center north) 2000 EVS X048 B No 
Turkey Trabzon TR: Trabzon (north) 2000 EVS X048 B No 
Turkey Van TR: Van (east) 2000 EVS X048 B No 
Ukraine Crimea & Sevastopol UA: Crimea 2005 EVS X048 B No 
Ukraine Crimea & Sevastopol UA: South - Autonomous Republic of 
Crimea 
2010 EVS X048B B No 
Ukraine Dnipropetrovsk UA: Dnipropetrovsk oblast 2005 WVS B No 
Ukraine Dnipropetrovsk UA: East - Dnipropetrovsk Oblast 2010 EVS X048B B No 
Ukraine Donetsk UA: Donetsk oblast 2005 EVS X048 B No 
Ukraine Donetsk UA: East - Donetsk Oblast 2010 EVS X048B B No 
Ukraine Kharkiv UA: Kharkiv oblast 2005 EVS X048 B No 
Ukraine Kharkiv UA: East - Kharkiv Oblast 2010 EVS X048B B No 
Ukraine Kyiv_sub UA: Kyiv oblast 2005 EVS X048 B No 
Ukraine Kyiv_sub UA: North - Kyiv Oblast 2010 EVS X048B B No 
Ukraine Odesa UA: Odessa oblast 2005 EVS X048 B No 
Ukraine Odesa UA: South - Odesa Oblast 2010 EVS X048B B No 
Ukraine Zaporizhzhya UA: Zaporizhia oblast 2005 EVS X048 B No 




Belgium Prov. Brabant BE: Vlaams Brabant 1995; 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Belgium Prov. Brabant BE: Waals-Brabant 1995; 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Belgium Prov. Brabant BE: Région Wallonne - Prov. Brabant 
Wallon 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
Belgium Prov. Brabant BE: Vlaams gewest - Prov. Vlaams-
Brabant 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
China Guangdong w/ Hainan CN: Hainan Province 2010 WVS C No 
Denmark Jylland DK: Århus Amt 1985; 1990; 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Denmark Jylland DK: Nordjyllands Amt 1985; 1990; 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Denmark Jylland DK: Ringkøbing Amt 1985; 1990; 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Denmark Jylland DK: Sønderjyllands og Ribe Amt 1985; 1990; 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Denmark Jylland DK: Vejle Amt 1985; 1990; 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Denmark Jylland DK: Viborg Amt 1985; 1990; 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Denmark Østsjælland & Vest- 
og Sydsjælland 
DK: Roskilde Amt 1985; 1990; 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Denmark Østsjælland & Vest- 
og Sydsjælland 
DK: Storstøms Amt 1985; 1990; 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Denmark Østsjælland & Vest- 
og Sydsjælland 
DK: Vestsjællands Amt 1985; 1990; 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Germany, 
West 
Baden-Wurttemberg DE: Nord Baden-Wurttemberg 1985; 1990 EVS X048 C No 
Germany, 
West 
Baden-Wurttemberg DE: Sud Baden-Wurttemberg 1985; 1990 EVS X048 C No 
Germany, 
West 
Bavaria DE: Bayern - Mittelfranken 2010 EVS X048B C No 
Germany, 
West 
Bavaria DE: Bayern - Niederbayern 2010 EVS X048B C No 
Germany, 
West 
Bavaria DE: Bayern - Oberbayern 2010 EVS X048B C No 
Germany, 
West 
Bavaria DE: Bayern - Oberfranken 2010 EVS X048B C No 
Germany, 
West 






Bavaria DE: Bayern - Schwaben 2010 EVS X048B C No 
Germany, 
West 
Bavaria DE: Bayern - Unterfranken 2010 EVS X048B C No 
Germany, 
West 
Berlin DE: Ost-Berlin 1991 EVS X048 C No 
Germany, 
West 
Berlin DE: West-Berlin 1991 EVS X048 C No 
Greece Ipeiros & Dytiki 
Makedonia 
GR: Kentriki Ellada - Ipeiros 2010 EVS X048B C No 
Greece Ipeiros & Dytiki 
Makedonia 
GR: Voreia Ellada - Dytiki 
Makedonia 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
Greece Kriti GR: Chania 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Greece Kriti GR: Dodekanisos 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Greece Kriti GR: Kriti (rest) 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Greece Nisiá Aigaío GR: Chios 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Greece Nisiá Aigaío GR: Kyklades 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Greece Nisiá Aigaío GR: Nisia Aigaiou, Kriti - Notio 
Aigaio 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
Greece Nisiá Aigaío GR: Nisia Aigaiou, Kriti - Voreio 
Aigaio 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
Greece Peloponnisos & Dytiki 
Ellada 
GR: Aitoloakarnania 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Greece Peloponnisos & Dytiki 
Ellada 
GR: Argolida 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Greece Peloponnisos & Dytiki 
Ellada 
GR: Arkadia 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Greece Peloponnisos & Dytiki 
Ellada 
GR: Korinthia 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Greece Peloponnisos & Dytiki 
Ellada 
GR: Lakonia 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Greece Peloponnisos & Dytiki 
Ellada 




Greece Peloponnisos & Dytiki 
Ellada 
GR: Voiotia 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Greece Peloponnisos & Dytiki 
Ellada 
GR: Kentriki Ellada - Dytiki Ellada 2010 EVS X048B C No 
Greece Peloponnisos & Dytiki 
Ellada 
GR: Kentriki Ellada - Peloponnisos 2010 EVS X048B C No 
Greece Sterea Ellada, Attiki, 
Ionia Nisia 
GR: Attiki 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Greece Sterea Ellada, Attiki, 
Ionia Nisia 
GR: Evvoia 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Greece Sterea Ellada, Attiki, 
Ionia Nisia 
GR: Fthiotida 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Greece Sterea Ellada, Attiki, 
Ionia Nisia 
GR: Kerkyra 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Greece Sterea Ellada, Attiki, 
Ionia Nisia 
GR: Attiki - Attiki 2010 EVS X048B C No 
Greece Sterea Ellada, Attiki, 
Ionia Nisia 
GR: Kentriki Ellada - Ionia Nisia 2010 EVS X048B C No 
Greece Sterea Ellada, Attiki, 
Ionia Nisia 
GR: Kentriki Ellada - Sterea Ellada 2010 EVS X048B C No 
Greece Thessalia GR: Karditsa 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Greece Thessalia GR: Larisa 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Greece Thessalia GR: Magnisia 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Greece Thessalia GR: Thessalia (rest) 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Greece Thessalia GR: Trikala 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 










IR: Golestan 2000; 2010 WVS C No 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
Zanjan & Qazvin IR: Ghazvin 2000; 2010 WVS C No 




Ireland Border IE: Donegal 1991 EVS X048 C No 
Ireland Border IE: Leitrim 1991 EVS X048 C No 
Ireland Border IE: Louth 1991 EVS X048 C No 
Ireland Border IE: Monaghan 1991 EVS X048 C No 
Ireland Border IE: Sligo 1991 EVS X048 C No 
Ireland Mid-East w/ Dublin IE: Dublin City 1991 EVS X048 C No 
Ireland Mid-East w/ Dublin IE: Dublin County 1991 EVS X048 C No 
Ireland Mid-East w/ Dublin IE: Kildkare 1991 EVS X048 C No 
Ireland Mid-East w/ Dublin IE: Meath 1991 EVS X048 C No 
Ireland Mid-East w/ Dublin IE: Wicklow 1991 EVS X048 C No 
Ireland Midland IE: Laois 1991 EVS X048 C No 
Ireland Midland IE: Longford 1991 EVS X048 C No 
Ireland Midland IE: Offaly 1991 EVS X048 C No 
Ireland Midland IE: Westmeath 1991 EVS X048 C No 
Ireland Mid-West,IRE IE: Clare 1991 EVS X048 C No 
Ireland Mid-West,IRE IE: Limerick City 1991 EVS X048 C No 
Ireland Mid-West,IRE IE: Limerick County 1991 EVS X048 C No 
Ireland Mid-West,IRE IE: Tipp N 1991 EVS X048 C No 
Ireland South-West IE: Cork City 1991 EVS X048 C No 
Ireland South-West IE: Cork County 1991 EVS X048 C No 
Ireland South-West IE: Kerry 1991 EVS X048 C No 
Ireland West IE: Galway 1991 EVS X048 C No 
Ireland West IE: Mayo 1991 EVS X048 C No 
Ireland West IE: Roscommon 1991 EVS X048 C No 
Kazakhstan Akmola & Astana City KZ: Akmolinsk region 2010 WVS C No 
Kazakhstan Akmola & Astana City KZ: Astana 2010 WVS C No 
Latvia Jelgavas rajons LV: Jelgava 2000 WVS C No 
Lithuania Alytaus apskritis LT: Aukstaitija 2000 EVS X048 C No 




Lithuania Marijampoles apskritis LT: Suvalkija 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Lithuania Telsiu apskritis LT: Zemaitija 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Malaysia Kedah and Perlis MY: Kedah 2010 WVS C No 
Pakistan Balochistan PK: Rural Balochistan 2004 WVS C No 
Pakistan Balochistan PK: Urban Balochistan 2004 WVS C No 
Pakistan NWFP PK: Rural NWFP (Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa) 
2004 WVS C No 
Pakistan Punjab w/ Islamabad PK: Islamabad 2004 WVS C No 
Pakistan Sindh PK: Rural Sindh 2004 WVS C No 
Poland Lubuskie PL: Gorzowskie 1990 EVS X048 C No 
Poland Podkarpackie PL: Rzeszowskie 1990 EVS X048 C No 
Portugal Centro PT: Literoral Centro 1990 EVS X048 C No 
South Africa Natal ZA: Durban 1995 WVS C No 
South Africa Natal ZA: Rest of Natal 1995 WVS C No 
South Africa Orange Free State ZA: Bloemfontein 1995 WVS C No 
South Africa Orange Free State ZA: Rest of Orange Free State 1995 WVS C No 
South Africa Transvaal ZA: Rest of Transvaal 1995 WVS C No 
Sweden Skåne SE: Norr 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Sweden Skåne SE: Öst 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Sweden Skåne SE: Syd 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Sweden Skåne SE: Väst 2000 EVS X048 C No 
Sweden Västra Götaland SE: Alvsborg 1990 EVS X048 C No 
Sweden Västra Götaland SE: Skaraborg 1990 EVS X048 C No 
Sweden Västra Götaland SE: Stor Göteborg och Bohus 1990; 2000 EVS X048 C No 
United 
Kingdom 
Midlands GB-GBN: East Midlands 1995; 2000 EVS X048 C No 
United 
Kingdom 
Midlands GB-GBN: West Midlands 1995; 2000 EVS X048 C No 
United 
Kingdom 






Midlands GB-GBN: East Midlands (England) – 
Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 
Midlands GB-GBN: East Midlands (England) – 
Leicestershire, Rutland and 
Northamptonshire 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 
Midlands GB-GBN: East Midlands (England) – 
Lincolnshire 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 
Midlands GB-GBN: East of England – 
Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 
Midlands GB-GBN: West Midlands (England) 
– Herefordshire, Worcestershire and 
Warwickshire 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 
Midlands GB-GBN: West Midlands (England) 
– Shropshire and Staffordshire 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 
Midlands GB-GBN: West Midlands (England) 
– West Midlands 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 
North West,GB GB-GBN: North West (England) – 
Cheshire 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 
North West,GB GB-GBN: North West (England) – 
Cumbria 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 
North West,GB GB-GBN: North West (England) – 
Greater Manchester 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 
North West,GB GB-GBN: North West (England) – 
Lancashire 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 
North West,GB GB-GBN: North West (England) – 
Merseyside 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 
Scotland GB-GBN: Scotland – Eastern 
Scotland 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 
Scotland GB-GBN: Scotland – Highlands and 
Islands 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 
Scotland GB-GBN: Scotland – South Western 
Scotland 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 






South East w/ London GB-GBN: South East 2000 EVS X048 C No 
United 
Kingdom 
South East w/ London GB: South East 2005 WVS C No 
United 
Kingdom 
South East w/ London GB-GBN: East of England – Essex 2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 
South East w/ London GB-GBN: London – Inner London 2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 
South East w/ London GB-GBN: London – Outer London 2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 
South East w/ London GB-GBN: South East (England) – 
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and 
Oxfordshire 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 
South East w/ London GB-GBN: South East (England) – 
Hampshire and Isle of Wight 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 
South East w/ London GB-GBN: South East (England) – 
Kent 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 
South East w/ London GB-GBN: South East (England) – 
Surrey, East and West Sussex 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 
South West,GB GB-GBN: South West (England) – 
Cornwall and Isles of Scilly 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 
South West,GB GB-GBN: South West (England) – 
Devon 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 
South West,GB GB-GBN: South West (England) – 
Dorset and Somerset 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 
South West,GB GB-GBN: South West (England) – 
Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and 
Bristol/Bath area 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 
Wales GB-GBN: Wales – East Wales 2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 
Wales GB-GBN: Wales – West Wales and 
The Valleys 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 






Yorkshire GB: Yorks & Humberside 2000; 2005 WVS C No 
United 
Kingdom 
Yorkshire GB-GBN: Yorkshire and the Humber 
– East Yorkshire and Northern 
Lincolnshire 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 
Yorkshire GB-GBN: Yorkshire and the Humber 
– North Yorkshire 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 
Yorkshire GB-GBN: Yorkshire and the Humber 
– South Yorkshire 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
United 
Kingdom 
Yorkshire GB-GBN: Yorkshire and the Humber 
– West Yorkshire 
2010 EVS X048B C No 
Bangladesh Khulna BD: Jhenaidah 1999; 2005 WVS D No 
Belgium Prov. Brabant BE: Brussel 2005 EVS X048 D No 
Brazil Amazonas, MG, MG 
do Sul, Rondônia, 
Roraima 
BR: AM 2010 WVS D No 
Brazil Amazonas, MG, MG 
do Sul, Rondônia, 
Roraima 
BR: MS 2010 WVS D No 
Brazil Amazonas, MG, MG 
do Sul, Rondônia, 
Roraima 
BR: MT 2010 WVS D No 
Brazil Goiás, DF, Tocantins BR: DF 2010 WVS D No 
Brazil Goiás, DF, Tocantins BR: GO 2010 WVS D No 
China Gansu w/ Inner 
Mongolia & Ningxia 
CN: Neimenggu 2005 WVS D No 
China Gansu w/ Inner 
Mongolia & Ningxia 
CN: Ningxia Province 2010 WVS D No 
Denmark Capital region DK: Frederiksborg Amt 1985 EVS X048 D No 
Denmark Jylland DK: Danmark - Midtjylland 2010 EVS X048B D No 
Denmark Jylland DK: Danmark - Nordjylland 2010 EVS X048B D No 
Finland Etelã-Suomi w/ 
Uusimaa 




Finland Etelã-Suomi w/ 
Uusimaa 
FI: Etelä-Karjala 2000 EVS X048 D No 
Finland Etelã-Suomi w/ 
Uusimaa 
FI: Kanta-Häme 2000 EVS X048 D No 
Finland Etelã-Suomi w/ 
Uusimaa 
FI: Kymenlaakso 2000 EVS X048 D No 
Finland Etelã-Suomi w/ 
Uusimaa 
FI: Päijät-Häme 2000 EVS X048 D No 
Finland Etelã-Suomi w/ 
Uusimaa 
FI: Varsinais-Suomi 2000 EVS X048 D No 
Finland Etelã-Suomi w/ 
Uusimaa 
FI: Uusimaa 2000; 2005 EVS X048 D No 
Finland Itã-Suomi FI: Kuopion 2000 WVS D No 
Finland Itã-Suomi FI: Etelä-Savo 2000 EVS X048 D No 
Finland Itã-Suomi FI: Kainuu 2000 EVS X048 D No 
Finland Itã-Suomi FI: Pohjois-Karjala 2000 EVS X048 D No 
Finland Itã-Suomi FI: Pohjois-Savo 2000; 2005 EVS X048 D No 
Finland Pohjois-Suomi FI: Lapin 2000 WVS D No 
Finland Pohjois-Suomi FI: Keski-Pohjanmaa 2000 EVS X048 D No 
Finland Pohjois-Suomi FI: Lappi 2000 EVS X048 D No 
Finland Pohjois-Suomi FI: Pohjois-Pohjanmaa 2000; 2005 EVS X048 D No 
Finland Väli-Suomi FI: Hämeen 2000 WVS D No 
Finland Väli-Suomi FI: Keski-Suomi 2000 EVS X048 D No 
Finland Väli-Suomi FI: Pirkanmaa 2000 EVS X048 D No 
Finland Väli-Suomi FI: Pohjanmaa 2000 EVS X048 D No 
Finland Väli-Suomi FI: Satakunta 2000 EVS X048 D No 
Finland Väli-Suomi FI: Etelä-Pohjanmaa 2000; 2005 EVS X048 D No 
Finland Väli-Suomi FI: Manner-Suomi - Länsi-Suomi 2010 EVS X048B D No 
Germany, East Brandenburg DE: Cottbus 1991 EVS X048 D No 
Germany, East Brandenburg DE: Frankfurt/Oder 1991 EVS X048 D No 




Germany, East Brandenburg DE: Brandenburg - Brandenburg - 
Nordost 
2010 EVS X048B D No 
Germany, East Brandenburg DE: Brandenburg - Brandenburg-
Südwest 
2010 EVS X048B D No 
Germany, East Mecklenburg-West 
Pomerania 
DE: Neubrandenburg 1991 EVS X048 D No 
Germany, East Mecklenburg-West 
Pomerania 
DE: Rostock 1991 EVS X048 D No 
Germany, East Mecklenburg-West 
Pomerania 
DE: Schwerin 1991 EVS X048 D No 
Germany, East Saxony DE: Dresden 1991 EVS X048 D No 
Germany, East Saxony DE: Karl Marxstadt (Chemnitz) 1991 EVS X048 D No 
Germany, East Saxony DE: Leipzig 1991 EVS X048 D No 
Germany, East Saxony DE: Sachsen - Chemnitz 2010 EVS X048B D No 
Germany, East Saxony DE: Sachsen - Dresden 2010 EVS X048B D No 
Germany, East Saxony DE: Sachsen - Leipzig 2010 EVS X048B D No 
Germany, East Saxony-Anhalt DE: Halle 1991 EVS X048 D No 
Germany, East Saxony-Anhalt DE: Magdeburg 1991 EVS X048 D No 
Germany, East Thuringia DE: Erfurt 1991 EVS X048 D No 
Germany, East Thuringia DE: Gera 1991 EVS X048 D No 
Germany, East Thuringia DE: Suhl 1991 EVS X048 D No 
Germany, 
West 
Baden-Wurttemberg DE: Baden-Württemberg - Freiburg 2010 EVS X048B D No 
Germany, 
West 
Baden-Wurttemberg DE: Baden-Württemberg - Karlsruhe 2010 EVS X048B D No 
Germany, 
West 
Baden-Wurttemberg DE: Baden-Württemberg - Stuttgart 2010 EVS X048B D No 
Germany, 
West 
Baden-Wurttemberg DE: Baden-Württemberg - Tübingen 2010 EVS X048B D No 
Germany, 
West 
Hesse DE: Hessen - Darmstadt 2010 EVS X048B D No 
Germany, 
West 






Hesse DE: Hessen - Kassel 2010 EVS X048B D No 
Germany, 
West 
Lower Saxony DE: Niedersachsen - Braunschweig 2010 EVS X048B D No 
Germany, 
West 
Lower Saxony DE: Niedersachsen - Hannover 2010 EVS X048B D No 
Germany, 
West 
Lower Saxony DE: Niedersachsen - Lüneburg 2010 EVS X048B D No 
Germany, 
West 















DE: Nordrhein-Westfalen - 
Düsseldorf 










DE: Nordrhein-Westfalen - Münster 2010 EVS X048B D No 
Germany, 
West 
Rhineland-Palatinate DE: Rheinland-Pfalz - Koblenz 2010 EVS X048B D No 
Germany, 
West 
Rhineland-Palatinate DE: Rheinland-Pfalz - Rheinhessen-
Pfalz 
2010 EVS X048B D No 
Ireland South-East IE: Carlow 1991 EVS X048 D No 
Ireland South-East IE: Waterford City 1991 EVS X048 D No 
Ireland South-East IE: Waterford County 1991 EVS X048 D No 
Ireland South-East IE: Wexford 1991 EVS X048 D No 
Korea, Rep. Jeollanam-do w/ 
Gwangju 
KR: Jeonnam / South Jeolla 2000; 2005; 2010 WVS D No 
Latvia Rîgas rajons LV: Jurmala 2000 WVS D No 
Macedonia East MK: Bregalnicki 2000; 2005 WVS D No 
Macedonia Southwest MK: Ohridski 2000; 2005 WVS D No 




Morocco Central,MOR MA: Boukkala Abda 2010 WVS D No 
Morocco North-Central MA: Fès Boulemane 2005; 2010 WVS D No 
Morocco Northwestern MA: Gharb Chrarda 2005; 2010 WVS D No 
Morocco South-Central MA: Meknès Tafilalet 2005; 2010 WVS D No 
Nigeria North East NG: Maduguri 1992 WVS D No 
Nigeria North West,NG NG: Kaduna 1992 WVS D No 
Nigeria North West,NG NG: Kano 1992 WVS D No 
Nigeria North West,NG NG: Zaria 1992 WVS D No 
Nigeria South East NG: Enuou 1992 WVS D No 
Nigeria South East NG: Owerri 1992 WVS D No 
Nigeria South West,NG NG: Lagos 1992; 2008 WVS D No 
Peru Ancash PE: Chimbote 2001 WVS D No 
Peru Junín PE: Huancayo 2001 WVS D No 
Peru La Libertad,PER PE: Trujillo 2001 WVS D No 
Peru Lambayeque PE: Chiclayo 2001 WVS D No 
Peru Loreto w/ Ucayali PE: Iquitos 2001 WVS D No 
Peru Puno PE: Juliaca 2001 WVS D No 
Poland Dolnoslaskie PL: Wroclawskie 1990 EVS X048 D No 
Poland Kujawsko-Pomorskie PL: Bydgoskie 1990 EVS X048 D No 
Poland Lódzkie PL: Piotrkowskie 1990 EVS X048 D No 
Poland Lubelskie PL: Bialskopodlaskie 1990 EVS X048 D No 
Poland Malopolskie PL: Krakowskie 1990 EVS X048 D No 
Poland Mazowieckie PL: Ciechanowskie 1990 EVS X048 D No 
Poland Podlaskie PL: Suwalskie 1990 EVS X048 D No 
Poland Pomorskie-
Zachodniopomorskie 
PL: Szczecinskie 1990 EVS X048 D No 
Poland Slaskie PL: Bielskie 1990 EVS X048 D No 
Poland Swietokrzyskie PL: Kielecki 1990 EVS X048 D No 




Poland Wielkopolskie PL: Poznanskie 1990 EVS X048 D No 
Portugal Norte PT: Grande Porto 1990 EVS X048 D No 
Portugal Norte PT: Interior Norte 1990 EVS X048 D No 
Portugal Norte PT: Litoral Norte 1990 EVS X048 D No 
Slovenia Jugovzhodna Slovenija SI: Dolensjka 1995; 2000 EVS X048 D No 
Slovenia Obalno-kraska SI: Primorska 2000 EVS X048 D No 
South Africa Cape Province ZA: Cape Town 1995 WVS D No 
South Africa Cape Province ZA: East London 1995 WVS D No 
South Africa Cape Province ZA: Kimberly 1995 WVS D No 
South Africa Cape Province ZA: Rest of Cape Providence 1995 WVS D No 
South Africa Cape Province ZA: Eastern Cape 2000; 2005; 2010 WVS D No 
South Africa Cape Province ZA: Northern Cape 2000; 2005; 2010 WVS D No 
South Africa Cape Province ZA: Western Cape 2000; 2005; 2010 WVS D No 
South Africa Transvaal ZA: Johannesburg 1995 WVS D No 
South Africa Transvaal ZA: Pretoria 1995 WVS D No 
South Africa Transvaal ZA: Reaf/Vaal 1995 WVS D No 
South Africa Transvaal ZA: Gauteng 2000; 2005; 2010 WVS D No 
South Africa Transvaal ZA: Mpumalanga 2000; 2005; 2010 WVS D No 
South Africa Transvaal ZA: North West 2000; 2005; 2010 WVS D No 
South Africa Transvaal ZA: Northern Province/Limpopo 2000; 2005; 2010 WVS D No 
Sweden Örebro SE: Kopparberg 1990 EVS X048 D No 
Sweden Skåne SE: Kristianstad 1990 EVS X048 D No 
Sweden Skåne SE: Malmohus 1990 EVS X048 D No 
Sweden Skåne SE: Öresund 2000 EVS X048 D No 
Turkey Adana, Gaziantep TR: Adana 1990; 2000 WVS D No 
Turkey Adana, Gaziantep TR: Gaziantep (southeast) 2000 EVS X048 D No 
Turkey Bursa, Istanbul, 
Kocaeli 
TR: Bursa 1990; 2000 WVS D No 
Turkey Bursa, Istanbul, 
Kocaeli 






North GB-GBN: North East 1995; 2000 EVS X048 D No 
United 
Kingdom 
North GB-GBN: North East (England) – 
Northumberland and Tyne and Wear 
2010 EVS X048B D No 
United 
Kingdom 
North GB-GBN: North East (England) – 
Tees Valley and Durham 
2010 EVS X048B D No 
United 
Kingdom 
South East w/ London GB-GBN: Home 
countries/Kent/Sussex 
1995 EVS X048 D No 
United 
Kingdom 
South East w/ London GB-GBN: South 1995 EVS X048 D No 
Albania Fleri AL: Albania – South-Albania 2009 EVS X048B E No 
Australia Capital Territory AU: New South Wales and ACT 
(NSW&ACT) 
1995 WVS E Yes 
Australia New South Wales AU: New South Wales and ACT 
(NSW&ACT) 
1995 WVS E No 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Bosansko-podrinjski k. BA: Bosna i Hercegovina - Federacija 
Bosne i Hercegovine 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Herceg-bosanski k. BA: Bosna i Hercegovina - Federacija 
Bosne i Hercegovine 





BA: Bosna i Hercegovina - Federacija 
Bosne i Hercegovine 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Posavski k. BA: Bosna i Hercegovina - Federacija 
Bosne i Hercegovine 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Sarajevski k. BA: Bosna i Hercegovina - Federacija 
Bosne i Hercegovine 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Srednjo-bosanski k. BA: Bosna i Hercegovina - Federacija 
Bosne i Hercegovine 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Tuzlanski k. BA: Bosna i Hercegovina - Federacija 
Bosne i Hercegovine 
2010 EVS X048B E No 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Unsko-sanski k. BA: Bosna i Hercegovina - Federacija 
Bosne i Hercegovine 








BA: Bosna i Hercegovina - Federacija 
Bosne i Hercegovine 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Zenicko-dobojski k. BA: Bosna i Hercegovina - Federacija 
Bosne i Hercegovine 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Brazil Amazonas, MG, MG 
do Sul, Rondônia, 
Roraima 
BR: Northwest 1995 WVS E No 
Bulgaria Blagoevgrad BG: Sofia-province 1995; 2005 EVS X048 E Yes 
Bulgaria Blagoevgrad BG: Yugozapadna i yuzhna tsentralna 
Bulgaria - Yugozapaden 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Bulgaria Burgas BG: Severna i iztochna Bulgaria - 
Yugoiztochen 
2010 EVS X048B E No 
Bulgaria Dobrich BG: Varienska - Province of 
Varienska - 
1995 EVS X048 E Yes 
Bulgaria Dobrich BG: Varna 2005 WVS E Yes 
Bulgaria Dobrich BG: Severna i iztochna Bulgaria - 
Severoiztochen 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Bulgaria Gabrovo BG: Loveschka 1995; 2005 EVS X048 E Yes 
Bulgaria Gabrovo BG: Severna i iztochna Bulgaria - 
Severen tsentralen 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Bulgaria Haskovo BG: Xaskovska 1995 EVS X048 E Yes 
Bulgaria Haskovo BG: Yugozapadna i yuzhna tsentralna 
Bulgaria - Yuzhen tsentralen 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Bulgaria Karzhali BG: Xaskovska 1995 EVS X048 E Yes 
Bulgaria Karzhali BG: Haskovo 2005 WVS E Yes 
Bulgaria Karzhali BG: Yugozapadna i yuzhna tsentralna 
Bulgaria - Yuzhen tsentralen 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Bulgaria Kyustendil BG: Sofia-province 1995; 2005 EVS X048 E Yes 
Bulgaria Kyustendil BG: Yugozapadna i yuzhna tsentralna 
Bulgaria - Yugozapaden 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 




Bulgaria Lovech BG: Severna i iztochna Bulgaria - 
Severozapaden 
2010 EVS X048B E No 
Bulgaria Montana,BUL BG: Mikchailovgradska 1995 EVS X048 E No 
Bulgaria Montana,BUL BG: Severna i iztochna Bulgaria - 
Severozapaden 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Bulgaria Pazardzhik BG: Plovdiv 1995; 2005 EVS X048 E Yes 
Bulgaria Pazardzhik BG: Yugozapadna i yuzhna tsentralna 
Bulgaria - Yuzhen tsentralen 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Bulgaria Pernik BG: Sofia-province 1995; 2005 EVS X048 E Yes 
Bulgaria Pernik BG: Yugozapadna i yuzhna tsentralna 
Bulgaria - Yugozapaden 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Bulgaria Pleven BG: Loveschka 1995; 2005 EVS X048 E Yes 
Bulgaria Pleven BG: Severna i iztochna Bulgaria - 
Severozapaden 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Bulgaria Plovdiv BG: Yugozapadna i yuzhna tsentralna 
Bulgaria - Yuzhen tsentralen 
2010 EVS X048B E No 
Bulgaria Razgrad BG: Razgradska - Province of 
Razgradska - 
1995 EVS X048 E No 
Bulgaria Razgrad BG: Severna i iztochna Bulgaria - 
Severen tsentralen 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Bulgaria Ruse BG: Severna i iztochna Bulgaria - 
Severen tsentralen 
2010 EVS X048B E No 
Bulgaria Ruse BG: Razgradska - Province of 
Razgradska - 
1995 EVS X048 E Yes 
Bulgaria Shumen BG: Varienska - Province of 
Varienska - 
1995 EVS X048 E Yes 
Bulgaria Shumen BG: Varna 2005 WVS E Yes 
Bulgaria Shumen BG: Severna i iztochna Bulgaria - 
Severoiztochen 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Bulgaria Silistra BG: Razgradska - Province of 
Razgradska - 
1995 EVS X048 E Yes 
Bulgaria Silistra BG: Severna i iztochna Bulgaria - 
Severen tsentralen 




Bulgaria Sliven BG: Burgaska - province of Burgaska 
- 
1995; 2000; 2005 EVS X048 E Yes 
Bulgaria Sliven BG: Severna i iztochna Bulgaria - 
Yugoiztochen 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Bulgaria Smolyan BG: Plovdiv 1995; 2005 EVS X048 E Yes 
Bulgaria Smolyan BG: Yugozapadna i yuzhna tsentralna 
Bulgaria - Yuzhen tsentralen 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Bulgaria Sofia BG: Yugozapadna i yuzhna tsentralna 
Bulgaria - Yugozapaden 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Bulgaria Sofia Stolitsa BG: Yugozapadna i yuzhna tsentralna 
Bulgaria - Yugozapaden 
2010 EVS X048B E No 
Bulgaria Stara Zagora BG: Xaskovska 1995 EVS X048 E No 
Bulgaria Stara Zagora BG: Haskovo 2005 WVS E Yes 
Bulgaria Stara Zagora BG: Severna i iztochna Bulgaria - 
Yugoiztochen 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Bulgaria Targovishte BG: Razgradska - Province of 
Razgradska - 
1995 EVS X048 E Yes 
Bulgaria Targovishte BG: Severna i iztochna Bulgaria - 
Severoiztochen 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Bulgaria Varna BG: Varienska - Province of 
Varienska - 
1995 EVS X048 E No 
Bulgaria Varna BG: Severna i iztochna Bulgaria - 
Severoiztochen 
2010 EVS X048B E No 
Bulgaria Veliko Tarnovo BG: Loveschka 1995; 2005 EVS X048 E Yes 
Bulgaria Veliko Tarnovo BG: Severna i iztochna Bulgaria - 
Severen tsentralen 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Bulgaria Vidin BG: Mikchailovgradska 1995 EVS X048 E Yes 
Bulgaria Vidin BG: Montana 2005 WVS E Yes 
Bulgaria Vidin BG: Severna i iztochna Bulgaria - 
Severozapaden 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Bulgaria Vratsa BG: Mikchailovgradska 1995 EVS X048 E Yes 




Bulgaria Vratsa BG: Severna i iztochna Bulgaria - 
Severozapaden 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Bulgaria Yambol BG: Burgaska - province of Burgaska 
- 
1995; 2005 EVS X048 E Yes 
Bulgaria Yambol BG: Severna i iztochna Bulgaria - 
Yugoiztochen 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Colombia Caqueta CO: Amazonia 2005 WVS E No 
Croatia Bjelovar-Bilogora HR: Hrvatska - Sredisnja i Istocna 
(Panonska) Hrvatska 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Croatia Brod-Posavina HR: Hrvatska - Sredisnja i Istocna 
(Panonska) Hrvatska 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Croatia City of Zagreb HR: Hrvatska - Sjeverozapadna 
Hrvatska 
2010 EVS X048B E No 
Croatia Dubrovnik-Neretva HR: Hrvatska - Jadranska Hrvatska 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Croatia Istria HR: Hrvatska - Jadranska Hrvatska 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Croatia Karlovac HR: Hrvatska - Sredisnja i Istocna 
(Panonska) Hrvatska 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Croatia Koprivnica-Križevci HR: Hrvatska - Sjeverozapadna 
Hrvatska 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Croatia Krapina-Zagorje HR: Hrvatska - Sjeverozapadna 
Hrvatska 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Croatia Lika-Senj HR: Hrvatska - Jadranska Hrvatska 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Croatia Medimurje HR: Hrvatska - Sjeverozapadna 
Hrvatska 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Croatia Osijek-Baranja HR: Hrvatska - Sredisnja i Istocna 
(Panonska) Hrvatska 
2010 EVS X048B E No 
Croatia Požega-Slavonia HR: Hrvatska - Sredisnja i Istocna 
(Panonska) Hrvatska 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Croatia Primorje-Gorski Kotar HR: Hrvatska - Jadranska Hrvatska 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Croatia Šibenik-Knin HR: Hrvatska - Jadranska Hrvatska 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Croatia Sisak-Moslavina HR: Hrvatska - Sredisnja i Istocna 
(Panonska) Hrvatska 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 




Croatia Varaždin HR: Hrvatska - Sjeverozapadna 
Hrvatska 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Croatia Virovitica-Podravina HR: Hrvatska - Sredisnja i Istocna 
(Panonska) Hrvatska 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Croatia Vukovar-Syrmia HR: Hrvatska - Sredisnja i Istocna 
(Panonska) Hrvatska 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Croatia Zadar HR: Hrvatska - Jadranska Hrvatska 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Croatia Zagreb County HR: Hrvatska - Sjeverozapadna 
Hrvatska 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Czech 
Republic 
Jihocecký kraj CZ: Ceska Republika - Jihozapad 2010 EVS X048B E No 
Czech 
Republic 
Jihomoravský kraj CZ: Ceska Republika - Jihovychod 2010 EVS X048B E No 
Czech 
Republic 
Karlovarský kraj CZ: Západoèeský kraj - West 
Bohemia - 
1995; 2000; 2005 WVS E Yes 
Czech 
Republic 
Karlovarský kraj CZ: Ceska Republika - Severozapad 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Czech 
Republic 
Kraj Vysocina CZ: Ceska Republika - Jihovychod 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Czech 
Republic 
Královéhradecký kraj CZ: Východoèeský kraj - East 
Bohemia - 
1995; 2000 WVS E No 
Czech 
Republic 
Královéhradecký kraj CZ: Ceska Republika - Severovychod 2010 EVS X048B E No 
Czech 
Republic 
Liberecký kraj CZ: Severoèeský kraj - North 
Bohemia - 
1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Czech 
Republic 
Liberecký kraj CZ: Ceska Republika - Severovychod 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Czech 
Republic 
Olomoucký kraj CZ: Severomoravský kraj - North 
Moravia - 
1995; 2000; 2005 WVS E Yes 
Czech 
Republic 
Olomoucký kraj CZ: Ceska Republika - Stredni 
Morava 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Czech 
Republic 
Pardubický kraj CZ: Východoèeský kraj - East 
Bohemia - 
1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Czech 
Republic 






Plzenský kraj CZ: Západoèeský kraj - West 
Bohemia - 
1995; 2000 WVS E No 
Czech 
Republic 
Plzenský kraj CZ: Ceska Republika - Jihozapad 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Czech 
Republic 
Ústecký kraj CZ: Severoèeský kraj - North 
Bohemia - 
1995; 2000; 2005 WVS E No 
Czech 
Republic 
Ústecký kraj CZ: Ceska Republika - Severozapad 2010 EVS X048B E No 
Czech 
Republic 
Zlínský kraj CZ: Severomoravský kraj - North 
Moravia - 
1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Czech 
Republic 
Zlínský kraj CZ: Ceska Republika - Stredni 
Morava 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Denmark Bornholm DK: Danmark - Hovedstaden 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Denmark Fyn DK: Danmark - Syddanmark 2010 EVS X048B E No 
Denmark Østsjælland & Vest- 
og Sydsjælland 
DK: Danmark- Sjælland 2010 EVS X048B E No 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
Ismailia EG: Canal zone 2007 WVS E No 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
Suez EG: Canal zone 2007 WVS E Yes 
France Alsace FR: Est 1990; 2000 EVS X048 E Yes 
France Aquitaine FR: Sud Ouest 1990; 2000 EVS X048 E No 
France Auvergne FR: Sud Est 1990 EVS X048 E Yes 
France Auvergne FR: Centre Est 2000 EVS X048 E Yes 
France Basse-Normandie FR: Bassin Parisien 1990; 2000 EVS X048 E Yes 
France Bourgogne FR: Bassin Parisien 1990; 2000 EVS X048 E Yes 
France Bretagne FR: Ouest 1990; 2000 EVS X048 E Yes 
France Centre FR: Bassin Parisien 1990; 2000 EVS X048 E No 
France Champagne-Ardenne FR: Bassin Parisien 1990; 2000 EVS X048 E Yes 
France Franche-Comté FR: Est 1990; 2000 EVS X048 E Yes 
France Haute-Normandie FR: Bassin Parisien 1990; 2000 EVS X048 E Yes 




France Limousin FR: Sud Ouest 1990; 2000 EVS X048 E Yes 
France Lorraine FR: Est 1990; 2000 EVS X048 E No 
France Midi-Pyrénées FR: Sud Ouest 1990; 2000 EVS X048 E Yes 
France Nord - Pas-de-Calais FR: Nord 1990; 2000 EVS X048 E No 
France Pays de la Loire FR: Ouest 1990; 2000 EVS X048 E No 
France Picardie FR: Bassin Parisien 1990; 2000 EVS X048 E Yes 
France Poitou-Charentes FR: Ouest 1990; 2000 EVS X048 E Yes 
France Provence-Côte d'Azur-
Corse 
FR: Méditerranée 1990; 2000 EVS X048 E No 
France Rhône-Alpes FR: Sud Est 1990 EVS X048 E No 
France Rhône-Alpes FR: Centre Est 2000 EVS X048 E No 
Guatemala Alta Verapaz GT: Oriente/Izabal/Verapaces 2005 WVS E No 
Guatemala Baja Verapaz GT: Oriente/Izabal/Verapaces 2005 WVS E Yes 
Guatemala Izabal GT: Oriente/Izabal/Verapaces 2005 WVS E Yes 
Hungary Gyor-M-S HU: Dunántúl - Nyugat-Dunántúl 2010 EVS X048B E No 
Ireland Border IE: Ireland - Border, Midland and 
Western 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Ireland Mid-East w/ Dublin IE: Ireland - Southern and Eastern 2010 EVS X048B E No 
Ireland Midland IE: Ireland - Border, Midland and 
Western 
2010 EVS X048B E No 
Ireland South-East IE: Ireland - Southern and Eastern 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Ireland South-West IE: Ireland - Southern and Eastern 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Ireland West IE: Ireland - Border, Midland and 
Western 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Japan Aichi JP: Chubu,Hokuriku 1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E No 
Japan Akita JP: Hokkaido/Tohoku 1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Aomori JP: Hokkaido/Tohoku 1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Chiba JP: Kanto 1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 




Japan Ehime JP: 
Chugoku,Shikoku,Kyushu,Okinawa 
1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Fukui JP: Chubu,Hokuriku 1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Fukuoka JP: 
Chugoku,Shikoku,Kyushu,Okinawa 
1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E No 
Japan Fukushima JP: Hokkaido/Tohoku 1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Gifu JP: Chubu,Hokuriku 1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Gumma JP: Kanto 1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Hiroshima JP: 
Chugoku,Shikoku,Kyushu,Okinawa 
1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Hokkaido JP: Hokkaido/Tohoku 1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E No 
Japan Hyogo JP: Kinki 1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Ibaraki JP: Kanto 1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Ishikawa JP: Chubu,Hokuriku 1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Iwate JP: Hokkaido/Tohoku 1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Kagawa JP: 
Chugoku,Shikoku,Kyushu,Okinawa 
1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Kagoshima JP: 
Chugoku,Shikoku,Kyushu,Okinawa 
1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Kanagawa JP: Kanto 1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Kochi JP: 
Chugoku,Shikoku,Kyushu,Okinawa 
1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Kumamoto JP: 
Chugoku,Shikoku,Kyushu,Okinawa 
1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 




Japan Kyoto JP: Kinki 1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Mie JP: Kinki 1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Miyagi JP: Hokkaido/Tohoku 1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Miyazaki JP: 
Chugoku,Shikoku,Kyushu,Okinawa 
1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Nagano JP: Chubu,Hokuriku 1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Nagasaki JP: 
Chugoku,Shikoku,Kyushu,Okinawa 
1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Nara JP: Kinki 1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Niigata JP: Chubu,Hokuriku 1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Oita JP: 
Chugoku,Shikoku,Kyushu,Okinawa 
1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Okayama JP: 
Chugoku,Shikoku,Kyushu,Okinawa 
1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Okinawa JP: 
Chugoku,Shikoku,Kyushu,Okinawa 
2000; 2005 WVS E Yes 
Japan Osaka JP: Kinki 1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Saga JP: 
Chugoku,Shikoku,Kyushu,Okinawa 
1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Saitama JP: Kanto 1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Shiga JP: Kinki 1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Shimane JP: 
Chugoku,Shikoku,Kyushu,Okinawa 
1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Shizuoka JP: Chubu,Hokuriku 1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 




Japan Tochigi JP: Kanto 1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Tokushima JP: 
Chugoku,Shikoku,Kyushu,Okinawa 
1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Tokyo JP: Kanto 1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E No 
Japan Tottori JP: 
Chugoku,Shikoku,Kyushu,Okinawa 
1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Toyama JP: Chubu,Hokuriku 1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Wakayama JP: Kinki 1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Yamagata JP: Hokkaido/Tohoku 1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Yamaguchi JP: 
Chugoku,Shikoku,Kyushu,Okinawa 
1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Japan Yamanashi JP: Chubu,Hokuriku 1985; 1990; 1995; 
2000; 2005 
WVS E Yes 
Korea, Rep. Chungbuk KR: Chungchong Do 1990 WVS E Yes 
Korea, Rep. Chungnam w/ Daejeon KR: Chungchong Do 1990 WVS E No 
Nigeria South East NG: East 2008 WVS E No 
Norway Akershus NO: Oslo and Akershus 2010 WVS E Yes 
Norway Aust-Agder NO: Agder and Rogaland 2010 WVS E Yes 
Norway Buskerud NO: South Eastern Norway 2010 WVS E Yes 
Norway Hedmark NO: Hedmark and Oppland 2010 WVS E No 
Norway Hordaland NO: Western Norway 2010 WVS E No 
Norway Møre og Romsdal NO: Western Norway 2010 WVS E Yes 
Norway Nord-Trøndelag NO: Trøndelag 2010 WVS E Yes 
Norway Oppland NO: Hedmark and Oppland 2010 WVS E Yes 
Norway Oslo NO: Oslo and Akershus 2010 WVS E No 
Norway Østfold NO: South Eastern Norway 2010 WVS E No 




Norway Sogn og Fjordane NO: Western Norway 2010 WVS E Yes 
Norway Sør-Trøndelag NO: Trøndelag 2010 WVS E No 
Norway Telemark NO: South Eastern Norway 2010 WVS E Yes 
Norway Vest-Agder NO: Agder and Rogaland 2010 WVS E Yes 
Norway Vestfold NO: South Eastern Norway 2010 WVS E Yes 
Philippines Central Visayas PH: VISAYAS 1997; 2006 WVS E Yes 
Philippines Eastern Visayas PH: VISAYAS 1997; 2006 WVS E Yes 
Philippines Tagalog, Luzon, W. 
Visayas 
PH: VISAYAS 1997; 2006; 2010 WVS E No 
Portugal Lisboa PT: Lisbon & Tagus Valley (Grande 
Lisboa) 
1990; 2000 EVS X048 E No 
Portugal Lisboa PT: Vale de tejo 1995 EVS X048 E No 
Romania Bucuresti [Bucharest] RO: Macroregiunea trei - Bucuresti-
Ilfov 
2010 EVS X048B E No 
Russian 
Federation 
Altai Republic RU: Western Siberia 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Altai Territory RU: Western Siberia 1995; 2000 WVS E No 
Russian 
Federation 
Amur Region RU: Far East 1995; 2000; 2010 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Arkhangelsk Region RU: Northern 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Astrakhan Region RU: Volga 2000 EVS X048 E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Astrakhan Region RU: Volga; Povolzskij 1995; 2010 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Belgorod Region RU: Central Black Earth 2000 EVS X048 E No 
Russian 
Federation 
Belgorod Region RU: Central 1995; 2010 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Bryansk Region RU: Central 1995; 2000; 2010 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 








RU: Far East 1995; 2000; 2010 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Chuvash Republic RU: Volgo-Vyatki 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Irkutsk Region RU: Eastern Siberia 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 





RU: Far East 1995; 2000; 2010 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Kabardino-Balkaria RU: North Caucasus 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Kaluga Region RU: Central 1995; 2000; 2010 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 





RU: North Caucasus 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Kemerovo Region RU: Western Siberia 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Khabarovsk Territory RU: Far East 1995; 2000; 2010 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Kirov Region RU: Volgo-Vyatki 1995; 2000 WVS E No 
Russian 
Federation 
Kostroma Region RU: Central 1995; 2000; 2010 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Krasnodar Region RU: North Caucasus 1995; 2000 WVS E No 
Russian 
Federation 
Krasnodar Region RU: South 2010 WVS E No 
Russian 
Federation 
Krasnoyarsk Territory RU: Eastern Siberia 1995; 2000 WVS E No 
Russian 
Federation 






Kursk Region RU: Central Black Earth 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Leningrad Region RU: North-Western 1995; 2000; 2010 WVS E No 
Russian 
Federation 
Leningrad Region RU: North West federal district 2010 EVS X048B E No 
Russian 
Federation 
Lipetsk Region RU: Central Black Earth 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Magadan Region RU: Far East 1995; 2000; 2010 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 





RU: Volgo-Vyatki 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Novgorod Region RU: North-Western 1995; 2000; 2010 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Novosibirsk Region RU: Western Siberia 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Omsk Region RU: Western Siberia 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Orel Region RU: Central 1995; 2000; 2010 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Orenburg Region RU: Urals 1995; 2000; 2010 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Penza Region RU: Volga 2000 EVS X048 E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Penza Region RU: Volga; Povolzskij 1995; 2010 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Perm RU: Volga; Povolzskij 2010 WVS E No 
Russian 
Federation 
Perm RU: Urals 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 






Primorsky Krai RU: Far East federal district 2010 EVS X048B E No 
Russian 
Federation 
Pskov Region RU: North-Western 1995; 2000; 2010 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 





RU: Urals 1995; 2000; 2010 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Republic of Buryatia RU: Eastern Siberia 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Republic of Dagestan RU: North Caucasus 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Republic of Ingushetia RU: North Caucasus 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Republic of Kalmykia RU: Volga 2000 EVS X048 E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Republic of Kalmykia RU: Volga; Povolzskij 1995; 2010 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Republic of Karelia RU: Northern 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Republic of Khakassia RU: Eastern Siberia 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Republic of Komi RU: Northern 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Republic of Mari El RU: Volgo-Vyatki 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Republic of Mordovia RU: Volgo-Vyatki 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Republic of North 
Ossetia-Alania 
RU: North Caucasus 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Republic of Sakha 
(Yakutia) 
RU: Far East 1995; 2000; 2010 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 






Republic of Tatarstan RU: Volga; Povolzskij 1995; 2010 WVS E No 
Russian 
Federation 
Republic of Tatarstan RU: Privolzhsky federal district 2010 EVS X048B E No 
Russian 
Federation 
Republic of Tyva RU: Eastern Siberia 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Rostov Region RU: North Caucasus 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Ryazan Region RU: Central 1995; 2000; 2010 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Sakhalin Region RU: Far East 1995; 2000; 2010 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Samara Region RU: Volga 2000 EVS X048 E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Samara Region RU: Volga; Povolzskij 1995; 2010 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Saratov Region RU: Volga 2000 EVS X048 E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Saratov Region RU: Volga; Povolzskij 1995; 2010 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Smolensk Region RU: Central 1995; 2000; 2010 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Stavropol Territory RU: South Federal district 2010 EVS X048B E No 
Russian 
Federation 
Stavropol Territory RU: South 2010 WVS E No 
Russian 
Federation 
Stavropol Territory RU: North Caucasus 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Sverdlovsk Region RU: Urals 1995; 2000; 2010 WVS E No 
Russian 
Federation 
Sverdlovsk Region RU: Siberian federal district 2010 EVS X048B E No 
Russian 
Federation 






Tomsk Region RU: Western Siberia 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Trans-Baikal Territory RU: Far East 2010 WVS E No 
Russian 
Federation 
Tula Region RU: Central 1995; 2000; 2010 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Tver Region RU: Central 1995; 2000; 2010 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Tyumen Region RU: Western Siberia 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Udmurt Republic RU: Urals 1995; 2000; 2010 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Ulyanovsk Region RU: Volga 2000 EVS X048 E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Ulyanovsk Region RU: Volga; Povolzskij 1995; 2010 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Vladimir Region RU: Central 1995; 2000; 2010 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Volgograd Region RU: Volga 2000 EVS X048 E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Volgograd Region RU: Volga; Povolzskij 1995; 2010 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Vologda Region RU: North-Western 2010 WVS E No 
Russian 
Federation 
Vologda Region RU: Northern 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Voronezh Region RU: Central Black Earth 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Russian 
Federation 
Yaroslavl Region RU: Central 1995; 2000; 2010 WVS E Yes 
Serbia Borski CS: Central Serbia 2002 WVS E Yes 
Serbia Branicevski CS: Central Serbia 2002 WVS E Yes 
Serbia Jablanicki CS: Central Serbia 2002 WVS E Yes 




Serbia Juzno–banatski CS: Vojvodina 2002 WVS E Yes 
Serbia Kolubarski CS: Central Serbia 2002 WVS E Yes 
Serbia Macvanski CS: Central Serbia 2002 WVS E Yes 
Serbia Moravski CS: Central Serbia 2002 WVS E Yes 
Serbia Nisavski CS: Central Serbia 2002 WVS E No 
Serbia Pcinjski CS: Central Serbia 2002 WVS E Yes 
Serbia Pirotski CS: Central Serbia 2002 WVS E Yes 
Serbia Podunavski CS: Central Serbia 2002 WVS E Yes 
Serbia Pomoravski CS: Central Serbia 2002 WVS E Yes 
Serbia Rasinski CS: Central Serbia 2002 WVS E Yes 
Serbia Raski CS: Central Serbia 2002 WVS E Yes 
Serbia Severno–backi CS: Vojvodina 2002 WVS E Yes 
Serbia Severno–banatski CS: Vojvodina 2002 WVS E Yes 
Serbia Srednje–banatski CS: Vojvodina 2002 WVS E Yes 
Serbia Sremski CS: Vojvodina 2002 WVS E Yes 
Serbia Sumadijski CS: Central Serbia 2002 WVS E Yes 
Serbia Toplicki CS: Central Serbia 2002 WVS E Yes 
Serbia Zajecarski CS: Central Serbia 2002 WVS E Yes 
Serbia Zapadno–backi CS: Vojvodina 2002 WVS E Yes 
Serbia Zlatiborski CS: Central Serbia 2002 WVS E Yes 
Slovak 
Republic 
Banskobystrický kraj SK: Central Slovakia 1995; 2005 WVS E Yes 
Slovak 
Republic 
Banskobystrický kraj SK: Slovenská Republika - Stredné 
Slovensko 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Slovak 
Republic 
Kosický kraj SK: Eastern Slovakia 1995 WVS E Yes 
Slovak 
Republic 
Kosický kraj SK: Slovenská Republika - Východné 
Slovensko 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Slovak 
Republic 






Nitriansky kraj SK: Slovenská Republika - Západné 
Slovensko 
2010 EVS X048B E No 
Slovak 
Republic 
Presovský kraj SK: Eastern Slovakia 1995; 2005 WVS E No 
Slovak 
Republic 
Presovský kraj SK: Slovenská Republika - Východné 
Slovensko 
2010 EVS X048B E No 
Slovak 
Republic 
Trenciansky kraj SK: West Slovakia 1995 WVS E Yes 
Slovak 
Republic 
Trenciansky kraj SK: Slovenská Republika - Západné 
Slovensko 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Slovak 
Republic 
Trnavský kraj SK: West Slovakia 1995 WVS E Yes 
Slovak 
Republic 
Trnavský kraj SK: Slovenská Republika - Západné 
Slovensko 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Slovak 
Republic 
Zilinský kraj SK: Central Slovakia 1995 WVS E No 
Slovak 
Republic 
Zilinský kraj SK: Northern Slovakia 2005 WVS E No 
Slovak 
Republic 
Zilinský kraj SK: Slovenská Republika - Stredné 
Slovensko 
2010 EVS X048B E No 
Spain Álava ES: Pais Vasco 1990; 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Spain Álava ES: Noreste - País Vasco 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Spain Albacete ES: Castilla-Mancha 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
WVS E Yes 
Spain Alicante/Alacant ES: C Valenciana 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
WVS E Yes 
Spain Almería ES: Andalucia 1990; 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Spain Almería ES: Sur - Andalucía 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Spain Ávila ES: Castilla Leon 1990; 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Spain Ávila ES: Centro - Castilla y León 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Spain Badajoz ES: Extremadura 1990; 1995; 2000 WVS E No 
Spain Badajoz ES: Centro - Extremadura 2010 EVS X048B E No 




Spain Barcelona ES: Este - Cataluña 2010 EVS X048B E No 
Spain Burgos ES: Castilla Leon 1990; 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Spain Burgos ES: Centro - Castilla y León 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Spain Cáceres ES: Extremadura 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
WVS E Yes 
Spain Cádiz ES: Andalucia 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
WVS E Yes 
Spain Castellón/Castelló ES: C Valenciana 1990; 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Spain Castellón/Castelló ES: Este - Comunidad Valenciana 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Spain Ciudad Real ES: Castilla-Mancha 1990; 1995; 2000 WVS E No 
Spain Ciudad Real ES: Centro - Castilla-La Mancha 2010 EVS X048B E No 
Spain Córdoba,SP ES: Cataluna 2010 WVS E No 
Spain Córdoba,SP ES: Andalucia 1990; 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Spain Coruña (A) ES: Galicia 1990; 1995; 2000 WVS E No 
Spain Coruña (A) ES: Noroeste - Galicia 2010 EVS X048B E No 
Spain Cuenca ES: Castilla-Mancha 1990; 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Spain Cuenca ES: Centro - Castilla-La Mancha 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Spain Girona ES: Cataluna 1990; 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Spain Girona ES: Este - Cataluña 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Spain Granada ES: Andalucia 1990; 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Spain Granada ES: Sur - Andalucía 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Spain Guadalajara ES: Castilla-Mancha 1990; 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Spain Guadalajara ES: Centro - Castilla-La Mancha 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Spain Guipúzcoa ES: Pais Vasco 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
WVS E Yes 
Spain Huelva ES: Andalucia 1990; 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Spain Huelva ES: Sur - Andalucía 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Spain Huesca ES: Aragon 1990; 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Spain Huesca ES: Noreste - Aragón 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 




Spain Jaén ES: Sur - Andalucía 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Spain León ES: Castilla Leon 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
WVS E No 
Spain León ES: Centro - Castilla y León 2010 EVS X048B E No 
Spain Lleida ES: Cataluna 1990; 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Spain Lleida ES: Este - Cataluña 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Spain Lugo ES: Galicia 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
WVS E Yes 
Spain Málaga ES: Andalucia 1990; 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Spain Málaga ES: Sur - Andalucía 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Spain Ourense ES: Galicia 1990; 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Spain Ourense ES: Noroeste - Galicia 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Spain Palencia ES: Castilla Leon 1990; 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Spain Palencia ES: Centro - Castilla y León 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Spain Palmas, Las ES: Canarias 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
WVS E No 
Spain Palmas, Las ES: Canarias - Canarias 2010 EVS X048B E No 
Spain Pontevedra ES: Galicia 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
WVS E Yes 
Spain Salamanca ES: Castilla Leon 1990; 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Spain Salamanca ES: Centro - Castilla y León 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Spain Segovia ES: Castilla Leon 1990; 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Spain Segovia ES: Centro - Castilla y León 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Spain Sevilla ES: Andalucia 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
WVS E No 
Spain Sevilla ES: Sur - Andalucía 2010 EVS X048B E No 
Spain Soria ES: Castilla Leon 1990; 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Spain Soria ES: Centro - Castilla y León 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Spain Tarragona ES: Cataluna 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 




Spain Teruel ES: Aragon 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
WVS E Yes 
Spain Toledo ES: Castilla-Mancha 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
WVS E Yes 
Spain Valencia/València ES: C Valenciana 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
WVS E No 
Spain Valencia/València ES: Este - Comunidad Valenciana 2010 EVS X048B E No 
Spain Valladolid ES: Castilla Leon 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
WVS E Yes 
Spain Vizcaya ES: Pais Vasco 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2005; 2010 
WVS E No 
Spain Vizcaya ES: Noreste - País Vasco 2010 EVS X048B E No 
Spain Zamora ES: Castilla Leon 1990; 1995; 2000 WVS E Yes 
Spain Zamora ES: Centro - Castilla y León 2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Spain Zaragoza ES: Aragon 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
WVS E No 
Spain Zaragoza ES: Noreste - Aragón 2010 EVS X048B E No 
Switzerland Aargau CH: Schweiz/Suisse/Svizzera - 
Nordwestschweiz 
2010 EVS X048B E No 
Switzerland Appenzell A&I Rh. CH: Schweiz/Suisse/Svizzera - 
Ostschweiz 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Switzerland Basel-Land CH: Schweiz/Suisse/Svizzera - 
Nordwestschweiz 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Switzerland Basel-Stadt CH: Schweiz/Suisse/Svizzera - 
Nordwestschweiz 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Switzerland Bern w/ Jura CH: Schweiz/Suisse/Svizzera - 
Espace Mittelland 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Switzerland Freiburg CH: Schweiz/Suisse/Svizzera - 
Espace Mittelland 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Switzerland Genf CH: Schweiz/Suisse/Svizzera - 
Région lémanique 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Switzerland Glarus CH: Schweiz/Suisse/Svizzera - 
Ostschweiz 




Switzerland Graubünden CH: Schweiz/Suisse/Svizzera - 
Ostschweiz 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Switzerland Luzern CH: Schweiz/Suisse/Svizzera - 
Zentralschweiz 
2010 EVS X048B E No 
Switzerland Neuenburg CH: Schweiz/Suisse/Svizzera - 
Espace Mittelland 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Switzerland Nidwalden CH: Schweiz/Suisse/Svizzera - 
Zentralschweiz 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Switzerland Obwalden CH: Schweiz/Suisse/Svizzera - 
Zentralschweiz 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Switzerland Schaffhausen CH: Schweiz/Suisse/Svizzera - 
Ostschweiz 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Switzerland Schwyz CH: Schweiz/Suisse/Svizzera - 
Zentralschweiz 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Switzerland Solothurn CH: Schweiz/Suisse/Svizzera - 
Espace Mittelland 
2010 EVS X048B E No 
Switzerland St. Gallen CH: Schweiz/Suisse/Svizzera - 
Ostschweiz 
2010 EVS X048B E No 
Switzerland Thurgau CH: Schweiz/Suisse/Svizzera - 
Ostschweiz 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Switzerland Uri CH: Schweiz/Suisse/Svizzera - 
Zentralschweiz 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Switzerland Waadt CH: Schweiz/Suisse/Svizzera - 
Région lémanique 
2010 EVS X048B E No 
Switzerland Wallis CH: Schweiz/Suisse/Svizzera - 
Région lémanique 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Switzerland Zug CH: Schweiz/Suisse/Svizzera - 
Zentralschweiz 
2010 EVS X048B E Yes 
Thailand Amnat Chaeron / 
Ubon Ratchathani 
TH: The Northeast 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Ang Tong TH: The Central 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Bangkok Metropolis TH: The Central 2010 WVS E No 
Thailand Buri Ram TH: The Northeast 2010 WVS E Yes 




Thailand Chai Nat TH: The Central 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Chaiyaphum TH: The Northeast 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Chanthaburi TH: The Central 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Chian Mai TH: The North 2010 WVS E No 
Thailand Chiang Rai TH: The North 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Chon Buri TH: The Central 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Chumphon TH: The South 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Kalasin TH: The Northeast 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Kam Phaeng Phet TH: The North 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Kanchanaburi TH: The Central 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Khon Kaen TH: The Northeast 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Krabi TH: The South 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Lampang TH: The North 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Lamphun TH: The North 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Loei TH: The Northeast 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Lop Buri TH: The Central 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Mae Hong Son TH: The North 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Maha Sarakham TH: The Northeast 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Mukhadan / Nakhon 
Phanom 
TH: The Northeast 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Nakhon Nayok TH: The Central 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Nakhon Pathom TH: The Central 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Nakhon Ratchasima TH: The Northeast 2010 WVS E No 
Thailand Nakhon Sawan TH: The North 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Nakhon Si Thammarat TH: The South 2010 WVS E No 
Thailand Nan TH: The North 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Narathiwat TH: The South 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Nong Bua Lam Phu / 
Udon Thani 
TH: The Northeast 2010 WVS E Yes 




Thailand Nonthaburi TH: The Central 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Pattani TH: The South 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Phachuap Khiri Khan TH: The Central 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Phangnga TH: The South 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Phatthalung TH: The South 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Phayao TH: The North 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Phetchabun TH: The North 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Phetchaburi TH: The Central 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Phichit TH: The North 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Phitsanulok TH: The North 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Phra Nakhon Sri 
Ayuthaya 
TH: The Central 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Phrae TH: The North 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Phuket TH: The South 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Prachin Buri / Sa Kaeo TH: The Central 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Pratum Thani TH: The Central 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Ranong TH: The South 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Ratchaburi TH: The Central 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Rayong TH: The Central 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Roi Et TH: The Northeast 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Sakon Nakhon TH: The Northeast 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Samut Prakan TH: The Central 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Samut Sakhon TH: The Central 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Samut Songkhram TH: The Central 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Saraburi TH: The Central 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Satun TH: The South 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Si Sa Ket TH: The Northeast 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Singburi TH: The Central 2010 WVS E Yes 




Thailand Sukhothai TH: The North 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Suphan Buri TH: The Central 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Surat Thani TH: The South 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Surin TH: The Northeast 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Tak TH: The North 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Trang TH: The South 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Trat TH: The Central 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Uthai Thani TH: The North 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Uttaradit TH: The North 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Yala TH: The South 2010 WVS E Yes 
Thailand Yasothon TH: The Northeast 2010 WVS E Yes 
United 
Kingdom 
East Anglia GB-GBN: Eastern 1995; 2000 EVS X048 E No 
United 
Kingdom 
East Anglia GB: Eastern 2005 WVS E No 
United 
Kingdom 
Yorkshire GB-GBN: North 1995 EVS X048 E No 
United States Alabama US: East South Central 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States Arizona US: Rocky Mountain state 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States Arkansas US: West South Central 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States Colorado US: Rocky Mountain state 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E No 
United States Connecticut US: New England 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States Delaware US: South Atlantic 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States District of Columbia US: South Atlantic 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States Florida,US US: South Atlantic 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 




United States Georgia US: South Atlantic 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States Idaho US: Northwest 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States Illinois US: East North Central 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E No 
United States Indiana US: East North Central 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States Iowa US: West North Central 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States Kansas US: West North Central 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States Kentucky US: East South Central 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States Louisiana US: West South Central 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States Maine US: New England 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States Maryland US: South Atlantic 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States Massachusetts US: New England 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E No 
United States Michigan US: East North Central 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States Minnesota US: West North Central 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States Mississippi US: East South Central 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States Missouri US: West North Central 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E No 
United States Montana,US US: Rocky Mountain state 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States Nebraska US: West North Central 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 




United States Nevada US: Rocky Mountain state 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States New Hampshire US: New England 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States New Jersey US: Middle Atlantic States 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States New Mexico US: Rocky Mountain state 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States New York US: Middle Atlantic States 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E No 
United States North Carolina US: South Atlantic 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States North Dakota US: West North Central 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States Ohio US: East North Central 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States Oklahoma US: West South Central 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States Oregon US: Northwest 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States Pennsylvania US: Middle Atlantic States 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States Rhode Island US: New England 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States South Carolina US: South Atlantic 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States South Dakota US: West North Central 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States Tennessee US: East South Central 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E No 
United States Texas US: West South Central 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E No 
United States Utah US: Rocky Mountain state 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 




United States Vermont US: New England 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States Virginia US: South Atlantic 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States Washington US: Northwest 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E No 
United States West Virginia US: South Atlantic 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States Wisconsin US: East North Central 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
United States Wyoming US: Rocky Mountain state 1990; 1995; 2000; 
2010 
EVS X048 E Yes 
Vietnam An Giang VN: mekong river delta 2006 WVS E Yes 
Vietnam Bac Lieu / Ca Mau VN: mekong river delta 2006 WVS E Yes 
Vietnam Bac Ninh / Bac Giang 
/ Ha Bac 
VN: northeast 2006; 2008 WVS E No 
Vietnam Bak Kan / Thai 
Nguyen 
VN: northeast 2006 WVS E Yes 
Vietnam Ben Tre VN: mekong river delta 2006 WVS E Yes 
Vietnam Binh Dinh VN: central coast 2006 WVS E Yes 
Vietnam Binh Duong / Binh 
Phuoc 
VN: southeast 2006 WVS E Yes 
Vietnam Binh Thuan / Ninh 
Thuan 
VN: central coast 2006 WVS E Yes 
Vietnam Cao Bang VN: northeast 2006 WVS E Yes 
Vietnam Da Nam / Quang Nam VN: central coast 2000; 2006 WVS E No 
Vietnam Dak Lack VN: central highland 2000; 2006 WVS E No 
Vietnam Dong Nai / Ba Ria-
Vung Tau 
VN: southeast 2006 WVS E Yes 
Vietnam Dong Thap VN: mekong river delta 2006 WVS E Yes 
Vietnam Gia Lia / Kon Tum VN: central highland 2006 WVS E Yes 
Vietnam Ha Tinh / Nghe An VN: north central 2000; 2006 WVS E No 




Vietnam Hai Phong VN: red river delta 2006 WVS E Yes 
Vietnam Hanoi / Ha Tay VN: red river delta 2000; 2006 WVS E No 
Vietnam Ho Chi Minh City|Ho 
Chi Minh 
VN: southeast 2000; 2006 WVS E No 
Vietnam Khanh Hoa VN: central coast 2006 WVS E Yes 
Vietnam Kien Giang VN: mekong river delta 2006 WVS E Yes 
Vietnam Lam Dong VN: central highland 2006 WVS E Yes 
Vietnam Lang Son VN: northeast 2006 WVS E Yes 
Vietnam Long An VN: mekong river delta 2006 WVS E Yes 
Vietnam Phu Yen VN: central coast 2006 WVS E Yes 
Vietnam Quang Binh VN: north central 2006 WVS E Yes 
Vietnam Quang Ngai VN: central coast 2006 WVS E Yes 
Vietnam Quang Ninh VN: northeast 2006 WVS E Yes 
Vietnam Quang Tri VN: north central 2006 WVS E Yes 
Vietnam Soc Trang / Can Tho / 
Hau Gian 
VN: mekong river delta 2000; 2006 WVS E No 
Vietnam Son La VN: northwest 2006 WVS E Yes 
Vietnam Tay Ninh VN: southeast 2006 WVS E Yes 
Vietnam Thai Binh VN: red river delta 2006 WVS E Yes 
Vietnam Thanh Hoa VN: north central 2006 WVS E Yes 
Vietnam Thua Thien - Hue VN: north central 2006 WVS E Yes 
Vietnam Tien Giang VN: mekong river delta 2006 WVS E Yes 
Vietnam Tra Vinh / Vinh Long VN: mekong river delta 2006 WVS E Yes 
Vietnam Tuyen Quan / Ha Gian VN: northeast 2006 WVS E Yes 
Vietnam Yen Bai / Lao Chai / 
Lao Cai 
VN: northwest 2000; 2006 WVS E No 
Albania Berat AL: Center 2001; 2009 WVS F Yes 
Albania Dibra AL: North 2001; 2009 WVS F No 
Albania Durres AL: Center 2001; 2009 WVS F No 




Albania Gjirokastra AL: South 2001; 2009 WVS F Yes 
Albania Korca AL: South 2001; 2009 WVS F Yes 
Albania Kukes AL: North 2001; 2009 WVS F Yes 
Albania Lezha AL: North 2001; 2009 WVS F Yes 
Albania Shkoder AL: Albania – North-Albania 2009 EVS X048B F No 
Albania Shkoder AL: North 2001 WVS F Yes 
Albania Vlora AL: South 2001; 2009 WVS F No 
Brazil Acre BR: Northwest 1995 WVS F Yes 
Brazil Alagoas BR: North 1995 WVS F Yes 
Brazil Bahia BR: Southeast 1995 WVS F Yes 
Brazil Ceará BR: North 1995 WVS F Yes 
Brazil Espírito Santo BR: Southeast 1995 WVS F Yes 
Brazil Goiás, DF, Tocantins BR: Center-West 1995 WVS F No 
Brazil Maranhão BR: North 1995 WVS F Yes 
Brazil Minas Gerais BR: Southeast 1995 WVS F Yes 
Brazil Pará and Amapá BR: North 1995 WVS F Yes 
Brazil Paraíba BR: North 1995 WVS F Yes 
Brazil Paraná BR: South 1995 WVS F Yes 
Brazil Pernambuco BR: North 1995 WVS F No 
Brazil Piauí BR: North 1995 WVS F Yes 
Brazil Rio de Janeiro BR: Southeast 1995 WVS F Yes 
Brazil Rio Grande do Norte BR: North 1995 WVS F Yes 
Brazil Rio Grande do Sul BR: South 1995 WVS F No 
Brazil Santa Catarina BR: South 1995 WVS F Yes 
Brazil São Paulo BR: Southeast 1995 WVS F No 
Brazil Sergipe BR: North 1995 WVS F Yes 
Chile Antofagasta CL: Norte 1995; 2000; 2010 WVS F No 
Chile Araucanía CL: Sur 2000; 2010 WVS F Yes 




Chile Biobío CL: Sur 2000; 2010 WVS F No 
Chile Coquimbo CL: Centro 2000; 2010 WVS F Yes 
Chile Libertador General 
Bernardo O'Higgins 
CL: Centro 2000; 2010 WVS F Yes 
Chile Los Lagos CL: Sur 2000; 2010 WVS F Yes 
Chile Magallanes y 
Antártica Chilena 
CL: Sur 2000 WVS F No 
Chile Maule CL: Centro 2000; 2010 WVS F Yes 
Chile Tarapacá CL: Norte 2000; 2010 WVS F Yes 
Chile Valparaíso CL: Centro 1995; 2000; 2010 WVS F No 
China Anhui CN: East 1995 WVS F Yes 
China Beijing CN: East 1995 WVS F Yes 
China Fujian CN: East 1995 WVS F Yes 
China Guangdong w/ Hainan CN: South 1995 WVS F No 
China Guangxi CN: South 1995 WVS F Yes 
China Guizhou CN: South 1995 WVS F Yes 
China Hebei CN: East 1995 WVS F Yes 
China Heilongjiang CN: North 1995 WVS F Yes 
China Henan CN: East 1995 WVS F Yes 
China Hubei CN: Center 1995 WVS F Yes 
China Hunan CN: South 1995 WVS F Yes 
China Jiangsu CN: East 1995 WVS F Yes 
China Jiangxi CN: East 1995 WVS F Yes 
China Jilin CN: North 1995 WVS F Yes 
China Liaoning CN: North 1995 WVS F No 
China Shaanxi CN: Center 1995 WVS F Yes 
China Shandong CN: East 1995 WVS F No 
China Shanghai CN: East 1995 WVS F Yes 
China Shanxi CN: Center 1995 WVS F Yes 




China Xinjiang CN: North 1995 WVS F Yes 
China Yunnan CN: South 1995 WVS F Yes 
China Zhejiang CN: East 1995 WVS F Yes 
Colombia Antioquia CO: Central 2000 WVS F No 
Colombia Atlantico CO: Atlántica 2000; 2005 WVS F Yes 
Colombia Bolivar,CO CO: Atlántica 2000 WVS F No 
Colombia Boyaca CO: Centro Oriental 2000; 2005 WVS F Yes 
Colombia Caldas CO: Central 2000 WVS F Yes 
Colombia Cauca CO: Pacífica 2000 WVS F Yes 
Colombia Cauca CO: Occidente 2005 WVS F Yes 
Colombia Choco CO: Pacífica 2000 WVS F Yes 
Colombia Choco CO: Occidente 2005 WVS F Yes 
Colombia Cundinamarca CO: Centro Oriental 2000; 2005 WVS F No 
Colombia Huila CO: Central 2000 WVS F Yes 
Colombia Meta CO: Orinoquia 2005 WVS F Yes 
Colombia Narino CO: Occidente 2005 WVS F No 
Colombia Narino CO: Pacífica 2000 WVS F Yes 
Colombia Norte de Santander CO: Centro Oriental 2000; 2005 WVS F Yes 
Colombia Nuevos 
Departamentos 
CO: Orinoquia 2005 WVS F No 
Colombia Quindio CO: Central 2000 WVS F Yes 
Colombia Risaralda CO: Central 2000 WVS F Yes 
Colombia Santander CO: Centro Oriental 2000; 2005 WVS F Yes 
Colombia Tolima CO: Central 2000 WVS F Yes 
Colombia Valle del Cauca CO: Pacífica 2000 WVS F No 
Colombia Valle del Cauca CO: Occidente 2005 WVS F Yes 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
Aswan EG: Upper egypt 2007 WVS F Yes 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 






Beni Suef EG: Lower egypt 2007 WVS F Yes 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
Dakahlia EG: Lower egypt 2007 WVS F Yes 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
Damietta EG: Lower egypt 2007 WVS F Yes 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
Fayoum EG: Lower egypt 2007 WVS F Yes 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
Gharbia EG: Lower egypt 2007 WVS F Yes 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
Giza EG: Lower egypt 2007 WVS F Yes 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
Kafr El Sheikh EG: Lower egypt 2007 WVS F Yes 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
Kaliobia EG: Lower egypt 2007 WVS F Yes 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
Menoufia EG: Lower egypt 2007 WVS F Yes 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
Port Said EG: Lower egypt 2007 WVS F Yes 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
Qena EG: Upper egypt 2007 WVS F No 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
Shrkia EG: Lower egypt 2007 WVS F No 
Estonia Harju county EE: North-Western Estonia 2000 EVS X048 F No 
Estonia Hiiu county EE: Western Estonia 2000 EVS X048 F Yes 
Estonia Ida-Viru county EE: North-Eastern Estonia 2000 EVS X048 F No 
Estonia Järva county EE: North-Western Estonia 2000 EVS X048 F Yes 
Estonia Jõgeva county EE: North-Eastern Estonia 2000 EVS X048 F Yes 
Estonia Lääne county EE: Western Estonia 2000 EVS X048 F Yes 
Estonia Lääne-Viru county EE: North-Eastern Estonia 2000 EVS X048 F Yes 
Estonia Pärnu county EE: South-Western Estonia 2000 EVS X048 F No 




Estonia Rapla county EE: North-Western Estonia 2000 EVS X048 F Yes 
Estonia Saare county EE: Western Estonia 2000 EVS X048 F No 
Estonia Tartu county EE: South-Eastern Estonia 2000 EVS X048 F No 
Estonia Valga county EE: South-Eastern Estonia 2000 EVS X048 F Yes 
Estonia Viljandi county EE: South-Western Estonia 2000 EVS X048 F Yes 
Estonia Võru county EE: South-Eastern Estonia 2000 EVS X048 F Yes 
Guatemala Chimaltenango GT: Altiplano/Centro 2005 WVS F Yes 
Guatemala Chiquimula GT: Oriente/Izabal/Verapaces 2005 WVS F Yes 
Guatemala El Petén GT: Altiplano/Centro 2005 WVS F No 
Guatemala El Progreso GT: Oriente/Izabal/Verapaces 2005 WVS F Yes 
Guatemala Escuintla GT: Sur 2005 WVS F No 
Guatemala Huhuetenango GT: Altiplano/Centro 2005 WVS F Yes 
Guatemala Jalapa GT: Oriente/Izabal/Verapaces 2005 WVS F Yes 
Guatemala Jutiapa GT: Oriente/Izabal/Verapaces 2005 WVS F Yes 
Guatemala Quetzaltenango GT: Altiplano/Centro 2005 WVS F Yes 
Guatemala Quiché GT: Altiplano/Centro 2005 WVS F Yes 
Guatemala Retalhuleu GT: Sur 2005 WVS F Yes 
Guatemala Sacatepéquez GT: Altiplano/Centro 2005 WVS F Yes 
Guatemala San Marcos GT: Altiplano/Centro 2005 WVS F Yes 
Guatemala Santa Rosa GT: Sur 2005 WVS F Yes 
Guatemala Sololé GT: Altiplano/Centro 2005 WVS F Yes 
Guatemala Suchitepéquez GT: Sur 2005 WVS F Yes 
Guatemala Totonicapán GT: Altiplano/Centro 2005 WVS F Yes 
Guatemala Zacapa GT: Oriente/Izabal/Verapaces 2005 WVS F Yes 
Mexico Aguascalientes MX: Centro 1995 WVS F Yes 
Mexico Aguascalientes MX: Centro occidente 2000 WVS F Yes 
Mexico Baja California Norte MX: Norte 1995; 2000 WVS F Yes 
Mexico Baja California Sur MX: Norte 1995; 2000 WVS F Yes 




Mexico Chiapas MX: Sur 1995; 2000 WVS F No 
Mexico Chihuahua MX: Norte 1995; 2000 WVS F Yes 
Mexico Coahuila MX: Norte 1995; 2000 WVS F Yes 
Mexico Colima MX: Centro 1995 WVS F Yes 
Mexico Colima MX: Centro occidente 2000 WVS F Yes 
Mexico Durango MX: Norte 1995; 2000 WVS F Yes 
Mexico Guanajuato MX: Centro 1995 WVS F Yes 
Mexico Guanajuato MX: Centro occidente 2000 WVS F Yes 
Mexico Guerrero MX: Sur 1995; 2000 WVS F Yes 
Mexico Hidalgo MX: Centro 1995; 2000 WVS F Yes 
Mexico Jalisco MX: Centro 1995 WVS F No 
Mexico Jalisco MX: Centro occidente 1980; 2000 WVS F No 
Mexico Mexico MX: Centro 2000 WVS F Yes 
Mexico Michoacan MX: Centro 1980; 1995 WVS F No 
Mexico Michoacan MX: Centro occidente 2000 WVS F Yes 
Mexico Morelos MX: Centro 1995; 2000 WVS F Yes 
Mexico Nayarit MX: Centro 1995 WVS F Yes 
Mexico Nayarit MX: Centro occidente 2000 WVS F Yes 
Mexico Nuevo Leon MX: Norte 1980; 1995; 2000 WVS F No 
Mexico Oaxaca MX: Sur 1995; 2000 WVS F Yes 
Mexico Puebla MX: Centro 1995; 2000 WVS F No 
Mexico Queretaro MX: Centro 1995; 2000 WVS F Yes 
Mexico Quintana Roo MX: Sur 1995; 2000 WVS F Yes 
Mexico San Luis Potosi MX: Centro 1995 WVS F Yes 
Mexico San Luis Potosi MX: Centro occidente 2000 WVS F Yes 
Mexico Sinaloa MX: Norte 1995; 2000 WVS F No 
Mexico Sonora MX: Norte 1995; 2000 WVS F Yes 
Mexico Tabasco MX: Sur 1995; 2000 WVS F Yes 




Mexico Tlaxcala MX: Centro 1995; 2000 WVS F Yes 
Mexico Veracruz MX: Sur 1980; 1995; 2000 WVS F No 
Mexico Yucatan MX: Sur 1995; 2000 WVS F Yes 
Mexico Zacatecas MX: Centro 1995 WVS F Yes 
Mexico Zacatecas MX: Centro occidente 2000 WVS F Yes 
Peru Amazonas,PE PE: NORTE 2005 WVS F Yes 
Peru Ancash PE: CENTRO 2005 WVS F Yes 
Peru Apurímac PE: ORIENTE 2005 WVS F Yes 
Peru Arequipa PE: SUR 2005 WVS F Yes 
Peru Ayacucho PE: SUR 2001; 2005 WVS F Yes 
Peru Cajamarca PE: NORTE 2001; 2005 WVS F Yes 
Peru Cusco PE: ORIENTE 2005 WVS F No 
Peru Huancavelica PE: CENTRO 2005 WVS F Yes 
Peru Huánuco PE: CENTRO 2005 WVS F Yes 
Peru Ica PE: CENTRO 2005 WVS F Yes 
Peru Junín PE: CENTRO 2005 WVS F No 
Peru La Libertad,PER PE: NORTE 2005 WVS F Yes 
Peru Lambayeque PE: NORTE 2005 WVS F Yes 
Peru Loreto w/ Ucayali PE: NORTE 2005 WVS F Yes 
Peru Madre de Dios PE: ORIENTE 2005 WVS F Yes 
Peru Moquegua PE: SUR 2005 WVS F Yes 
Peru Pasco PE: CENTRO 2005 WVS F Yes 
Peru Piura PE: NORTE 2005 WVS F Yes 
Peru Puno PE: SUR 2005 WVS F Yes 
Peru San Martín PE: NORTE 2005 WVS F Yes 
Peru Tacna PE: SUR 2005 WVS F Yes 
Peru Tumbes PE: NORTE 2005 WVS F Yes 
Philippines Bicol Region PH: SOUTH LUZON 1997; 2006; 2010 WVS F No 




Romania Arad RO: Crisana-Maramures (region) 1995 EVS X048 F Yes 
Romania Arges RO: Mutenia 1995 EVS X048 F Yes 
Romania Bacau RO: Moldova 1995 EVS X048 F Yes 
Romania Bihor RO: Crisana-Maramures (region) 1995 EVS X048 F No 
Romania Bistrita-Nasaud RO: Transylvania 1995 EVS X048 F Yes 
Romania Botosani RO: Moldova 1995 EVS X048 F Yes 
Romania Braila RO: Mutenia 1995 EVS X048 F Yes 
Romania Brasov RO: Transylvania 1995 EVS X048 F Yes 
Romania Buzau RO: Mutenia 1995 EVS X048 F Yes 
Romania Calarasi RO: Mutenia 1995 EVS X048 F Yes 
Romania Caras-Severin RO: Banat 1995 EVS X048 F Yes 
Romania Cluj RO: Transylvania 1995 EVS X048 F No 
Romania Constanta RO: Dobrogia 1995 EVS X048 F No 
Romania Covasna RO: Transylvania 1995 EVS X048 F Yes 
Romania Dambovita RO: Mutenia 1995 EVS X048 F Yes 
Romania Dolj RO: Oltenia 1995 EVS X048 F No 
Romania Galati RO: Oltenia 1995 EVS X048 F Yes 
Romania Giurgiu RO: Mutenia 1995 EVS X048 F Yes 
Romania Gorj RO: Oltenia 1995 EVS X048 F Yes 
Romania Harghita RO: Transylvania 1995 EVS X048 F Yes 
Romania Hunedoara RO: Transylvania 1995 EVS X048 F Yes 
Romania Ialomita RO: Mutenia 1995 EVS X048 F Yes 
Romania Iasi RO: Moldova 1995 EVS X048 F No 
Romania Ilfov RO: Mutenia 1995 EVS X048 F Yes 
Romania Maramures RO: Crisana-Maramures (region) 1995 EVS X048 F Yes 
Romania Mehedinti RO: Oltenia 1995; 2000 EVS X048 F Yes 
Romania Mures RO: Transylvania 1995 EVS X048 F Yes 
Romania Neamt RO: Moldova 1995 EVS X048 F Yes 




Romania Prahova RO: Mutenia 1995 EVS X048 F No 
Romania Salaj RO: Crisana-Maramures (region) 1995 EVS X048 F Yes 
Romania Satu Mare RO: Crisana-Maramures (region) 1995 EVS X048 F Yes 
Romania Sibiu RO: Transylvania 1995 EVS X048 F Yes 
Romania Teleorman RO: Mutenia 1995 EVS X048 F Yes 
Romania Timis RO: Banat 1995 EVS X048 F No 
Romania Tulcea RO: Dobrogia 1995 EVS X048 F Yes 
Romania Valcea RO: Oltenia 1995 EVS X048 F Yes 
Romania Vaslui RO: Moldova 1995 EVS X048 F Yes 
Romania Vrancea RO: Moldova 1995 EVS X048 F Yes 
Romania Vrancea RO: Macroregiunea doi - Sud-Est 2010 EVS X048B F Yes 
Turkey Amasya TR: Karadeniz 2000 WVS F Yes 
Turkey Aydin TR: Ege-Marmara 2000 WVS F Yes 
Turkey Burdur TR: Akdeniz 2000 WVS F Yes 
Turkey Edirne TR: Ege-Marmara 2000 WVS F Yes 
Turkey Giresun TR: Karadeniz 2000 WVS F Yes 
Turkey Hatay TR: Akdeniz 2000 WVS F No 
Turkey Kastamonu TR: Karadeniz 2000 WVS F Yes 
Turkey Kirklareli TR: Ege-Marmara 2000 WVS F Yes 
Turkey Rize TR: Karadeniz 2000 WVS F Yes 
Turkey Samsun TR: Karadeniz 2000 WVS F Yes 
Turkey Sinop TR: Karadeniz 2000 WVS F Yes 
Turkey Tekirdag TR: Ege-Marmara 2000 WVS F Yes 


















Ind w/ access 








% of Ind. 
w/ access 
WB past 
Angola Lower-middle 2,972 2007 4 115 163 - 5.5% 0.0% 
Angola Lower-middle 8,589 2011 4 238 4,120 - 48.0% 0.0% 
Angola Lower-middle 14,379 2016 18 625 3,619 606 25.2% 4.2% 
Armenia Upper-middle 5,922 2010 11 308 5,865 - 99.0% 0.0% 
Armenia Upper-middle 6,116 2016 11 313 5,727 5,696 93.6% 93.1% 
Bangladesh Lower-middle 10,544 2000 6 341 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Bangladesh Lower-middle 11,440 2004 6 361 3,100 - 27.1% 0.0% 
Bangladesh Lower-middle 10,996 2007 6 361 4,788 - 43.5% 0.0% 
Bangladesh Lower-middle 17,842 2011 7 600 11,881 - 66.6% 0.0% 
Bangladesh Lower-middle 17,863 2014 7 600 11,680 6,484 65.4% 36.3% 
Benin Lower 5,491 1996 6 200 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Benin Lower 6,219 2001 6 247 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Benin Lower 16,599 2012 12 750 6,503 2,648 39.2% 16.0% 
BurkinaFaso Lower 6,354 1993 5 230 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
BurkinaFaso Lower 6,445 1999 5 210 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
BurkinaFaso Lower 12,477 2003 14 400 238 - 1.9% 0.0% 
BurkinaFaso Lower 17,087 2010 13 573 4,085 - 23.9% 0.0% 
BurkinaFaso Lower 8,111 2014 13 252 2,039 1,199 25.1% 14.8% 
Burundi Lower 9,389 2011 5 376 4,174 - 44.5% 0.0% 
Burundi Lower 5,149 2013 5 200 2,658 1,189 51.6% 23.1% 
Burundi Lower 17,269 2017 17 554 5,585 6,807 32.3% 39.4% 
Cambodia Lower-middle 15,352 2000 24 471 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Cambodia Lower-middle 16,823 2006 19 557 2,411 - 14.3% 0.0% 




Cambodia Lower-middle 17,578 2014 19 611 2,477 3,663 14.1% 20.8% 
Cameroon Lower-middle 3,871 1991 5 149 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Cameroon Lower-middle 10,656 2004 12 466 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Cameroon Lower-middle 15,426 2011 12 578 4,729 - 30.7% 0.0% 
CotedIvoire Lower-middle 8,099 1994 10 246 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
CotedIvoire Lower-middle 3,040 1999 3 140 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
CotedIvoire Lower-middle 10,060 2012 11 351 3,200 197 31.8% 2.0% 
DominicanRepublic Upper-middle 27,195 2007 32 1,428 27 - 0.1% 0.0% 
DominicanRepublic Upper-middle 9,372 2013 9 524 2,436 - 26.0% 0.0% 
DRCongo Lower 9,995 2007 11 300 4,941 - 49.4% 0.0% 
DRCongo Lower 18,827 2014 11 536 7,605 3,486 40.4% 18.5% 
Egypt Lower-middle 9,864 1993 5 546 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Egypt Lower-middle 14,779 1996 6 934 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Egypt Lower-middle 15,573 2000 6 1,000 10 - 0.1% 0.0% 
Egypt Lower-middle 9,159 2003 5 976 1,862 - 20.3% 0.0% 
Egypt Lower-middle 19,474 2005 6 1,359 3,212 - 16.5% 0.0% 
Egypt Lower-middle 16,527 2008 6 1,264 2,254 - 13.6% 0.0% 
Egypt Lower-middle 21,762 2014 6 1,828 7,841 592 36.0% 2.7% 
Ethiopia Lower 14,070 1997 11 535 3,688 - 26.2% 0.0% 
Ethiopia Lower 15,367 2000 11 539 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Ethiopia Lower 16,515 2003 11 596 6,913 - 41.9% 0.0% 
Ethiopia Lower 15,683 2016 11 643 6,389 6,396 40.7% 40.8% 
Ghana Lower-middle 4,562 1994 10 400 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Ghana Lower-middle 4,843 1999 10 400 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Ghana Lower-middle 5,691 2003 10 412 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Ghana Lower-middle 4,916 2008 10 411 2,496 - 50.8% 0.0% 
Ghana Lower-middle 9,396 2014 10 427 5,560 2,978 59.2% 31.7% 
Ghana Lower-middle 5,150 2016 10 200 216 3,191 4.2% 62.0% 




Guinea Lower 7,954 2005 8 295 1,807 - 22.7% 0.0% 
Guinea Lower 9,142 2012 8 300 4,938 - 54.0% 0.0% 
Haiti Lower 10,159 2000 10 317 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Haiti Lower 10,757 2006 10 339 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Haiti Lower 14,287 2012 11 445 9,342 1,096 65.4% 7.7% 
Jordan Upper-middle 6,006 2002 3 498 582 - 9.7% 0.0% 
Jordan Upper-middle 10,876 2007 3 928 1,354 - 12.4% 0.0% 
Jordan Upper-middle 11,352 2012 3 806 3,929 - 34.6% 0.0% 
Kenya Lower-middle 8,195 2003 8 400 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Kenya Lower-middle 8,444 2009 8 398 3,221 - 38.1% 0.0% 
Kenya Lower-middle 31,079 2014 8 1,593 10,898 3,451 35.1% 11.1% 
Kenya Lower-middle 5,394 2015 8 245 3,385 1,001 62.8% 18.6% 
Lesotho Lower-middle 7,095 2005 10 405 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Lesotho Lower-middle 7,624 2010 10 400 1,463 - 19.2% 0.0% 
Lesotho Lower-middle 6,621 2014 10 399 2,246 802 33.9% 12.1% 
Liberia Lower 5,239 1986 4 156 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Liberia Lower 7,092 2007 6 298 14 - 0.2% 0.0% 
Liberia Lower 4,397 2009 6 150 2,123 - 48.3% 0.0% 
Liberia Lower 3,939 2011 6 150 2,075 - 52.7% 0.0% 
Liberia Lower 9,239 2013 5 322 4,120 2,190 44.6% 23.7% 
Liberia Lower 4,290 2016 6 150 2,741 1,994 63.9% 46.5% 
Madagascar Lower 7,060 1997 6 269 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Madagascar Lower 17,375 2009 21 594 5,233 - 30.1% 0.0% 
Madagascar Lower 8,169 2011 21 267 3,032 - 37.1% 0.0% 
Madagascar Lower 8,045 2013 4 274 2,960 1,579 36.8% 19.6% 
Madagascar Lower 10,655 2016 21 358 1,412 2,250 13.3% 21.1% 
Malawi Lower 13,220 2000 3 559 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Malawi Lower 11,698 2005 3 521 - - 0.0% 0.0% 




Malawi Lower 2,906 2012 3 140 1,642 126 56.5% 4.3% 
Malawi Lower 2,897 2014 3 140 1,751 1,161 60.4% 40.1% 
Malawi Lower 24,562 2016 3 850 8,859 6,485 36.1% 26.4% 
Malawi Lower 3,860 2017 3 150 2,737 1,955 70.9% 50.6% 
Mali Lower 9,704 1996 8 300 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Mali Lower 12,849 2001 9 402 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Mali Lower 14,583 2006 9 407 2,303 - 15.8% 0.0% 
Mali Lower 10,424 2013 6 413 4,555 1,738 43.7% 16.7% 
Mali Lower 7,758 2015 6 177 4,852 1,633 62.5% 21.0% 
Mozambique Lower 11,212 2009 10 270 3,877 - 34.6% 0.0% 
Mozambique Lower 13,745 2011 10 610 7,151 - 52.0% 0.0% 
Mozambique Lower 7,749 2015 10 306 4,236 2,094 54.7% 27.0% 
Namibia Upper-middle 6,755 2000 13 259 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Namibia Upper-middle 9,804 2007 13 500 673 - 6.9% 0.0% 
Namibia Upper-middle 10,018 2013 13 549 689 1,145 6.9% 11.4% 
Nepal Lower 8,726 2001 5 251 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Nepal Lower 10,793 2006 5 260 3,547 - 32.9% 0.0% 
Nepal Lower 12,674 2011 3 289 7,042 - 55.6% 0.0% 
Nepal Lower 12,862 2016 7 383 6,059 4,164 47.1% 32.4% 
Nigeria Lower-middle 8,781 1990 4 298 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Nigeria Lower-middle 7,620 2003 6 362 207 - 2.7% 0.0% 
Nigeria Lower-middle 33,385 2008 6 886 3,888 - 11.6% 0.0% 
Nigeria Lower-middle 6,344 2010 6 239 5,206 - 82.1% 0.0% 
Nigeria Lower-middle 38,948 2013 6 896 18,724 2,338 48.1% 6.0% 
Nigeria Lower-middle 8,034 2015 6 326 5,512 1,307 68.6% 16.3% 
Peru Upper-middle 27,843 2000 24 1,414 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Peru Upper-middle 41,648 2008 25 1,851 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Peru Upper-middle 24,212 2009 25 1,132 4,974 - 20.5% 0.0% 




Philippines Lower-middle 13,594 2008 17 792 9,365 - 68.9% 0.0% 
Philippines Lower-middle 25,074 2017 17 1,248 5,424 - 21.6% 0.0% 
Rwanda Lower 11,321 2005 11 462 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Rwanda Lower 7,313 2008 5 249 778 - 10.6% 0.0% 
Rwanda Lower 13,671 2011 5 492 4,713 - 34.5% 0.0% 
Rwanda Lower 13,497 2015 5 492 6,081 5,403 45.1% 40.0% 
Senegal Lower 6,310 1993 4 258 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Senegal Lower 8,593 1997 4 320 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Senegal Lower 14,602 2005 11 376 2,439 - 16.7% 0.0% 
Senegal Lower 19,441 2009 11 320 9,384 - 48.3% 0.0% 
Senegal Lower 15,688 2011 14 391 7,927 - 50.5% 0.0% 
Senegal Lower 17,272 2013 14 200 5,098 6,672 29.5% 38.6% 
Senegal Lower 16,976 2014 14 400 4,680 7,788 27.6% 45.9% 
Senegal Lower 17,702 2015 14 214 9,474 10,820 53.5% 61.1% 
Senegal Lower 17,730 2016 14 428 6,490 6,292 36.6% 35.5% 
SierraLeone Lower 7,374 2008 4 353 2,132 - 28.9% 0.0% 
SierraLeone Lower 16,658 2013 4 435 5,211 - 31.3% 0.0% 
SierraLeone Lower 8,501 2016 4 336 2,521 1,827 29.7% 21.5% 
Tanzania Lower 4,029 1999 22 176 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Tanzania Lower 12,522 2004 21 345 32 - 0.3% 0.0% 
Tanzania Lower 16,318 2008 26 475 4,759 - 29.2% 0.0% 
Tanzania Lower 10,139 2010 26 475 3,337 - 32.9% 0.0% 
Tanzania Lower 19,319 2012 28 583 8,984 1,173 46.5% 6.1% 
Tanzania Lower 13,266 2016 28 608 5,565 3,345 41.9% 25.2% 
TimorLeste Lower-middle 13,137 2010 13 455 2,525 - 19.2% 0.0% 
TimorLeste Lower-middle 12,607 2016 13 455 4,830 3,041 38.3% 24.1% 
Togo Lower 3,360 1988 5 153 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Togo Lower 8,569 1998 6 288 - - 0.0% 0.0% 




Togo Lower 4,674 2017 6 171 2,260 643 48.4% 13.8% 
Uganda Lower 7,246 2001 4 297 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Uganda Lower 8,531 2006 9 368 903 - 10.6% 0.0% 
Uganda Lower 4,108 2009 10 169 1,237 - 30.1% 0.0% 
Uganda Lower 8,700 2011 10 404 5,213 - 59.9% 0.0% 
Uganda Lower 5,322 2015 10 210 3,711 3,219 69.7% 60.5% 
Uganda Lower 18,506 2016 15 696 9,387 6,496 50.7% 35.1% 
Zambia Lower-middle 7,146 2007 9 319 2,203 - 30.8% 0.0% 
Zambia Lower-middle 16,411 2014 10 721 5,448 2,119 33.2% 12.9% 
Zimbabwe Lower 5,907 1999 10 230 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Zimbabwe Lower 8,907 2006 10 398 - - 0.0% 0.0% 
Zimbabwe Lower 9,171 2011 10 406 28 - 0.3% 0.0% 





Table 32: Sector allocation of World Bank Water projects 
Sector names in World Bank dataset that were allocated to the Water sector 
(Historic)Hydro 
(Historic)Other water supply and sanitation 
(Historic)Pollution control / waste management 
(Historic)Rural water supply and sanitation 
(Historic)Urban water supply 
(Historic)Water supply and sanitation adjustment 
Other Water Supply 
Sanitation and Waste Management 
Water 
Sanitation 
Public Administration - Water Sanitation and Waste Management 
Public Administration - Water 
Sewerage 
Waste Management 
Water resource management 
Water Supply 
Note: Only a few project budgets are dedicated to one sector only (100%). Therefore we took the 
sector with the highest budget allocation percentage (independent of whether all percentages for 
budget allocation add up to 100% or not). If the highest percentage has no given sector then sector 
was treated as not available (n/a) and if several sectors are listed with the same budget allocation 




Table 33: Transformation of descriptive variables into numerical values 
Transformation of descriptive variables into numerical values for the variable 
Quality of drinking water 
Description Value 
Canal; Covered spring; Dam; Dam/lake/pond; Developed spring; Improved spring; Improved stream; Lake, pond; 
Lake/pond/river/channel/irrigation channel; Nile, canal; Nile/canals; Ocean/lake; Open spring; Other spring; Pond, lake; Pond, River, 
Stream; Pond,lake; Pond/lake; Pond/lake/dam; Pond/tank/lake; Pretected source; Protected source; Protected spring; Public fountain; 
Puits, forage; Resevoir; Rier/dam/lake/ponds/stream/canal/irrigation channel; River; River or stream; River, lake, sea; River, stream; 
River, stream, pond, lake; River,spring,pond /ma; River,spring,surf. w; River,stream; River/dam/lake/pond/stream/canal/irrigation 
channel; River/dam/lake/ponds/stream/canal/irirgation channel; River/dam/lake/ponds/stream/canal/irrigation channel; River/stream; 
River/stream not protected; River/stream/pond/lake; River/stream/pond/lake/dam; RiviŠre; Sea, lake; Souce not protected; Source; Spring; 
Spring water unprotected; Spring, Not improved; Sprong/kuwa; Surface water (river/dam); Surface water 
(River/Dam/Lake/Pond/Stream/Canal/Irrigation channel); Surface water(river/dam/lake/pond/stream/canal/irrigation channel; Surface 
well/other well; Surface/other well; Undeveloped spring; Unprotected spring; Other rainwater; Pluie; Rainwater; Rainwater cistern; 
Rainwater in a cistern 
1 
Borehole public; Dug - well unprotected; Dugout; Gravity flow scheme; Gravity flow water; Non protected well; Open dug well; Open 
public well; Open well; Open well /Hole/Cesspool in residence; Open well /hole/cesspool outside residence; Public and others 
Unprotected well; Public borehole; Public well; Public well, cement, not covered; Public well, traditional; Spring - protected; Spring water 
protected; Tubed/Piped public well or borehole; Unprotectd well; Unprotected dug well; Unprotected public well/spring; Unprotected 
well; Well without cover; Neighbor's open well; Neighbour's open well; Open well in yard; Open well in yard/compound; Open well in 
yard/plot; Unprotected well to yard; Unprotected well/spring in yard/plot; Open well in compound/plot; Open well in dwelling; open well 
in dwelling/yard; Well in residence/yard/plot 
2 
Covered public well; Covered well; Dug well - protected; Manual pumped water; Others Protected well; Protected dug well; protected 
public dug well; Protected public well; Protected public well/spring; Protected well; Protected without pump; Protected/covered well; 
Public well, cement, covered; Semi-protected well; Well equipped with pump; Well outside residence; Well with cover; Well with 
handpump; Well with pump; Well without handpum; Well without hndpump; Protected well in someone else's yard/plot; 
Public/neighbor's tubewell; Public/neighbor's well; Protected well  to yard; Protected well in yard/ compound; Protected well in yard/plot; 
Protected well/spring in yard/plot; Well in yard/plot; Covered well in compound/plot; protected dug well in dwelling/yard/plot; Protected 
well in dwelling; Well in compound; Well in dwelling; Well in house/yard/plot; Well in residence; Well in residence/yard/compound; 





Borehole; Borehole /Pump; Borehole or tubewell; Borehole with pump; Borehole with pump outside residence; Borehole/ tubewell; Deep 
tubewell; Forage; Hand pump / Tube well or borehole; Shallow tubewell; Tube well; Tube well or borehole; Tubewell; Tubewell or 
borehole; Neighbor's borehole; Borehole in yard/plot; Tubewell in yard/plot; Borehole with pump in residence 
4 
Borne fontaine; Community stand pipe; Community standpipe; Eau courante; Piped - public; Piped - public tap / standpipe; Piped outside 
dwel.; Piped outside dwelling; Piped outside residence; Piped public tap; Public tab/standpipe; Public tap; Public tap / neighbors house; 
Public tap/standpipe; Public to neighborhood; Public/nieghbor's tap; Stone tap/dhara; Neighbor's house; Neighbor's tap; Neighbor's Tap, 
NAWASA (others recode); Neighbor's Tap, Source Unknown (others recode); Neighbor's tap/standpipe; Neighbour's tap; Of a neighbor; 
Piped from the neighbor; Piped into neighbour's yard/plot; Piped into someone else's yard/plot; Piped to neighbor; Piped to neighbour's 
house; Piped water elsewhere; Private tap/neighbor; In the courtyard; Outside house; Outside pipe; Piped - into yard/plot; Piped into tap in 
yard/plot; Piped into yard; Piped into yard /plot; Piped into yard/plot; Piped into yard/plot/building; Piped outside compound; Piped 
outside dwelling but within buikding; Piped to yard/plot; Tubed/piped well or bore hole in dwelling/yard; In the house; Pipe into dwelling 
(own artesian); Piped - into dwelling; Piped in dwelling; Piped in dwelling/yard/plot; Piped inside dwel.; Piped inside dwelling; Piped into 
compound; Piped into compound/plot; Piped into dwelling; Piped into house; Piped into house/yard/plot; Piped into own dwelling; Piped 
into residence; Piped water into residence; Piped water into residence/yard/compound; Tap in compound; Tap in dwelling; Water in house 
5 
Autre vendeur; Bicycle with jerrycans; Bottled water; Bottled water or sachets; Bottled water/refilling station; Buy water from a car; 
Camion, citerne; Cart with small tank; Mineral water in sachet; Motorcycle with three wheels; Sachet water; Sachet water (in a bag); Sales 
Company of water; Satchel water; Tanker truck; Tanker truck/ cistern; Tanker truck/bowser; Tanker truck/peddler; Tanker,truck,other v; 
Vendor; Vendor = Cart with small tank; Vendor: Cart with small tank; Water from vendor; Water in plastic bag; Water in sachet; Water 
sachets; Water sachets (pure water); Water sale by company; Water vender; Water vendor; Other; Along the road; Autre; Marigot; Other; 
Others 
Other 
Note: We listed all entries irrespective of identical meanings but variant forms of spelling. Descriptions that are transformed into "Other" are not 






Transformation of descriptive variables into numerical values for the variable 
Type of toilet 
Description Value 
No facilities; No facilities, bush; No facility; No facility / bush / field; No facility, bush; No facility, bush, field; No facility,bush; No 
facility/ bush/ field; No facility/ bush/ field/ river; No facility/bush; No facility/bush/field; No facility/Field; No facility/outdoors/bush; No 
service; No toilet facility, nature; No toilet/field/bush; No toilet/field/forest; Not facility; Open air; River; River, canal; River/canal 
0 
Bucket; Bucket latrine; Bucket toilet; Bucket, pan; Bucket/Pan; Bucket/pan toilet; Bucket/potty/other container; Bush; Bush/field; Dans la 
nature; Stream/river 
1 
Latrine over river/lake 2 
Pit latrine without slab/open pit; Basic Pit; Close pit; Covered pit latrine - without slab / open pit; Covered pit latrine no slab; Covered pit 
latrine, no slab; Fosse etanche; No flush toilet,  where; Non covered latrine; Non-VIP pit latrine with slab; Non-VIP pit latrine without 
slab; Not improved latrine; Open pit; Own traditional pit toilet; Pit; Pit latrine - without slab; Pit latrine - without slab/open pit; Pit latrine 
(traditional); Pit latrine without slab / open pit; Pit latrine without slab non-wahable; Pit latrine without slab/ open pit; Pit latrine, without 
slab/open pit; Pit toilet latrine; Pit toilet, latrine; Pit toilet/latrine; Pit toilet/Open borehole; Pit toilet\latrine; Pour flush latrine; Private 
latrine without slab; Puits perdu; Rudimentary pit toilet latrine; Share latrine without slab; Share pit toilet/letrine; Shared traditional pit 
toilet; Simple latrine; Slit latrine; Toilet without flush; Trad. pit toilet; Trad. w bucket flush; Trad. w tank flush; Traditional bucket flush; 
Traditional latrine; Traditional pit latrine; Traditional pit toilet; Traditional Pit/Latrine unconnected to sewer/without septic; Traditional 
with bucket flush; Traditional with tank flush; Uncovered pit latrine - without slab; Uncovered pit latrine no slab; Uncovered pit latrine, no 
slab; Uncovered pit-latrine; Without cement sink; Pit latrine; Pit latrine - without slab / open pit; Open latrine; Pit latrine - with slab; 
Cemented with sink; Covered hole; Covered pit latrine - with slab; Covered pit latrine with slab; Covered pit latrine, with slab; Pit latrine 
with non-washable slab; Pit latrine with slab (not washable); Pit latrine with slab (washable); Pit latrine with slab no washable; Pit latrine 
with slab that can not be washed; Pit latrine with washable slab; Pit latrine, with slab; Private latrine with slab; Share latrine with slab; 
Uncovered pit latrine - with slab; Uncovered pit latrine with slab; Uncovered pit latrine, with slab; Pit latrine with slab; Ventilated 
Improved Pit latrine (VIP); (VIP) Latrine/Blair Toilet; Improved (ventilated) pit latrine; Improved latrine; Improved pit latrine; Improved 
pit toilet latrine; Outside dwelling; Own pit toilet/latrine; Pit latrine - ventilated improved; Pit latrine - ventilated improved pit (VIP); Pit 
latrine (outside); Pit latrine ventilated improved pit latrine; Pit latrine, ventilated improved; Septic hole; Septic well; Traditional improved 
latrine; Unventilated latrine; Vent. imp. pit latr.; Vent. imp. pit latrine; Vent.imp.pit latrine; Vented improved pit latrine; Ventilated 
improved (VIP); Ventilated improved pit; Ventilated improved pit (VIP) latrine; Ventilated improved pit lat; Ventilated improved pit 
latrine; Ventilated improved pit latrine (LAA); Ventilated improved pit toilet; Ventilated improved pit/latrine (VIP Blair toilet); Ventilated 





Covered latrine; Covered pit-latrine; Latrine; Latrine (ciego o negro); Latrine with manual flush; Inside yard: Latrine to open pit (ditch or 
river); Out of yard: Latrine to open pit (ditch or river); Indoors: Latrine to septic tank; Inside yard: Latrine to septic tank; Latrine 
connected to sewer/with septic tank; Mobile chemical toilet; Out of yard: Latrine to septic tank; Indoors: Latrine to piped public system; 
Inside yard: Latrine to piped public system; Out of yard: Latrine to piped public system 
4 
Flush, don't know where; Flush to somewhere else; Flush - to somewhere else; Flush - don't know where; Avec chasse d'eau; Flush; Flush 
- ; Flush -  where; Flush don't know where; Flush or pour flush toilet; Flush other; Flush to vault (Bayara); Flush toileet; Flush toilet; Flush 
toilet to somewhere else; Flush toilet: own; Flush toilet: shared; Flush unconnected to sewer/without septic tank; Flush,  where; Flust to 
pipe connected to canal; Modern flush; Modern flush toilet; Out/public; Own flush toilet; Own flush toilet outsite/yard; Personal toilet; 
Public flush toilet; Public toilet; Share toilet; Shared flush toilet; Toilet in common; Toilet with flush; W.C.; Water flow do not know 
where; Flush - to pit latrine; Hanging latrine; Drop/Hanging toilet; Drop/overhang; Flush to latrine; Flush toilet to pit latrine; Hanging 
toilet; Hanging toilet / hanging latrine; Indoors: Flush to open pit (ditch or river); Inside yard: Flush to open pit (ditch or river); Out of 
yard: Flush to open pit (ditch or river); Toilet hanging (on stilts); Traditional tank flush; Water sealed/slab latrine; Flush to pit latrine; 
Hanging toilet/latrine; Water sealed/slab la; Flush to septic tank; Flush - to septic tank; Barrel, tank; Composting toilet; Composting toilet 
/ ECOSAN; Composting toilet/Arbo loo; Composting toilet/ecosan; Ecosan; Flush -  to septic tank; Flush connected to sewer/with septic 
tank; Flush to pipe connected to ground water; Flush toilet to septic tank; Indoors: Flush to septic tank; Inside yard: Flush to septic tank; 
Out of yard: Flush to septic tank; Out/private; Septic pit; Septic tank; Share flush toilet outside/yard; Septic tank/toilet; Septic tank/modern 
toilet; Flush - to piped sewer system; Flush toilet to piped sewer system; Flushed to piped sewer system; Indoors: Flush to piped public 
system; Inside yard: Flush to piped public system; Out of yard: Flush to piped public system; Own flust toilet into residence; Piped 
sewage system; Private toilet; Share flush toilet into residence; Flush to piped sewer system 
5 
Delete; Non de jure resident; Not a de jure resident; Other; Other place; Other; Autre Other 
Note: We listed all entries irrespective of identical meanings but variant forms of spelling. Descriptions that are transformed into "Other" are not 
included in our regressions. 
  
Transformation of descriptive variables into numerical values for the variable 
Relation to household head 
Description Value 
Head 1 
Co-spouse; Co-wife; Spouse; Wife; Wife or husband 2 
Mother; Parent; Parent/ parent-in-law; Parents/ parent-in-law 3 
Daughter; Son /daughter; Son/daughter 4 




Grandchild; Granddaughter; Grand-daughter; Grand-son/daughter 6 
Niece; Niece by blood; Niece/nehew by blood; Niece/nephew; Niece/nephew by blood; Niece/nephew by blood* 7 
Mother-in-law; Parent-in-law 8 
Daughter-in-law; Son /daughter-in-law; Son/daughter-in-law 9 
Brother or sister-in-law; Brother/Sister in law; Niece by marriage; Niece/nephew by marriage; Niece/nephew by marriage*; Sister in law; 
Sister-in-law 
10 
Other relative; Uncle/Aunt/Other relative 11 
Adopted /foster child; Adopted/ foster/ stepchild; Adopted/foster child; Adopted/foster child/stepchild; Adopted/foster daughter; 
Adopted/foster/step child; Stepson/daughter; Step-son/daughter; Step-son/step-daughter 
12 
Not related 13 
Domestic employee; Domestic employee (CS); Domestic service; House maid; Maid 14 






Abadie, Alberto, Susan Athey, Guido Imbens, and Jeffrey Wooldridge. 2017. “When Should You Adjust 
Standard Errors for Clustering?” ArXiv:1710.02926 [Econ, Math, Stat], October. 
Acemoglu, Daron, and Melissa Dell. 2010. “Productivity Differences between and within Countries.” 
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 2 (1): 169–88. 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2001. “The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation.” American Economic Review 91 (5): 
1369–1401. 
Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2012. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, 
and Poverty. Rough cut. New York: Currency. 
Adeoye, Omotola, and Catalina Spataru. 2019. “Modelling and Forecasting Hourly Electricity Demand 
in West African Countries.” Applied Energy 242 (May): 311–33. 
Ahlerup, Pelle, Ola Olsson, and David Yanagizawa-Drott. 2009. “Social Capital vs Institutions in the 
Growth Process.” European Journal of Political Economy 25 (1): 1–14. 
Akçomak, Semih, and Bas ter Weel. 2009. “Social Capital, Innovation and Growth: Evidence from 
Europe.” European Economic Review 53 (5): 544–67. 
Alesina, Alberto, and David Dollar. 2000. “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” Journal of 
Economic Growth 5 (1): 33–63. 
Alesina, Alberto, William Easterly, and Janina Matuszeski. 2011. “Artificial States.” Journal of the 
European Economic Association 9 (2): 246–77. 
Alesina, Alberto, and Paola Giuliano. 2015. “Culture and Institutions.” Journal of Economic Literature 
53 (4): 898–944. 
Alesina, Alberto, Paola Giuliano, and Nathan Nunn. 2013. “On the Origins of Gender Roles: Women 
and the Plough.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 128 (2): 469–530. 
Alesina, Alberto, Sule Özler, Nouriel Roubini, and Phillip Swagel. 1996. “Political Instability and 
Economic Growth.” Journal of Economic Growth 1 (2): 189–211. 
Alesina, Alberto, Enrico Spolaore, and Romain Wacziarg. 2000. “Economic Integration and Political 
Disintegration.” American Economic Review 90 (5): 1276–96. 
Algan, Yann, and Pierre Cahuc. 2010. “Inherited Trust and Growth.” American Economic Review 100 
(5): 2060–92. 
Ang, James B., Per G. Fredriksson, Aqil Luqman bin Nurhakim, and Emerlyn Huiwen Tay. 2018. 
“Sunlight, Disease, and Institutions.” Kyklos 71 (3): 374–401. 
Aschauer, David Alan. 1989. “Is Public Expenditure Productive?” Journal of Monetary Economics 23 
(2): 177–200. 
Asteriou, Dimitrios. 2009. “Foreign Aid and Economic Growth: New Evidence from a Panel Data 
Approach for Five South Asian Countries.” Journal of Policy Modeling 31 (1): 155–61. 
Bain, Robert, Ryan Cronk, Jim Wright, Hong Yang, Tom Slaymaker, and Jamie Bartram. 2014. “Fecal 
Contamination of Drinking-Water in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: A Systematic Review 
and Meta-Analysis.” PLOS Medicine 11 (5): e1001644. 
Baird, Sarah, Joan Hamory Hicks, Michael Kremer, and Edward Miguel. 2016. “Worms at Work: Long-
Run Impacts of a Child Health Investment.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 131 (4): 1637–80. 
Balasubramanyam, V. N., M. Salisu, and David Sapsford. 1996. “Foreign Direct Investment and Growth 
in EP and Is Countries.” The Economic Journal 106 (434): 92–105. 
Ball, Richard. 2001. “Individualism, Collectivism, and Economic Development.” The ANNALS of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 573 (1): 57–84. 
Banerjee, Abhijit, and Esther Duflo. 2012. Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight 
Global Poverty. Reprint edition. New York: PublicAffairs. 
Banfield, Edward C. 1958. The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. Free Press. 
Barreca, Alan. 2012. “Climate Change, Humidity, and Mortality in the United States.” Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 63 (1): 19–34. 
Barreca, Alan, Karen Clay, Olivier Deschenes, Michael Greenstone, and Joseph S. Shapiro. 2016. 
“Adapting to Climate Change: The Remarkable Decline in the US Temperature-Mortality 
Relationship over the Twentieth Century.” Journal of Political Economy 124 (1): 105–59. 
Barro, Robert J. 1991. “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries.” The Quarterly Journal of 




Barro, Robert J., and Rachel M. McCleary. 2003. “Religion and Economic Growth across Countries.” 
American Sociological Review 68 (5): 760–81. 
Beine, Michel, and Christopher Parsons. 2015. “Climatic Factors as Determinants of International 
Migration.” The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 117 (2): 723–67. 
Bendavid, Eran, and Jay Bhattacharya. 2014. “The Relationship of Health Aid to Population Health 
Improvements.” JAMA Internal Medicine 174 (6): 881–87. 
Benova, Lenka, Oliver Cumming, and Oona M. R. Campbell. 2014. “Systematic Review and Meta-
Analysis: Association between Water and Sanitation Environment and Maternal Mortality.” 
Tropical Medicine & International Health: TM & IH 19 (4): 368–87. 
Beugelsdijk, Sjoerd, Henri L. F. de Groot, and Anton B. T. M. von Schaik. 2004. “Trust and Economic 
Growth: A Robustness Analysis.” Oxford Economic Papers 56 (11): 118–34. 
Bhalotra, Sonia R, Alberto Diaz-Cayeros, Grant Miller, Alfonso Miranda, and Atheendar S 
Venkataramani. 2017. “Urban Water Disinfection and Mortality Decline in Developing 
Countries.” Working Paper 23239. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Bhattarai, Keshab. 2016. “Impact of Foreign Aid on Growth and Trade.” Journal of Economics and 
Development Studies 4 (3): 41–55. 
Bitzer, Juergen, and Erkan Goeren. 2018. “Foreign Aid and Subnational Development: A Grid Cell 
Analysis.” AidData Working Paper 55. Williamsburg: AidData at William & Mary. 
Bjørnskov, Christian. 2007. “Determinants of Generalized Trust: A Cross-Country Comparison.” Public 
Choice 130 (1–2): 1–21. 
Bjørnskov, Christian, and Pierre-Guillaume Méon. 2013. “Is Trust the Missing Root of Institutions, 
Education, and Development?” Public Choice 157 (3–4): 641–69. 
Blackwell, Jenefer M., Sarra E. Jamieson, and David Burgner. 2009. “HLA and Infectious Diseases.” 
Clinical Microbiology Reviews 22 (2): 370–85. 
Bloom, David, and Jeffrey D. Sachs. 1998. “Geography, Demography, and Economic Growth in 
Africa.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 29 (2): 207–96. 
Boone, Christopher, Peter Glick, and David E. Sahn. 2011. “Household Water Supply Choice and Time 
Allocated to Water Collection: Evidence from Madagascar.” The Journal of Development 
Studies 47 (12): 1826–50. 
Botting, Marianne J., Edoye O. Porbeni, Michel R. Joffres, Bradley C. Johnston, Robert E. Black, and 
Edward J. Mills. 2010. “Water and Sanitation Infrastructure for Health: The Impact of Foreign 
Aid.” Globalization and Health 6 (1): 12. 
Bouguen, Adrien, Yue Huang, Michael Kremer, and Edward Miguel. 2019. “Using Randomized 
Controlled Trials to Estimate Long-Run Impacts in Development Economics.” Annual Review 
of Economics 11 (1): 523–61. 
Bowles, Samuel. 1972. “Schooling and Inequality from Generation to Generation.” Journal of Political 
Economy 80 (3): S219–51. 
Brooks, J. M., R. A. Colbert, J. P. Mear, A. M. Leese, and A. B. Rickinson. 1998. “HLA-B27 Subtype 
Polymorphism and CTL Epitope Choice: Studies with EBV Peptides Link Immunogenicity with 
Stability of the B27:Peptide Complex.” Journal of Immunology (Baltimore, Md.: 1950) 161 
(10): 5252–59. 
Burke, Marshall, W. Matthew Davis, and Noah S. Diffenbaugh. 2018. “Large Potential Reduction in 
Economic Damages under UN Mitigation Targets.” Nature 557 (7706): 549–53. 
Burke, Marshall, Solomon M. Hsiang, and Edward Miguel. 2015. “Global Non-Linear Effect of 
Temperature on Economic Production.” Nature 527 (7577): 235–39. 
Burnside, Craig, and David Dollar. 2000. “Aid, Policies, and Growth.” The American Economic Review 
90 (4): 847–68. 
———. 2004. “Aid, Policies, and Growth: Revisiting the Evidence.” American Economic Review 90 
(April). 
Cameron, A. Colin, and Douglas L. Miller. 2015. “A Practitioner’s Guide to Cluster-Robust Inference.” 
Journal of Human Resources 50 (2): 317–72. 
Cameron, Drew B., Anjini Mishra, and Annette N. Brown. 2016. “The Growth of Impact Evaluation for 
International Development: How Much Have We Learned?” Journal of Development 




Capuno, Joseph J., Carlos Antonio R. Tan, and Vigile Marie Fabella. 2015. “Do Piped Water and Flush 
Toilets Prevent Child Diarrhea in Rural Philippines?” Asia Pacific Journal of Public Health 27 
(2): NP2122–32. 
Carleton, Tamma A., and Solomon M. Hsiang. 2016. “Social and Economic Impacts of Climate.” 
Science 353 (6304). 
Carmignani, Fabrizio. 2015. “The Curse of Being Landlocked: Institutions Rather than Trade.” The 
World Economy 38 (10): 1594–1617. 
Castelló, Amparo, and Rafael Doménech. 2002. “Human Capital Inequality and Economic Growth: 
Some New Evidence.” The Economic Journal 112 (478): C187–200. 
Chambers, Dustin, and Susan Hamer. 2012. “Culture and Growth: Some Empirical Evidence.” Bulletin 
of Economic Research 64 (4): 549–64. 
Chauvet, Lisa, and Patrick Guillaumont. 2003. “Aid and Growth Revisited: Policy, Economic 
Vulnerability and Political Instability.” 200327. Working Papers. Clermont-Ferrand: CERDI. 
Chen, Xinxiang. 2011. “Tolerance and Economic Performance in American Metropolitan Areas: An 
Empirical Investigation.” Sociological Forum 26 (1): 71–97. 
Chiao, Joan Y., and Katherine D. Blizinsky. 2010. “Culture–Gene Coevolution of Individualism–
Collectivism and the Serotonin Transporter Gene.” Proceedings of the Royal Society of London 
B: Biological Sciences 277 (1681): 529–37. 
Clemens, Michael A., Steven Radelet, Rikhil R. Bhavnani, and Samuel Bazzi. 2012. “Counting 
Chickens When They Hatch: Timing and the Effects of Aid on Growth*.” The Economic 
Journal 122 (561): 590–617. 
Cohen, Daniel, and Marcelo Soto. 2007. “Growth and Human Capital: Good Data, Good Results.” 
Journal of Economic Growth 12 (1): 51–76. 
Colacito, Riccardo, Bridget Hoffmann, and Toan Phan. 2019. “Temperature and Growth: A Panel 
Analysis of the United States.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 51 (2–3): 313–68. 
Collier, Paul, and David Dollar. 2002. “Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction.” European Economic 
Review 46 (8): 1475–1500. 
Cui, Wei. 2017. “Social Trust, Institution, and Economic Growth: Evidence from China.” Emerging 
Markets Finance and Trade 53 (6): 1243–61. 
Dalgaard, Carl-Johan, and Henrik Hansen. 2001. “On Aid, Growth and Good Policies.” The Journal of 
Development Studies 37 (6): 17–41. 
Dalgaard, Carl-Johan, Henrik Hansen, and Finn Tarp. 2004. “On The Empirics of Foreign Aid and 
Growth*.” The Economic Journal 114 (496): F191–216. 
Davis, Lewis. 2016. “Individual Responsibility and Economic Development: Evidence from Rainfall 
Data.” Kyklos 69 (3): 426–70. 
De, Rajlakshmi, and Charles Becker. 2015. “The Foreign Aid Effectiveness Debate: Evidence from 
Malawi.” AidData Working Paper 6. Williamsburg: AidData at William & Mary. 
Dearmon, Jacob, and Kevin Grier. 2009. “Trust and Development.” Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization 71 (2): 210–20. 
Deaton, Angus. 2010. “Instruments, Randomization, and Learning about Development.” Journal of 
Economic Literature 48 (2): 424–55. 
Deaton, Angus, and Nancy Cartwright. 2018. “Understanding and Misunderstanding Randomized 
Controlled Trials.” Social Science & Medicine, Randomized Controlled Trials and Evidence-
based Policy: A Multidisciplinary Dialogue, 210 (August): 2–21. 
Debski, Julia, Michael Jetter, Saskia Mösle, and David Stadelmann. 2018. “Gender and Corruption: The 
Neglected Role of Culture.” European Journal of Political Economy, May. 
Dell, Melissa, Benjamin F. Jones, and Benjamin A. Olken. 2009. “Temperature and Income: 
Reconciling New Cross-Sectional and Panel Estimates.” American Economic Review 99 (2): 
198–204. 
———. 2012. “Temperature Shocks and Economic Growth: Evidence from the Last Half Century.” 
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 4 (3): 66–95. 
———. 2014. “What Do We Learn from the Weather? The New Climate–Economy Literature.” Journal 
of Economic Literature 52 (3): 740–98. 
Deryugina, Tatyana, and Solomon M Hsiang. 2014. “Does the Environment Still Matter? Daily 





Deschênes, Olivier, and Michael Greenstone. 2007. “The Economic Impacts of Climate Change: 
Evidence from Agricultural Output and Random Fluctuations in Weather.” American Economic 
Review 97 (1): 354–85. 
Devarajan, Shantayanan, Vinaya Swaroop, and Heng-fu Zou. 1996. “The Composition of Public 
Expenditure and Economic Growth.” Journal of Monetary Economics 37 (April): 313–44. 
Dincer, Oguzhan C., and Eric M. Uslaner. 2010. “Trust and Growth.” Public Choice 142 (1): 59–67. 
Doherty, Tanya, Sarah Rohde, Donela Besada, Kate Kerber, Samuel Manda, Marian Loveday, Duduzile 
Nsibande, et al. 2016. “Reduction in Child Mortality in Ethiopia: Analysis of Data from 
Demographic and Health Surveys.” Journal of Global Health 6 (2). 
Dollar, David, and Jakob Svensson. 2000. “What Explains the Success or Failure of Structural 
Adjustment Programmes?” The Economic Journal 110 (466): 894–917. 
Doucouliagos, Hristos, and Martin Paldam. 2009. “The Aid Effectiveness Literature: The Sad Results 
of 40 Years of Research.” Journal of Economic Surveys 23 (3): 433–61. 
Dreher, Axel, Stephan Klasen, James Raymond Vreeland, and Eric Werker. 2013. “The Costs of 
Favoritism: Is Politically Driven Aid Less Effective?” Economic Development and Cultural 
Change 62 (1): 157–91. 
Duflo, Esther, Abhijit Banerjee, Rachel Glennerster, and Cynthia G Kinnan. 2013. “The Miracle of 
Microfinance? Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation.” Working Paper 18950. Cambridge: 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Duflo, Esther, Michael Greenstone, Raymond Guiteras, and Thomas Clasen. 2015. “Toilets Can Work: 
Short and Medium Run Health Impacts of Addressing Complementarities and Externalities in 
Water and Sanitation.” Working Paper 21521. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Dwivedi, Laxmi Kant, Kajori Banerjee, Nidhi Jain, Mukesh Ranjan, and Priyanka Dixit. 2018. “Child 
Health and Unhealthy Sanitary Practices in India: Evidence from Recent Round of National 
Family Health Survey-IV.” SSM - Population Health, October. 
Easterly, Diego, Steven Pennings, and Diego Anzoategui. 2016. “How Much Long-Run Economic 
Growth Happens at the Country Level?” Development Research Institute Working Paper, 1–32. 
Easterly, William. 2003. “Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 
(3): 23–48. 
———. 2014. The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor. 
New York: Basic Books. 
Easterly, William, and Ross Levine. 2003. “Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments Influence 
Economic Development.” Journal of Monetary Economics 50 (1): 3–39. 
Easterly, William, and Sergio Rebelo. 1993. “Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth: An Empirical 
Investigation.” Journal of Monetary Economics 32 (December): 417–58. 
Edwards, Sebastian. 2015. “Economic Development and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid: A Historical 
Perspective.” Kyklos 68 (3): 277–316. 
Ekanayake, E. M., and Dasha Chatrna. 2010. “The Effect of Foreign Aid on Economic Growth in 
Developing Countries.” Journal of International Business and Cultural Studies 3 (1): 1–13. 
ESRI. 2017. “ArcGIS.” 2017. http://desktop.arcgis.com/en/. 
“Eurostat.” 2018. 2018. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/regions/data/database. 
Ezeh, Osita K., Kingsley E. Agho, Michael J. Dibley, John Hall, and Andrew N. Page. 2014. “The 
Impact of Water and Sanitation on Childhood Mortality in Nigeria: Evidence from Demographic 
and Health Surveys, 2003–2013.” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public 
Health 11 (9): 9256–72. 
Falk, Armin, Anke Becker, Thomas Dohmen, Benjamin Enke, David Huffman, and Uwe Sunde. 2018. 
“Global Evidence on Economic Preferences*.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 133 (4): 
1645–92. 
Fankhauser, Samuel. 1994. “The Economic Costs of Global Warming Damage: A Survey.” Global 
Environmental Change 4 (4): 301–9. 
Fayissa, Bichaka, and Mohammed I. El-Kaissy. 1999. “Foreign Aid and the Economic Growth of 
Developing Countries (LDCs): Further Evidence.” Studies in Comparative International 
Development 34 (3): 37–50. 
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development Germany. 2019. “World Bank Group.” 






Fernández, Raquel. 2011. “Does Culture Matter?” In Handbook of Social Economics, edited by Jess 
Benhabib, Alberto Bisin, and Matthew O. Jackson, 1:481–510. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Field, Simon. 1992. “The Effect of Temperature on Crime.” The British Journal of Criminology 32 (3): 
340–51. 
Fincher, Corey L., Randy Thornhill, Damian R. Murray, and Mark Schaller. 2008. “Pathogen Prevalence 
Predicts Human Cross-Cultural Variability in Individualism/Collectivism.” Proceedings of the 
Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences 275 (1640): 1279–85. 
Fink, Günther, Isabel Günther, and Kenneth Hill. 2011. “The Effect of Water and Sanitation on Child 
Health: Evidence from the Demographic and Health Surveys 1986–2007.” International 
Journal of Epidemiology 40 (5): 1196–1204. 
Florida, Richard, and Charlotta Mellander. 2007. “The Creative Class or Human Capital? - Explaining 
Regional Development in Sweden.” Working Paper Series in Economics and Institutions of 
Innovation, Royal Institute of Technology, CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and 
Innovation Studies 79 (January). 
Florida, Richard, Charlotta Mellander, and Haifeng Qian. 2008. “Creative China? The University, 
Tolerance and Talent in Chinese Regional Development.” Working Paper Series in Economics 
and Institutions of Innovation, Royal Institute of Technology, CESIS - Centre of Excellence for 
Science and Innovation Studies 145 (October). 
Forte, Anabel, Jesús Peiró-Palomino, and Emili Tortosa-Ausina. 2015. “Does Social Capital Matter for 
European Regional Growth?” European Economic Review 77 (C): 47–64. 
“Forum of Federations.” 2007. Forum of Federations. 2007. http://www.forumfed.org/countries/. 
Fotso, Jean-Christophe, Alex Chika Ezeh, Nyovani Janet Madise, and James Ciera. 2007. “Progress 
towards the Child Mortality Millennium Development Goal in Urban Sub-Saharan Africa: The 
Dynamics of Population Growth, Immunization, and Access to Clean Water.” BMC Public 
Health 7 (1): 218. 
Fuente, Angel de la, and Rafael Doménech. 2006. “Human Capital in Growth Regressions: How Much 
Difference Does Data Quality Make?” Journal of the European Economic Association 4 (1): 1–
36. 
Gallup, John Luke, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Andrew D. Mellinger. 1999. “Geography and Economic 
Development.” International Regional Science Review 22 (2): 179–232. 
Gao, Xiaojiang, Arman Bashirova, Astrid K. N. Iversen, John Phair, James J. Goedert, Susan 
Buchbinder, Keith Hoots, et al. 2005. “AIDS Restriction HLA Allotypes Target Distinct 
Intervals of HIV-1 Pathogenesis.” Nature Medicine 11 (12): 1290–92. 
Gary, Aurore, and Mathilde Maurel. 2015. “Donors’ Policy Consistency and Economic Growth.” Kyklos 
68 (4): 511–51. 
Gennaioli, Nicola, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2013. “Human 
Capital and Regional Development.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 128 (1): 105–64. 
Gennaioli, Nicola, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez De Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2014. “Growth in 
Regions.” Journal of Economic Growth 19 (3): 259–309. 
Georgas, James, Fons Van de Vijver, and John W. Berry. 2004. “The Ecocultural Framework, Ecosocial 
Indices, and Psychological Variables in Cross-Cultural Research.” Journal of Cross-Cultural 
Psychology 35 (January): 74–96. 
GESIS Leibniz Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. 2015. “European Values Study Longitudinal Data File 
1981-2008 (EVS 1981-2008).” 2015. 
https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/sdesc2.asp?no=4804&db=e&doi=10.4232/1.12253. 
González-Galarza, Faviel F., Louise Y. C. Takeshita, Eduardo J. M. Santos, Felicity Kempson, Maria 
Helena Thomaz Maia, Andrea Luciana Soares da Silva, André Luiz Teles e Silva, et al. 2015. 
“Allele Frequency Net 2015 Update: New Features for HLA Epitopes, KIR and Disease and 
HLA Adverse Drug Reaction Associations.” Nucleic Acids Research 43 (D1): D784–88. 
Gopalan, Sasidaran, and Ramkishen Rajan. 2016. “Has Foreign Aid Been Effective in the Water Supply 
and Sanitation Sector? Evidence from Panel Data.” World Development 85 (C): 84–104. 
Gorodnichenko, Yuriy, and Gérard Roland. 2011. “Which Dimensions of Culture Matter for Long-Run 




Gorodnichenko, Yuriy, and Gerard Roland. 2017. “Culture, Institutions, and the Wealth of Nations.” 
The Review of Economics and Statistics 99 (3): 402–16. 
Greif, Avner. 1994. “Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical 
Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies.” Journal of Political Economy 102 (5): 
912–50. 
Greßer, Christina, Daniel Meierrieks, and David Stadelmann. 2020. “The Link between Regional 
Temperature and Regional Income: Econometric Evidence with Sub-National Data.” 2020–01. 
CREMA Working Paper Series. Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts 
(CREMA). 
Greßer, Christina, and David Stadelmann. 2019. “The Influence of the Cultural Values Independence 
and Obedience on Regional Incomes: Econometric Evidence.” Papers in Regional Science 98 
(5): 2047–73. 
———. 2020a. “Evaluating Water- and Health Related Development Projects: A Cross-Project and 
Microbased Approach.” AidData Working Paper 98. Williamsburg: AidData at William & 
Mary. 
———. 2020b. “Evaluating Water- and Health-Related Development Projects: A Cross-Project and 
Micro-Based Approach.” The Journal of Development Studies 0 (0): 1–19. 
Gross, Elena, Isabel Günther, and Youdi Schipper. 2017. “Women Are Walking and Waiting for Water: 
The Time Value of Public Water Supply.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 66 (3): 
489–517. 
Grossmann, Igor, and Michael E. W. Varnum. 2015. “Social Structure, Infectious Diseases, Disasters, 
Secularism, and Cultural Change in America.” Psychological Science 26 (3): 311–24. 
Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales. 2006. “Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 20 (2): 23–48. 
———. 2009. “Cultural Biases in Economic Exchange?” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 124 (3): 
1095–1131. 
———. 2011. “Civic Capital as the Missing Link: Handbooks in Economics.” Social Economics, 
Volume 1A: Handbooks in Economics, 417–80. 
———. 2016. “Long-Term Persistence.” Journal of the European Economic Association 14 (6): 1401–
36. 
Günther, Isabel, and Günther Fink. 2010. “Water, Sanitation and Children’s Health : Evidence from 172 
DHS Surveys.” Policy Research Working Paper WPS 5275. Washington DC: The World Bank. 
Hall, Robert E., and Charles I. Jones. 1999. “Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output 
Per Worker Than Others?” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (1): 83–116. 
Hansen, Henrik, and Finn Tarp. 2001. “Aid and Growth Regressions.” Journal of Development 
Economics 64 (2): 547–70. 
Harger, Kaitlyn, and Joshua C. Hall. 2015. “Obedience and Income Levels.” Applied Economics Letters 
22 (2): 94–98. 
Harper, David A. 2004. Foundations of Entrepreneurship and Economic Development. New York: 
Taylor & Francis. 
Harrison, Lawrence E., and Samuel P. Huntington. 2000. Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human 
Progress. New York: Basic Books. 
Harttgen, Kenneth, Stefan Lang, Judith Santer, and Johannes Seiler. 2019. “Modelling Under-Five 
Mortality through Multilevel Structured Additive Regression with Varying Coefficients for Asia 
and Sub-Saharan Africa.” The Journal of Development Studies 0 (0): 1–30. 
Henderson, J. Vernon, Tim Squires, Adam Storeygard, and David Weil. 2017. “The Global Distribution 
of Economic Activity: Nature, History, and the Role of Trade.” The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics. 
Henderson, J. Vernon, Adam Storeygard, and David N. Weil. 2012. “Measuring Economic Growth from 
Outer Space.” The American Economic Review 102 (2): 994–1028. 
Hofstede, Geert. 1984. Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values. 
SAGE. 
———. 2001. Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions and Organizations 




———. n.d. “The 6 Dimensions Model of National Culture by Geert Hofstede.” Geert Hofstede. 
Accessed January 9, 2021. https://geerthofstede.com/culture-geert-hofstede-gert-jan-
hofstede/6d-model-of-national-culture/. 
Hopewell, Mike R., and Jay P. Graham. 2014. “Trends in Access to Water Supply and Sanitation in 31 
Major Sub-Saharan African Cities: An Analysis of DHS Data from 2000 to 2012.” BMC Public 
Health 14 (1): 208. 
Hsiang, Solomon. 2016. “Climate Econometrics.” Annual Review of Resource Economics 8 (1): 43–75. 
Hsiang, Solomon M. 2010. “Temperatures and Cyclones Strongly Associated with Economic 
Production in the Caribbean and Central America.” Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences 107 (35): 15367–72. 
Hutton, Guy. 2013. “Global Costs and Benefits of Reaching Universal Coverage of Sanitation and 
Drinking-Water Supply.” Journal of Water and Health 11 (1): 1–12. 
ICF International. 2012. “DHS Sampling Manual.” 2012. 
https://www.dhsprogram.com/publications/publication-DHSM4-DHS-Questionnaires-and-
Manuals.cfm. 
———. 2019a. “The DHS Program - Protecting the Privacy of DHS Survey Respondents.” 2019. 
https://dhsprogram.com/What-We-Do/Protecting-the-Privacy-of-DHS-Survey-
Respondents.cfm. 
———. 2019b. “The DHS Program - What We Do.” 2019. https://dhsprogram.com/What-We-
Do/index.cfm. 
Ichino, Andrea, and Giovanni Maggi. 1999. “Work Environment and Individual Background: 
Explaining Regional Shirking Differentials in a Large Italian Firm.” Working Paper 7415. 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
“IEG Methodology.” 2019. 2019. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/methodology. 
Ilahi, Nadeem, and Franque Grimard. 2000. “Public Infrastructure and Private Costs: Water Supply and 
Time Allocation of Women in Rural Pakistan.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 
49 (1): 45–75. 
Intellectual Property Office. 2016. “IPO: Patent Data.” November 2016. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ipo-patent-data. 
Isham, Jonathan, and Daniel Kaufmann. 1999. “The Forgotten Rationale for Policy Reform: The 
Productivity of Investment Projects.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (1): 149–84. 
Jetter, Michael, Saskia Mösle, and David Stadelmann. 2017. “Landlockedness and Economic 
Development: Analyzing Subnational Panel Data and Exploring Mechanisms.” CESifo Working 
Paper Series 6733 CESifo Group Munich. 
Jeuland, Marc A., David E. Fuente, Semra Ozdemir, Maura C. Allaire, and Dale Whittington. 2013. 
“The Long-Term Dynamics of Mortality Benefits from Improved Water and Sanitation in Less 
Developed Countries.” PloS One 8 (10): e74804. 
Jiang, Ping, Ranran Li, Ningning Liu, and Yuyang Gao. 2020. “A Novel Composite Electricity Demand 
Forecasting Framework by Data Processing and Optimized Support Vector Machine.” Applied 
Energy 260 (February): 114243. 
Kaasa, Anneli, Maaja Vadi, and Urmas Varblane. 2014. “Regional Cultural Differences Within 
European Countries: Evidence from Multi-Country Surveys.” Management International 
Review 54 (6): 825–52. 
Kareiva, Peter, Amy Chang, and Michelle Marvier. 2008. “Development and Conservation Goals in 
World Bank Projects.” Science 321 (5896): 1638–39. 
Karras, Georgios. 2006. “Foreign Aid and Long-Run Economic Growth: Empirical Evidence for a Panel 
of Developing Countries.” Journal of International Development 18 (1): 15–28. 
Kashima, Emiko S., and Yoshihisa Kashima. 1998. “Culture and Language: The Case of Cultural 
Dimensions and Personal Pronoun Use.” Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 29 (3): 461–86. 
Kaufmann, Daniel, and Aart Kraay. 2011. “Governance and Growth: Causality Which Way? --Evidence 
for the World, in Brief,” October. 
Kaufmann, Daniel, and Yan Wang. 1995. “Macroeconomic Policies and Project Performance in the 
Social Sectors: A Model of Human Capital Production and Evidence from LDCs.” World 




Kitayama, Shinobu, Lucian Gideon Conway, Paula R. Pietromonaco, Hyekyung Park, and Victoria C. 
Plaut. 2010. “Ethos of Independence across Regions in the United States: The Production-
Adoption Model of Cultural Change.” The American Psychologist 65 (6): 559–74. 
Knack, Stephen, and Philip Keefer. 1995. “Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests 
Using Alternative Institutional Measures.” Economics & Politics 7 (3): 207–27. 
———. 1997. “Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation.” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (4): 1251–88. 
Koolwal, Gayatri, and Dominique van de Walle. 2013. “Access to Water, Women’s Work, and Child 
Outcomes.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 61 (2): 369–405. 
Kotsadam, Andreas, Gudrun Østby, Siri Aas Rustad, Andreas Forø Tollefsen, and Henrik Urdal. 2018. 
“Development Aid and Infant Mortality. Micro-Level Evidence from Nigeria.” World 
Development 105 (May): 59–69. 
Kremer, Michael, Jessica Leino, Edward Miguel, and Alix Peterson Zwane. 2011. “Spring Cleaning: 
Rural Water Impacts, Valuation, and Property Rights Institutions*.” The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 126 (1): 145–205. 
Kyriacou, Andreas P. 2016. “Individualism–Collectivism, Governance and Economic Development.” 
European Journal of Political Economy 42 (Supplement C): 91–104. 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. 1998. “Law and 
Finance.” Journal of Political Economy 106 (6): 1113–55. 
Landes, David S. 1999. Wealth And Poverty Of Nations. New Ed edition. London: Abacus. 
Lanzafame, Matteo. 2014. “Temperature, Rainfall and Economic Growth in Africa.” Empirical 
Economics 46 (1): 1–18. 
Levine, Ross, and David Renelt. 1991. “Cross-Country Studies of Growth and Policy: Methodological, 
Conceptual, and Statistical Problems.” Policy Research Working Paper Series 608. The World 
Bank. 
Levine, Ross, and Sara J. Zervos. 1993. “What We Have Learned about Policy and Growth from Cross-
Country Regressions?” The American Economic Review 83 (2): 426–30. 
Li, Ning, Kou Bai, Zhengtao Zhang, Jieling Feng, Xi Chen, and Li Liu. 2019. “The Nonlinear 
Relationship between Temperature Changes and Economic Development for Individual 
Provinces in China.” Theoretical and Applied Climatology 137 (3): 2477–86. 
Li, Zehang, Yuan Hsiao, Jessica Godwin, Bryan D. Martin, Jon Wakefield, Samuel J. Clark, and with 
support from the United Nations Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation and its 
technical advisory Group. 2019. “Changes in the Spatial Distribution of the Under-Five 
Mortality Rate: Small-Area Analysis of 122 DHS Surveys in 262 Subregions of 35 Countries in 
Africa.” PLOS ONE 14 (1): e0210645. 
Licht, Amir N., Chanan Goldschmidt, and Shalom H. Schwartz. 2007. “Culture Rules: The Foundations 
of the Rule of Law and Other Norms of Governance.” Journal of Comparative Economics 35 
(4): 659–88. 
Liew, Chung-Yee, Masoud Rashid Mohamed, and Said Seif Mzee. 2012. “The Impact of Foreign Aid 
on Economic Growth of East African Countries.” Journal of Economics and Sustainable 
Development 3 (12): 129–38. 
Liwin, Lilipramawanty Kewok, and Brian Houle. 2019. “The Effects of Household and Community 
Context on Mortality among Children under Five in Sierra Leone: Evidence from the 2013 
Demographic and Health Survey.” Demographic Research 40 (11): 279–306. 
Magierowska, M., I. Theodorou, P. Debré, F. Sanson, B. Autran, Y. Rivière, D. Charron, and D. 
Costagliola. 1999. “Combined Genotypes of CCR5, CCR2, SDF1, and HLA Genes Can Predict 
the Long-Term Nonprogressor Status in Human Immunodeficiency Virus-1-Infected 
Individuals.” Blood 93 (3): 936–41. 
Mahmood, Rezaul, Stuart Foster, and David Logan. 2006. “The GeoProfile Metadata, Exposure of 
Instruments, and Measurement Bias in Climatic Record Revisited.” International Journal of 
Climatology 26 (June): 1091–1124. 
Malik, Girijasankar. 2008. “Foreign Aid and Economic Growth: A Cointegration Analysis of the Six 
Poorest African Countries.” Economic Analysis and Policy 38 (2): 251–60. 
Martinez, Alfonso, Marina Salido, Gema Bonilla, Dora Pascual-Salcedo, Miguel Fernandez-Arquero, 




2004. “Association of the Major Histocompatibility Complex with Response to Infliximab 
Therapy in Rheumatoid Arthritis Patients.” Arthritis and Rheumatism 50 (4): 1077–82. 
Marty, Robert, Carrie B. Dolan, Matthias Leu, and Daniel Runfola. 2017. “Taking the Health Aid Debate 
to the Subnational Level: The Impact and Allocation of Foreign Health Aid in Malawi.” BMJ 
Global Health 2 (1): e000129. 
McCleary, Rachel M., and Robert J. Barro. 2006. “Religion and Economy.” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 20 (2): 49–72. 
Mekasha, Tseday Jemaneh, and Finn Tarp. 2013. “Aid and Growth: What Meta-Analysis Reveals.” The 
Journal of Development Studies 49 (4): 564–83. 
Mendelsohn, Robert, Ariel Dinar, and Apurva Sanghi. 2001. “The Effect of Development on the Climate 
Sensitivity of Agriculture.” Environment and Development Economics 6 (1): 85–101. 
Mincer, Jacob. 1974. Schooling, Experience, and Earnings. 1st ed. New York: National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
Minoiu, Camelia, and Sanjay Reddy. 2010. “Development Aid and Economic Growth: A Positive Long-
Run Relation.” The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 50 (1): 27–39. 
Mitton, Todd. 2016. “The Wealth of Subnations: Geography, Institutions, and within-Country 
Development.” Journal of Development Economics 118 (Supplement C): 88–111. 
Montesquieu, Charles Louis de Secondat Baron de. 1750. The Spirit of Laws. London: J. Nourse and P. 
Vaillant. 
Moore, Frances C., and Delavane B. Diaz. 2015. “Temperature Impacts on Economic Growth Warrant 
Stringent Mitigation Policy.” Nature Climate Change 5 (2): 127–31. 
Moyo, Dambisa. 2010. Dead Aid: Why Aid Makes Things Worse and How There Is Another Way for 
Africa. London: Penguin. 
Murray, Damian R., and Mark Schaller. 2010. “Historical Prevalence of Infectious Diseases Within 230 
Geopolitical Regions: A Tool for Investigating Origins of Culture.” Journal of Cross-Cultural 
Psychology 41 (1): 99–108. 
Muthukrishna, Michael, Adrian V. Bell, Joseph Henrich, Cameron M. Curtin, Alexander Gedranovich, 
Jason McInerney, and Braden Thue. 2020. “Beyond Western, Educated, Industrial, Rich, and 
Democratic (WEIRD) Psychology: Measuring and Mapping Scales of Cultural and 
Psychological Distance.” Psychological Science 31 (6): 678–701. 
Nese, Jon M. 1994. “Systematic Biases in Manual Observations of Daily Maximum and Minimum 
Temperature.” Journal of Climate 7 (5): 834–42. 
Newman, John, Menno Pradhan, Laura B. Rawlings, Geert Ridder, Ramiro Coa, and Jose Luis Evia. 
2002. “An Impact Evaluation of Education, Health, and Water Supply Investments by the 
Bolivian Social Investment Fund.” The World Bank Economic Review 16 (2): 241–74. 
Nikolaev, Boris, and Raufhon Salahodjaev. 2017. “Historical Prevalence of Infectious Diseases, 
Cultural Values, and the Origins of Economic Institutions.” Kyklos 70 (1): 97–128. 
Njuguna, John. 2019. “Progress in Sanitation among Poor Households in Kenya: Evidence from 
Demographic and Health Surveys.” BMC Public Health 19 (1): 135. 
Nordhaus, William D. 2006. “Geography and Macroeconomics: New Data and New Findings.” 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 103 (10): 
3510–17. 
Norman, Guy, Steve Pedley, and Bahi Takkouche. 2010. “Effects of Sewerage on Diarrhoea and Enteric 
Infections: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis.” The Lancet. Infectious Diseases 10 (8): 
536–44. 
Nunn, Nathan. 2012. “Culture and the Historical Process.” Economic History of Developing Regions 27 
(Suppl. 1) (February): 108–26. 
Nunn, Nathan, and Leonard Wantchekon. 2011. “The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa.” 
American Economic Review 101 (7): 3221–52. 
Odokonyero, Tonny, Robert Marty, Tony Muhumuza, Alex T. Ijjo, and Godfrey Owot Moses. 2018. 
“The Impact of Aid on Health Outcomes in Uganda.” Health Economics 27 (4): 733–45. 
OECD. 2019. “Development Aid Drops in 2018, Especially to Neediest Countries.” 2019. 
https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/development-aid-drops-in-2018-especially-to-neediest-
countries.htm. 
Putnam, Robert D. 1994. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Revised ed. 




Putterman, Louis, and David N. Weil. 2010. “Post-1500 Population Flows and the Long Run 
Determinants of Economic Growth and Inequality.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 125 
(4): 1627–82. 
Quibria, M. G. 2014. “Aid Effectiveness: Research, Policy and Unresolved Issues.” Development 
Studies Research 1 (1): 75–87. 
Rajan, Raghuram, and Arvind Subramanian. 2008. “Aid and Growth: What Does The Cross-Country 
Evidence Really Show?” The Review of Economics and Statistics 90: 643–65. 
———. 2011. “Aid, Dutch Disease, and Manufacturing Growth.” Journal of Development Economics 
94 (1): 106–18. 
Ranson, Matthew. 2014. “Crime, Weather, and Climate Change.” Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management 67 (3): 274–302. 
Ray, Isha. 2007. “Women, Water, and Development.” Annual Review of Environment and Resources 32 
(1): 421–49. 
Rhines, Andrew, Martin P. Tingley, Karen A. McKinnon, and Peter Huybers. 2015. “Decoding the 
Precision of Historical Temperature Observations.” Quarterly Journal of the Royal 
Meteorological Society 141 (693): 2923–33. 
Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi. 2004. “Institutions Rule: The Primacy of 
Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development.” Journal of Economic 
Growth 9 (2): 131–65. 
Roodman, David. 2007. “The Anarchy of Numbers : Aid, Development, and Cross-Country Empirics.” 
The World Bank Economic Review 21 (2): 255–77. 
Roth, Felix. 2009. “Does Too Much Trust Hamper Economic Growth?” Kyklos 62 (1): 103–28. 
Rutstein, S. O. 2000. “Factors Associated with Trends in Infant and Child Mortality in Developing 
Countries during the 1990s.” Bulletin of the World Health Organization 78 (10): 1256–70. 
Sala-I-Martin, Xavier, Gernot Doppelhofer, and Ronald I. Miller. 2004. “Determinants of Long-Term 
Growth: A Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) Approach.” American Economic 
Review 94 (4): 813–35. 
Salami, Adeleke O., Marco Stampini, Abdul B. Kamara, Caroline A. Sullivan, and Regassa Namara. 
2014. “Development Aid and Access to Water and Sanitation in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Water 
International 39 (3): 294–314. 
Schlenker, Wolfram, and David B. Lobell. 2010. “Robust Negative Impacts of Climate Change on 
African Agriculture.” Environmental Research Letters, February. 
Schneider, Gerald, Thomas Plümper, and Steffen Baumann. 2000. “Bringing Putnam to the European 
Regions : On the Relevance of Social Capital for Economic Growth.” European Urban and 
Regional Studies 7 (4): 307–17. 
Shi, Shuxing, Kunming Huang, Dezhu Ye, and Linhui Yu. 2014. “Culture and Regional Economic 
Development: Evidence from China.” Papers in Regional Science 93 (2): 281–99. 
Sorenson, Susan B., Christiaan Morssink, and Paola Abril Campos. 2011. “Safe Access to Safe Water 
in Low Income Countries: Water Fetching in Current Times.” Social Science & Medicine 72 
(9): 1522–26. 
Spolaore, Enrico, and Romain Wacziarg. 2009. “The Diffusion of Development.” The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 124 (2): 469–529. 
———. 2013. “How Deep Are the Roots of Economic Development?” Journal of Economic Literature 
51 (2): 325–69. 
Tabellini, Guido. 2008. “Institutions and Culture.” Journal of the European Economic Association 6 (2–
3): 255–94. 
———. 2010. “Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe.” Journal of 
the European Economic Association 8 (4): 677–716. 
UNESCO World Water Assessment Programme. 2019. “The United Nations World Water Development 
Report 2019: Leaving No One Behind.” Paris: UNESCO. 
Uyl, Debby den, Irene E. van der Horst-Bruinsma, and Michiel van Agtmael. 2004. “Progression of HIV 
to AIDS: A Protective Role for HLA-B27?” AIDS Reviews 6 (2): 89–96. 
Voeten, J. T., T. M. Bestebroer, N. J. Nieuwkoop, R. A. Fouchier, A. D. Osterhaus, and G. F. 
Rimmelzwaan. 2000. “Antigenic Drift in the Influenza A Virus (H3N2) Nucleoprotein and 





Wagstaff, Adam, and Shengchao Yu. 2007. “Do Health Sector Reforms Have Their Intended Impacts?: 
The World Bank’s Health VIII Project in Gansu Province, China.” Journal of Health Economics 
26 (3): 505–35. 
Wang, Limin. 2002. “Health Outcomes in Poor Countries and Policy Options: Empirical Findings from 
Demographic and Health Surveys.” Policy Research Working Paper WPS2831. Washington 
DC: The World Bank. 
Wang, Xia, and Paul R. Hunter. 2010. “A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of the Association 
between Self-Reported Diarrheal Disease and Distance from Home to Water Source.” The 
American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 83 (3): 582–84. 
Warner, Andrew. 2002. “Institutions, Geography, Regions, Countries and the Mobility Bias.” CID 
Working Papers 91 (May): 1–26. 
Way, Baldwin M., and Matthew D. Lieberman. 2010. “Is There a Genetic Contribution to Cultural 
Differences? Collectivism, Individualism and Genetic Markers of Social Sensitivity.” Social 
Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 5 (2–3): 203–11. 
Wayland, Joshua. 2017. “Constraints on Foreign Aid Effectiveness in the Water, Sanitation, and 
Hygiene (WaSH) Sector.” Journal of Water Sanitation and Hygiene for Development 8 (1): 44–
52. 
Weber, Max. 2012. Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus. Jazzybee Verlag. 
Whiteley, Paul F. 2000. “Economic Growth and Social Capital.” Political Studies 48 (3): 443–66. 
Whittington, Dale, Marc Jeuland, Kate Barker, and Yvonne Yuen. 2012. “Setting Priorities, Targeting 
Subsidies among Water, Sanitation, and Preventive Health Interventions in Developing 
Countries.” World Development 40 (8): 1546–68. 
Woldemicael, Gebremariam. 2000. “The Effects of Water Supply and Sanitation on Childhood Mortality 
in Urban Eritrea.” Journal of Biosocial Science 32 (2): 207–27. 
Wolf, Jennyfer, Paul R. Hunter, Matthew C. Freeman, Oliver Cumming, Thomas Clasen, Jamie Bartram, 
Julian P. T. Higgins, et al. 2018. “Impact of Drinking Water, Sanitation and Handwashing with 
Soap on Childhood Diarrhoeal Disease: Updated Meta-Analysis and Meta-Regression.” 
Tropical Medicine & International Health 23 (5): 508–25. 
Wolf, Jennyfer, Annette Prüss‐Ustün, Oliver Cumming, Jamie Bartram, Sophie Bonjour, Sandy 
Cairncross, Thomas Clasen, et al. 2014. “Systematic review: Assessing the impact of drinking 
water and sanitation on diarrhoeal disease in low- and middle-income settings: systematic 
review and meta-regression.” Tropical Medicine & International Health 19 (8): 928–42. 
Wolf, Susanna. 2007. “Does Aid Improve Public Service Delivery?” Review of World Economics 143 
(4): 650–72. 
World Bank. 2013. “Task Team Leader Toolkit : Investment Project Financing - the Project Cycle.” 
95168. The World Bank. 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/986001468010231537/Task-team-leader-toolkit-
investment-project-financing-the-project-cycle. 
———. 2017. “World Development Indicators.” 2017. https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-
development-indicators. 
———. 2018. “World Bank Projects & Operations | Data Catalog.” 2018. 
https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-bank-projects-operations. 
———. 2020a. “Documents & Reports - All Documents | The World Bank.” 2020. 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/home. 
———. 2020b. “World Bank Maps.” 2020. https://maps.worldbank.org/#. 
World Health Organization, and UNICEF. 2017. “Progress on Drinking Water, Sanitation and Hygiene: 
2017 Update and SDG Baselines.” Geneva. 
World Values Survey Association, JDSystems Data Archive. 2015. “World Value Survey 1981-2014 
Longitudinal Aggregate.” 2015. 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWVL.jsp. 
Wyon, David, R. Kok, M. Lewis, and G. Meese. 2020. “Effects of Moderate Cold and Heat Stress on 
Factory Workers in Southern Africa.” South African Journal of Science 78 (May): 184–89. 
Zhang, Jing. 2012. “The Impact of Water Quality on Health: Evidence from the Drinking Water 




Zhao, Xiaobing, Mason Gerety, and Nicolai V. Kuminoff. 2018. “Revisiting the Temperature-Economic 
Growth Relationship Using Global Subnational Data.” Journal of Environmental Management 
223 (October): 537–44. 
 
